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 Foreword and Acknowledgements
This book is the fruit of a long journey that started with a conference entitled 
“The Art of Neighbouring: Old Crossroads and New Connections along the 
PRC’s borders” held at the Asia Research Institute, National University of 
Singapore, in March 2012. This conference brought together scholars of 
different disciplines and regions and developed a comparative perspective 
on the ways in which China’s rapid economic growth, its strategic decisions 
to foster trade, secure influence, and access natural resources affect the lives 
and futures of the people living on both sides along its borders. China has 
in recent years embarked on a more assertive approach to redefine its role 
in the region. At the same time, China’s strategy to portray its rise as peace-
ful and benevolent continues to be relevant. These at times contradictory 
realities are the starting point for the contributors of this book to reflect 
on the common experiences and situated practices of neighbouring China.
Much of the current discussion on China’s rise and its growing global 
and regional influence concerns geopolitical and macroeconomic issues; 
it is largely based on state-centred policies and the various nuances of 
off icial rhetoric. Yet an important part that is missing in the discussion 
is the borderland itself and the people dwelling there. Borderlands are 
crucial junctures through which the increasing f lows of raw materials, 
commodities and people are channelled. Looking from the borderlands 
back to the centres contributes to new insights into the region’s dynamic 
interconnectedness.
This book investigates the various meanings and modalities of neighbour-
ing across Chinese borders. The title of this book suggests that neighbouring 
is an art of mediating relations against the background of peace and turmoil, 
hopes and fears. Neighbouring, as the contributors of this book show, helps 
us recognize evolving interactions between nations, territories, geo-political 
positionalities, historical connections, movements of people, as well as 
locally narrated identities.
This book would not have been possible without the efforts and patience 
of all contributors who have worked tirelessly over the years on this project. 
As editors, we wish to thank the Asia Research Institute for organizing the 
2012 conference, and especially Prasenjit Duara and Brenda Yeoh for their 
support. Our thanks also go to Liang Yongjia, Malini Sur, Philip Fountain, 
Hyunjoon Shin, Max Hirsh, Dru Gladney, Oscar Martinez, Tom Cliff, Xiang 
Biao, Jeffrey Robin, Itty Abraham, T.G. Suresh, Thongchai Winichakul, 
Chris Lyttleton, Wang Gungwu, Michael Feener, and Johan Lindquist for 
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their intellectual engagement with this project at various stages. We want 
to thank Priya Nelson and David Brent from the University of Chicago 
Press for their earlier work and guidance, and we are immensely grateful 
that Saskia Gieling and Amsterdam University Press have led this project 
to see the light of day.
Last but not least, work on this volume was supported by generous grants 
and fellowships from the Asia Research Institute, the Swiss National Sci-
ence Foundation (PBSKP1_134323), the European Commission (Marie-Curie 
Fellowship ‘Neighbouring’, 298595), and the European Research Council 
(ERC Starting Grant ‘Highland Connections’, 637764). Open access was 
facilitated by post-grant funding in the context of the European Commis-
sion’s OpenAIRE project.
 Introduction
Neighbouring in the Borderworlds along China’s Frontiers
Juan Zhang and Martin Saxer
For it is a simple matter to love one’s neighbour when he is distant, but it 
is a different matter in proximity. – Jacques-Alain Miller (1994)
A near neighbour is more helpful than distant kin. – A Chinese proverb
Over the past decades, living in proximity to an increasingly powerful 
China has gained new meanings. ‘Rising China’ – the nation, the notion, 
and the buzzword – sparks dreams and triggers fears. Borders that were 
closed during the Cold War era have again become zones of contact and 
exchange. Old trade routes are revived, new economic corridors established, 
and remote border towns turned into special zones. Tales of entrepreneurial 
success spread wide and stimulate hopes for trans-regional development. 
At the same time, security concerns remain high, territorial disputes still 
loom large, and minorities from northern Burma to Tibet, Xinjiang and 
Tajikistan continue to seek autonomy.
In this context, engaging in multiple neighbouring relations has become 
a necessity for those living in these zones of contact and exchange. The 
experiences and realities of relation-making across China’s borders shape 
life in profound and lasting ways. However, these experiences and reali-
ties of everyday neighbouring receive less analytic attention than they 
deserve. Current debates on China’s relations with its neighbours tend to 
focus on questions of economic influence, military power, and diplomatic 
strategies; both academic and public attention is directed towards topics 
such as China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea or China’s new 
regional initiatives such as ‘One Belt One Road’ (yidai yilu 一带一路) that 
aims to revive the Silk Road and gain inf luence in Southeast Asia and 
Central Asia. Smaller-scale processes of exchange along the 22,000 km 
of land borders that 14 countries share with China usually remain out of 
sight. At best, they make headlines as individual cases of economic success 
or political unrest; hardly ever are they put in relation to each other. 
Everyday interaction and exchange across the Himalayas, for example, 
is seldom seen against the background of similar experiences in Siberia 
or Burma.
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The oversight of important everyday processes of neighbouring along 
the edges of Asia’s rising powers, and the lack of a comparative framework 
to capture them, are the challenges this book seeks to address. This 
book starts with a simple question: What does China’s rise mean for its 
immediate neighbours? Looking beyond extensive political analysis 
prepared by think tanks, and newspaper headlines on high level sum-
mits, trade deals, collaborations and disputes, this book presents lived 
realities of shared dreams and fears. Authors of this book bring forward a 
comparative framework that allows us to understand seemingly disparate 
processes in places as far apart as Kyrgyzstan and northern Vietnam 
as pieces of a larger puzzle. Rather than treating the frontier zones as 
remote peripheries at the edge of nation-states, we conceptualize them 
as crucial junctures that hinge a considerable part of Asia together. We 
argue that these junctures present a vantage point to see and understand 
the dynamic and ongoing reconf iguration of post-Cold War Asia in new 
ways.
Our aim with this book is thus two-fold. First, we seek to gain a better 
understanding of the contemporary cross-border relations at various scales. 
We look into everyday practices of exchange and interaction and ask what 
China’s rise means for the people living on both sides of the borders, how 
their lives and futures are conditioned by the geopolitics of post-Cold-War 
Asia, and which strategies they employ to deal with new regimes of control 
and (partially) open borders.
Second, we propose neighbouring as an analytical notion for an anthro-
pological inquiry into relatedness, competition, and ways of being in a 
world in which communities become increasingly mobile and connected. 
As it stands, neighbouring has remained an under-theorized social relation. 
While many forms of neighbouring are implicitly at the core of classic 
anthropological studies, they have mostly been discussed in terms of 
kinship (especially ethnographic writings of ‘f ictive kinship’), ethnicity, 
nation, class, caste or community. In other disciplines, neighbouring has 
not been studied in its own right, despite the fact that the term appears 
frequently in international relations (IR), politics, security studies and 
urban planning.
This book takes the experiences and politics of relation-making across 
China’s borders as a starting point of an anthropological inquiry into 
neighbouring. Neighbouring is thereby understood as both agency and 
experience. It involves, at once, mental and material processes; it entails 
techniques of negotiating proximity and makes use of asymmetries in 
power and wealth; it informs desire and stimulates distrust; and it denotes 
iNTroDuc TioN 13
collective and individual efforts to manage evolving relations that we will 
call agonistic intimacies.
In this introduction, we f irst discuss how neighbours and neighbouring 
are def ined, and trace the historical roots of neighbouring between China 
and its neighbours by looking into the meta-narrative of tributary relations 
and the question of governance and autonomy. Then, we situate the terrain 
of our inquiry in the borderworlds that straddle Chinese frontiers and sketch 
out the geopolitical transformation of post-Cold War Asia as the backdrop 
against which contemporary neighbouring unfolds. On the basis of this brief 
sketch of historical background and post-Cold War context, we explore the 
contemporary characteristics of neighbouring relations. We look into the 
politics of proximity and distance, and reflect on agonistic intimacies that 
def ine neighbours and neighbouring. We conclude this introduction with 
an overview of the chapters, showing how each of them helps illuminate 
the larger project of the book.
The Neighbour
Before we delve into an analysis of ‘neighbouring’ or even ‘the art of 
neighbouring’ as a shared experience and practice, it is important to 
f irst def ine who is a ‘neighbour’ and what it means to be a ‘neighbour’. 
The term neighbour, derived from the old English word nēahgebūr – the 
peasant (gebūr) who dwells near (nēah) – suggests social relations based 
on the spatial proximity of f ixities such as households or estates. In 
Chinese, neighbour, or linju (邻居) also describes social relations def ined 
by living in close quarters. ‘Lin’ (邻) indicates a basic community unit 
of f ive households (wujia weilin五家为邻) according to Shuowen, (an 
early second-century Chinese dictionary from the Han Dynasty) that are 
adjacent to one another. The neighbour is often associated with friendli-
ness and kindness, a sense of connectedness and shared responsibility. 
Neighbourly relations are thus often thought of as being equal, respectful, 
and mutually helpful. The Chinese proverb ‘a near neighbour is more 
helpful than distant kin’ (yuanqin buru jinlin 远亲不如近邻) describes 
precisely the kind of intimate relations between near neighbours. Much 
of the current IR scholarship and political analysis continues to evaluate 
China’s ‘Good Neighbour Diplomacy’ through this seemingly innocent 
notion (for example Zhu 2010).
However, neighbours and neighbouring are never innocent or sim-
ple. It may be easy to ‘love one’s neighbour when he’s distant’, just as 
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Jacques-Alain Miller (1994) describes, but it is a different matter in proxim-
ity. Uradyn Bulag’s writing (Chapter 5, this volume) on Mongolia’s ‘Third 
Neighbour Diplomacy’ offers some interesting insights on the politics of 
proximity, equality, and ‘friendship’ in neighbouring situations. Mongolia 
is a country endowed with world-class coal, copper and uranium deposits. 
It is also a country wedged between two mighty neighbours – China and 
Russia. Both neighbours have a strong interest in exercising inf luence 
and extracting natural resources from Mongolia. As a counter strategy, 
Mongolia chooses to seek support among potential ‘third neighbours’, 
particularly the United States of America (USA) and Japan. As a small 
state, Mongolia is willing to share its ‘fortune sovereignty’ – mainly 
its rich natural resources – with its neighbours both near and far as a 
means of balancing power positions and inf luence. For Mongolia, far 
‘neighbours’ such as the USA and Japan, and now increasingly member 
countries of the European Union, may be much more lovable than close 
neighbours Russia and China. But it also borrows strength and support 
strategically from Russia and China in a moment of need. The case of 
Mongolia shows the kind of complicated and strategic relations between 
neighbours.
Indeed, there are neighbours who live in close proximity, and neigh-
bours who are worlds apart. There are neighbours that are strong, and 
neighbours that are weak. There are neighbours who are cooperative 
and friendly, and neighbours who are disrespectful and obnoxious. The 
neighbour is always a familiar presence. But one never knows who the 
neighbour really is and what the neighbour might do in different times 
and situations. Just as the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek puts it: 
‘there always lurks the unfathomable abyss of radical Otherness beneath 
the “neighbour”’ (Žižek 2005: 143). Veena Das (2007) in her writing about 
the 1984 massacre of Sikhs in India demonstrated that some neighbours 
are capable of turning into unexpected traitors and murderers. There 
is always a looming suspicion about neighbours, who they really are 
and what they can do, which challenges the popular imaginaries of 
neighbourly harmony and equality. The neighbour therefore is a complex 
f igure that is both intimate and suspicious. This paradoxical characteristic 
about the neighbour renders neighbouring an inherently paradoxical and 
unstable experience, one that needs constant negotiation, reinforcement, 
commitment, and performance of innocence and good-will. The art of 
neighbouring thus entails collective sensibility and situated practicality 
where neighbours carefully manage their relations and negotiate shifting 
power positions.
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Neighbouring: Maintaining Closeness Near and Far
As the neighbour is a f igure of ambivalence, neighbouring as an experience 
and a daily practice is also fraught with ambivalence and contradictions. By 
definition, neighbouring indicates close relations that are often determined 
by spatial f ixities – dwellings, estates, and households; but these seemingly 
‘f ixed’ relations can be surprisingly elastic or f luid.
Today, when we talk about neighbouring relations between nation-states, 
a sense of closeness is often measured by how different bodies are brought 
together in immediate contact – often at border crossings, via bridges and 
roads, in special zones, dry ports, and marketplaces. These physical loca-
tions seem to suggest that interactions of neighbours are always confined 
by spatial f ixities and, as a result, the patterns of such close-contact interac-
tions are bounded and predictable.
However, we show in this book that neighbouring does not necessarily 
imply f ixed engagement and predictable interaction. Authors of this book 
pay attention to movements and the fluidity of social situations. Neighbour-
ing can take the form of periodical encounters, or it can emerge from an 
initially close contact that continues to be maintained across distance. 
Neighbouring may also take place far away from the national borders 
but still remain functionally linked to particular opportunities and risks 
presented by locations, just as Bulag’s chapter on Mongolia demonstrates 
(Chapter 5, this volume). Another case in point is the bazaar traders in 
Bishkek and Almaty described by Henryk Alff (Chapter 4, this volume). 
Alff shows how the closeness of neighbouring relations does not correlate 
with spatial f ixities. After the opening of the borders between China and 
Central Asia in the 1990s, local shuttle trade was the predominant form 
of cross-border engagement. Later on, wholesale traders gradually took 
over and the zones of contact moved away from the immediate borders 
to the more distant bazaars of Bishkek and Almaty. Close relations with 
traders in China however remain active and meaningful. The rhetoric of 
trust is established in this particular situation to facilitate processes of 
‘neighbouring at a distance’. It consolidates partnerships, maintains ties, 
and to a certain extent resolves disputes.
In one way or another, proximity, or ‘closeness’, remains a condition for 
neighbouring. However, this ‘closeness’ cannot be measured in kilometres 
or miles. It does not describe a static constellation but a relatively malleable 
condition; it indicates that one has entered a state of being with others and 
has to bear subsequent social and political implications. Neighbouring, 
in this sense, is diligent ‘border work’ (Reeves 2014) that stretches across 
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spaces near and far. Moreover, such closeness by no means implies equality 
or harmony. In fact, asymmetry and tension are far more characteristic for 
neighbouring than harmony and equality. The spectre of violence all to 
easily come to haunt even longstanding neighbours, as, for example, Lee 
Ann Fujii’s exemplary study of the chaos and killing during the horrif ic 
genocide in Rwanda in the mid-1990s shows (Fujii 2009). Collective violence 
and profound sympathy are often bred together in closeness. In extreme 
conflicts, some neighbours commit mass violence against people they know 
intimately, as others become protectors.
Neighbouring is an inherently unstable and unpredictable social relation. 
Compared to kinship, for example, it is less f irmly rooted in incontrovertible 
moralities. It is precisely for this reason, one could argue, that the rhetori-
cal invocation of good neighbourliness so often employs the language of 
kinship. But f irm invocations of a brotherly bond or other familial ties 
always risk to be seen as just that – rhetorical strategies that seek to hide 
the disharmony embedded in closeness inherent in neighbouring relations.
Neighbouring: Contesting Intimacies
Neighbouring entails a particular form of intimacy, one that is neither 
radically antagonistic nor particularly harmonious under ordinary circum-
stances. On the one hand, neighbours continue to rely on closeness to seek 
common ground and mutual interest; on the other hand, it cannot be ruled 
out that neighbouring relations may one day turn into open enmity, when 
borders close, ambassadors are withdrawn, and people become refugees. 
There is constant subterranean tension that haunts neighbourly relations 
as anxiety and doubts co-exist with friendly gestures and vows of trust. 
Neighbouring describes relations that entail what Bhrigupati Singh (2011) 
calls ‘agonistic intimacy’, which can be both unsettling and productive.
Singh’s concept brings together the notion of contest (agon in Greek) with 
the idea of cultural intimacy (Herzfeld 2005). It helps make sense of situa-
tions in which conflict remains ‘co-present with modes of relatedness’ and 
shared aspirations (Singh 2011: 431). Such situations are very common in the 
borderworlds this book is concerned with. Despite xenophobic suspicions 
and envious gazes in Siberia, the lingering fears of disruption and instability 
in the margins of India, the continuing anxiety in northern Vietnam, or new 
asymmetries in the Himalayas, agonistic intimacies def ine what it means 
to live in each other’s proximity.
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Neighbourly agonism operates at both local and transnational scales, ac-
tivating antagonism and inspiration at the same time. It threatens relations 
but also consolidates ties. This is what Bonnie Honig calls the ‘aff irmative 
dimensions of contestation’ (Honig 1993: 15). When borderland communities 
compete for resources, rights, status and power, it is often the perpetuated 
contest itself that becomes the foundation of ‘neighbourly’ intimacy. The 
‘in-betweenness’ of borderworlds, as Chris Vasantkumar calls it (chapter 
7, this volume), fosters both ruthless capitalist competition and surprising 
solidarities at the same time.
Juxtaposing both imaginaries of harmony and what Žižek calls the 
‘unfathomable abyss of radical Otherness’, we focus on the plurality of 
relations and actions in the contact zones between China and its neighbours 
(Pratt 1991). We turn our focus on what makes neighbours embrace shared 
dreams, voice similar doubts, and take similar precautions. We argue that it 
is not the ‘distinct features’ of neighbours at the margins – whether cultural, 
primordial, or a response to state oppression – that matter most, but the 
specif ic agonistic intensities rooted in the positionality of neighbouring 
relations and the skills to mediate and make use of them.
Neighbouring: Negotiating Asymmetries
Another key characteristic of neighbouring relations is the innate power 
asymmetries between neighbours that are in need of constant balancing 
and negotiation. These acts of balancing and negotiation often become 
the foundational terms of engagement. Rather than equals, neighbours 
occupy different power positions and are in constant motion to challenge 
or overturn, maintain or take advantage of the inherent power imbalances.
The earlier patterns of neighbourly engagements between China and 
its neighbours were most famously theorized by the venerable historian 
John King Fairbank and his followers as a ‘tributary system’ (chaogong 
tixi 朝贡体系).1 Simply put, the ‘tributary system’ is a meta-narrative that 
postulates a sinocentric view of neighbourly interaction among pre-modern 
polities: China, as the superior power and civilization, is placed in the centre; 
its neighbours are situated at various scales of peripheriality. As subordi-
nates, they pay tribute to the empire to show reverence and allegiance. In 
1 Feng Zhang points out that the term ‘tributary system’ is a Western invention, which is 
translated back into Chinese as chaogong tixi. The terms chao and gong often appear separately 
in Chinese historical sources, but they did not form a ‘system’ as such; See Zhang (2009).
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exchange, they are granted trade rights and protection, and are bestowed 
with gifts, investiture, and royal acknowledgement, through which, in turn, 
the emperor reinforces his authority and legitimacy as the benevolent, 
celestial ruler ordained (Fairbank 1968, Kang 2010).
Trade, in particular, was an important imperial technique in pacif ica-
tion and peacekeeping. Reserved as an exclusive entitlement to the tribute 
states that swore allegiance and loyalty to the central empire, trade became 
useful in ruling frontiers, consolidating allies, and maintaining the regional 
order (Frank 1998, Hamashita 2008, Tagliacozzo and Chang 2011). Trade and 
tribute were deemed to be ‘cognate aspects of a single system of foreign 
relations’ – ‘the moral value of tribute being the more important in the 
minds of the rulers of China, and the material value of trade in the minds 
of the barbarians’ (Fairbank and Teng 1941: 140-141).
Fairbank’s conceptualization of the tributary system in pre-modern Asia 
gained tremendous popularity and influence in the 1960s. As archetypal 
‘Chinese world order’ and model for Chinese diplomacy it had a lasting 
effect on IR scholarship and the social sciences. However, its unabashed 
sinocentric views, essentializing frameworks, and simplistic understand-
ing of the dynamic practices of trans-empire engagements also attracted 
considerable criticism (see e.g. Hamashita 2005, Hevia 1995, Rossabi 1983, 
Wang 1983, Wills 1988, 2001).
Fairbank and his followers portrayed pre-modern China as an ‘empire 
without neighbours’ (Fairbank and Twitchett 1980: 182), in the sense that 
China was surrounded by foreigners who were mostly ‘barbarians’ and 
who could only be dealt with by enforcing the strict terms of tributary 
interaction. Critical historical accounts, however, contradict this view and 
show that the modes of interaction between China and its neighbours 
varied drastically with ever changing motivations, ambitions, and interests 
(Crossley, Siu, and Sutton 2006, Giersch 2006, Hevia 1995, Lary 2008, Perdue 
2005, Rossabi 1983, Shin 2006).
During periods when pre-modern China was powerful and stable, 
formal tribute relations may have determined much of the asymmetrical 
but predictable terms of engagement between China and its surrounding 
polities. However, these terms did not necessarily mean that the ‘smaller’ 
neighbours were disadvantaged in interaction. The Mongols, for example, 
fully exploited their intermittent tributary relations with the Ming empire 
for not only gaining wealth and protection, but also for their own interests 
in defeating rival polities and expanding power on the steppe (Serruys 
1967). The institutionalization of tribute relations neither elevated China’s 
anxiety towards its neighbours’ willingness to submit, not did it ease the 
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hostility and suspicion that these neighbours felt towards China. (For con-
temporary examples of neighbourly anxieties under friendship diplomacies, 
see Chapters 1 and 9 in this book).
During periods when China was weakened by internal unrest, wars, and 
famine, neighbouring practices at the state level turned out to be extremely 
f lexible and pragmatic. The political and military weakness of the Song 
dynasties, for example, was translated into a more realistic foreign policy 
when Chinese imperial off icials treated neighbouring states as their equals 
(Rossabi 1983). In many circumstances when state-level interactions ceased 
to operate, unoff icial connections persisted through trade and exchange 
(Hamashita 2005, Swope 2002).
In brief, the tributary system does explain certain patterns and politics, 
but as Feng Zhang nicely put it, ‘much of the interesting interaction between 
China and its neighbours occurred outside of it’ (Zhang 2009: 562). The 
scholarly works of Eric Tagliacozzo and Takeshi Hamashita, for example, 
clearly demonstrate that pirates and labourers had just as profound an effect 
on pre-modern Asian geopolitics as the state, and everyday interactions 
that took place at state peripheries played a pivotal role in shaping regional 
and global networks (Hamashita 2008, Tagliacozzo 2009, Tagliacozzo and 
Chang 2011).
Today, no one would describe China’s interactions with its neighbours 
through the framework of tributary relations. What dominates the public 
discourse now is the so-called ‘Good Neighbourly Diplomacy’ and mutual 
development. But China’s discourse of the ‘peaceful rise’ is still reminiscent 
of the past rhetoric of tributary interactions (Wills 2011). As a modern twist 
of ‘ruling by virtue’, China is believed to be exercising its regional influence 
through what Joseph Nye (2004) calls ‘soft power’. Trade, and perhaps now 
‘development’, continues to be a state technique that aims at ‘benevolent 
governing’ and the insurance of peace and order in the frontiers.
Inherent in this new phase of sinocentrism is still the old lens through 
which China’s neighbours are viewed. No longer ‘barbarians’, they are now 
called or thought of as ‘under-developed’ nations, weak states, hill tribes, 
and minority nationalities. Today, the imperial image of barbarian tribes 
to be civilized or subdued may have given way to a more benign rhetoric of 
development and cultural preservation; however, the underlying dialectic 
of neighbouring relations between asymmetric powers continues to be 
relevant.
China’s rise in recent decades has indeed reconfigured new asymmetries 
and modes of engagement in Asia; but we believe that the resulting realities 
can only be understood if we take into consideration local meanings and 
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situated encounters. Just as the model of the ‘tributary system’ in itself is 
incapable of explaining the complex dynamics of China-foreign interactions 
in the past, China’s ‘peaceful rise’ and its exercise of ‘soft power’ falls short 
in exemplifying contemporary China-foreign relations. It cannot capture 
the multiplicities of relations and evolving politics between China and its 
neighbours. A more productive approach, we believe, is to look beyond 
analysis that originates from the powerful ‘centre’ and start focusing instead 
on the peripheries.
Neighbouring: Engaging the Margins
To shift our focus to the peripheries, it is worthwhile to examine, f irst and 
foremost, how the peripheries are def ined and mapped, by whom, and for 
whose interest this has been normalized and naturalized as if it represents 
social reality. Classif ication, masked as objective science and carried out 
with utmost authority by power centres, is a project that conditions and 
perpetuates power asymmetries.
A common feature of most of the peripheries of nation-states is the 
imposed and often arbitrary classif ication of their inhabitants as ‘ethnic 
groups’, ‘hill tribes’ or ‘minority nationalities’. This classif icatory enterprise, 
which already underpinned the political projects of Chinese, Russian, and 
British imperial expansion, was eagerly adopted by modern nation-states 
and continues to resonate with popular imaginaries of the ‘remote’ and 
‘tribal’ both in the East and the West (see, for example, Crossley, Siu, and 
Sutton 2006, Harrell 1995, Lary 2008).
The enterprise of ethnic classif ication represents one dimension of 
neighbouring, namely between elites in mostly national centres of power 
claiming civilizational superiority and their archetypal Other in the pe-
riphery. Inherent in this enterprise is a particular conceptualization in 
which the remote becomes the location of the Other, whose ‘strangeness’ 
and imagined ‘isolation’ justify the dominant political structure of power.
One of the most radical attempts to shift attention away from centres and 
look instead at margins is James Scott’s book The Art of Not Being Governed 
(2009), which he describes as an ‘anarchist history of upland Southeast 
Asia’. Following van Schendel (2002), Scott uses the term Zomia for the 
uncharted contact zones between the Indian subcontinent, Southeast 
Asia, and Southwest China. Scott takes socio-linguistically diverse Zomia 
not as a conglomerate of primordial tribes, but as the result of f lexible 
communities who consciously ‘opted out’ of state rule. Until the advent 
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of roads and airplanes, he argues, the mountainous areas along much of 
the present day borders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) served 
as refuge for those who chose a lifestyle different from lowland civiliza-
tions. According to Scott, the ‘tribes’ in the mountains are thus a result of 
in-migration and ethnogenesis, an effect of oppressive taxes and corvée 
obligations in the valley states. Turning the idea of cultural determinism 
on its head, Scott frames the distinctive features of hill societies, including 
swidden agriculture, millenarian movements, a relatively egalitarian social 
structure, and oral instead of written histories, as deliberate mechanisms 
to ‘escape’ state authority. In Scott’s model of Zomia, seeking refuge is the 
motive that characterizes relation-making between lowland centres and 
highland margins.
Scott’s provocative and sharp reflections on upland agency are insightful 
and relevant for the project at hand. However, they explicitly deal only with 
the pre-World War II era and concern but a section of our terrain of inquiry. 
Moreover, we also f ind Scott’s thesis neglecting a crucial dimension that 
is necessary to understand the dynamics in the borderworlds described in 
this book. While ‘opting out’ is certainly one motivation that brought (and 
continues to bring) people to the rugged peripheries, other equally strong 
motivations were and are the manifold opportunities found in borderworlds 
– be it in trade, natural resources or tourism (Giersch 2006, 2010, Kolås 2008). 
The motive of ‘seeking fortune’, for example, has been at least as important 
as the motive of ‘seeking refuge’.
Fortune seeking, however, is tied to connectivity and exchange rather 
than to remoteness and isolation. In this context, ‘not being governed’ 
indicates a particular relational politics that is often rather a matter of 
skilfully mediating the presence of strong outside powers than openly 
escaping them. In other words, ‘not being governed’ while still engaging 
in active exchange relations often does imply a certain amount of being 
governed – at least nominally. What is at stake is rather a strategy of not 
being governed too much or too rigidly. As openly opting out of state pow-
ers became increasingly diff icult after World War II, this mode of skilful 
neighbouring with the intention of being nominally but flexibly governed 
is arguably even more important today. This is how remote and ‘underde-
veloped’ – even ‘backward’ – peripheries get tax deductions and flexible 
policies, how they build roads and power grids, how they establish special 
zones and economic belts, and become sites of eco-tourism and heritage 
preservation. ‘Governing’ is a notion too rigid to describe the malleable, 
contested, situational strategies that local societies use to mediate the pres-
ence of strong power. We propose that ‘neighbouring’ can better describe 
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how power asymmetries are managed at the local level. It indicates an 
interactive process, often with unpredictable results. Unlike ‘governing’, it 
does not assume superiority or hegemonic control. It simply describes the 
relational interaction of power players and how they engage with each other 
with their own agency, resourcefulness, and performativity.
The performance of loyalty and harmony combined with a strong 
emphasis on visual appearances are crucially important in neighbouring 
relations this respect, as several of the contributions in this volume suggest. 
Pál Nyíri (Chapter 2), for example, describes how the ceremonies, banners 
and even the uniforms of security guards in a privately owned Special 
Economic Zone at the border in northern Laos mimetically replicate the 
paraphernalia of the Chinese state. This form of posturing bears similarities 
to the Zomian strategies of appeasing lowland states that Scott describes 
(Scott 2009: 7-11). The difference is that establishing a Special Economic 
Zone requires close contact with state authorities. Today, posturing and 
rhetoric only work as long as there is legal endorsement and high-level of-
f icial support. Essentially, the art of (not) being governed in the peripheries 
is about managing power asymmetries and organizing multiple relations 
at the margins. This is what we call the art of neighbouring.
Neighbouring in the Post-Cold War World
The geography of contemporary social life, Willem van Schendel (2002) 
aptly remarks, has outgrown the contours of the postwar world map. 
New and possibly discontinuous ‘regions’, such as ‘lattices, archipelagos, 
hollow rings, or patchworks’ need to be visualized to overcome the ‘con-
tiguity fetish of prevailing regional schemes’ (van Schendel 2002: 658). 
The borderworlds along China’s edges – as the terrain of inquiry this book 
proposes – is reminiscent of such an archipelago or a hollow ring. The 
majority of processes and events analysed in the ten chapters of this book 
cut across the territorial boundaries of nation-states and the artif icial lines 
that demarcate area studies disciplines. In this way, this volume seeks to 
transcend ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Schiller 2002) and 
shed light on the ‘geographies of ignorance’ (van Schendel 2002) at the 
fringes of nation-states and disciplines.
This book does not ignore the relevance of national geographies; in-
stead, it ‘jumps scales’ (ibid.) and assembles large regions across Southeast, 
South, Central, East and Far East Asia into a ‘world area’ that was and still 
is at the heart of state formation. Given the fact that mobile communities 
iNTroDuc TioN 23
existed before any modern states were formed (Ludden 2003), we consider 
neighbouring not as a geographically bounded experience, but as sets of 
overlapping relations that are subject to movement and change. Neigh-
bouring, as we understand it, entails both a geographical reality of living 
in proximity, and a f lexible construction of social relations that can be 
stretched across time, space, and distance. The stories of Tibetan returnees 
in Amdo, Tibet (Vasantkumar, Chapter 7 of this volume), for instance, show 
that borderworld interactions between mobile actors require a more widely 
drawn geography. Thus, the configuration of neighbouring relations in our 
inquiry has less to do with geographically bounded areas ‘neighbouring 
each other’; it rather concerns a social topography of communities and 
connections as people migrate and stay. The peripheries portrayed in this 
book are worlds in motion, and the art of neighbouring is almost always 
tied to changing social relations as people and things move.
When we depict neighbouring as a shared experience and a common 
reality in the peripheries along China’s edges, we mostly focus on the 
contemporary conditions of this experience in the context of post-Cold 
War geopolitics in Asia. Large parts of China’s contemporary land borders 
are the result of imperial and colonial claims and treaties (Woodman 1969). 
The red lines drawn on modern maps often arbitrarily separated territories 
and peoples. Before World War II, such artif icial borderlines were often 
cast as irrelevant and had little to do with everyday realities on the ground 
(Lary 2008). Frontiers and contact zones were under fuzzy sovereign rule 
and mostly beyond the administrative reach of central powers. Since the 
1950s, however, this situation changed. The newly founded nation-states 
set out to militarize frontier zones with clearly demarcated borders. The 
fuzzy territories of erstwhile empires were turned into carefully guarded 
zones of national sovereignty. A series of border disputes and armed 
conflicts between China and its neighbouring nation-states ensued, most 
notably with India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969), and Vietnam (1979). 
These conflicts resulted in a period of curtailment and closure at China’s 
edge. Longstanding ties and formal networks of exchange were severed 
considerably; in some cases, former neighbours turned into bitter enemies.
After the end of the Cold War, and especially since China’s accession to 
the World Trade Organization in 2001, the political sensitivities of borders, 
while still lingering, were gradually superimposed by expectations of 
prosperity. In this context, drastic changes took place across the border-
worlds. Sino-Vietnamese relations were normalized in 1992. The Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established in 2001. Border disputes 
between Russia and China were mostly resolved in 2004. The Nathula Pass 
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between Sikkim and the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) reopened in 
2006. Railways and road networks were expanded into territories that 
were formerly diff icult to access. Casinos, mines and rubber plantations 
emerged. And new pipelines, dams and power grids were built to channel 
energy into these zones of development (Diana 2009, Garver 2006, Harris 
2008, Lyttleton and Nyíri 2011, Nyíri and Breidenbach 2008, Zatsepine 2008).
A quarter of a century after 1989, notions of ‘opening up’ and multilateral 
collaboration have mostly replaced the ideological framework of contain-
ment – if not by choice then by public demand or perceived economic 
necessity. Stimulated by this momentum, frontier communities that were 
used to orient themselves toward Moscow, Delhi, Hanoi, or Kathmandu 
started looking toward China for new connections. Simultaneously, people 
within China directed their gaze to the border zones in search of emerging 
opportunities (Zhang 2011).
From tributary relations in the past to contemporary practices of (not) 
being governed, people, networks, and even institutions act upon multiple 
scales. China’s rise in recent decades has produced new modes of engage-
ment in Asia; however, the resulting realities can only be understood if we 
take into consideration local meanings and situated encounters.
When Veena Das wrote about the remaking of selves in the realm of the 
everyday, she showed that it is revealed not by grand gestures of transforma-
tion, but through a ‘descent into the ordinary’ (Das 2007: 7). Celebratory 
state policies and ambitious international frameworks aside, neighbouring 
is inherently such a descent into the ordinary and the everyday, at the 
interstices of multiple relations and dynamic actions. It is important to keep 
a critical distance from sino- or eurocentric views and the veiled sense of 
moral superiority embedded in both Chinese ‘peaceful rise’ discourse and 
Western ‘development’ rhetoric. What is at stake, instead, is to bring to light 
the multiplicities and complexities of relation-making in the borderworlds 
at China’s edge. In this sense, this book aspires to offer parallax views and 
multilayered perspectives.
Structure of the Book
The ten contributions in this volume are structured in three sections to 
illuminate three aspects of neighbouring described above. The f irst sec-
tion explores the emergent borderworlds in the context of China’s rise 
and opening-up. Examples from Siberia, the Himalayas and northern Laos 
show the gamut of ‘neighbouring China’ in a post-Cold War context. These 
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examples also shed light on the dialectics of centres and margins, as well 
as how neighbours forge relations through drastic social change.
Chapter 1 by Franck Billé, opens with an emblematic image of this neigh-
bouring situation: the residents of the Siberian city of Blagoveshchensk gaze 
across the Amur River and see the bright and sparkling neon lights of Heihe, 
a border town in north-eastern China. Two decades ago, Heihe was a dark 
village at China’s periphery; now it is a booming hub thanks to border trade. 
Heihe’s neon lights, which allegedly run on cheap Russian electricity, render 
the ambivalence that Blagoveshchensk residents felt towards China visible. 
At Russia’s edge, they feel neglected and far removed from the centre. And 
the transformation of Heihe seems to suggest a different possibility for a 
city at the nation’s margin. For some of the Blagoveshchensk residents, the 
sparkling lights in Heihe symbolize the problems of neighbouring China; 
for others, they signal the ushering in of a new kind of modernity associ-
ated with China’s economic confidence. The lights beckon a future where 
everything seems possible but, at the same time, also provide a reflection 
on current asymmetries. Billé explores both the friction between the twin 
cities and the ways in which they mimetically refer to each other.
The importance of visual appearances and mimicry in the art of neigh-
bouring is also a topic in Pál Nyíri’s account of two casino complexes in 
northern Laos. Both complexes were established as Special Economic Zones 
by Chinese entrepreneurs on leased land on the Lao side of the Lao-China 
border. Nyíri shows how the zones’ management deploys ‘simulacra of 
development’ and the ‘paraphernalia of the Chinese state’ to position 
themselves favourably between Laos and the PRC. Although the zones are 
dependent on gambling and prostitution for revenue, their ambitions are 
couched in images of spearheading modernity. These images tie in with the 
development agendas of both states and, at once, keep them at arms length. 
While in one casino zone the strategy seems to work, in the other it fell 
out of favour with the Chinese authorities and witnessed a rapid decline.
A pervasive rhetoric of development also forms the backdrop against 
which recent changes in northwestern Nepal have to be understood. Martin 
Saxer describes in Chapter 3 how fervent Chinese road construction on the 
Tibetan Plateau in the name of the Great Western Development Scheme, 
and the extension of some of these roads across the border into Nepal, have 
spurred a drastic re-orientation of the Himalayan valleys toward Tibet 
and the PRC. With goods, and increasingly also food, being imported from 
China rather than flown into the mountains from Nepal’s lowland centres, 
seasonal entrepôts near the border emerge as zones of engagement and 
intensive neighbouring. But despite the obvious boom (and the occasional 
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bust), the roads to China are not just the harbingers of modernity that put 
an end to the last enclaves of Himalayan tradition, as it is often purported. 
Rather than leading to modernity, Saxer argues, local communities see the 
roads as much as ways back to the long tradition of trans-Himalayan trade 
associated with memories of prosperity.
The three chapters in this f irst section provide snapshots that show 
the facets of the contemporary dynamics of neighbouring China along its 
borders. The contributions weave together several threads. In all three cases, 
spectacular asymmetries have recently resurfaced, leading to raising stakes 
in the art of neighbouring. Against the background of the omnipresent 
rhetoric of rapid development, fervent economic activity with a certain 
boom-and-bust quality has come to shape the borderworlds. Mimetic 
strategies and ‘cosmological bluster’ stand for the politics of appearances 
in this context.
The second section of the book looks into transnational neighbouring 
relations that are less directly tied to the spectacles of spatial proximity 
near an international borderline. Proximity, as argued above, is a matter of 
managing intimacy and physical as well as symbolic distance. Borderworlds 
as zones of engagement may reach beyond the immediate borderline. Based 
on the observation that neighbouring is not necessarily tied to a sedentary 
setting, neighbouring is practiced as a strategy of orientation and situated 
intimacy. It also entails the entanglements of f ixities and mobilities. Neigh-
bouring – enabled by ‘jumping scales’ (van Schendel 2002) – connects across 
regions and ties geopolitics to the very local and material. The chapters 
in this section provide three different perspectives on these aspects of 
neighbouring.
Henryk Alff (Chapter 4) discusses the dynamic reconfiguration of social 
relations in the context of trade between China and Central Asia. What 
started in the early 1990s with local shuttle traders has since reached an 
entirely different scale. The vast bazaar complexes of Bishkek and Almaty 
function as hubs for the import of Chinese goods and their distribution 
throughout the former Soviet Union. As transportation became more and 
more professionalized and wholesale businesses replaced shuttle traders, 
the zones of engagement moved away from the actual borderline to the back 
off ices of the bigger players. Neighbouring relations are now managed over 
distance. However, the recently established Customs Union between Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan’s anticipated entry, fundamentally 
change the situation again. Local shuttle trade between Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan, for example, has regained a certain importance as it allows 
traders to circumvent the new customs rules for wholesale imports. Alff’s 
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chapter shows the elasticity of neighbouring relations and the multiple 
scales on which it operates.
Uradyn Bulag’s analysis (Chapter 5) of Mongolia’s ‘Third Neighbour’ di-
plomacy adds another twist to neighbouring as a multi-scalar endeavour of 
negotiating distance and proximity. Endowed with world-class coal, copper 
and uranium deposits, in which both of its two mighty neighbours – China 
and Russia – have a strong interest, Mongolia chose to seek support among 
potential ‘third neighbours’, particularly the USA and Japan. To become 
a neighbour, Bulag argues, means to be oriented to someone’s ‘fortune 
sovereignty’, thereby becoming a force to be reckoned with. As a small 
state, Mongolia is strategically employing ‘smart power’; it is willing to 
share its ‘fortune sovereignty’ with its neighbours near and far as a means 
of managing proximity and distance. The ceremony of presenting precious 
gift horses to foreign dignitaries thereby plays an important symbolic role. 
However, not all neighbours seem to understand the symbolic ties between 
the f ine horses (meant to roam freely in the vast steppes rather then being 
taken home) and the territorial logic of mining tenders.
Mobility and f ixity are also the topic of Tina Harris’ reflections (Chapter 
6) on the mobile and the material. Neighbouring, Harris argues, is mediated 
through pathways and their disruptions. Harris examines the construction 
and use of borders and roads between China and India. She reexamines 
the meanings of tension that arise between those who set the borders and 
those who move the borders, those who map the paths and those who create 
alternative routes. Just as active neighbouring is a matter of managing 
distance, managing distance is a matter of dealing with mobilities and 
f ixities.
The f inal section of the volume investigates neighbouring as social 
relations of ‘agonistic intensities’. In Chapter 7, Chris Vasantkumar traces 
the stories of Tibetan refugees from Amdo in north-eastern Tibet who 
returned to China and started doing businesses. As new arrivals they were 
regarded as overly sinicized and outsiders in exile; back in Tibet they are 
watched with much scrutiny. Moving from one neighbouring situation to 
the next, they remain somehow always in-between. They are ‘odd’ in the 
sense that one cannot hold them concurrently in view with either ‘proper 
exiles’ (seeking refuge rather than fortune) or their Han Chinese neighbours 
in Gansu and Qinghai.
Leaving one contentious neighbouring situation behind for another 
is also what characterizes the cases of Burmese Muslims in China that 
Renaud Egreteau presents (Chapter 8). Seeking both refuge and fortune 
across the border in Yunnan, which is considered a safer environment 
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than authoritarian and Buddhist-dominated Myanmar, Burmese Muslims 
establish new livelihoods in the jade industry of the bustling Yunnanese 
border towns. Here, they manage to make use of their social networks in 
Myanmar while at the same time f ind entry into the Hui Muslim society 
in Yunnan. In this sense, they move from being inessential neighbours in 
their Burmese homeland to being essential neighbours in the context of 
cross-border trade in precious stones. Agonistic interplays rather than open 
antagonism characterize the situation.
Agon – or contest – is also at the heart of Juan Zhang’s analysis (Chapter 9) 
of the tensions during a high-level bilateral trade fair at the Sino-Vietnamese 
border. As the Vietnamese imposed extra duty on Chinese goods unexpect-
edly at the fair, Chinese traders at the border experienced the fragility of 
bilateral trade relations, and the uncertainty of cross-border interactions. 
Such tensions and the anxiety it triggers, Zhang argues, are always the 
undercurrent of neighbouring relations. Neighbouring in anxiety speaks to 
the agonistic intimacy that can be both unsettling and productive. Uncer-
tainty triggers anxiety, and anxiety becomes the disavowed foundation of 
precarious trust and performative friendship between neighbours.
In Chapter 10 of the book, Magnus Fiskesjö steps away from an anthro-
pocentric framing of neighbouring relations. Fiskesjö takes the notion of 
neighbouring to explore human-animal relations and deeply rooted sino-
centric hierarchies. He argues that, in a certain sense, animal neighbours 
are seen as an extension of the barbarian periphery, a link in a hierarchical 
chain-of-being-like conception of the world. But this clearly antagonistic 
dispositive (the history of a thousand-year war, as Fiskesjö puts it) has 
become complicated by China’s nascent animal rights movement, which 
emphasizes universal moralities in the f ight against enslavement and the 
self ish extermination of human’s animal neighbours.
The unifying themes in the four chapters in this f inal section are the 
spectres of unsettled relations and uncertain outcomes. Agonistic relations 
suggest that in order to achieve common interest, potential antagonisms 
between neighbours are always held in check, and friendships have to be 
consciously maintained and performed. Agonistic intimacies at China’s 
borderworlds reconfigure contemporary relation politics, as communities 
and polities move towards a future of promises and uncertainties.
While this book does not attempt to formulate a general theory of 
neighbouring, it is a f irst step in laying the ground for an anthropology of 
neighbouring. The focus of this book – the shared experiences of neighbour-
ing along and across China’s borders, proximity as a matter of orientation 
and intimacy, and agonistic intimacy that fosters fragile futures – helps 
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envision the possible contours of such an anthropology. Furthermore, we 
hope that the ten ref lections of neighbouring situations in the border-
worlds at China’s edge render visible a geographical configuration of great 
geopolitical importance. The borderworlds at stake, which sporadically 
make headlines as spaces of disorder but usually remain buried under the 
‘neat graphics of national order’, as Ludden puts it (2003: 1058), reveal their 
positionality only in comparison. We hope that this book as a whole will 
contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics that transform both 





1 Bright Lights across the River
Competing Modernities at China’s Edge
Franck Billé*
Introduction
It is 9 p.m. and the entire city of Heihe on the other side of the Amur River 
lights up. All the high-rise riverbank buildings suddenly sparkle in a wide 
array of bright colours and a laser light dances across the sky. With pop 
music blasted across loudspeakers, the Chinese city has taken an air of 
festivity. Yet this is an ordinary day: two hours later the lights and the music 
will go off, only to return the next day at the same time.
On the opposite side, the sleepy Siberian city of Blagoveshchensk looks 
upon this quotidian spectacle with a certain level of ambivalence. ‘It’s just a 
show to attract Russian tourists’; ‘it looks really beautiful from here’; ‘they’re 
powering these lights with Russian electricity they buy at discount prices, 
it makes me angry’ were some of the various comments and responses my 
questions elicited. While the majority of respondents did not necessarily 
voice positive assessments, the importance of the light-show for the city of 
Blagoveshchensk was undeniable.
For some Blagoveshchensk residents, the show was nothing but a glitzy 
façade of modernity, barely concealing the poverty, dirt and uneducated 
rural population of the ‘real’ Heihe. For others, it was the trademark of 
a new frontier town, built with the purchasing power of their Russian 
neighbours, and symbol of a renewed, economically confident China. For 
most, however, the symbolic importance of night-time Heihe clearly reached 
beyond the image of economic success that the Chinese city was celebrating: 
Heihe’s bright riverbank was also a reflective surface, a mirror reminding 
uneasy onlookers of their own failings. Indeed, while Heihe is booming and 
expanding ever more rapidly, Blagoveshchensk remains beset by multiple 
* This research was carried out as part of an ESRC funded project (2012-2015) based at the 
University of Cambridge (UK) entitled ‘Where Rising Powers Meet: China and Russia at their 
North Eastern Border’. I am grateful for the numerous comments and suggestions I received when 
I presented versions of this paper at the universities of Cambridge, UC Berkeley and Singapore. 
Many thanks to Caroline Humphrey, Marilyn Strathern, Barbara Bodenhorn and Yuri Slezkine 
for their comments, and in particular to Martin Saxer and Juan Zhang for their careful reading 
and suggestions encouraging me to push the argument further.
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administrative and political hurdles, which together severely inhibit its 
growth.
China’s meteoric rise over the last decade has catapulted the country 
centre stage, spawning a vast quantity of books and articles in a broad range 
of academic f ields. Core foci in this literature have been the evolution of 
China’s role in the region and issues of security and stability. China’s rapid 
growth into a position of world power, against a backdrop of unresolved 
territorial disputes with several of its neighbours, have made borders a 
central concern (Chung 2004, Li 2008, Fravel 2008, Elleman et al. 2012). 
Indeed, despite China’s insistence on its good-neighbourly intentions and 
commitment to a ‘peaceful rise’ (heping jueqi 和平崛起), anxieties about 
China-dominated futures endure (Billé 2008, 2015).
If China’s active involvement in Asia and the profound changes in 
international relations this is likely to have for the region have been 
explored by numerous authors (Evans et al. 2000, Shambaugh 2005), 
comparatively less attention has been given to the social and cultural 
reverberations of China’s rise on its immediate neighbours. Those in 
the national centres have been familiar with a particular imagination 
of China, but this is different in the frontiers where neighbouring is an 
everyday reality. Russian views in border cities such as Blagoveshchensk, 
for example, dramatically differ from Moscow’s xenophobic narratives 
of ‘Yellow Peril’ and doomsday scenarios. Local views are not necessarily 
always positive, especially since China’s rise has largely taken place at 
the expense of Russia’s position in the region. Indeed, as China’s only 
European neighbour, China’s rise has been symbolically potent for Russia, 
and the sudden reversal of established cultural hierarchies where Russia 
had always enjoyed a dominant position has been a source of anxiety. 
Nonetheless, local views remain signif icantly more multifaceted and 
complex than those heard in the capital. They also frequently echo nar-
ratives heard elsewhere, notably in nations neighbouring China’s western 
and south-eastern borders where the ‘Chinese dream’, particularly among 
the younger generations, is steadily gaining ground.
Historian David Ludden (2003: 1062) famously reminded us that all too 
often ‘we imagine that mobility is border crossing, as though borders came 
first, and mobility, second’. The truth is more the other way around. Borders, 
he contends, are sociopolitical constructs that slice across ethnic and cul-
tural continuums. While his point is well taken, at times the drawing of 
boundary lines has preceded the peopling of national peripheries, resulting 
in two groups on either side having little in common. The 2,500-mile border 
separating Chinese Manchuria from the Russian Far East is such a case. 
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If some indigenous groups such as Buryats or Evenki are found on both 
sides of the border, the vast majority of inhabitants, as I discuss below, are 
in fact Russians on one side and Chinese on the other. Similarly, frontier 
cities such as Blagoveshchensk, which were founded and developed when 
the other side was either unpopulated or insulated behind an iron curtain, 
have grown largely along national ideals and benchmarks, and differ, in 
fact, little from other towns in western Russia.
The novel situation in which the two sides suddenly found themselves 
after 1989 when the border opened is an apt illustration of the generative 
power of neighbouring. If, as numerous postsocialist examples have shown, 
renewed contact with a long lost neighbour does not necessarily lead to 
a smoothing out, let alone disappearance, of sociocultural differences, 
cross-border engagement can be genuinely transformative. The trajectory 
of Blagoveshchensk’s and Heihe’s urban development over the last two 
decades is a clear testament to this force.
The argument developed in this chapter is strongly indebted to the 
work of Anna Tsing, and particularly to her notion of ‘friction’ (2005). The 
reverberations of her analysis, whereby ‘cultural diversity brings a creative 
friction to global connections’ (Tsing 2005: ix-x), are especially potent here 
given that both Russia and China see their mutual border as a fault-line 
between two world cultures or ‘civilizations’. As the ethnography of this 
chapter illustrates, friction can, through quotidian engagement, lead to 
an increasing enmeshing of lives, worldviews, and aspirations, as well as 
generate social and cultural transformations.
My argument is also inspired by Taussig’s work on mimesis (1993) which 
productively fuses together the seemingly incompatible tension between, 
on the one hand, a readiness to adopt elements of the neighbour’s culture 
and, on the other, a persistent emphasis on differentiation and uniqueness. 
Mimesis is thus not a matter of slavish reproduction (see Bosker 2013). What 
the urban evolution of Blagoveshchensk and Heihe represent is, in fact, 
what Kenzari (2011) refers to as ‘mimetic rivalry’, with each city borrowing 
inspiration from its neighbour but appropriating it in unique and original 
ways. Mimetic practices thus lead to cultural friction and exchange, and, 
perhaps more importantly, to commensurability. Indeed, to be recognized 
by the Other as different, one must ultimately be comparable, and therefore 
recognizable in intelligible ways.
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Background
Blagoveshchensk was established in 1858 at the location of the fort of 
Albazino, the f irst Russian settlement on the Amur River. Meaning ‘An-
nunciation’ in Russian, its foundation was symbolic. It not only marked 
Russian territorial advance eastwards but represented a beacon of progress 
and civilization in a continent perceived as feudal, despotic and stagnant.1 
Blagoveshchensk, just like the neighbouring towns of Khabarovsk and 
Vladivostok became in the space of a few decades a vibrant ‘center of eco-
nomic life of the Russian Far East, matching the cities in European Russia 
in terms of size and architecture’ (Zatsepine 2011: 107). Comparisons with 
European cities were common and highly symbolic. Although at some 
point in Russia’s history some thinkers, notably the intellectual current 
known as the Slavophiles, had advocated embracing Russia’s own Asian 
cultural heritage and cultivate links with Asian societies (see Laruelle 2007), 
the dominant Russian worldview has consistently looked to the west for 
inspiration. The use of Asia as a terrain onto which political and cultural 
aspirations could be actively projected was in fact made explicit by Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky in the late 1880s: ‘In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, 
but in Asia we shall be the masters. In Europe we were Tatars, but in Asia 
we too are Europeans’ (Dostoyevsky 1993: 1374). Thus, even at the height of 
the Sino-Soviet friendship, the tacit cultural hierarchy was clear to both 
sides: China was the younger brother (mladshii brat), to be guided by a 
technologically and ideologically more advanced Russia towards a bright 
communist future.
An important port on the Amur River, Blagoveshchensk’s growth was 
fuelled in no small part by Chinese labour. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, the town had a sizeable Chinese population who worked as trad-
ers and manual labourers. In 1900, during the Boxer Rebellion (Yihetuan 
yundong 义和团运动), fearing that the 8,000 Chinese residents may form a 
‘f ifth column’, Blagoveshchensk’s authorities decided to deport the Chinese 
community in its entirety. They were driven out of the city at bayonet point 
and made to swim across the river. Those who were too old or too frail 
to comply were ruthlessly killed. Altogether, about 5,000 Chinese men, 
women and children died on that day (Dyatlov 2003, 2012, Qi 2009: 76-79, 
Zatsepine 2011).
A few years later Chinese migrant workers were again visible in 
Blagoveshchensk. But throughout the 20th century Sino-Russian relations 
1 Note also in this regard the meaning of Vladivostok as ‘Ruler of the East’.
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remained strongly shaped by political events. The installation of a Com-
munist regime in China in 1949 was followed by a period of intense cultural 
exchange and political and ideological collaboration between the two na-
tions. However, this period was short-lived and relations between the PRC 
and the Soviet Union quickly deteriorated. Soviet attempts at moving away 
from the excesses of Stalin’s policies were poorly received by Mao Zedong 
who considered this departure from communist orthodoxy a betrayal of 
shared political ideals.
The territorial disputes that had soured much of the modern period 
before 1949 once again took centre stage, spearheaded by Mao Zedong’s 
famous statement in July 1964 that Tsarist Russia had stolen 580,000 
square miles through ‘unequal treaties’ (bupingdeng tiaoyue 不平等条约) 
that Qing China had signed under duress. In 1969, border skirmishes on 
Damansky Island (in Chinese Zhenbao dao 珍宝岛) almost led to open 
warfare. These events resulted in the hermetic sealing of the Sino-Russian 
border. From then until 1989, the two sides became completely isolated 
from each other. The closure of the border signalled the reinforcement of 
a geopolitical fracture as well as a strong social interruption: numerous 
ethnic groups, such as the Buryat Mongols or the Evenki who traditionally 
straddled the border and nomadised across the international boundary 
line, suddenly found themselves cut off from their relatives on the other 
side.
The three decades between 1960 and 1989 are commonly referred to as the 
Sino-Soviet Split (Zhong-Su jiaowu 中苏交恶; Sovetsko-kitaiskii raskol). The 
period was characterized by pervasive suspicion on both sides and constant 
propaganda. Slogans such as ‘You are living on the border, stay vigilant! 
(Zhivësh na granitse, bud’ bditelen!)’ and ‘Border under lock (Granitsa na 
zamke)’ were continually reiterated. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976) Chinese counter-propaganda was also blasted across the Amur 
River. In recounting stories about this diff icult period, my interlocutors 
in Blagoveshchensk mentioned that even innocuous behaviours such as 
looking at the other side of the river with binoculars could potentially lead 
to being questioned by the police.
Becoming Neighbours Again
The opening of the border in 1989 signalled a change of pace in the relation-
ship between Russia and China. Suddenly Russians were able to cross 
the border and engage socially and commercially with the Chinese on 
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the other side. This shift was especially meaningful for Blagoveshchensk, 
which, as a border town, had been subjected to very strong restrictions 
with regards to mobility. Not only had it been closed to Chinese visitors, 
Russians themselves, if they lived elsewhere, had only been able to enter 
the town with a special permit. Overnight, from a remote town on the edge 
of the national polity, Blagoveshchensk found itself at a crossroads between 
two widely divergent cultural realms, as well as at a unique juncture of 
commercial contact. Once again it became possible for people to renew 
ties with relatives on the other side, though many had irretrievably lost 
all traces or even memory of their foreign ancestry by then (Shishmanova 
2011). One of my interlocutors, Andrei,2 with ginger hair and typical 
European features, told me that his family had successfully concealed 
their Chinese heritage during the latter part of the Soviet period. For 
those mixed Russians who had phenotypically Asian features, alternative 
family stories were painstakingly (re)constructed. Many tried to pass for 
another Asian group, for Koreans for instance. Maria’s family, ethnically 
very mixed, had to resort to such practices, especially because of her 
grandfather’s high social position. The political atmosphere was such in 
those years that her grandfather even concealed his heritage from his own 
wife, who only found out after several years of marriage. On the Chinese 
side, individuals with mixed heritage were compelled to do the same, some 
carefully dyeing their hair black in order not to attract undue attention 
(Shishmanova 2011).
Thus, in many cases, by the time the border reopened and it was safe 
again to renew contact with the other side, all details about relatives had 
long been lost. For Andrei and Maria, China was as mysterious as it was for 
most of Blagoveshchensk inhabitants. In the late socialist period, study of 
the Chinese language had been actively discouraged and many faculties of 
Sinology, in both Russia and Mongolia, were closed down. With the border 
hermetically sealed, borderlanders on either side knew virtually nothing 
about their neighbours.
It was precisely this sense of unknown that drove so many Russians to 
cross the Amur River in the early 1990s to see for themselves what China 
was like. This ‘ethnographic’ interest was compounded with the sudden op-
portunity for Russians to purchase items that were not, or no longer, locally 
available. Andrei, who began his career as a kirpich, literally a ‘brick’, the 
local term for a person who buys large amounts of goods abroad and carries 
2 All names are pseudonyms.
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them back across the border,3 explained that the f irst few years of the 1990s 
were characterized by a mad rush, with over 2,000 people a day pushing 
and shoving to get on boats in order to complete as many trips as possible.4 
‘It was really crazy. You didn’t see many intellectuals (intelligenty) then’.
In the f irst few years of the 1990s Heihe was little more than an outgrown 
village. The only restaurants available were street stalls, and most com-
mercial activities also took place by the roadside. As Andrei recalled:
You would see old ladies sewing Adidas trousers right there on the street. 
On one side they would have the material, on the other the trousers ready 
to wear. They sold these to Russian visitors who knew full well they were 
fake goods,5 but they were very cheap. They were very bad quality though 
and wouldn’t last long. At times the seams would fall apart even before 
you had reached the Russian shore.
For both sides, the sudden opening of the international border meant a 
propitious meeting of complementary desires. Over the last two decades this 
intense flurry of commercial activity has been a defining factor of dynamic 
development for the two towns. For Blagoveshchensk, whose f inancial 
support from the capital has long dried up, survival without neighbouring 
Heihe would be very precarious. The Chinese goods and produce available 
across the border have provided a real lifeline for the Russian town. In the 
case of Heihe, the existence of Blagoveshchensk has played an even more 
fundamental role and it has very rapidly grown into a town whose size 
and modernity have come to rival Blagoveshchensk’s. In fact, the town has 
thrived precisely because of its location. The centre of Heihe is explicitly 
geared towards the Russian market: the vast majority of shops have signs 
in Cyrillic and most Chinese residents know at least some basic Russian. 
Heihe is a booming town, set to surpass its Russian counterpart in a few 
years in terms of number of residents.
3  In the late 1990s, traders realized that delegating the actual cross-border transport and 
having a team of kirpichi bringing goods from China would lead to higher returns. These former 
kirpichi are commonly known as ‘lamps’ ( fonari). In other parts of the Russian Far East, notably 
in the Primorskii krai, kirpichi are referred to as ‘camels’ (verbliudy).
4 Initially there were no restrictions on weight. Rules have tightened considerably since then, 
with a maximum weight of 50 kilograms per day (as of November 2011) provided the traveler has 
spent at least three days outside Russia. For stays under three days the maximum allowance is 
20 kilograms.
5 In the early 1990s fake Adidas trainers were sold in Blagoveshchensk as ‘Abibas’. The name 
has stuck as shorthand for fake goods.
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This newfound symbiotic partnership between the ‘twin cities’ is per-
ceived by both parties as a guarantee for future success and development. 
To reinforce existing links, more and more international cultural events are 
being organized by the two localities, such as Sino-Russian art exhibitions, 
or an annual swimming competition across the river called ‘Sino-Russian 
Heilongjiang Friendship’ (Zhong-E Youyi Heilongjiang 中俄友谊黑龙江).
In practice, however, the two cities’ (and indeed the two countries’) 
dramatically different approaches to neighbouring emerge particularly 
clearly through urban practices and the use of space. The physical coming 
together of Russia and China at Blagoveshchensk is, to a large extent, an 
exceptional situation for Russia. Despite a 2,500 mile-long land border, 
the two countries hardly ever physically touch but remain ‘insulated’ by 
supplementary demarcation lines and restricted areas. Thus a ‘border zone’ 
(dublirovanie pogranichnoi polosy), a strip of land extending up to 18 miles 
inland on the Russian side, runs parallel to the international boundary (see 
Billé 2012). This border zone is restricted to both foreigners and Russians. ‘As 
a result, the wildlife there is very rich’ explains Alexandr, an economist at 
the Amur State University. ‘One time I saw a bear there. I was on the Chinese 
side [where there are no restrictions], and I saw the Russian embankment, 
which only our border guards get to see’. At other points along the border 
there are also zones of fortif ication (ukreplennye rayony) which typically 
include obstructions and minefields.
This cautious outlook is also visible in the very layout of the city. 
Blagoveshchensk seems to be inward-looking, almost turned on itself. The 
main avenue, ulitsa Lenina, runs parallel to the Amur River, but at some 
distance from it. There are no large unobstructed vistas looking onto the 
other side. To a visitor, it feels in fact as if the river was largely irrelevant. 
Similarly, the few hotels that are situated near the river do not capitalize 
on their location, with the best rooms facing away rather than towards the 
river. This could not contrast more with Heihe’s layout. There, the entire 
city faces Russia, with the tallest and most modern buildings, including the 
best hotel in the city, standing right on the river bank.
To an extent, differences in layout are understandable. Heihe is a new 
city that has grown and developed in response to cross-border trade with 
Russia. By contrast, Blagoveshchensk is much older and for the largest 
part of its history it had no neighbour to look at. Originally founded as a 
military outpost, architecturally the city retains a certain defensive quality, 
such as the lookout posts which, until recently, were still found all along 
the river bank, a legacy of the Sino-Soviet period. But this seems to be 
only part of the story. In the twenty years that elapsed since the border 
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opened, Blagoveshchensk’s river bank remained completely undeveloped. 
Heihe’s embankment on the other hand was turned into a pedestrianized 
promenade, lined with trees, small parks, and – in the summer – cafés 
and small restaurants. As was described at the beginning of this chapter, 
at night the whole area illuminates in a bewildering array of colours, and 
a laser beam dances in the sky, occasionally prodding the sleepy Russian 
shore on the other side. This marked imbalance in fact prompted a Chinese 
architect and friend of mine to remark on the contrast, describing it as a 
‘hot face pressed against a cold ass’ (yi zhang re lian tie zai leng pigu shang 
一张热脸贴在冷屁股上).
This stark difference is to an extent predicated on the commercial 
exchange taking place between the two cities, with Heihe’s riverfront 
essentially functioning as a giant billboard seeking to attract customers. 
The city of Heihe is replete with Russian symbols, from statues of bears on 
the embankment to matrioshka-shaped trash cans, and the street signage 
includes Russian in addition to Chinese and English. Blagoveshchensk’s 
residents tend to perceive the inclusion of these symbols as a means to 
attract them through the recreation of a familiar environment, but the 
strategy has been quite different. In recent years, Heihe has in fact styled 
itself as a window to Europe, with a whole section of Hailan Street lined 
with shops selling a wide range of goods, from Russian fur hats to European 
style paintings. By replicating Russian symbolism, the city of Heihe offers 
Chinese tourists a ‘mini Russian experience’. Visitors can take short cruises 
along the Amur River, and on their return, shop for Russian goods in Heihe 
itself without having to physically cross the river – an experience which 
involves obtaining an international passport (huzhao 护照) and spending 
considerable sums of money.
In fact, this situation is not unique to Heihe, and several other Chinese 
border cities have followed a similar trajectory. Manzhouli, on the border 
with both Russia and Mongolia, has exploited its geographical position to 
attract Chinese tourists looking for a ‘European experience’. Its buildings 
mimic European architecture and a number of somewhat surreal theme 
parks have also mushroomed close to the border gates (guomen 国门), like 
for instance a ‘matrioshka park’ representing famous Russian and Western 
personalities and including seemingly random personalities such as Charlie 
Chaplin, Audrey Hepburn and Jesus.
This strategy is somewhat reminiscent of the process of ‘mimetic con-
densation’ described by Joseph Rykwert (2000: 150) whereby remote and 
sacred places were miniaturized for pilgrims who were unable to reach 
them. This move has enabled cities like Manzhouli and Heihe to benefit 
42 frANck billé
from both Russian consumption and from domestic Chinese tourism and 
to develop rapidly as a result. The inclusion of Russian symbols in the form 
of statues, monuments and architecture is also intimately tied to the city’s 
international ambitions. Like the city of Manzhouli, Heihe was among the 
40 or so Chinese cities that announced, as early as the 1990s, their intention 
to become ‘global cities’ (quanqiu chengshi 全球城市) (Gu and Sun 1999).
By contrast Blagoveshchensk’s central symbols reflect an unambiguous 
intent to draw a clear separation between itself and its neighbour. In ad-
dition to the numerous zones of separation described earlier that insulate 
Russia from China, the city of Blagoveshchensk, through its statues, monu-
ments and memorials, is structurally insistent on defining itself as Russian 
rather than liminal. Thus the monument that dominates Ploschad’ Pobedy 
(Victory Square), Blagoveshchensk’s central square, is a monumental arch 
bearing the inscription ‘The land of the Amur was, is and will be Russian 
(Zemlya amurskaya byla, est’ i budet russkoi)’. The same inscription is also 
found on a monument on the edge of the city, erected by General Governor 
Korsakov in 1868, a large mural depicting the Amur River marking the 
border with China.
In addition to the emphasis placed on protection and clear demarca-
tion, Russian attitudes also index a high degree of passivity. Changes on 
the Russian side in the post-socialist period have occurred primarily in 
response to particular stimuli rather than as proactive measures, and have 
frequently been cosmetic rather than truly transformative. In 2012, Russia 
unveiled a new iconic structure: the longest suspension bridge in the world, 
connecting the city of Vladivostok to Russky Island, home to a mere 5,000 
people and host to the APEC Summit held in September 2012 (Nemstova 
2012). By contrast, not a single bridge connects Blagoveshchensk to Heihe 
– nor indeed any border cities over the long Amur River – despite repeated 
Chinese offers to bear the entire cost of the project.
A crucial difference between the two cities of Heihe and Blagovesh-
chensk – as well as several others on the Sino-Russian border – is that 
Blagoveshchensk has suddenly, and unwittingly, found itself in the posi-
tion of neighbouring. Originally an outpost of European presence in an 
uncharted East, the city did not need to actively engage with anyone. It 
merely acted as a beacon shining a light onto a dark and mostly empty 
space. Over the last two decades, as the small village of Heihe grew into 
a full-size town, Blagoveshchensk has seen its signif icance as model of 
modernity signif icantly weakened.
This notion of a beacon extends, of course, beyond the metaphoric. The 
significance of physical illuminations is in fact crucial given the importance 
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of electrif ication campaigns in the early socialist period and their sig-
nif icance with regard to modernity.6 Electric light, through its powerful 
association with notions of higher understanding and culture, was seen 
as the metonymic emblem of a single grand narrative, that of modernity 
itself (Sneath 2009: 87). The common power outages and theft of copper and 
aluminum wires, which have occasionally plunged sections of Siberian cities 
into darkness since the early 1990s, are thus frequently seen as nothing less 
than the failure of this modernist grand narrative. As Oushakine (2009: 
21) writes, people routinely complain of being left in the dark (ostavili v 
temnote) and of being cut off from the rest of the world (otrezali ot mira). 
In the context of Blagoveshchensk, the fact that it is the Chinese side that 
is now brightly illuminated is therefore symbolically potent as well as a 
destabilizing factor.
From a position of cultural isolation, and despite a structural reluctance 
to engage, the city of Blagoveshchensk now f inds itself in a close, indeed 
symbiotic, relation with Heihe. In line with Anna Tsing’s (2005) seminal 
work on global interconnections, I suggest that relations between these 
‘twin cities’ are perhaps best understood through Tsing’s fertile metaphor 
of friction. My use of friction in this context primarily denotes an affective 
force, not reducible to negative or positive outcomes, but potentially span-
ning both. Friction stands here as the generative energy produced through 
the physical and involuntary coming together of two different polities. As 
I will argue in the following sections, this friction is proving to be a truly 
transformative force. In the case of Blagoveshchensk in particular, the very 
presence of Heihe on the other side of the river has acted as a reflective 
surface, mirroring Russia’s own dreams, aspirations, and limitations with 
regard to progress and modernity.
Neighbouring Through Engagement
As the boat approaches the Russian bank, Sasha reminds me to set my watch 
back. The two cities may be right across from each other, and separated by 
a 500-meter stretch of water, they are nonetheless two time zones apart. 
This temporal rupture, adding to the bureaucratic hurdles and the endless 
queues for tickets, increases the sense of distance between the two cities. 
6 Indeed, the f irst Soviet plan for national economic recovery and development – ‘State 
Commission for Electrif ication of Russia’ or GOELRO – was a major restructuring of the Soviet 
economy based on total electrif ication of the country.
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Similarly, the immediately visible somatic differences in the population of 
these border cities make the two environments oddly bipolar: apart from 
Russians and Chinese, there is very little distinctive ethnic diversity.7 This 
contributes to the peculiar sentiment that one is crossing from one world 
into another. The idea that the river marks a civilizational fault line is very 
much present in the minds of local people. The assumption of both Russians 
and Chinese that they are fundamentally different from each other is in 
fact shaping interactions between the two groups.8 This notion of cultural 
chasm was a recurrent motif in interviews. It was also graphically conveyed 
in some of the drawings made by classes of students at the Amur State 
University, depicting the twinned cities of Heihe and Blagoveshchensk as 
separated by an abyss or even as distinct planets.
Figure 1.1  Depiction of Heihe and Blagoveshchensk by a 20 year-old female 
student, Amur State University, Blagoveshchensk, 2011
7 In reality diversity is anything but absent. There are sizeable groups of Armenians and Azeris 
in Blagoveshchensk, and Heihe is home to a number of national minorities, such as Manchus 
and Tatars. However, this inner diversity tends to remain invisible to the other side.
8 Other Russian borders in Asia elicit similar discursive practices. The boundary with Japan, 
in the Kurile archipelago, is also touted by Japanese guidebooks as Japan’s border with Europe 
(Morris-Suzuki 1999: 58).
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Figure 1.2  Depiction of Heihe and Blagoveshchensk by a 20 year-old male 
student, Amur State University, Blagoveshchensk, 2011
For Sasha, a Russian entrepreneur in his early 20s who relocated to Heihe a 
couple of years ago, the sense of unbridgeable difference has very much faded 
away. Initially attracted to China because it was unknown and mysterious 
to him, he has now fully acclimatized to living there. Having gained full 
fluency in Chinese, he has recently persuaded his retired mother to move in 
with him. But despite the lower cost of living on the Chinese side, very few 
Russians have followed his example. His decision to live on the other side 
of the river is frequently met with inquisitive looks and raised eyebrows.
Nonetheless, throughout my f ieldwork, it clearly emerged that old ste-
reotypes are slowly losing ground, particularly among the young generation 
who have spent more time in China. In the two decades since the border 
opened, residents of Blagoveshchensk have become increasingly accustomed 
to the cultural divide. In addition to the commercial interactions between 
the two cities, local Russians now spend the majority of their holidays in 
China: in Heihe for public holidays and short breaks, and further inland, 
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in Harbin, Beijing, Beidaihe or Sanya for longer holidays. For the younger 
generations, this has often meant that they have been spending time in 
China regularly from a very young age. This increased interaction has also 
led to greater interest in Chinese culture and traditions, such as martial 
arts and cuisine. Russian infatuation with Chinese food has in fact led to a 
veritable proliferation of Chinese restaurants in Blagoveshchensk, which 
are now three times as numerous as establishments serving Russian food. 
This transformation of the local dietary landscape has brought with it a 
slew of new practices, such as the widespread use of chopsticks and a taste 
for Chinese alcohol (baijiu 白酒).
In conversations with me, many interlocutors emphasized the sense of 
familiarity and closeness they associate with Heihe. ‘It’s not really China’, 
I was told. ‘Heihe is an area of Blagoveshchensk (Heihe – eto rayon goroda)’. 
‘It’s a place where you go spend a weekend, have nice Chinese food, and have 
fun with your friends’. The liminality of Heihe was tied to a large extent to 
the fact one could navigate it without knowing a single word of Chinese, 
since most Chinese in Heihe know at least basic Russian. And although the 
city may differ in its cultural outlook, the frequency with which Russian 
visitors bump into friends and encounter familiar faces lends the experience 
a certain sense of familiarity.
Just as Heihe is seen as not quite Chinese, locals also perceive Blagovesh-
chensk as having a certain liminal quality. If my interlocutors never claimed 
that Blagoveshchensk was not (or even not wholly) Russian, they were keen 
to draw my attention to the existence of a Sino-Russian pidgin and to the 
many Chinese words that pepper local Russian speech. The most common 
example I was given was the verb chifanit (to eat, from chifan 吃饭) and its 
derivatives pochifanem (‘let’s go eat’) and chifan’ka (restaurant), but other 
terms such as fanzi (‘apartment’, usually of poor-quality, from fangzi 房子), 
laovaiskii (‘foreign’, from laowai 老外) and sesechki (‘thanks’, combining 
xiexie 谢谢with the diminutive suffix -chki) were also mentioned. Other ex-
pressions such as mne mafanno (‘it’s inconvenient to me’, ‘troublesome’, from 
mafan 麻烦), khaovarit’sya (‘fun’ or ‘to have fun’, from haowanr 好玩儿) or 
tinbudun (‘cannot understand’ or ‘someone a little dumb’, from tingbudong 
听不懂) are less commonly used but were known to some respondents.
What struck me as particularly fascinating in these discussions was 
perhaps not the existence of these terms but the persistent aff irmation 
that a form of pidgin was in use between the two cities. This insistence 
concerning the emergence of a Sino-Russian pidgin has in fact been the 
subject of recent book-length studies by two Russian scholars (Oglezneva 
2007, Perekhval’skaya 2008). While the classif ication of these linguistic 
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forms as ‘pidgin’ remains somewhat contentious, what these scholarly dis-
cussions do index is the embryonic emergence of local identities, divergent 
from national norms, and bridging the cultural and linguistic divide. The 
enthusiasm of respondents for the topic clearly extended beyond actual 
practices, as only a few interlocutors were able to cite more than two or 
three words.
The apparent desire of Blagoveshchensk residents to attenuate the 
linguistic gap that separates them from their neighbours is also seen in 
the increasing popularity of Chinese, which has become one of the most 
popular foreign languages in Blagoveshchensk, ranking a close second after 
English. Around 1,000 students study Chinese full-time, while another 1,500 
study it as a minor subject in evening classes. A Confucius Institute (Kongzi 
Xueyuan 孔子学院) was also recently established in the city through which 
a further 250 students, including a class of retirees, are currently enrolled. In 
addition, the Institute is also providing free classes for government customs 
and administration, with the view to facilitating international contact and 
exchange.
In part, this growth reflects a stronger interest for Chinese language and 
culture, but for the majority it simply represents a key to future success. 
Thus an ever larger number of parents are registering their children in 
Chinese language classes or paying for private tuition in order to give them 
a competitive edge. Chinese is seen primarily as a useful tool to guarantee 
access to the international labour market as well as permanent outmigra-
tion. This keen interest in Chinese is therefore mostly strategic. In this 
regard it is noteworthy that the recent increase in the number of Chinese 
language classes is not taking place at the expense of English. Chinese is 
merely studied in addition to it.
Irrespective of individual motivations, linguistic and cultural engage-
ment with China has led to better knowledge about the country and 
impacted signif icantly on Russian worldviews and geopolitical imagina-
tions. A closer examination of attitudes of Blagoveshchensk’s residents, 
particularly those of the younger generations, thus highlights the current 
coexistence of two competing geopolitical mental maps, one with Moscow 
as reference point, the other resolutely turned towards China. Preliminary 
interviews carried out with three classes of students at the Amur State 
University suggest that differences in world-views are to an extent tied 
to social background. Students who have had little or no personal experi-
ence of China are predominantly from families one might call ‘socialist 
intelligentsia’: their parents are educated professionals such as teachers 
and doctors, with a high social status during the socialist period but with 
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limited f inancial resources today. The fact that the vast majority of these 
students have been to Moscow and cities in western Russia suggests that 
their worldviews (or at least those of their parents) remain f irmly anchored 
to Moscow and ‘the West’. By contrast, for children of traders who have had 
extensive contact with China, Moscow appears to have lost much of its 
relevance as a cultural benchmark. Most of these students have not visited 
Moscow, and their responses overall underscored the sense of unbridgeable 
distance they felt separated them from the capital. For this group, the future 
was unquestionably found in ‘the East’, specif ically in the cities of eastern 
and southern China such as Shanghai or Shenzhen.
The growing importance of China as cultural benchmark has been 
paralleled by a decrease in Moscow’s capacity to shape ideas of the future 
and modernity. Particularly among Blagoveshchensk’s economically more 
successful social strata, the megalopolises of southern China have largely 
eclipsed the lure previously emanating from Moscow and St Petersburg. 
While some segments of Russian society remain attached, culturally and 
geopolitically, to the models inculcated during the socialist period, it is 
likely that the current trend favouring China will continue to expand given 
that the old ‘socialist intelligentsia’ tends to be less f inancially successful. 
Chinese and Asian cultural models are also gaining ground among the 
younger generation through anime and martial arts, and it is also from 
China that fashion trends predominantly originate.
Mimetic Neighbouring
The significant divergences in Heihe’s and Blagoveshchensk’s structural out-
looks described earlier contribute to making these two cities diametrically 
different. But a closer look at their evolution and emergent architectural 
practices reveals a number of fascinating parallels. Indeed, if in its urban 
development Heihe appears to take the lead, the process is in reality far less 
one-sided. Heihe’s urbanization model in fact closely follows Russian unspo-
ken assumptions about what a city is supposed to look like. Thus throughout 
the course of its development, Heihe has replicated Blagoveshchensk’s 
structural and urban features. A giant Ferris wheel, brightly illuminated 
at night and three times larger than the Russian one, was for example built 
in Heihe recently, and strategically erected right opposite Blagoveshchensk’s 
main intersection.
Similarly, Heihe’s urban landscape is dotted with statues, an established 
feature of Russian (and other European) cities, but a far less common 
brighT lighTS AcroSS The river 49
occurrence in Chinese cities. In addition to the Russian-themed features 
discussed above, a number of statues, sculptures and memorials are also 
found in the town, especially along the riverbank. In most cases the symbol-
ism is readily understandable, such as the black dragon stele representing 
the Amur River (Black Dragon River or 黑龙江in Chinese). Other times, like 
in the case of a very large statue of a woman holding a child, entitled simply 
‘Mother’ (muqin 母亲), the meaning is less clear, though it may be another 
reference to Russian literature, specif ically to Maxim Gorky’s eponymous 
novel.9 As the statue is not accompanied by text in Russian or Chinese, this 
is a reference unlikely to be picked up by visitors. Generally, these statues 
often appear not to be responding to an economic or affective need, but 
to be there simply for the sake of being there. Not because of a particular 
event to be commemorated, but because the presence of statues is inherent 
to what a modern and developed city should be like.
In the introduction of a volume focusing on emerging practices in Asian 
cities, Aihwa Ong (2011b: 4) notes that urban transformations involve 
‘unavoidable practices of inter-city comparison, referencing, or modelling’. 
Her argument builds upon Anderson’s notion of ‘spectre of comparison’ 
(Anderson 1998: 2) which Ong def ines as the ‘distance to be travelled in 
order to catch up with the development benchmark and metropolitan ideals 
established by and in the West’ (Ong 2011b: 14). While she points out that a 
number of Asian metropolises have in fact developed independently of an 
ultimate reference to the West, it is arguable that cities in ‘twinned city’ 
settings develop dialogically rather than with a single centralized model 
in mind. This point appears to be largely supported by the urbanization 
process witnessed in Heihe, where the focus is less on innovation than on 
one-upmanship with the construction of structures that are similar to those 
found in Blagoveshchensk, only newer, taller, bigger.
Of course, both cities also have a ‘national frame of reference’, and 
Blagoveshchensk and Heihe’s development is largely modelled on trends 
seen in Moscow and Beijing respectively. But through direct competition, 
twin cities are also drawn together and tend to gradually come to take on 
similar features. Blagoveshchensk, despite its overall structural reluctance 
to engage, has thus adopted some of the urban trappings characteristic of 
China. For instance, the two Siberian tigers that flank the entrance doors of 
the main shopping mall, on 50 Let Oktyabrya Street, appear to be a localized 
version of the Chinese practice of placing lions by the entrance of significant 
9 I am grateful to Adam Chau for pointing out this connection. Gorky’s book is in fact a 
‘signature piece’ of Russian literature for Chinese readers (Zhang, personal communication).
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buildings. Similarly, the novel use of lights on the façade of buildings, or the 
blaring out of music in public spaces, lend the city a certain Asian flavour. 
In adopting such features, Blagoveshchensk is neither styling itself as an 
Asian city nor consciously emulating Heihe – all my Russian interlocutors 
were adamant about that. It is simply developing and modernizing itself 
using a repertoire of available markers of modernity.
Throughout the last two decades the two cities of Heihe and Blagovesh-
chensk have thus continually borrowed from a common pool of ‘building 
blocks’ to develop into modern cities, complete with statues, lights and the 
use of English. For a long time, the night-time lightshow example set by 
Heihe was resisted by Blagoveshchensk residents who declared f inding the 
lights and laser beams garish and in poor taste. It seems however that these 
aesthetic assessments were mixed with considerable envy and with the 
realization that the Russian town did not have the f inancial wherewithal to 
compete with its Chinese neighbour. This suddenly changed after Vladimir 
Putin’s off icial visit in summer 2011, when the Russian president urged 
Blagoveshchensk’s residents to take their neighbour as model. This later 
led to the allocation of central funds for a complete redesign of the Rus-
sian riverbank. By October, excavation works had begun and trucks were 
dumping sand all along the banks of the Amur to create prime riverfront 
real estate. A little over a year later, the f irst section of the new embankment 
opened to the public, with a second section scheduled for early 2014 and the 
third and f inal section by the summer. This came as a pleasant surprise for 
the majority of Blagoveshchensk residents who were steadfastly convinced 
the project would never go ahead. The popular consensus deemed the new 
riverbank a resounding success, in fact ‘much better than Heihe’s’. Replete 
with historic monuments and military statues, the rather imposing em-
bankment exudes ethnic pride and renewed confidence. Its very structure 
is strongly reminiscent of military fortif ications and incorporates in fact 
the shape of the Soviet lookout towers in the outline of its outer vertical 
wall. In this sense, it differs starkly from Heihe’s embankment, which is 
redolent with Russian symbolism and actively seeks to foster a sense of 
good-neighbourliness.
Other dramatic transformations in the course of the last few years have 
been the city’s policies with regard to public illumination. Having long 
criticized Heihe’s practice of night-time ‘light shows’, Blagoveshchensk 
now appears to be following suit. As the municipality’s principal architect 
explained in a newspaper article, the city should elicit a festive mood 
(prazdnichnoe nastroenie) when one walks around it at night. If ideally 
the local authorities would like all buildings to be lit, precedence will be 
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given to historically important buildings found on the principal thorough-
fares. That these measures are Blagoveshchensk’s ‘tailored response to 
its Chinese counterpart (svoeobrazny otvet kitaiskoi storone)’ is clear from 
the priority given to the riverbank: even before the central Lenin Street 
and 50 Let Oktyabrya Street, the very f irst place to be illuminated will be 
Krasnoflotskaya Street, a minor road running right along the embankment 
(Zrazhevskaya 2011).10
What this sudden evolution clearly signalled was the readiness of 
Blagoveshchensk to engage architecturally with Heihe, and to engage with 
it on Chinese terms. Traditionally, Siberian ideals of urban modernity had 
revolved primarily around the human struggle over nature, with smooth 
and straight roads f iguring as crucial markers of this modernity. In their 
conversations with me, Blagoveshchensk residents routinely mentioned 
roads in their inter-city comparisons. Several proudly pointed out 
Blagoveshchensk’s grid-like regularity,11 and this aspect was in fact a feature 
that was frequently emphasized in the drawings as well. According to 
Maria, a political scientist working at the Amur State University, the Rus-
sian cultural preference for grid-like regularity as marker of progress and 
modernity is even stronger in a town like Blagoveshchensk which was a 
military outpost and retains this ‘Roman fort’ quality. ‘We are still modern-
ists here’, she quipped. ‘Blagoveshchensk hasn’t reached post-modernism 
yet!’
In most interviews, respondents explicitly contrasted what they saw 
as the ‘real’ modernity of Blagoveshchensk with its wide, straight and 
tree-lined avenues, as opposed to the bright, shiny, but essentially ‘fake’ 
Chinese-style modernity. Heihe’s riverfront development – the only sur-
face of Heihe visible from the other side of the Amur – was consistently 
described to me as a Potemkin village, a visual trick performed by the 
Chinese. It was nothing but ‘pyl’ v glaza’, I was told, a show intended 
to attract Russian customers. My Russian interlocutors pointed out the 
discrepancy they saw between, on the one hand, the surface image of 
the city as a success story and emergent modernity and, on the other, 
10 Evidently Blagoveshchensk seeks to avoid the occasional, but smarting, questions from 
visitors who, pointing at the bright lights of Heihe, ask the way to the city center.
11 However, people also commented on the high quality of the roads in China. Tanya, who 
lives in Heihe and works remotely with her main off ice in Blagoveshchensk, pointed out: ‘Roads 
in Russia are very bad. Actually we have a saying – “There are two evils in Russia: idiots and 
roads” (v Rossii dve bedy: duraki i dorogi). Our roads are full of potholes and are often quite 
dangerous. When Putin came to visit, they resurfaced all the streets where his car was going to 
pass through. But only those!’
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the ‘real’ Heihe – poor, dangerous, and with a low level of ‘culture’. As a 
result of these discursive practices, Heihe’s modernity has consistently 
been described as a two-dimensional surface dedicated to exchange with 
Russian customers. In interviews, my interlocutors equated it essentially 
with a ‘bazaar city’, thereby rendering invisible other forms of urban 
development and commercial exchange in which Russians do not f igure 
(Billé 2014).
Russian compression of Heihe into a singular surface also means that 
Blagoveshchensk has long dismissed Chinese realities as a mere illusion 
and has resisted engaging with its Chinese neighbour on an equal footing. 
A consequence of viewing Heihe as a surface is of course that the observer’s 
gaze, unable to pierce it, is ref lected back, thereby turning the surface 
into a mirror. This reverberating process is graphically evident from one 
of the drawings made by one of the students. Unable to see beyond the 
riverside front, the focus of the gaze is turned upon Blagoveshchensk 
itself. As a result, and despite their avowed shallowness and artif iciality, 
the bright lights of Heihe function as a ref lective surface which returns 
to Russian onlookers the comparative lack of development of their own 
Figure 1.3  Emphasis on the linear and grid-like quality of Blagoveshchensk in 
student drawings, Amur State University, Blagoveshchensk, 2011
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city.12 Genuine or not, Heihe’s surface has become one of the main sights 
of Blagoveshchensk. Indeed, night-time Heihe even features among 
some of the very small selection of postcards and souvenirs available in 
Blagoveshchensk.
The mimetic quality of the relationship between the two cities is greatly 
facilitated by a shared understanding of the nature of urbanism and mo-
dernity. As mentioned earlier, Heihe’s evening lightshow gains potency 
precisely because of the signif icance of light and electricity in Russian 
culture. Similarly, other aspects characteristic of contemporary Chinese 
urbanism, such as monumentalism or iconicity (Ren 2011; Woodworth 2011), 
are also foundational to Russia’s experience of urban modernity (Stites 
1999). The reflective quality of Heihe’s surface is thus closely intertwined 
with wider notions of projection, mimesis and alterity.
12 Projection is seen from the Chinese side insofar as Heihe’s night lights – and in particular 
the laser beam mentioned earlier – also function as a torch illuminating the other side. No 
longer just a two-dimensional façade, the riverbank thus gains considerable depth as well as 
agency to act upon the other side. I am grateful to Marilyn Strathern for suggesting this active 
dimension of the Heihe riverfront surface.
Figure 1.4  Emphasis on the linear and grid-like quality of Blagoveshchensk in 
student drawings, Amur State University, Blagoveshchensk, 2011
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As the anthropologist Michael Taussig (1993) has shown, cultures 
continually borrow from each other through a dual process of imitation 
– mimicry – and differentiation – alterity. This argument holds true for 
urban staging of modernity, where urban symbols become part of the overall 
grammar. As I illustrated earlier, this is particularly the case with cities in 
‘twin city’ settings such as Blagoveshchensk and Heihe which are drawn into 
a continued dialogue. Surface inscriptions are particularly powerful here 
since they are the ones where identities tend to be marked and displayed 
(Anzieu 1995 [1985]).
Borrowing and imitation, as Simon Harrison has eloquently argued, 
are fundamental processes to the production of difference insofar as 
‘people should differ from one another intelligibly’ (Harrison 2006: 44-47). 
As Richard Handler has shown in the context of Quebec, ‘Like a row of 
ethnic restaurants in any North American city … nations and ethnic groups 
participate in a common market to produce differences that make them 
all the same’ (Handler 1988: 195). Thus Heihe’s installation of a larger Ferris 
wheel, its erection of taller buildings, and its display of brighter lights are 
all inscribed within a dual ‘process of mutual identif ication with each 
other as well as competitive differentiation from each other’ (Harrison 
2006: 46). Similarly, Blagoveshchensk’s decisions to landscape and redesign 
its riverbank and to illuminate the buildings that line the Amur River 
constitute a sign of engagement, competition, as well as self-redefinition. 
One-upmanship is thus not simply a passive copying of the Other, but a more 
complex and inherently dialogical process whereby the ‘groups concerned 
are making claims to equality as well as to superiority’ (Harrison 2006: 
46). This uneasy melding of mimesis and rivalry comes in fact close to 
Singh’s concept of ‘agonistic intimacy’, which he def ines as ‘relatedness 
whose coordinates are not predisposed entirely toward either oppositional 
negation or communitarian aff irmation’ (Singh 2011: 431).
Concluding Remarks
In the last two decades since the Sino-Russian border opened, the two cities 
of Heihe and Blagoveshchensk have witnessed a dramatic transformation. 
From a small village, Heihe has mushroomed into a sizeable town which 
now rivals Blagoveshchensk in terms of density and urban modernity. If 
Blagoveshchensk appears to have remained mostly stagnant, the transfor-
mations the town has experienced have been no less radical. The opening 
of the border has led to the city’s loss of signif icance with regard to national 
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security. No longer a closed city guarding the border with an enemy state, 
Blagoveshchensk has become peripheral and remote from the point of view 
of the capital.13
While its ties to Moscow and western Russia have weakened, the Rus-
sian town has, by contrast, grown very close to its Chinese neighbour. 
Economically dependent on each other for their survival, the two cities are 
commonly described as in symbiosis with one another. Visually they also 
mirror each other. In a process of mimetic condensation, Heihe has taken 
on Russian symbols and reinvented itself as a Russian theme park. For the 
Russians on the other side of the Amur River, the very surface of Heihe acts 
as a mirror reflecting the aspirations and failings of their own city.
This mirroring process recalls Žižek’s discussion of the dual nature of the 
neighbour, who stands as both the same and Other: ‘beneath the neighbour 
as my semblant, my mirror image, there always lurks the unfathomable 
abyss of radical Otherness, of a monstrous Thing that cannot be gentrif ied’ 
(Žižek 2005: 143). The mirror image that informs the relationship between 
Heihe and Blagoveshchensk is similarly a dual one. The ties that bind the 
two cities may be close, but they have not attenuated the sense that the 
river marks some kind of civilizational fault-line. More than two decades 
after the border reopened and relations normalized between the two sides, 
the idea endures that Europe and Asia are two different and incompatible 
civilizations (Fond Obshchestvennoye Mnenie 2007, Ponkratova et al. 2009). 
But at the same time, the sentiment that Heihe is not quite Chinese, not 
quite Other, was made explicit in interviews. Food in Heihe was consistently 
described as ‘too Russif ied’, not Chinese enough. Heihe’s Chinese residents 
similarly tend to be seen as having changed through their contact with 
Russians and to have become different from other Chinese. The picture of 
Heihe that emerged in discussions with my interlocutors was thus one that 
was both the absolute Other in the Žižekian sense and a part of oneself (an 
area of Blagoveshchensk itself, a ‘rayon goroda’). Relations to the national 
capital were similarly fractured: Moscow was both the ultimate cultural 
reference point and the absolute remote.
It is precisely in this heterogeneity of views that the destabilization 
of cultural values (and the unseating of Blagoveshchensk as outpost and 
13 The sense of remoteness increasingly associated with Moscow is both physical and symbolic. 
Travel from Blagoveshchensk to Moscow has become extremely expensive – to the extent that it 
is now cheaper to travel via Harbin and Beijing. On visits to Moscow, Blagoveshchensk residents 
are also surprised to discover that in the capital no-one seems to know where Blagoveshchensk 
is. Whereas Blagoveshchensk was a strategically and symbolically important city during the 
Soviet era, it has become a non-place (cf. Augé 1992, Brown 2003).
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cultural beacon) gains palpability. The conflicting views expressed by my 
interlocutors should not necessarily be interpreted as symptomatic of a 
deep social fracture, with Blagoveshchensk society neatly divided into 
two moieties. The idea that these positions represent the extremities of a 
wide spectrum – ranging from very negative ideas of China predicated on 
demographic imbalance and alleged irredentist ambitions to extremely 
enthusiastic attitudes about China and Chinese culture – is also somewhat 
misleading. In fact, much ambivalence was present within individuals. Thus 
even the most staunchly pro-Chinese interviewees, such as students who 
spoke fluent Chinese and dreamed of moving to China to live and work, 
occasionally juxtaposed both positive and negative assessments.
As I have shown in this text, the friction generated by close contact be-
tween two neighbours has not necessarily always been a positive one, as the 
example of the Blagoveshchensk massacre in 1900 makes clear. However, as 
affective energy, neighbouring is ultimately transformative. It can, though 
not always, attenuate the sense of social and cultural distance between two 
polities, but more importantly the ‘art of neighbouring’ compels both parties 
to engage with each other in ways that are comparable and commensurable.
While the drawing of national borders has, in most countries, tended 
to slice through ethnic and cultural continuums, the 2,500 mile border 
separating Chinese Manchuria from the Russian Far East is somewhat 
unusual. While some groups autochthonous to the region do straddle the 
international boundary line, the vast majority of inhabitants are Russians 
on one side and Chinese on the other. The two groups moved to the region 
in fact long after the border was f ixed, many of them through national 
relocation programs (Breyfogle et al. 2007) and for several decades were 
not allowed to interact. Throughout that period, these Russian and Chinese 
borderlanders did not reside at a site of exchange but, on the contrary, at a 
remote location, on the very edge of their respective polity. The dialogical 
and mimetic rapport established between the two border cities of Heihe 
and Blagoveshchensk in the last two decades has therefore, through sheer 
proximity, brought the two populations together. Unable to sustain the 
f iction of cultural separateness (see Tsing 2005: ix-x), the two cities have 
been compelled to (re)conceptualize themselves as one constituent in a 
symbiotic pair rather than separate entities. Thus, through the formation 
of countless commercial, cultural, social and linguistic ties, the energy 
generated through this neighbouring ‘friction’ has encouraged both cities 
to develop in increasingly commensurable ways, in spite of the structural 
differences that continue to visually set them apart.
2 Realms of Free Trade, Enclaves of 
Order
Chinese-Built ‘Instant Cities’ in Northern Laos
Pál Nyíri*
In its heyday, the hallmark of British imperialism was a mix of free-trade 
mercantilism and the imposition of modern government that involved 
counting, measuring, delimiting, and disciplining. Today, China’s engage-
ments with poor countries are frequently called neocolonial or neo-imperial 
and alternately accused of engaging in robber-baron capitalism and of 
subverting the free market through state-backed loans and murky patron-
age networks. But, just as the ideology of free trade did not prevent the 
British government from enforcing an opium monopoly in India and using 
it to improve its foreign-trade balance, so too large-scale Chinese projects 
abroad combine the involvement of policy banks and state enterprises with 
the championing of free trade.
To its authoritarian southwestern neighbours, Laos and Burma in 
particular, China is the source of both free trade and developmental-state 
ideology. The most ardent champions of both are often private businessmen 
rather than government off icials. This chapter will discuss how Chinese 
investors in two special economic zones in northern Laos, whose economy 
has been based on gambling, prostitution, and drugs, have deployed both 
ideologies and created simulacra of development while fending off both 
the Lao and the Chinese state. While the fantasy landscapes and ‘vice 
economies’ of these special zones seem like an extreme case, the prolifera-
tion of state- and private-led Chinese-invested special economic zones and 
other concessions around the world arguably rests on the same duality.
The Special Zones of Northern Laos
In 2007, the Lao government granted Fokhing, a Hong Kong-registered 
company, a 16 square kilometres land concession across the main border 
* Parts of this article are based on Nyíri (2012a). The author wishes to thank the participants 
of the 2012 Berkeley Summer Research Institute on ‘Bordering China’ for their comments.
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crossing with China, at Boten in Luang Namtha Province. The concession, 
called Golden Boten City, was for 30 years, with the option of renewing the 
lease twice. In the next f ive years, the area underwent an economic boom 
centred on a large casino that mostly attracted gamblers from mainland 
China. Business opportunities drew thousands of shop- and stall-keepers, 
prostitutes, and other workers from China, numbering an estimated 4,800 
in the peak season of 2010. Hotels with a total capacity of 2,700 rooms, 
condo-style apartment buildings, and workers’ dormitories were built on 
the site of the former village of Boten. Management estimated that US$130 
million had been invested by mid-2010. According to a report written for the 
visit of the chairman of the Lao National Assembly in November 2010, this 
included the construction of the school, as well as preparing the ground for 
the houses of relocated villagers and a relocated iodization plant.
The zone ran on Chinese currency and Beijing time, and until December 
2010, it relied on Chinese providers for both the f ixed and mobile phone and 
Internet networks. Members of a 700 strong security force-marched around 
in uniforms resembling those of Chinese police, emblazoned with ‘Special 
Zone Security’ in Chinese characters. According to a report written at the 
end of 2010, the zone had 300 Lao employees, but they were visible only in 
low-skilled jobs (maids, bell boys). Wages were higher than both Laos and 
China’s adjacent areas: in 2011, cleaning jobs were being advertised for 1,800 
yuan (US$300) a month plus room and board.
From the outset, the management of the company styled Golden Boten 
City a special zone (tequ 特区), but it was only in 2010 that the Lao govern-
ment off icially gazetted it as such, based on a new government decree 
on special economic zones. Under the decree, the zone is governed by an 
Economic Committee (EC) and an Administrative Committee (AC). The 
former’s members are appointed by the investors. The f irst chairman of the 
EC was Fokhing’s owner, Huang Mingxuan, a Hong Kong resident originally 
from southern Fujian Province who used to operate a gambling hall in Mong 
La, just across the China-Burma border, controlled by a splinter group of 
the former Burmese Communist Party and known for its amphetamine 
production (Nyíri 2012a). Members of the AC are appointed by the Lao 
prime minister’s off ice but paid by the investing company. While the AC 
exercises an overall supervisory function, the EC is in charge not only 
of the economy but also of ‘cultural, social, education and public health 
development’ as well as ‘security and order’ and land allocation (Article 94 
of the decree). In return for a yearly concession fee paid to the government, 
the EC has the right to levy its own taxes and administrative fees and enact 
legislation and issue license plates and ID cards that are different from 
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those in the rest of Laos but are valid across the country. Initially, Chinese 
visitors did not even need to go through Lao immigration to visit the zone, 
and they still do not have to clear Lao customs because the zone is located 
between the immigration checkpoint and the new customs house, built 
by the zone itself.
Figure 2.1  Condos at Golden Boten City. Danielle Tan, 2012
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By 2010, the buildings, the like of which had never been seen in northern 
Laos, the organization of space, the urban-like bustle, Chinese-English 
bilingual street signs, the second-hand Chinese police van, the uniforms of 
the security guards, the currency, banners with political slogans in Chinese 
characters, the Chinese channels to which hotel room televisions were 
tuned, and the shimmering neon signs of the entertainment venues created 
a sense of being in China, which was frequently voiced both by Western 
journalists who wrote about the place and by Lao workers.1 This sense was 
produced by the radical rupture of the visual, spatial, and social organiza-
tion of the place compared to the surrounding Lao countryside marked by 
sparse wooden huts, lush nature, and dark nights. It was also strengthened 
and coloured by the presence of visual cues (uniforms, off icial-looking 
signs, banners) associated specif ically with the strong Chinese state, the 
equivalents of which are far less ubiquitous even in urban Laos.
Yet in the same year, following reports in Chinese media that security 
staff had detained and tortured Chinese gamblers, the Chinese foreign min-
istry issued a statement warning Chinese nationals against going to Laos to 
gamble. Chinese border guards began turning back Chinese citizens who 
had not obtained visas in advance. Chinese telephone companies operating 
in Boten were ordered to cut their services. Chinese police issued arrest 
warrants for some f ifty gambling hall operators and employees wanted on 
charges of inducement to gamble and facilitating illegal border crossing. 
By April 2011, all gambling halls – operated by twelve different companies, 
following the Macau model2 – had closed down, small traders had left in 
droves, and the zone was deserted. The zone’s management now appealed 
to the Lao government, with whose senior members it had cultivated cordial 
relations, for support, offering f inancing for the Lao section of a planned 
Yunnan-Singapore railway.
Despite the demise of Golden Boten City, the special zone lives on. 
In March 2012, a company from China, rumoured to be connected to a 
high off icial in Xishuangbanna, the Chinese prefecture across the border, 
purchased the zone’s assets from Fokhing, and announced plans to build a 
logistics hub. By July, earth-moving machinery was seen at work in the zone.3 
1 I visited Golden Boten City three times and the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone 
twice between 2008 and 2011.
2 In Macau, such companies are known as ‘junket operators’. They play a crucial role in 
organizing gambling by visitors from mainland China because of currency controls and the 
fact that gambling debts are not legally enforceable. The junket operators provide loans and 
enforce debts by extralegal means.
3 Danielle Tan, personal communication, September 26, 2012.
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In the meantime, Golden Boten, deserted though it is, remains a monument 
to the Chinese version of urban modernity that no other place in Laos 
matches. It is not without basis that the English-language Luang Namtha 
Provincial Tourism Magazine describes Boten as the ‘most internationally 
modernized city in [L]ao’.
Like Boten, the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone in Bokeo prov-
ince, across the Mekong from Thailand, was granted as a concession to 
the Hong Kong-registered KingsRomans Group in 2007 and gazetted in 
2010. Unlike Boten, however, this zone is not on the Kunming-Bangkok 
highway but on farmland 50 kilometres to the north of it. Various f igures 
have been circulating about the size and duration of the concession; the 
company’s own documents mention 103 square kilometres and 99 years. 
Like his counterpart in Boten, the chairman of KingsRomans and the zone’s 
EC, Zhao Wei, was born in mainland China and used to operate a gambling 
hall in Mong La; he now is a Macau resident.




The Golden Triangle zone’s main feature, too, is gambling. So far, two 
casinos, f ive hotels, a nightclub, two shopping arcades, several markets, 
and a large number of dormitories and single-story houses for families have 
been completed. According to Zhao, KingsRomans had invested more than 
US$500 million in the zone by late 2010 and had 1,500 employees. Much of 
the investment has been in basic infrastructure: roads, reinforcements 
of the riverbank, a water-bottling plant, houses for farming households 
to be resettled within the zone. The company has also planted crops and 
introduced pig, cattle, and poultry farming, and there are plans to develop 
‘organic sightseeing farming’ with the help of specialists from China. 
Two-thirds of the area consists of hills, which will be left undeveloped 
as a nature reserve where swidden – traditionally practiced by mountain 
dwellers in the area – will be forbidden. While many Chinese invest in 
rubber and other plantations in northern Laos, Zhao Wei has prohibited 
rubber planting in the zone, as he plans to develop it as a base for regional 
tourism. In 2011, estimates of the zone’s migrant population varied between 
six and ten thousand; this excludes some 5,000 Lao peasants who inhabit 
seven villages in the zone.
Telephone network coverage is offered by Thai and Chinese companies. 
Electricity comes from Thailand, but sockets are Chinese. Like Boten, the 
zone uses Beijing time. The statutes governing the zone’s legal status seem 
to be the same as in Boten, but Golden Triangle’s managers have made more 
of the zone’s autonomy, which covers ‘everything except defence, foreign 
relations and legislation’ (Hanzi 2010, 13). Zhao Wei, referred to as Chairman 
Zhao, makes public appearances akin to those made by Chinese off icials; 
zone managers are referred to as ‘cadres’. Here, too, there are anti-drug 
posters and banners in Chinese.
The Safety Off ice comprises about 100 Lao policemen and a detachment 
of Chinese and Burmese security guards. Lao police can be seen patrolling 
the rural parts of the zone in brand-new cars – presumably bought by the 
zone administration – but not around the casinos, suggesting an informal 
division of jurisdiction. According to a news report, one of Zhao’s assistants 
is a former rural government off icial from China, while another is a former 
diplomat who served at the Chinese embassy in Vientiane (Fawthrop 2011). 
On the Lao side, the chairman of the AC is a Lao police off icial with a degree 
from Vietnam, while the vice-chairman is a member of the Lao National 
Assembly. Street signs, like off icial documents, are trilingual (Lao, English 
and Chinese), but West Garden Road, the main riverside avenue, is lined 
with weather-beaten Lao national and Party flags, perhaps a leftover from 
a high-ranking off icial’s visit.
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The work force is more multinational than in Boten. In line with the more 
upmarket décor of the casinos, modelled clearly on Macau, there is said to 
be a Portuguese and a Malaysian in the company’s management. While 
shop- and stall-keepers, prostitutes, and other petty entrepreneurs tend 
to be from Sichuan, Fujian, Hunan, and north-eastern China, construction 
workers are mostly Burmese (even some Lao farms within the zone report-
edly employ Burmese farm hands), while company, casino and hotel staff 
are a mix of Chinese, Thai, and Burmese. The zone also has a Lao farming 
population. Ethnic Chinese from northern Thailand and Burma often work 
in positions of some trust, for example as drivers or bodyguards. Wages are 
similar to Boten, but there is an ethnic hierarchy: Burmese construction 
workers’ monthly wages start at US$120-US$150; those of KingsRomans’ Lao 
employees at US$150-US$200; and Chinese workers get a 400 yuan (US$67) 
supplement for ‘working abroad’.
Simulacra of Development
The developers of Golden Boten and the Golden Triangle Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ) are attempting to establish themselves as regional modernizers 
at an opportune moment. In the last decade or so, northern Laos – one of 
the poorest and most remote areas of Southeast Asia – has been undergo-
ing a profound transformation as it became the site of one of the major 
transport arteries of the Greater Mekong Subregion, a project of economic 
integration supported by the Asian Development Bank (Glassman 2012). 
This has facilitated the entry of Chinese investors attracted by cheap labour 
and available land to grow cash crops such as rubber and cassava, for which 
demand in China is high. Some of the new plantations take advantage of 
the Chinese government’s opium substitution subsidies. It also generates 
tropical hardwood as an extremely valuable initial by-product of plantation 
agriculture (Diana 2009, Dwyer 2013, Shi 2008). Chinese truckers and traders 
followed (Tan 2010), and the mountainous region, inhabited largely by eth-
nic minorities disenfranchised by the Lao state, has been catapulted from a 
largely self-suff icient and in part slash-and-burn agriculture into the global 
cash economy (Lyttleton et al. 2004). The relative wealth of farmers engaging 
in rubber planting across the Chinese border, now visible to Lao neighbours 
who often belong to the same ethnic groups, have had as profound an effect 
on aspirations of modernity as the Chinese-built roads and the motorbikes 
sold by Chinese shopkeepers in northern Lao towns have had on the speed 
of transportation (Diana 2009, Lyttleton and Nyíri 2011).
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In 2008, a master plan for the economic development of northern Laos, 
prepared by Chinese specialists on behalf of the Yunnan Province Reform 
and Development Commission and presented to the Lao government, 
proposed setting up new free trade zones along the country’s borders and 
developing tourism concessions, operated and controlled by contractors. 
This proposal seems to be reflected in Laos’ 2009 Law on Investment Promo-
tion, which enables the establishment of Special Economic Zones, def ined 
as ‘a development zone for urbanization’ that may consist of industrial, 
touristic, free trade, residential and other kinds of zones (Article 33). This 
vision is further elaborated in Decree No. 443/PM, issued in October 2010, 
which sets out the criteria for transforming a special zone into a city (Article 
33): it must have a population of at least 80 thousand and infrastructure 
that includes schools, hospitals, and preferably an international airport.
Such fantastic visions are probably both inspired by developers’ promo-
tional texts and fuel more promises by them. These texts and especially 
the visuals that accompany them, like those made for other special zones 
the world over, situate them in an explicitly global landscape marked by 
concentric circles of distance from world capitals. The first brochure Golden 
Boten City produced for investors envisioned ‘thousands of people … with 
various occupations and identities, to form a huge community, and a mod-
ern society’.4 A report on Phoenix TV, a popular Hong Kong-based Chinese 
satellite channel, compared Boten to Shenzhen, China’s f irst, legendary 
special zone, which grew from a f ishing village to one of southern China’s 
largest cities (Phoenix TV 2010). The rows of Boten’s condo-like buildings 
replicates the ‘instant cities’ constructed by Chinese companies that, in the 
last few years, have spread from the outskirts of Kampala and Luanda to 
the Michigan rust belt: some of these are related to government commis-
sions and intended for the local middle class, while others combine retail 
and exhibition spaces with residential and recreational ones marketed to 
relatively high-income buyers in China.
My f irst encounter with the instant city motive was in Southeast Fujian 
Television’s drama series Into Europe (Zouru Ouzhou 走入欧洲). Produced 
in the late 1990s, it was one of a number of dramas about audacious Chinese 
migrants who make it in the world. There, the protagonist unveiled a similar 
scale model of urban modernity – for a Chinese trade city near Paris – to 
an applauding French audience (Nyíri 2006). Since then, the fantasy of a 
Chinese hero bringing modernity to the West has come close to turning 
into reality. Ronja Yu’s documentary Chinatown chronicles the failed project 
4 English in the original.
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of a large Chinese product distribution hub combined with real estate 
development in the small town of Kalmar in Eastern Sweden, which hoped 
it would revive its f lagging fortunes. One of the returning motives in the 
f ilm is the scale model of the new city, with tree-lined avenues, condos, 
and streetlights: something clearly more metropolitan looking than today’s 
Kalmar. The Kalmar project may have fallen through, but others are on 
the way in Illange-en-Moselle in France and in Milan, Michigan. Both 
are large aimed at attracting Chinese investors and providing them with 
residential real estate; the Milan project has the additional selling point of 
in-state tuition at the University of Michigan (Springfield News-Sun 2012). 
In the Golden Triangle SEZ, a scale model very similar to that developed for 
Kalmar – but complete with schools, hospitals, and airport – is on display 
in a special building.
Figure 2.3  The KingsRomans casino by night
Danielle Tan, 2012
Many of the newly announced ‘instant cities’, like Bui City in Ghana 
– planned in conjunction with the Bui Dam – may never materialize. They 
may, like the scale models so far, remain simulacra of a reality whose materi-
alization is delayed indefinitely. Others are struggling. In Peru, the Chinese 
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state aluminium company Chinalco is spending US$50 million to build 
a new town next to the Morococha copper mine to resettle locals whose 
houses are in their way. With 1,050 new houses, the company describes this 
as the largest non-state ‘social project’ in the history of Peruvian mining. 
Nonetheless, it admits that not all locals have been persuaded to move 
(Guancha 2012).
Even so, the appeal of instant cities, both as investment hubs and as 
modern places, seems wide. As Easterling (2012) writes, the term ‘city’ is 
‘an enthusiastic validation of the zone’s effort to evolve beyond its early 
identity as a remote locale for warehousing and transshipment … [If] the 
zone banishes many of the circumstantial frictions of urbanity, it none-
theless welcomes a host of residential, business, and cultural programs’. 
The way a journalist describes the Morococha new town is typical of the 
developmental enthusiasm of these stories:
Unlike the precarious labyrinth of corrugated metal shacks and painted 
brick houses that make up the old town, the houses built by Chinalco all 
have quality inside plumbing and concrete walls.
According to a […] mine off icial, most of Morocoja’s residents used to rent 
their living spaces. After the construction of the new town, some families 
own their houses and enjoy modern comforts that had not existed in 
Morocoja before, such as running water, sewage, 24-hour electricity, and 
a police off ice. (Guancha 2012)
While the residential appeal of instant cities, particularly their low-end rural 
versions, may not be as high as hoped by the investors, it would be a mistake 
to dismiss them summarily as prestige projects intended to whitewash 
extractive exploitation. These new export products of Chinese urbanism 
are likely here to stay. They, in turn, are modelled on cities that sprung up 
in China’s remote areas as a result of a sudden trade, commodity, or tourist 
boom, like Jiuzhaigou in Sichuan, Ordos in Eastern Inner Mongolia, or 
Ereen on the Mongolian border (on the latter, see Lacaze 2012, on suburban 
‘instant cities’, see Weston 2012). But Boten and the Golden Triangle are 
what Aihwa Ong (2006) terms ‘spaces of exception’: places where rules are 
suspended. As she notes, writing about the CCTV tower in Beijing built 
by Rem Koolhaas, ‘the play of exception permits the spectacularization 
of urban success as well as of national emergence’ (Ong 2011a: 206). Ong’s 
insight that spectacular architecture in contemporary Asian cities carries 
mixed symbolic meanings of capitalist modernity and national revival 
acquires a particular twist in the special zones of the borderlands where 
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the ‘interactions between exception, spectacle, and speculation’ (Ong 2011a: 
207) are tied both to a discourse of the strong developmental state and one 
of freewheeling capital in particularly eloquent ways.
Another twist is that, in the borderlands, these feats of urbanization are 
turning spatial hierarchies on their head: the remote frontiers of the nation 
are, by virtue of their closeness to China, beginning to look more metro-
politan than its very centre. Thant Myint-U, the US-educated grandson of 
UN Secretary-General U Thant, makes this very point in a recent book: ‘It’s 
a stunning reversal in Burma’s geography. What had been remote is now 
closer to the new centre. What were muddy mountain hamlets are now 
more modern than Rangoon’ (quoted in Deb 2011).
The spectacle of modernization is accompanied by a trenchant discourse. 
The Golden Triangle SEZ promises to ‘lead local people to shake off the 
poverty and backwardness’ of the ‘wilderness of old days’ into a ‘modern 
economic development zone’, a ‘green ecocity with a population of no less 
than 200 thousand’ in 10-15 years.5 In this discourse, familiar from China, 
modernization is a journey along which humans and nature are transformed 
together with the investing company, so that ‘inhospitable and ungovern-
able places [become] pacif ied, morally superior, and governable consumer 
paradises’ (Tomba 2009: 610). At a ceremony in which KingsRomans donated 
f ifty motorized rickshaws (tuk-tuks) to Lao residents in the presence of 
Lao Premier Thongsing, Zhao Wei urged them to ‘change their traditional 
way of doing business’ (LaoSEZ 2011). Promotional brochures combine the 
heroic language of conquering nature, which harks back to Maoist times, 
with the lingo of modern management and the vision of urbanization with 
the latest buzzwords of sustainability and environmentalism, which too 
are understood as features of modernity. Although the pursuit of capital 
is never far from the surface, promotional texts for both zones invariably 
include a promise of cosmopolitanism and world-betterment that goes 
beyond economic globalization.
It is easy to dismiss these promises as the sales pitch of Mong La ‘drug 
lords wishing to launder their money’ (Tan 2010: 6), for whom the Lao 
government’s enthusiasm for special zones came as a godsend. But, as 
Keller Easterling (2012) has noted, special zones are fungible places where 
industrial modernity can ‘breed promiscuously with other enclave formats 
… merging with offshore f inancial areas, tourist compounds, knowledge 
villages, high technology campuses, museums and universities’. Why not, 
5 See http://www.kingsromans.com and http://www.laosez.com/html/tqgk/ (accessed Febru-
ary 16, 2011).
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then, casinos? Indeed, Easterling (2012) goes on to suggest that, ‘operating as 
it does in a frictionless realm of legal and economic exemptions, the zone, 
as it merges with other urban formats, perhaps most naturally adopts the 
scripts – the aura of fantasy – of the vacation resort and theme park’. But, 
crucially, this seeming playfulness takes nothing away from the economic 
and political seriousness of the project. The Lao government, for one, sees 
special zones as models of national development (Huang 2011), and this 
approach has been endorsed by UNIDO – the UN’s industrial development 
organization – and the Asian Development Bank, which run a joint project 
to ‘promote the development of special economic zones in Laos’.6 Negotia-
tions are underway between the Lao government and the management 
committee of Kunming’s large High and New Technologies Zone to set 
up a 1,000 hectare zone outside Laos, with Vientiane City and Yunnan 
Province’s overseas investment company holding 25 percent and 75 percent 
of the shares respectively (Chen 2013). This zone, with a registered capital 
of US$128 million, would be Yunnan’s f irst ‘overseas cooperation zone’ 
under a Chinese government scheme that provides off icial recognition and 
some financial support to selected special zones run by Chinese companies 
abroad (so far mostly in Africa). Neighbouring China, in the case of Laos, 
means importing its development.
Freedom and Order
The explicit and elaborate claims to model modernity are underpinned by 
appealing to two powerful and conflicting discourses. One discourse, both 
visual and textual, consists of replicating the paraphernalia of the Chinese 
state, from communiqués to ceremonies, from banners to uniforms. These 
appear to have a dual function: they serve as a metonymy for the authority of 
the strong neighbouring state and evoke efficacy as a developmental regime 
by imitating the practices of a state associated with developmental powers.
The imitation of Chinese – and other lowland state – symbols and ritual 
by chiefs of upland Southeast Asian polities has a long history. Following 
Edmund Leach (1960) and other scholars, James C. Scott (2009: 7) points 
6 Remarks by Sonam Yangchen Rana, UN Resident Coordinator, Lao Plaza Hotel, Vientiane, 
July 16, 2009; and Chong Chi Nai, ADB Country Director, ibid., October 15th, 2010. UNIDO was 
at the forefront of promoting export processing zones – an earlier form of special zones – in 
the 1970s but advised caution about the problems arising from their enclave-like nature in the 
1980s (Easterling 2012).
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out, for example, that the palaces, ceremonies, dress and cosmology of 
Shan rulers in pre-colonial and colonial Burma were based on Chinese 
models. Scott sees this ‘state mimicry’ as ‘cosmological bluster’, an attempt 
to conjure up the power of ‘stateness’ in the only familiar idiom (Scott 2009: 
11). At the same time, he describes it as a strategy of ‘symbolic subordination’ 
to appease the lowland state that might be compatible with actual rebellion 
(Scott 2009: 7). When Chairman Zhao makes speeches about ‘responsibility 
to history’, ‘rapid, healthy development’, or ‘promoting Sino-Lao friendship’ 
(Hanzi 2010: 13-15), he is not just lionizing himself: he, too, is engaging in 
‘cosmological bluster’ by borrowing the language of the state and of state 
enterprises that have, in the last few years, become the main builders of 
dams and roads across Laos, Burma and Cambodia, but also in Africa 
and elsewhere. This language aff irms paternalism, order, discipline, and 
economic growth, and associates it with the PRC as a model.
The twist on this contemporary version of ‘state mimicry’ – fragile though 
it may be, as the Boten case shows – is that the developmentalism it has at 
its centre appeals to lowland Lao off icials for whom the particular Chinese 
Communist idiom of stateness is familiar, yet also somewhat different from 
the Soviet/Vietnamese version in which they have been reared. Although 
special zones as a development model have been used by numerous Asian 
states, in Laos – as in Africa or Papua New Guinea – where they arrived 
only in the last few years, they have been specifically associated with China, 
where the f irst special economic zones, notably Shenzhen across the Hong 
Kong border, emerged in the late 1970s and became central vehicles and 
symbols of economic reform. Gradually, development zones became a 
ubiquitous device, both rhetorical and real, for local off icials wishing to 
attract, and to project, economic growth, and were routinely included in 
tours for off icials from ‘developing’ countries invited to visit China. Accord-
ing to a manager at Golden Triangle, Lao off icials returning from trainings 
in China, particularly young ones, have been keen to apply the ‘Shenzhen 
model’ in Laos. It is easy to imagine that the familiar trappings of the state 
would have a reassuring effect on these off icials – in turn engaged with an 
institutional rivalry with military units that are accumulating increased 
wealth, and thus influence within the state, by entering into joint ventures 
with Chinese rubber planters.
Yet next to state mimicry, a second discourse upon which claims of 
modernizing power are based is one of economic and social freedom from 
discipline imposed by the state. The vice-chairman of Golden Boten’s ad-
ministrative committee emphasized in an interview: ‘This is the only SEZ 
in the world that investors have the most rights to invest’. Such competitive 
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claims to greater freedom are of course central to the attractiveness of 
special zones, not only for major investors but also to individual fortune-
seekers, from gamblers to oilcake vendors. The prominence of gambling, 
drugs and sex is arguably not just a product of short-term profit seeking 
but a functional element of this discourse of freedom. Indeed, if the special 
zones feel both more regulated and more freewheeling than the national 
territory into which they are enclaved, it is perhaps partly by design. While 
workers and managers often invoke being outside China as an explanation 
for why certain rules – such as limits on working hours – do not apply, the 
same rationale is provided many times for other rules associated with more 
‘developed’ societies – such as an absence of bargaining.
So can we still speak of ‘enclaves of order’ if order is just pretence?7 What 
does it matter that the walls at Golden Triangle are covered with ‘notices’, 
written in the off icialese of the PRC, warning of the severe punishment 
inflicted on those in possession of illegal f irearms when the zone’s promo-
tional brochure offers shooting with submachine guns? What does it matter 
that drugs are prohibited in similarly stern language but widely available? 
Easterling (2012) suggests that, upon closer inspection, all special zones are 
‘at once the mascot[s] and contradiction of the basic tenets of “free market 
liberalism” … the zone itself is a form of big governance par excellence, 
constituting a signif icant effort to thread together existing networks of 
global contractual relations in the absence of any robust international law’ 
even as they rely ‘heavily on terms like openness, relaxation, and freedom. 
Of course, Dubai’s Education City is a safer and tamer environment than 
Golden Boten. Nonetheless, even at Boten, there is far more surveillance 
than outside its guarded gates.
While the special zones in northern Laos are an extreme case, the dual 
discourse of Chinese investors as agents of top-down development and 
entrepreneurial freedom may in some ways be indicative of a broader 
range of state- and private-led Chinese-invested special economic zones, 
infrastructural projects and other concessions that have been proliferat-
ing around the world. Such zones have ‘emerged as ‘zones of awkward 
engagement’ (Tsing 2005) in which Chinese and local worlds meet, mix and 
clash (Pedersen and Bunkenborg 2012). Much media and some scholarly 
attention has been paid to such projects, but it has been largely limited 
either to economic data or invectives about land-grabbing neocolonial-
ism and Kremlinological second-guessing about the Chinese leadership’s 
designs. While state involvement and political motivations are clear in 
7 I thank Martin Saxer for this question.
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some development zones and extractive and infrastructural projects, the 
special zones of northern Laos suggest that other projects that are only 
loosely or not at all linked to the Chinese state at any of its levels display 
more parallels with the early nineteenth century free-trade imperialism 
pioneered by private capital that – like in the foreign concessions imposed 
on China after the Opium Wars – imitated state institutions largely to 
bolster its own respectability. Although it later became imbricated more 
closely with the military power of colonial states, the ideology of trading 
enclaves such as Canton rested upon the idea of economic freedom as the 
motor of a local developmentalism from which the population benefits as 
long as it submits to discipline. In the highlands of Laos and Burma, the 
revival of such concessions and the ‘awkward engagement’ that takes place 
in them has become central to neighbouring China. The region, with its 
history of overlapping sovereignty, fuzzy boundaries, and populations never 
quite subjected to lowland authority – the proverbial ‘Zomia’ of Willem 
van Schendel and James Scott – and more recently of military stragglers, 
insurgents and drug lords that united migrants from China, local ethnic 
Chinese and highlanders in their armies, has provided particularly fertile 
soil to adventurers that can alternately or simultaneously position them-
selves as f ighters for freedom and harbingers of order (Nyíri 2012a). But 
the revival of concessions, not exclusively but to a substantial part linked 
these days to Chinese investors (Nyíri 2012b), is a global phenomenon that 
is no longer limited to poor countries but is increasingly penetrating the 
ailing peripheries of richer ones. Amidst the collapsing economy, soaring 
unemployment and multiplying neo-Nazi attacks that constitute the media 
image of contemporary Greece, a New York Times report shows half of the 
port of Piraeus leased for 35 years in 2010 by the Chinese investor Cosco as 
an island of economic success and job stability – with no unions and low 
wages. As Captain Fu Chengqiu, in charge of the project, declared to the 
reporter: ‘We showed the local people that we want to help them develop’ 
(Alderman 2012).

3 New Roads, Old Trades
Neighbouring China in Nepal
Martin Saxer*
Signs
On the wall of a rebuilt shepherd’s shelter at the end of a remote Himalayan 
valley there is a trilingual signboard reading ‘Karnali Gramin Trade Con-
cern’. The signboard in English, Chinese, and Nepali belongs to a little shop 
that sells Chinese goods – batteries, beer, shoes, jackets, cigarettes, rice, 
f lour, pots, etc. The shop is located at about 4,000 meters above sea level at 
the upper tip of the Limi valley in the district of Humla, Western Nepal. The 
place is called Tugling. The nearest airf ield is several days’ walk away. From 
November to May, the area is cut off from the rest of Humla. However, the 
Chinese border is close and a new road connects Tugling to Tibet.
A young entrepreneur, originally from a village nearby but based in 
Kathmandu, came back to establish the business. He bought a Chinese 
truck and installed a satellite telephone link. When I visited in autumn 2011, 
his younger brother was in charge of daily operations while he continued 
his business ventures throughout Asia. The trilingual signboard listed f ive 
telephone numbers in China, Nepal and India where he could be reached.
This shop with its cosmopolitan signboard has to be seen against the 
background of a larger and ongoing process in Nepal’s Himalayas. Over the 
past decade, fervent road construction on the Tibetan Plateau has led to a 
situation in which access to many of Nepal’s Himalayan border regions is 
now far easier from the Tibetan side than from Nepal’s urban centres in the 
south. Several new Chinese roads lead to the northern border of Nepal, and 
some are currently being extended into Nepali territory.1 As a consequence, 
* This chapter is based on f ield research carried out in Humla in September/October 2011 and 
October/November 2012 with grants from the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Asia 
Research Institute, National University of Singapore.
1  Apart from the Friendship Highway, at least half a dozen roads now reach the Nepal border 
or end very close to it. Four of them extend into Nepali territory, and two of them cross the 
Himalayan range. In the east, one road leads from Sakya to the upper Arun valley and almost 
down to the border at Kimathanka. A branch of this road leads to Riwu and is motorable almost 
up to the Tipta pass on the old trade route to Walung (see www.theotherimage.com/series/
walung). This has become an extremely important border-crossing. A second road leads to the 
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many of the high valleys that traditionally served as pathways for exchange 
between the Tibetan Plateau and South Asia but fell into decline since the 
1960s have seen a stark revival of cross-border trade. As these erstwhile 
crossroads of High Asia (Rizvi 1996) are, once again, becoming junctures of 
exchange, neighbouring China has come to shape many aspects of everyday 
life in the region. Road construction thereby plays a central, yet ambivalent, 
role.
Rongshar valley, with a side road branching off in the Everest region and leading to Gyaplung, 
just 6 km from the Nangpa pass that was the main trade route to Khumbu (International 
Campaign for Tibet 2003). West of the Friendship Highway, a new road connects Kyirong with 
Rasuwa, Syabru and Kathmandu. This connection, formally opened in 2012, is meant to become 
an alternative to the Friendship Highway (Campbell 2010, Tibet Information Network 2010). 
One road connects Mustang with the Brahmaputra valley and the east-west highway through 
Tibet; the stretch from the border to Lo Manthang has been completed in 2001 (Ghaley 2001). 
Since 2008 there is also a rough road down the Kali Gandaki to Pokhara and Kathmandu. 
Another road is planned through the Tsum Valley (Lama 2013) and there are at least two roads 
that end north of Dolpo; they are used by local traders and are visible on Google Earth. North of 
Mugu, there are no roads to the best of my knowledge. In Humla, there are two roads, one from 
Lake Manasarovar over Lapcha La through Limi (see www.theotherimage.com/series/limi) 
and one from Hilsa through Yari and Muchu, f inally planned to connect Simikot with the 
Tibetan border.
Figure 3.1  The shop in Tugling, Limi
Martin Saxer, 2011
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Roads receive uneven attention in public and in academia. Once built, 
as existing strips of gravel or tarmac, they are often just taken for granted 
and overlooked. The politics surrounding their construction and their value 
as signs of modernization and development, however, make the idea of the 
road a highly contested one. A road can stand for the promise of future 
connectivity and prosperity; at the same time, it can serve as a symbol for 
all that is wrong with modernity.
While big development organizations, including the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank, continue to have faith in the ultimately 
positive effects of road construction, especially in rural areas (Escobal and 
Ponce 2003, Jacoby 1998, Ren and van de Walle 2007), anthropologists have 
pointed to discrepancies between rhetoric and reality. Anna Tsing (2005), for 
example, describes abandoned logging roads in Kalimantan as the scars left 
behind by the ruthless transformation of a jungle into a ‘resource frontier’. 
The desolate logging roads are an index of failed development – they lead 
nowhere. In a similar vein, Pedersen and Bunkenborg (2012) argue that 
despite the rhetoric of connectivity roads may, in fact, disconnect rather 
than connect. Looking at Sino-Mongolian border roads and the interaction 
between local Mongolians and Chinese workers in the oil industry, they 
show how roads can serve as ‘technologies of distantiation’ (Pedersen and 
Bunkenborg 2012: 563).
In the case of the Himalayas, Ben Campbell (2010) argues that a high-
profile road project in Nepal has primarily remained a ‘rhetorical route for 
development’, which locals fear will not benefit them. Likewise, Jonathen 
Demenge (2013) shows for Ladakh that new roads to seemingly isolated 
places do not necessarily increase mobility.
The international press has been equally critical of Himalayan roads, 
although along slightly different lines: roads, it is assumed, will put an end 
to traditional ways of life. When a new road from China reached Upper 
Mustang, for example, Al Jazeera portrayed it as a fundamentally disjunc-
tive event and ran a story entitled ‘Mustang vs. China: A losing battle?’ 
(Chao 2011); the Financial Times chimed in with a lead sentence stating ‘[a] 
new road is inching towards the capital of a hidden Himalayan “kingdom”, 
bringing the modern world with it’ (Grover 2011).
However, in a region that traditionally relied on intensive exchange with 
neighbours north and south, mountain tracks – and now roads – are the 
single most important infrastructures. The hopes they trigger, the socio-
economic asymmetries they foster, and the opportunities they create are 
at the very core of social and political life in the Himalayas. The people I 
met during my research in northern Nepal neither necessarily fear the new 
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roads, nor do they believe that roads will bring ‘the modern world with 
them’, as the Financial Times assumes. Rather than leading to modernity 
(for good or for bad), the new roads are primarily conceived of as ways 
back to what is remembered as prosperous trans-Himalayan exchange. 
These may be new roads, but what they facilitate is an old trade: brokering 
between neighbours.





























Design: Martin Saxer, 2016
In this chapter, I focus on two new Himalayan roads in Western Nepal (see 
map, f igure 3.2). Both link the district of Humla in the far north-western 
corner of the country with Purang and the Kailash region of western Tibet. 
The f irst road leads from Purang (Tibet) via Hilsa to Yari. I will call it the 
Hilsa road. It is off icially endorsed but construction, which already started 
in the 1990s, has been slow. The other road, called the Limi road, was pri-
vately initiated in 2010. It leads across the high plateau that belongs to Limi 
VDC,2 passes Tukling (the camp described above), and crosses the Nyalo 
Pass. The two competing roads are designed to meet midway between the 
Tibetan border and Simikot, Humla’s district headquarters. The politics and 
2 The VDC, short for Village Development Committees, is the smallest administrative unit 
in Nepal. Limi is one of 31 VDCs in Humla District.
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agonistic intensities of neighbouring that surround these two road projects 
are the topic of this chapter.
In what follows, I will f irst provide some brief historical background and 
outline the contemporary constellation that puts the art of neighbouring 
at the centre of people’s endeavours and ambitions. Second, I will describe 
these ambitions, the institutions they revive, and the skills they require, 
and thereby explore the unfolding dynamics of neighbouring China in 
north-western Nepal.
Background
For centuries, if not millennia, the Himalayas were a zone of contact and 
exchange – a world of motion, rather than a realm of unbroken tradition. 
Hermit monks, outcasts, rebels and traders came to the mountain valleys. 
They were joined by waves of immigrants f leeing the rise of the Mughal 
Empire in India, Gelug power in Tibet, the expansion of the Ghorka kingdom 
in Nepal or, more recently, Communist rule in China.
The high mountains not only promised refuge, but also opportunities for 
trade. Separating the arid Tibetan Plateau from the hills and fertile plains 
of South Asia, the mountain range creates a differential between ecological 
zones and their respective economies and resources; brokering between the 
different demands of Tibet and the Indian Subcontinent has long been a 
crucial source of income in the Himalayas, especially since the higher val-
leys and villages do not guarantee agricultural or agro-pastoral subsistence. 
Tibetan salt, yak tails, sheep and pashmina wool were profitably exchanged 
for food grains from the hills and lowlands, as well as manufactured goods 
from India and beyond. Consequently, in the high Himalayas, wealth is 
traditionally associated with business. Quite in contrast to the image of the 
poor, rural, and isolated periphery, the Himalayas were home to a number 
of comparatively wealthy trading communities (Fürer-Haimendorf 1975, 
van Spengen 2000, Vinding 1998).
A series of developments in the second half of the 20th century affected 
these established systems of exchange. Communist rule in Tibet set limits 
to private trade and the border demarcation between Nepal and the PRC in 
the early 1960s outlawed all but six border crossings. Although closure was 
far from universal and in many places only temporary, the entire border 
region was affected in one way or another. Well-established cross-border 
relations were severed and Himalayan valleys that once served as bustling 
trade routes of regional importance suddenly found themselves at the very 
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periphery. Furthermore, the introduction of heavily subsidized salt, fortified 
with iodine to combat goitre, undermined the profitability of the salt-grain 
trade in Nepal (Rauber 1980, Saxer 2013a). A phase of reorientation began and 
it seemed that the days of prosperous trans-Himalayan trade were over for 
good. In some areas mountaineering, tourism, and donor money gradually 
replaced trade as sources of income and targets of ambition; other areas 
simply impoverished (Bauer 2004, Fisher 1990).
When in the mid-1960s the so-called Friendship Highway, one of the two 
major routes between Kathmandu and Lhasa, was opened for motorized 
traff ic, Nepali business people complained that Communist Tibet was poor 
and had nothing to offer. The New York Times cited a trader:
They are already getting a lot of our rice, maize and other grains, tobacco, 
cigarettes, sugar, matchboxes, oil, soap, biscuits, textiles. We get in return 
only wool and musk, for which there is no market, some salt and sheep. 
(New York Times 1964)
This asymmetry was even starker in Western Nepal. Throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, western Tibet remained dependent on grain imported 
through Humla. Wealth was certainly not universal, but Humla was still 
home to several relatively well-off communities (Fürer-Haimendorf 1975, 
Goldstein 1975, Levine 1988, Rauber 1981). Since then, however, the situa-
tion has fundamentally changed. The rapid rise of China as an economic 
and industrial power, and the construction of new roads facilitating 
access to the goods produced by China’s factories and agro-industries 
– among them the majority of the items listed by the complaining 
trader in 1964 – completely reversed the former trade imbalance. Today, 
Humla is one of the poorest districts of Nepal. Many households rely on 
government-subsidized rice and assistance by World Food Programme 
(WFP) to make ends meet. The region is attested levels of food insecurity 
comparable with the worst-affected areas in Sub-Saharan Africa (Nepal 
Khadya Surakshya Anugaman Pranali 2009, Regmi and Joshi 2008: 380, 
Roy et al. 2009).
The tales and memories of former trade-related prosperity, however, are 
very much alive. It is in the context of these memories that the majority of 
people I encountered during my research in the northern valleys of Nepal 
perceived the potential of the new roads. 
I will now turn to the two roads that link Upper Humla with Tibet – the 
Hilsa road and the Limi road – and discuss how such memories of old trade 
shape the contemporary realities of neighbouring China.
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Paljor’s Camp
In spring 2011, at the temporary head of the Hilsa road just below the village 
of Yari, a young man whom I will call Paljor, set up a tent shop to sell Chinese 
goods. I knew Paljor from my previous research when he was still the well-
respected secretary of an NGO in Kathmandu. He was clearly a talented 
young man who skilfully managed to mediate between stakeholders, donor 
interests, local politics, and the curiosity of foreign researchers like me. I was 
surprised to learn that he left his job in order to sell Chinese merchandise 
in a green army tent at the end of a dusty road in Upper Humla.
Humla is not known to attract ambitious young people. Not only outsiders 
tend to imagine contemporary Humla as poor and desolate, the Humli 
themselves speak of their district as a diff icult place to live. Leaving a good 
job in Kathmandu for a tent in Upper Humla thus seemed a rather unusual 
decision. But Paljor had analyzed the situation well: there was no road 
link between Humla and Nepal’s centres in the south, and even the mule 
tracks were diff icult to pass. Goods had thus to be flown into Humla and 
transportation costs were prohibitively expensive. Airfreight rates from 
Nepalgunj to Simikot, Humla’s district headquarters f ive days south of the 
Tibetan border, varied between NRS 120 and NRS 240 per kilogram (US$1.35 
– US$2.70), depending on fuel prices and seasonal demand. Shipping goods 
via the Chinese road network was much cheaper. Furthermore, Purang, 
the Tibetan town across the border, was booming. China’s Great Western 
Development Strategy (xibu dakaifa 西部大开发) brought investment to 
the region. Paljor reasoned that these developments, together with some 
recent progress on the Hilsa road, presented an opportunity.
Paljor was not the only one who saw this opportunity. While he planned 
to set up camp below Yari, a group of young local entrepreneurs bought 
a Chinese truck, pulled it across the river in Hilsa, and started offering 
transportation services on the 30-kilometer stretch between the border 
and the road head.3 Using their truck, Paljor started importing goods from 
China and selling them in his tent shop.
His prices were moderately higher than in Hilsa or across the border 
in Purang, and in principle most of his customers would have been able 
to cross the border themselves. Residents within a 30-kilometer zone to 
both sides of the border are entitled to a so-called ‘Entry-Exit Pass for 
3 At the time of research in 2011 and 2012 the narrow suspension bridge across the Karnali 
River in Hilsa was the only link between the Chinese road and the road from Hilsa to Yari. 
However, in 2012 construction of a new bridge started.
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Nepal-China Border Citizens’, which facilitates free movement across the 
border within this zone.4 Nevertheless, the tent shop at the road head 
offered a distinctive advantage. Further north towards Tibet there are 
practically no grazing grounds for pack animals, and buying fodder can 
quickly become more expensive than paying the moderately higher prices 
in Paljor’s camp. Moreover, traveling across the border to Purang, f inding 
accommodation, and dealing with shopkeepers from Xinjiang and Lhasa 
is strenuous and time consuming. Paljor’s customers were usually not the 
big and well-connected traders but people who had f ields to harvest and 
families to attend to back home. They were happy to avoid the hassle and 
preferred doing business with a trustworthy countryman rather than 
directly engaging in neighbouring relations across the border.
When Paljor started his business in 2011, the technicalities of cross-border 
trade were straightforward. On the Nepal side, state authority was mostly 
absent. Although there were several small police posts in the area, the 
police hardly interfered with trade. There was no customs off ice in Hilsa, 
trucks had no license plates (there was no authority to issue them) and ran 
on smuggled Chinese diesel. Only the Communist Youth League, present in 
Hilsa with a solemn red flag on one of the houses, distributed a pamphlet 
stating that the import of alcohol (and the export of timber) were not only 
reprehensible but also, in fact, illegal. This relative absence of state power 
contrasted sharply with the situation in Tibet where the Chinese state was 
pervasive and omnipresent. However, if anything, the Chinese authorities 
encouraged the export of consumer goods and the formalities required 
were minimal.
Trying to make use of the particular positionality between neighbours 
north and south, Paljor, himself from a well-known Humli trader fam-
ily, assumed the traditional role of a broker. In this sense, establishing a 
roadside business was a continuation of an old family trade. But Paljor 
felt yet in another way the in-betweeness of the situation. As a former 
NGO employee he was sensitive to issues of benefit sharing, participation 
4 A special provision for the movement of border residents has been in place since the early 
1960s. However, neither the agreements of 1950 and 1960, nor the 1961 Border Treaty or the 1963 
Protocol mention any specif ic rules. Furthermore, in some regions along the border, the absence 
of settlements within the 30 kilometer zone on the Tibetan side has made the arrangement 
impractical. A commission looked into the practical problems arising from settlements just 
outside the 30kilometer radius in 1966 and again in 1986. In practice, the arrangement has been 
handled in a variety of ways at different crossings and times. Finally, the ‘Entry-Exit Pass for 
Nepal-China Border Citizens’ was introduced in 2006 (Kansakar 2001, Off ice of the Geographer 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research 1965, Shneiderman 2013, Shrestha 2011).
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and environmental conservation. The idea of prof it for the sake of prof it 
clashed with his ideals. It was very important for Paljor to see and portray his 
endeavour as ethically sound and beneficial for the community around him. 
He condemned, for example, the highly profitable trade in cheap Chinese 
liquor for its devastating impact in the villages, and he also strongly disap-
proved of collecting yartsagunbu (Ophiocordyceps sinensis, dbyar rtswa 
dgun ‘bu), the fungus sold for very high prices to China, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore.5 The promise of quick money that drove hordes of young people 
to the mountains in spring, regardless of the dangers involved in collection 
and trade, was neither good for the community nor for the environment, 
he argued.
Over the summer, a few other young men followed Paljor’s example and 
started their own shops at the road head below Yari. The roadside camp 
grew. When I asked Paljor if he did not mind the competition, he denied and 
said that he even encouraged them to join him. Paljor honestly considered 
his venture to be much more than just a prof itable enterprise. He saw a 
perspective for Humla in the fact that one could make a living from legally 
trading simple goods like clothes and shoes – rather than trafficking animal 
parts and other illegal items for which Humla has once had a reputation.6 
He wanted to be a fair and mindful businessman facilitating access to 
affordable consumer goods in cash-strapped Humla.
Paljor’s ethical reasoning may not be shared by the majority of business-
people in the region. However, in the eyes of many, access to affordable 
consumer goods was not just an economic issue but a moral right, yet one 
that the state continually failed to guarantee. This emphasis on moral-
ity bears many similarities with Henryk Alff ’s observations of a ‘moral 
economy’ in the bazaars of Bishkek and Almaty, which serve a similar 
purpose (Alff, chapter 4, this volume; Scott 1976, Thompson 1966).
That Paljor limited his business to such simple consumer goods, such as 
clothes, shoes, soap, household utensils, and staples like vegetable oil and 
5 Yartsagunbu, known as dong chong xia cao (冬虫夏草) in China, is collected throughout 
the Himalayas and has a decisive socio-economic impact in the regions where it is found 
(Devkota 2009, Lama 2007, Olsgard 2009, Sulek 2009, Winkler 2008, 2010). See also Eric Valli’s 
f ilm Himalayan Gold Rush on the yartsagunbu boom in Dolpo (http://www.ericvalli.com/index.
php?/f ilms/himalayan-gold-rush).
6 With the declining revenue from the salt-grain trade, many Humli traders shifted their 
business to other goods in demand, and in the late 1980s and 1990s, trade with animal parts such 
as tiger bones and antelope pelts was highly prof itable. These items were once common, legal, 
and licit merchandise. With the international ban, trade moved to ‘remote’ border crossings 
such as in Humla. For a more detailed discussion see Saxer 2013a.
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wheat flower, did not mean that Paljor’s profits were meagre, however. At the 
time of my visit, he made around NPR 6,000 (US$80)7 in an average day – about 
as much as he had earned in a month in his former NGO job in Kathmandu. 
His friends operating the truck between the border and the road head earned 
considerably more, he said. They made three trips per day on the 30-kilometer 
road between Hilsa and Yari. They charged NPR 20,000 (US$266) per trip, 
and thus generated a turnover of NPR 60,000 (US$800) per day. According to 
Paljor, net profits were around 50 percent – NPR 30,000 (US$400) per day, or 
roughly NPR 900,000 (US$12,000) per month. Given that a good second-hand 
truck cost about US$14,000 in Tibet, the owners were able to recuperate their 
total investment in just 35 days. The season lasted for more than five months.
Figure 3.3  Paljor’s camp
Martin Saxer, 2011
These f igures are rough estimates, based on people’s best guesses. They may 
not be accurate. However, the tales of these profits spread like a wildf ire 
and captivated the minds of many. The opportunities the road and relatively 
open border presented changed ambitions and orientations, especially 
among young men.
7 The exchange rate in September 2011 was approximately US$1 to NPR 75, in November 2012 
about US$1 to NPR 85.
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The Entrepôt
When I came back a year later in October 2012, Paljor’s camp had moved 
a few kilometres further down to a place known as Pani Palbang. Instead 
of a single truck and a few shops, I found a veritable tent city with more 
than 30 vehicles, around 50 shops, and even an improvised service station.
The collective ambition triggered by the success stories of the road head 
pioneers had revived an old Himalayan institution: the seasonal trade mart. 
Much of the erstwhile trans-Himalayan trade relied on such entrepôts set up 
during the summer months in order to barter Tibetan salt for Nepali grain. 
The salt was brought from the salt lakes on the highland plateau by yak 
caravans and reloaded onto pack animals better suited for the temperatures 
in Nepal’s valleys. In Humla, dzo – cross-breeds of yaks and cows – as well as 
goat and sheep were used for this purpose. The locations of these entrepôts 
were shifting over time, but the names of the famous trade marts are still 
widely known. Although yaks have since been replaced by trucks in Tibet, 
the institution of the seasonal entrepôt seemed to lend itself well to the 
current constellation.
Among the new traders in Pani Palbang’s tent city was Dorji, a former 
classmate of Rinzin, my friend and research assistant. Dorji’s tent was one 
of the most spacious in Pani Palbang. It featured a stove, a sitting area, and 
two large shelves on which the merchandise was displayed: on one side 
clothes, footwear, household items, and sweets imported from Kashgar; on 
the other side beer, liquor, soft drinks and more expensive running shoes 
brought from Lhasa.
I had met Dorji the year before in one of the villages along the way, where 
he was working as schoolteacher. He struck me as unusually enthusiastic 
about his profession. He told me proudly that his students had passed the 
national exams with a much higher average than students from other rural 
schools. ‘One day, we will beat Kathmandu!’ he said. But just like Paljor’s, 
his ambitions and dreams had changed. Over the winter, Dorji had married 
and come to the conclusion that his teaching job with a monthly salary of 
NPR 9000 (US$106) was not going to be enough to cater for a family. Hearing 
all the success stories of his peers who had ventured into business – and 
ignoring all the stories of those who had failed – he decided to try his luck 
in trade himself.
Dorji offered us butter tea, Lhasa beer and Coca Cola. He had the habitus 
and posture of an experienced businessman. He smoked Chinese cigarettes 
and had gained some weight since we had last met him. Rinzin could not 
help commenting – as a compliment more than as a criticism – on this 
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striking transformation. Dorji proudly told us how he went to Purang, 
the town across the border, with nothing but a thousand rupees in his 
pocket (US$11). As many fellow newcomers, he was dependent on other 
people’s capital. His f irst step was thus to f ind potential investors. Friends 
introduced him to two businessmen, a Hui from Xinjiang and a Khampa 
from eastern Tibet. He convinced them to provide him with tent and an 
initial stock of goods worth a total of NPR 300,000 (US$3,530) – without any 
form of security, he added with a smile.
Dorji’s account made me think of the words of an elderly Humli trader 
who, remembering the situation in the early 1970s, told me how hungry 
Tibetans on the other side would beg his party in tears to barter salt for 
grain with them – despite the threat of punishment for breaking the 
government monopoly that ruled out private trade until the reforms of 
1979-1980. Within a generation, the tides had turned and the Humli traders 
had become dependent on the capital, trust, and goodwill of their partners 
on the Chinese side. However, the neighbouring situation as such, and 
the skills required to make use of it, were not fundamentally different. 
It is worth noting that Dorji did not approach potential investors within 
his family or his village. He went straight to Purang to establish relations 
regardless of ties of commonplace or ethnicity.8 What he was looking for 
was not just starting capital but potential long-term partners on the other 
side, people with knowledge and networks reaching beyond the immediate 
context of the borderland.
In the heydays of caravan trade, the ideal of ceremonial friendship, 
known as miteri in Nepali and dropo (grogs po) in Tibetan, was the model 
for such relations (Messerschmidt 1982: 275-278). Such friendships asserted 
in ritual were not exclusive and traders would rely on several such partner-
ships. Ceremonial friendship ties were instrumental in long-distance trade 
as they provided the partners with hospitality and inside knowledge away 
from home. Ceremonial friendship introduced a dimension of stability to 
the vagaries of border trade. Twenty-f irst century capitalism may require a 
different mode of partnership and, perhaps, rely on different forms of ritual; 
it remains to be seen whether the business relations Dorji established in 
2012 will be stable. However, the fact that two businessmen from altogether 
different backgrounds decided that giving Dorji credit was a worthwhile 
venture may be taken as a hint that all parties involved envisioned at least 
the possibility of a longer-term engagement.
8 Despite being ethnically Tibetan, Khampa (people from Eastern Tibet) are not considered 
to belong to any form of in-group in this respect.
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There are no houses or other permanent infrastructure that would re-
quire investment and bind people to a place, and thus there was always the 
risk that Nepali traders would simply decide to break camp and disappear 
without paying back their debts. The evanescence of the institution of the 
seasonal trade mart makes it not only adaptable to changing constellations; 
it also requires a high degree of trust.
This uncertainty and fragility grew with the size of the Pani Palbang 
trade mart. As an increasing number of people were investing their energy 
and money, and as more and more trucks and mule drivers were offering 
their transportation services, the basic parameters of the constellation were 
changing as well. While people like Paljor and Dorji made solid profits from 
simple goods like clothes, shoes, wheat flower and detergent, others started 
venturing into riskier and potentially more profitable domains, which in 
turn began to attract more scrutiny by the state.
In 2012, one of these highly profitable ventures was China-bound trade 
in Paris polyphylla (qiyeyizhihua 七叶一枝花), a medicinal herb locally 
known as satuwa. The root of satuwa is used for treating fever, headache, 
and livestock poisoning. In China, a variety of other conditions, including 
ulcers, tonsillitis, rheumatism, are treated with a decoction of the root 
(Madhu, et al. 2010). The plant grows at medium altitudes throughout the 
greater Himalayan region and is also collected in Humla, although on a 
relatively small scale compared to other commercially traded species. In 
2012, however, a Chinese businessman allegedly began buying large quanti-
ties of satuwa through a representative in Purang. Rumour had it that he 
was willing to invest RMB 30 million (US$4.9 million) in one season alone.
Soon, demand outstripped local supply, and people started importing 
satuwa from the herb markets in Delhi and Amritsar. By late summer, 
these supplies dried up and satuwa roots were imported from Pakistan and 
allegedly even from Afghanistan. As there were no roads that connected 
Humla with the south, the roots had to be flown into Simikot. On a daily 
basis, chartered airplanes would land in the district headquarters and bag 
after bag of the herb would be strapped onto the backs of mules and trans-
ported up to the Tibetan border – a trip that takes f ive to six days. While in 
2011, most of the pack animals I witnessed going up to the Tibetan border 
were empty; in October 2012 all of them were laden with Paris polyphylla. 
I witnessed caravan after caravan moving up to the border.
Satuwa is considered a rare and vulnerable species in several places, 
but it is not off icially a threatened species. Neither the CITES appendices9 
9 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, see www.cites.org.
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nor IUCN’s Red List10 include Paris polyphylla. Thus, trade in satuwa is 
technically legal – given that all the customs procedures are followed and 
the plant is not collected in a protected area. Legitimate road transport 
via the Friendship Highway between Kathmandu and Lhasa would have 
been feasible and also cheaper than chartering aircraft and mule caravans. 
Nevertheless, the herb was channelled in massive quantities through the 
border crossing at Hilsa.
Apparently, there was a working agreement at the border that facili-
tated import without formalities, bypassing Chinese customs and import 
procedures. The latter would normally imply sampling, testing, and plant 
quarantine for medicinal herbs following the same strict rules as the import 
of vaccines or antibiotics. Although Chinese law does provide an exemp-
tion for locally traded herbs at remote border-crossings, satuwa bought 
in India or Pakistan would probably not fall under this provision (China’s 
State Food and Drug Administration 2001, Saxer 2013b: 110-113). However, 
nobody I talked to was aware of any of these regulations. The arrangement 
simply worked, which was all that mattered. According to Dorji, net profits 
for Nepali traders – after all expenses, including charter f light and mule 
transport – were still around NPR 200 (US$2.35) per kilogram. Demand 
seemed bottomless and the starting capital required to set up a deal was 
allegedly easy to f ind. The opportunity was so good that several people 
around me considered investing.
The combination of existing infrastructure (the road, trucks, airplanes 
and mules), an abundance of people willing to invest and take risks, a 
vibrant trade mart that functioned as entrepôt, a remote border crossing 
that promised a degree of illegibility, and a Chinese or Tibetan off icial 
willing to cooperate trumped the fully legal channel through the main 
highway between Nepal and Tibet – despite much cheaper transport. The 
constellation, however, was not to last. In early November, the arrangement 
bypassing Chinese import procedures came to an end. Entire shipments of 
satuwa were returned and people began stocking the herb in Hilsa, waiting 
for a chance to complete the transactions.
At the same time, another basic arrangement came under pressure. The 
traders in Pani Palbang used to import Chinese wheat f lour beyond its 
off icial shelf life. On the arid and cold Tibetan Plateau, an expiration date 
means little anyway, and expired flour was much more affordable for the 
customers in Humla. Now, the Chinese authorities began enforcing a ban 
on the export of this wheat flour. Stocks in Pani Palbang quickly dried up 
10 International Union for Conservation of Nature, see www.iucn.org.
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and soon the mule caravans began coming back empty. I assume that the 
Chinese ban in the name of food safety and avoiding a potential health 
incident in Nepal was linked to the heightened scrutiny in the context of 
the now defunct satuwa arrangement.
Dorji, who had not invested in satuwa, was nevertheless affected by 
the wheat f lour ban. However, the season was coming to an end and he 
considered his f irst year of business a success. He had sold his initial stock 
of goods, bought new supplies, and paid back his debts. Estimated net profit 
of somewhere between RNP 200,000 and 300,000 (US$2,350-3,530) would 
result. Although nowhere as lucrative as Paljor’s shop in the f irst year, this 
would still account for f ive to six times his former salary.
In summary, we see that the collective ambition to prof it from the 
emerging trading opportunities triggered a revival of the old institution 
of the seasonal entrepôt, which serves as zone of engagement for intensive 
neighbouring. However, the case of satuwa also shows that the entrepôt 
lends itself well not only to the seasonality of trade but also to the boom-
and-bust quality of larger-scale frontier capitalism (Tsing 2005). The 
temporality of the trade mart facilitates quick adaptations to changing 
circumstances. Similar to the situation at the Sino-Vietnamese border that 
Zhang describes in chapter 9 (this volume), continuous legal uncertainty 
Figure 3.4  Simikot airport
Martin Saxer, 2011
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and confusion do not undermine the neighbouring situation – they have 
to be seen as generative aspects of neighbouring because they produce the 
shifting differentials that present themselves as opportunities.
The situation, as described up to this point, can be summed up as follows: 
the new road and a relatively permissive border regime created opportuni-
ties for those quick enough to capture them, and the entrepôt has emerged, 
once again, as zone of engagement, as a hot spot for active neighbouring. 
However, people did not benef it equally from this constellation. Asym-
metries abounded – not only between China and Nepal, but also between 
those places along the main artery of trade and those further away from it. 
Road construction clearly amplif ied these asymmetries.
Dalakoglou and Harvey (2012: 460) note that despite the pervasive role 
that mobility plays in the contemporary lives of people around the globe, 
one could also argue that ‘never before have so many people felt so deeply 
the consequences of their exclusion from a condition where mobility is 
embraced as a correlate of freedom (to trade, to work, to travel, etc.)’. This 
assessment fully applies to the present case. The question is: what do those 
who feel this exclusion do? This leads us to the second new road in Humla’s 
north, the one through Limi.
Building a Road
The Limi route was once equally or even more important for trade than the 
route which the Hilsa road now follows. Several places along this route are 
known as sites of former trade marts. Place names such as tsongsa – literally: 
the market place – are a testimony to this past. After the demarcation of the 
border in the early 1960s, however, the Limi route quickly fell into decline. 
As it was not included in the list of the six off icial border crossings between 
China and Nepal, trade via this route was no longer legally possible.
In 2010, Tsewang Lama, a former member of parliament and assistant 
minister from Humla came up with an ambitious plan to address this issue. 
He gathered a group of local business people, some from Limi, and some from 
other parts of Humla. They all witnessed the food crises in Humla and the 
beginning boom in western China, and they all agreed that progress on the 
official Hilsa road was painfully slow. Thus, they started exploring the pos-
sibility of an alternative road following the ancient trade route through Limi.
This route, they argued, offered a number of advantages for road con-
struction. On the Chinese side, existing dirt roads used by the Chinese 
border patrols connected the border with the road along the shores of 
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Lake Manasarovar; the f irst section in Nepal would lead across a high 
plateau at about 4800 meters above sea level, where road construction was 
comparatively easy. From there, the route led down to Takche and Tugling 
(described in the opening vignette), then up a wide alpine valley to the 
Nyalo Pass (5000 meters above sea level) and f inally down to Sallikhola, 
where it would one day meet with the projected Hilsa road, about half way 
from the Tibetan border to Simikot, Humla’s district headquarters. Even 
with limited funds it would be possible to reactivate this former trade route. 
The benefits for the local population would be immediate because the road 
would make basic necessities of daily life – wheat flour, detergent, clothes, 
shoes, etc. – more affordable, not just in Upper Humla but also in the lower 
parts of the district. At the same time, the road would provide opportunities 
for trade and income generation in hitherto disadvantaged areas of Humla. 
And, as this was a collective local effort, the risk that rent-seeking off icials 
or prof it-oriented contractors would try to f ill their own pockets seemed 
comparatively low.
Road construction is usually a business of states and major development 
banks; a local initiative to build a road across the world’s highest mountain 
range may thus seem adventurous. However, given that the neighbouring 
situation with ‘rising’ China was quickly becoming a pervasive reality, 
and given that the question how connections are forged and maintained 
lay at the heart of socio-political life in Humla, the bold move of regaining 
control over the region’s connectivity was also just the most logical thing 
to do. A Road Construction Committee was formed and with the help of 
Tsewang Lama, who was familiar with the jungle of Kathmandu politics, the 
Committee managed to obtain modest seed funding from the government. 
This was a good sign and raised hopes that the project had a chance to 
garner long-term state support.
With the government funding in hand and high hopes for more, the com-
mittee approached a major Nepali construction company and convinced 
them to put an excavator at their disposition – despite the fact that there 
would be no easy way to retrieve the equipment from Limi should the 
project stall. The committee also talked the Chinese off icials into letting 
them ship the excavator via the Kathmandu to Lhasa and Lhasa to Ngari 
highways to western Tibet and f inally across the border back to Nepal; 
furthermore, the Chinese side agreed to provide a limited amount of diesel 
to run the excavator and open the border crossing for limited local exchange 
and transportation of rice in the name of development aid.
In 2010, the year before Paljor started his tent shop on the Hilsa road, 
construction began on the Limi road, and by the end of the year the f ist 
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section from the border to Tugling was successfully completed. An off icial 
Chinese delegation came to attend the inauguration ceremony, thereby 
giving their seal of approval to the revival of cross-border relations between 
Tibetan speakers on both sides. A year later, in early autumn 2011, the road 
had crossed the Nyalo Pass and in summer 2012 the last section to down 
to Sallikhola, the future intersection with the proposed Hilsa road, was 
completed.
The diff iculties to overcome had been massive and more than once, 
the project’s fate was in limbo. In the second year, it became clear that the 
seed funding originally earmarked for the project would not be easy to get 
released. There was a rule that said that local road construction was not to 
employ heavy machinery. Current legislation demanded that, if an excavator 
was to be used, the project had to undergo a proper e-bidding process. This 
rule, designed as anti-corruption measure, was introduced on suggestion 
by an international development organization. While funding was with-
held, local business people stepped in with loans, knowing perfectly well 
that the risks were high. In the end, a pragmatic solution was reached and 
construction contracts for the f inal sections of the road went through the 
anonymous e-bidding process.
Despite such hiccups, more than 100 kilometres of road were built in less 
than three years – a considerable achievement compared to the mere 30 
kilometres in 16 years on the Hilsa road. This achievement was a result of 
perseverance and skilful negotiations with Tibetan authorities, customs 
off icials, and army commanders in the north as well as Nepali off icials, 
construction companies, and the political establishment of Lower Humla 
and Kathmandu in the south. Relations with each of these parties followed 
their own script, their own style and temporality. In other words, the road 
was an outcome of intensive neighbouring.
The troubles in the f inal year of construction, however, also left their 
scars. The anonymous e-bidding process undermined trust among former 
partners; disputes about maintenance obligations, unequal benefits from 
the road, and the schedule for promised road-extensions to nearby villages 
eroded the sense of working towards a common goal. In addition, concerns 
about negative effects of the road became louder. Would the road open the 
door to deforestation? Wood from Humla was in high demand across the 
border in Tibet. Pack animals carrying wooden beams up to the border 
were a frequent sight on the trails. However, the length of the beams and 
the total volume transported were limited. Trucks and the road clearly 
had the potential to change this radically. What if the Limi Road became 
synonymous with a traff icking route for illegally cut wood or other illicit 
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items? The semi-open border could be sealed at any minute and all the 
work would then be in vain. Uncertainty and confusion were not over; 
maintaining the neighbouring relations required constant effort.
Rinzin, my friend and travelling companion, was a trained forester and 
saw these risks with sorrow. However, walking through Humla, we also 
kept meeting (or hearing about) old friends who had left school before 
graduation and were now seeking their fortune in trade. The new roads and 
the booming China business made many young people re-evaluate their 
options, and education, preferably in a college in Kathmandu or abroad, 
was now longer automatically considered to be the main avenue for upward 
mobility. Musing on these observations, Rinzin shook his head and said, 
‘Everybody is a businessman now’.
Conclusions: A Question of Orientation
The stories of Paljor and Dorji, as well as the case of the Limi road construc-
tion, are expressions of a particular positionality between neighbours north 
and south. A border regime characterized by permissiveness (Kalir and Sur 
2012), investment and infrastructure development in Tibet, and the two 
new Himalayan roads accentuate this in-betweenness. In this constellation, 
northbound relations across the border with Tibet are always in one or 
another way linked to southbound relations with Lower Humla and the 
rest of Nepal. The result is an entangled double neighbouring situation, 
which involves a variety of activities and processes: reviving the institu-
tion of the seasonal trade mart, securing loans in China, negotiating with 
local authorities in Tibet, lowland construction companies, Kathmandu 
bureaucrats or a village leader in the next valley, and dealing with rules 
and moralities introduced by NGOs and powerful development agencies 
(‘third neighbours’, as Bulag would call them, chapter 5, this volume) are 
all forms of contemporary neighbouring.
I have argued that the specif ic forms neighbouring have to be under-
stood against the background of historical Himalayan brokering between 
the Tibetan Plateau in the north and the hills and plains in the south. 
Neighbouring is an old trade, or, more precisely, the contemporary form of 
neighbouring China has revived old trades. However, this does not mean 
that things went back to how they were before the 1960s. The contemporary 
asymmetries are clearly different from the old ones. The ecological dif-
ferential between the salt-rich highlands and the grain-rich lowlands that 
was the basis of trade for centuries has been almost completely replaced by 
92 MArTiN SAxer
differentials based on industrial production, transportation costs, and the 
geopolitical situation. Moreover, as the case of the satuwa boom shows, the 
remoteness of Humla has become an asset in a certain way, as it promises 
a degree of illegibility. These new asymmetries are arguably more prone to 
rapid change than the ecological differentials on which trade was tradition-
ally based.
Some institutions, like the seasonal entrepôt as locus of active neighbour-
ing, seem perfectly amenable to deal with these new and assumedly less 
stable asymmetries; other institutions, such as ceremonial friendship, may 
be superseded by new forms of establishing and maintaining trust. Further-
more, it remains to be seen whether the new roads continue to benefit local 
entrepreneurs in the ways they do now. Once the roads are completed, other 
f inancially more potent actors may appear on the scene. However, consider-
ing the trilingual signboard with the f ive telephone numbers on the rebuilt 
shepherd’s shelter in Tugling, I doubt that this niche will soon disappear. 
Putting all the confusion and uncertainty to productive use requires much 
local experience and the social and linguistic skills of local entrepreneurs; 
the scope and reach of their networks give them a considerable edge. After 
all, one thing seems clear: unlike the abandoned logging roads left behind 
by ruthless frontier capitalism in Kalimantan, which Tsing (2005) describes 
so aptly as ‘leading nowhere’, the two Himalayan roads described in this 
chapter do lead somewhere – metaphorically and physically. These roads 





4 Trading on Change
Bazaars and Social Transformation in the Borderlands of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Xinjiang
Henryk Alff*
Introduction
Narratives of post-Soviet trade experiences often convey a certain ambiguity. 
Their connotation staggers between nostalgia and ongoing socioeconomic 
hardship, between the uncertainty of the frequent change of rules and the 
promise of evolving opportunities. When 46-year-old Marzhan, a single 
mother of two children, elaborates upon her life course since Kazakhstan’s 
independence in 1991, it comes as an unbelievable story amidst the scenery 
of shipping containers, rushing cart-pushers delivering enormous bales 
of goods along the rows, and the ubiquitous scent of Chinese textiles. Her 
initial trade activities at ad-hoc open-air bazaars in Almaty- Kazakhstan’s 
former capital and most populous city some 360 kilometres from the 
Chinese border- indeed have been driven by socioeconomic necessity, a 
sense of responsibility, and entrepreneurial fortune-seeking. Over the years, 
she has gradually acquired, expanded and validated business contacts 
as she skilfully navigated economic, juridical and political uncertainties. 
Nowadays, with enormous efforts and capital invested over the past decade, 
her flourishing wholesale business of Beijing-manufactured, self-designed 
outerwear at Almaty’s Bolashak Bazaar has become a highly dependable 
source of income.
The sprawling bazaars in Almaty (Kazakhstan) and Bishkek (Kyr-
gyzstan), as the backdrop of Marzhan’s narratives, are the ethnographic 
locus of this chapter. In the past decades, these bazaars have evolved into 
major nodes of post-Soviet retail and wholesale trade networks (see Spector 
2008, 2009, Nasritdinov and O’Connor 2010). The bazaars in Almaty locally 
known under the Russian generic expression for f lea market (barakholka) 
* The research for this chapter was generously funded by the German Federal Ministry for 
Education and Research (BMBF) in the context of the competence network ‘Crossroads Asia: 
Conflict, Migration, Development’ (2011-2016) and the work package ‘Development potentials 
and risks of transformed exchange processes in the borderlands of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Xinjiang’ at the Centre for Development Studies (ZELF) of Freie Universität Berlin. The author 
would like to extend his gratitude to BMBF and Crossroads Asia for their constant support.
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are a labyrinth of containers and hangar-sized warehouses along a several 
kilometre strip on both sides of the city’s northern ring road.1 The bazaar 
is not just a place of ubiquitous consumption, but also an important place 
for employment.2 The second largest bazaar in Barakholka is Bolashak, 
which consists of 3,500 sales booths and warehouses in the form of standard 
10-, 20- and 40-foot shipping containers stacked up in two-storey rows. 
The ground-level containers are usually used as sales booths and the 
second-level containers as additional storage space for merchandise. In 
2006 Bolashak’s estimated annual sales, predominantly in textiles, were 
valuated at least US$660 million (Kontinent 2006). By 2011, according to 
data provided by the bazaar administration the number of entrepreneurs 
exceeded 7,000.
1 Almaty’s retail and wholesale bazaars since summer 2013 have been subject to considerable 
urban redevelopment, in the course of which container bazaars have been replaced by shopping 
centers. 
2 In 2007-2008, Barakholka’s bazaars were responsible for an estimated 5.1 percent of local 
employment (World Bank 2009: 10).









































Design: henryk Alff; cartography: Silke Dussmann
TrADiNg oN chANge 97
Impressive as it may seem, the size of Almaty’s Barakholka Bazaars, of 
which Bolashak is only one of the 28 (by other accounts 35), appears miniscule 
in comparison to the Dordoi Bazaar – Barakholka’s counterpart and competi-
tor across the border in Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek. ‘Dordoi Republic’, as it 
is called by the Russian edition of the Forbes magazine - due to its inherent 
dynamics as a ‘state within a state’ and its strategic importance for the coun-
try’s economy (Forbes 2011)- was founded in 1991 by the former functionary 
of the Communist Party’s youth wing, Askar Salymbekov. Over the years, 
it has developed into a bustling centre for the re-export3 of predominantly 
Chinese-made consumer goods to other Central Asian Republics and the 
Russian Federation. From Dordoi, Chinese goods are shipped to cities as far as 
Moscow, Novosibirsk and Yakutsk. Dordoi encompasses a vast area between 
53 to 100 hectares in the northern outskirts of Bishkek, which accommodates 
a large number of sales booths counting somewhere from 6,000 to 17,000.4 
The Dordoi Bazaar operates almost exclusively in the form of double-stacked 
shipping containers lined up in rows along heavily frequented passageways. 
Before the 2008 worldwide f inancial crisis, the estimated monthly sales 
of textiles, household appliances, electronics, and construction materials 
were worth US$331 million with three million customers visiting the bazaar 
monthly (World Bank 2009). Although sales have come down considerably 
for various reasons since 2008, there still are approximately 30,000 to 40,000 
traders, vendors and transport providers making a living from Dordoi. Ac-
cording to a report by the German development agency Gesellschaft für 
internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the total number of people employed 
at the Dordoi bazaar is even several times higher (GIZ 2011).
Despite the centrality and prominence of the bazaar economy in this 
region, scholarship on the dimensions and the everyday mechanisms of 
bazaar-based trade is limited. With a few exceptions (Angermann 2006, 
Nasritdinov and O’Connor 2010, Spector 2009, Laruelle and Peyrouse 2009, 
Zhaparov 2009, Özcan 2010), current studies of post-Soviet transformations 
in Central Asia have not yet paid enough attention to this essential aspect 
of economic life. Much of the recent work on China’s rising impact in post-
Soviet Eurasia has focused on geopolitical issues of inter-state cooperation 
3 In this context re-export means the export of imported goods by Kyrgyzstan due to favour-
able customs duties and without value added through further procession.
4 The large variance in the data provided in various sources stems from counts at different 
periods. While Nasritdinov and O’Connor give a number of active stalls of 6,000, as a result of 
their mapping of Dordoi in the winter of 2006 (Nasritdinov and O’Connor 2010: 73), a recent GIZ 
report puts the number at 17,000 (GIZ 2011: 14). A World Bank report overestimates the number 
of sales points with 40,300 (World Bank 2009: 10).
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in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the rhetoric 
of the ‘new Silk Roads’ or ‘new Great Games’ (Karrar 2009, Clarke and 
Mackerras 2009, Laruelle et al. 2010).5 While these lines of inquiry are 
important as a starting point, this chapter seeks to go beyond the ‘container 
perspective’ of a state- or area-centred approach by focusing on localized 
relations as well as the dynamic mobilities of people, goods, and values 
between various locales. This chapter traces the multi-level interrelations 
that contextually shape, and are being shaped, by bazaar-based trade across 
China’s north-western borderlands.
The question I address in this chapter is how bazaar traders, operating 
from quite a distance from the actual borders with China, use their social 
skills, knowledge and ties to survive and prosper in the volatile context of 
cross-border trade and exchange. Their social relations across and often far 
beyond borders, in fact, condition a ‘neighbouring situation’ that continues 
to reproduce the volatility that facilitates their entrepreneurial success. I 
argue that in this context, the ‘art of neighbouring’ is one of distant arrange-
ments where actors engage with one another in strategic ways to cope with 
challenges and vulnerabilities. At the same time, neighbourly relations 
at a distance continue to shape livelihoods of traders who rely heavily on 
cross-border economic activities.6 I thus deem the conscious valorization of 
these business relations between the local and the translocal a neighbouring 
practice, as they clearly remain functionally linked and embedded into 
‘spaces of engagement’ (van Schendel 2005) that are made up by a relational 
(rather than strictly territorial) understanding of borderlands. This type of 
‘neighbouring’, which is a deliberate and habitual social practice in bor-
derland bazaar traders’ everyday life, will be the f irst focus of this chapter.
Micro-level trade dynamics, however, are just one part of the story this 
chapter tells. The commercial activities of bazaar entrepreneurs are closely 
tied to state-led modernization schemes and their outcomes. A case in 
point are Beijing’s far-reaching multi-billion dollar development programs 
in Western China.7 The explicit goal of these development programs is to 
5 Millward (2009) gives an insightful account of how the official Chinese metaphor of a ‘new Silk 
Road’ is distinguished from the western one: ‘Whereas outside China the cross-cultural exchanges 
of the ‘Silk Road’ can serve as a heart-warming counter-argument to the ‘clash of civilizations’ 
world view, Chinese silk-roadism is more parochial and nationalistic’ (Millward 2009: 55). 
6 Participant observation and unstructured biographical interviews were conducted by the 
author at Barakholka’s Bolashak Bazaar in August-September 2011, April and October 2012, and 
Dordoi’s Kitai Bazaar in March-May 2012. 
7 Western China, as def ined in the framework of China’s Great Western Development 
strategy, comprises more than 70 percent of China’s territory that is considered peripheral 
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turn China’s West from a remote frontier into a transport corridor and 
a vibrant space for trade (Goodman 2004, Shih 2004). In a similar way, 
recent modernization schemes in Kazakhstan- which include the on-going 
implementation of a Customs Union with Russia and Belarus since 2010 and 
the establishment of the International Centre for Border Cooperation at the 
Sino-Kazakh border- not only dominate the public discourse in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, but also directly affect the conditions for trade. State-
driven modernization projects have, in fact, not only def ined the larger 
context of trade but also specif ically targeted nodes of small-scale trade 
networks such as border crossings as well as urban bazaars.
The impact of modernization projects on established practices of trans-
border trade is the second focus of this chapter. I examine the ways in 
which power asymmetries within and between these various sites set 
particular conditions within which bazaar entrepreneurs are able to 
(or fail to) develop their businesses. I analyse how bazaar entrepreneurs 
contest the change of rules and accommodate novel modes of distribution. 
Given the importance of trade to a large proportion of Kazakhstan’s and 
Kyrgyzstan’s (self-)employed population, it is important to highlight the 
mechanisms behind diverse trans-border trade activities. However, because 
of the ambiguous nature of these (extra-)legal trade activities, and the 
fact that most shipments are transported by avoiding customs duties and 
taxes, there is a high degree of secrecy surrounding the channels of supply. 
Trans-border trade therefore entails a certain degree of resistance against 
propagated rules and the off icial terms of legality. Taking it as an essential 
everyday skill, traders have learned to adapt to top-down interventions 
as they work with their ‘neighbours’ across the border to actively contest, 
subvert and circumvent respective rules. Their active engagement with 
state rules and with one another has in turn played an important part in 
shaping the actual outcomes of the modernization drive that has swept 
across the borderlands. For bazaar entrepreneurs, a crucial everyday skill 
in this context is to actively anticipate future change and make use of its 
potential in the best possible way through strategic collaborations with 
their close neighbours. To put it in a different way, active neighbouring 
conditions the possibility for success as bazaar entrepreneurs participate 
in and trade on change.
and largely populated by ‘minority nationalities’ (shaoshu minzu 少数民族). Western China 
includes six provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan), f ive autono-
mous regions (Guangxi, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang), and the municipality 
of Chongqing. 
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The Roots of Post-Soviet Trade
In the borderlands of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Xinjiang, neighbouring is 
not necessarily based on geographical closeness, although the ‘neighbouring 
situation’ f irst and foremost suggests a sense of proximity. While physical 
proximity often conditions frequent interactions as an inevitable part of 
daily social life, it is not a prerequisite for making connections and forming 
relations in the borderlands. In fact, trans-border connections can be negoti-
ated between rather distant nodes in a widely spun translocal network of 
trade (Karrar 2013). These nodes – bazaars, production facilities, border 
crossings, or transport hubs – are located hundreds of kilometres away 
from each other and away from the border or the urban centres; but they 
are crucial points of connection, interaction and exchange. They help to 
stretch trade networks when business is thriving; and they contract when 
the local and regional political-economic situations change, making the 
neighbouring situation elastic in a way.
Right after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the spatial and 
social organization of trans-border trade was rather different. Marzhan, like 
many of my interlocutors, remembers how in the early 1990s the Kazakh 
border village of Khorgos and the nearby cities of Yining (Kulja) and Zhar-
kent (formerly Panfilov) faced an unexpected boom in cross-border trade 
with consumer goods. Ad-hoc traders, individually or in groups, came all 
the way from Almaty and Bishkek to barter away what was left from Soviet 
state enterprises, including residual production and scrap metal, for cheap 
Chinese consumer goods. Over the 1990s these trade patterns changed for 
reasons yet to be fully understood.
Today, Zharkent is a sleepy border town that does not seem to capital-
ize much on its strategic position anymore, even with the advantage that 
Zharkent residents are entitled to enter China and stay for 24 hours once a 
month without a visa. Local traders in Zharkent’s central market informed 
me that Chinese consumer goods now make a loop to Almaty’s bustling 
Barakholka Bazaars f irst before being shipped back to the border town 
itself.8 Almaty- and Bishkek-based wholesale merchants today take over the 
lion’s share of trade. These merchants serve as redistributors of goods and 
8 There are different views on the role of the immediate borderland communities in trade 
activities. Spector has also observed that communities residing close to the border are largely 
omitted by trans-area trade f lows (Spector 2009, see also Parham 2009). A World Bank report 
published in 2007, however, sheds a different light on the success of the Khorgos crossing and 
the strategic positioning of border communities in trade development (World Bank 2007). 
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facilitators for the mobility of people and commodities. In China, the im-
mediate border towns, though thriving in comparison to their counterparts 
on the Kazakhstan side, are outplayed in their signif icance by Urumqi, the 
rapidly growing capital of Xinjiang located 670 kilometres from the Kazakh 
border at Khorgos. Urumqi has become the major transport and trade hub in 
the course of China’s Great Western Development campaign (Raballand and 
Andrésy 2007: 244-246, Sadovskaya 2012: 91). Roads, railways and pipeline 
constructions further amplify Urumqi’s role as a transit hub on the projected 
economic and development corridor between Coastal China, the Middle 
East and Western Europe (Zhao 2001).9
Far away from the Sino-Kazakh border, Almaty’s Bolashak Bazaar carries 
this vision of economic prosperity and development already in its name. 
Literally meaning ‘future’ or ‘progress’ in Kazakh, ‘bolashak’ connotes 
aspects of actively moving towards, or crafting progress without carrying 
the imprint of the past. With all hopes invested in the future, the Bolashak 
Bazaar and other contemporary bazaars make the impression of relying on 
centuries-old trade networks and routes of exchange along the ‘Silk Roads’. 
Many of my interlocutors insisted on some sort of historicism claiming that 
these networks and routes are inherent to the local systems of distribution 
and consumption for ages.
The Bolashak Bazaar was founded only in the mid-1990s allegedly by 
private investors whose identities remain a mystery.10 Local legend has it that 
these black market ‘prof iteers’ were the pioneers of contemporary bazaar 
trade, who established their business through flourishing connections in 
the ‘second economy’ and to leading political circles during as early as the 
late Soviet times.
Back in those days, ‘prof iteering’ (spekulatsiya) as bazaar trade (and any 
form of private trade) was pejoratively referred to, was a serious criminal 
offense and was broadly condemned as immoral and uncivilized. Despite 
that, the acquisition of highly desired but otherwise unavailable goods was 
practiced to some degree all over the Soviet Union. This practice required 
a skill in building and maintaining personal relations (blat), which when 
performed in private, aptly and effectively was considered a perfectly 
9 The annual China Eurasia Expo, for example, is currently promoted by Chinese off icials 
as a f lagship event for opening-up and trade development with neighbouring states at the ‘new 
Silk Roads’ (Kontimost 2011).
10 While in Kazakhstan the identity of bazaar proprietors and their connections to lead-
ing political circles remain largely a matter to rumours (Spector 2008), bazaar proprietors in 
Kyrgyzstan are well-known public f igures due to their presence in political life, often being 
members of parliament or in other high-ranking administrative positions.
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acceptable (or licit) social behaviour in order to deliver and acquire def i-
cient goods and services on an everyday basis. Caroline Humphrey notes 
a similarly ambiguous representation as outlined above in her assessment 
of post-Soviet trade: ‘Reactions to the facts of trade emerge from the under-
swell of the habitus of people’s life, which was formed in Soviet times but 
is now [after the dismantling of socialism] undirected and contradictory’ 
(Humphrey 2002: 175). Hence it makes sense to inquire deeper into how 
strategies, directions and experiences of trade practice continue to inform 
and to be shaped by this ambiguity nowadays.
Routes and Connections
From the Soviet era to the contemporary, the representation of bazaar 
trade in the region has always provoked a mixed sentiment among traders 
who continue to borrow the Soviet rhetoric of condemning the ‘shadiness’ 
and immorality of prof iteering in the bazaars, and at the same time sing 
praises of the tantalizing profitability that bazaar trade offers (Alff 2015). 
Marzhan, as one of the most experienced entrepreneurs at Bolashak for 
example, often switches between condemnations of what she perceives as 
‘uncivilized trade’ in the bazaars, in the following associated particularly 
with poor working conditions, and its (illicit) prof itability:
As many others, I started here hawking merchandise in open-air market 
stalls all year round. Working conditions have not improved much since 
the containers are in place. It’s still incredibly hot in summer and freez-
ingly cold in winter. But nowadays hard work, 10 to 12 hours each day, 
pays out for me.
Having endured the arduous years since she f irst started her business, 
Marzhan was able to gradually expand the reach of her business relations. 
After quitting her underpaid job as a lawyer in 1993, she became active in 
the so-called ‘shuttle trade’ (chelnochnaya torgovlya) – a common way to 
make a living in the years after the end of the Soviet Union.11 Being a shuttle 
trader, Marzhan f irst imported small quantities of Chinese textiles from 
11  Spector’s seminal work (2009: 98) provides a cautious estimate of 100,000 to 170,000 people 
in Kazakhstan being involved into transnational trade during the 1990s. For Kyrgyzstan, she 
estimates that out of a population of 5 million people in 1996 between 500,000 to 800,000 were 
involved in trade on an occasional or permanent basis (Spector 2009: 58-59).
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Urumqi’s Bingtuan (兵团) wholesale trading centre with the assistance of 
interpreters and middlemen. After a temporary setback during the 1998 
f inancial crisis in Russia, Marzhan and her business partner Adil expanded 
into the wholesale business. Today they rely on well-established personal 
contacts with manufacturers in eastern China, a strategy that has allowed 
them to bypass middlemen services in Xinjiang to cut costs. In 2005, they 
started working with a factory in Beijing to supply fashion apparels for men 
and women. This business generated a remarkable sales turnover of up to 
US$1.5 to 2 million per annum. Marzhan and Adil’s orders from Beijing are 
pressed into large bales, transported overland by train and truck across 
Western China and the Khorgos border to Kazakhstan – at peak seasons 
several truck loads per week.12
Apart from experienced Kazakhstani13 entrepreneurs who have learned 
to successfully navigate the broader trans-border marketplace that links 
China to Central Asia, traders from other origins also started to expand the 
existing networks and bring in new dynamics to the booming bazaar trade. 
One of the rather new phenomena is the increasing proportion of traders, 
salaried vendors, drivers, cart-pushers and caterers from Kyrgyzstan in 
Almaty. Their arrival in the Bolashak Bazaar contributes to a much more 
complex neighbouring situation in the borderland trade networks. Among 
those who operate their business in Bolashak’s 14 rows of double containers 
(approximately 130 containers each), the majority of vendors are believed to 
be Kyrgyzstani. A large number of them went to Bolashak after a series of 
recent political turmoils in their home country in 2005 and 2010 respectively.
Not unlike the Han-Chinese businessmen who used to form a large com-
munity at Bolashak and the other bazaars of Barakholka throughout the 
1990s,14 Kyrgyzstani bazaar entrepreneurs and employees are currently the 
12 The major reason why entrepreneurs still prefer small-scale, ad-hoc trade units over formal 
companies or trading f irms is the low taxation and customs duties. The juristic person of the 
f irm is often taxed in a close-to-exploitative way in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. 
13  The term ‘Kazakhstani’ is utilized throughout this text for the citizens of Kazakhstan, while 
‘Kazakh’ refers to the ethnic group only.
14 The Han-Chinese traders were forcibly driven out the bazaar economy through high ‘fees’ 
that were imposed on them in Kazakhstan, others were virtually deported from Kazakhstan to 
Kyrgyzstan. According to the head of Bolashak bazaar administration in Almaty in 2011, there 
were just about 80 to 100 Chinese traders left, most of whom employed Kazakhstani vendors 
at their sales outlets. Despite xenophobic sentiments in Kyrgyzstan, the Chinese established 
wholesale businesses at Dordoi and Karasuu bazaars thanks to a much more liberal climate there. 
Han-Chinese businesses have been the target of violent attacks in the past. During the Bishkek 
riots of 2005 and 2010 the Chinese shopping centre GOIN was burned down twice. The Dzhunkhai 
section of Dordoi, dominated by Han-Chinese merchants, was destroyed by a f ire as well in 2008. 
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main targets of increasing resentment by local Kazakhstani traders, who 
blame them for using price dumping to manipulate local competition. Azhar, 
for example, a 36 year old Kyrgyzstani woman selling tights just a few steps 
away from Marzhan’s thriving fashion business, complains that she and 
her compatriots are controlled and frequently harassed by Kazakhstani 
state off icials, especially from the immigration agency. She only has non-
resident status in Kazakhstan, and therefore no legal right to operate a 
private business. Lacking proper residential registration, she is forced to 
keep bribing off icials if she plans to stay in Kazakhstan for longer than 
f ive days. However, unlike the Han-Chinese in the 1990s, the Kyrgyzstani 
entrepreneurs in Kazakhstan do not face the same kind of rigid exclusion and 
they continue to occupy a dominant position in bazaar trade. This is partly 
due to their stronger socio-cultural linkages in the Kazakhstani society as in 
comparison to the earlier Han-Chinese migrants. The Kyrgyzstani resilience 
in the bazaar economy is also a result of their thriving distribution networks 
and the mutual support they provide to each other. Azhar says, ‘Kyrgyz 
stick together when doing business; they give discounts and sell goods on 
commission to each other, but not to Russians or Kazakhs’.
Although Azhar moved to Almaty as a salaried vendor back in 1998, she 
still maintains close contacts to Kyrgyz and Dungan15 wholesale suppliers 
at the Dordoi Bazaar in Bishkek. Until recently, Azhar used to return to 
Bishkek to stock up with supplies at least once every two weeks and often 
more frequently. Wholesale prices for Chinese-made textiles purchased 
from her Dordoi-based business partners are negotiable. Azhar is able to 
get very good prices even on small quantities and sometimes to even get 
goods on credit.
Azhar’s supply base is the Kitai Bazaar, established in 1992 as one of the 
earliest sections of the Dordoi Bazaar in Bishkek, which now is surrounded 
by other sections with cosmopolitan names like Evropa (Europe), Kerben 
(caravan) and Alyaska. Its name – Kitai means China in Russian – refers 
to the foremost origin of traded commodities. At Kitai’s 34 parallel rows 
with each row consisting of more than 30 shipping containers, cheap and 
low-quality textiles, accessories and shoes are sold. The f irst two rows 
of the Kitai Bazaar are always busy with wholesale clients arriving from 
15 Dungan is an ethnonym commonly used in the former Soviet Union since 1924 for Muslim 
Chinese groups that are known as Hui or huizu (回族) in China. Sizeable Dungan communities 
living in south-eastern Kazakhstan and northern Kyrgyzstan, claim ancestry to Hui refugees 
from Shaanxi and Gansu provinces, who f led the Qing Empire after turmoil in the late 19th 
century (Gladney, 1996, Ding 2005, Allès 2005).
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Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, who navigate their way 
through the narrow passageways between the shipping containers and 
Dordoi’s heavily used main thoroughfare. The Kitai Bazaar is dominated 
by Dungan and Kyrgyz traders and vendors. Han-Chinese merchants are 
hardly visible at all nowadays, as they tend to employ local vendors to run 
their shops. Bazaar entrepreneurs at Kitai source large amounts of cheaply 
produced textiles either from business partners in China or locally from 
Han-Chinese suppliers and warehouse owners at Dordoi.
Dungan and Han-Chinese wholesalers are often mentioned together 
in one breath. Some Dungans work for Han-Chinese as interpreters or 
shop assistants, presumably on the basis of cultural and linguistic aff inity 
(Zhaparov 2009), while others have established their own wholesale and 
transport businesses. Unlike Han-Chinese traders who are often accused of 
aiming to take over the market by unfair means, Dungan traders are seen 
in a more positive light. Even many Kyrgyz consider them to be genuine 
Muslims, honest, loyal and hard-working. The Dungan community at Dordoi 
is often portrayed as socially cohesive, which can be confirmed by my own 
observations at the Kitai Bazaar in Bishkek.
Dungan merchants have profited tremendously from their role as facilita-
tors for wholesale trade. Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Figure 4.2  Dordoi Bazaar’s main passageway, Bishkek
henryk Alff, 2012
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Dungans in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan recovered and rebuilt contacts 
with Hui and Han-Chinese in China, either through (imagined) kinship 
ties or ethnic-religious aff iliation (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2009).16 Rashid 
and his wife, for example, are influential Dungan traders in the business 
of wholesale trade with China. Their ancestors settled from Gansu to the 
vicinity of Bishkek (then Pishpek) in the late 1870s.17 Rashid, who claims 
to have been a pioneer of the ‘China trade’, remembers the time when 80 
percent of his fellow traders at the Kitai Bazaar were Dungans. As he puts it:
Dungans were the f irst who established trade between Kyrgyzstan and 
China in the early 1990s, together with the Uyghurs, who later predomi-
nantly switched to the catering sector. Some of us had remote kinship 
ties with places in China where our ancestors originally came from. 
These social contacts were not maintained during the Soviet times and 
thus of little use for most of us. But we still gained from being able to 
communicate with the Chinese in their native language at least on a 
colloquial level and, thus, have a common language when negotiating 
deals.
Rashid has been renting a small 10-foot sales container at a comparatively 
central position in the bazaar for the past 15 years. He sells cheaply produced 
woman’s sportswear in bulk. While Rashid is in charge of supplies, his wife 
is usually running the sales point at the Kitai Bazaar, serving customers 
predominantly from Kazakhstan and Russia or retail sellers from Dordoi 
Bazaar itself. In the past, Rashid would travel to Urumqi every two to three 
months to stock up with merchandise. Nowadays, he prefers to make orders 
over the phone or by e-mail and payments via a mutually agreed transfer 
system with his Hui business partners in Urumqi. This saves him time and 
money. Goods are then shipped by the Hui-owned transport companies via 
Kashgar and the Torugart pass to Bishkek, which takes a maximum of 15 days.
Looking at the experiences of Marzhan, Azhar and Rashid, it is striking 
how patterns, orientations and directions of petty trade, as well as their 
16 During conversations with Khuzei Daurov, the head of Kazakhstan’s Association of Dungans 
who was also a former consultant of President Nazarbaev and a successful businessman, he 
spoke extensively on the role of historic and newly established ties of Dungan communities in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with Hui partners all over China and even as far af ield as Malaysia 
(Personal communication with Daurov, October 9th, 2012). 
17 In the Soviet times, and still to some degree nowadays, Dungans are renowned for running 
highly competitive agricultural and catering businesses both in northern Kyrgyzstan and parts 
of south-western Kazakhstan (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2009: 105-106).
TrADiNg oN chANge 107
strategies, have changed over the past two decades. Within both the com-
mercial and the social structures of bazaars like Bolashak in Almaty and 
Kitai in Bishkek, a diversif ication is under way in terms of the ownership 
of and access to social as well as material resources. Nowadays, only a few 
of the traders at Bolashak and Kitai who started in the early and mid-1990s 
are still personally involved in selling goods at the bazaar stalls. Many have 
ventured from the retail business into the much more profitable wholesale 
trade. Wholesalers like Marzhan usually own or rent a number of containers 
at one or several bazaars and employ salaried vendors, cart-pushers and 
other staff.
Marzhan’s long-distance connections link her with Han-Chinese busi-
ness partners in Beijing; while Rashid and Azhar’s strategies are being built 
on ‘neighbouring-at-a-distance’ on the basis of (imagined and actual) ethnic 
and linguistic aff iliation. Their stories depict how bazaar entrepreneurs 
make flexible adaptations to the changing social conditions and charting 
new relations across borders. Geographical distance in all three cases does 
not exclude – and in a certain sense even fosters – socioeconomic closeness, 
whereas immediate vicinity often enhances competition among traders. 
Neighbouring in the borderlands of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Xinjiang, 
in this case, can be productively ‘elastic’, and distance is not necessarily 
what stretches it. Both the entrepreneurial mobilities and the socio-spatial 
ties of bazaar traders extend beyond what one would conceive of as the 
immediate borderland. Everyday trade practices of Marzhan, Rashid and 
Azhar, thus, involve and are shaped by some sort of scalar variability or 
fluidity (Brenner 2001: 592). To put it in a sociospatial way: their neighbour-
ing practice appears to be neither locally nor regionally framed or bounded, 
but tends to be rather translocal. This means neighbouring is constituted 
(and constantly re-constituted) by dynamically changing social relations 
across (often geographically distant) places (Freitag and von Oppen 2010). 
The following section seeks to elaborate on how schemes and outcomes 
of large-scale development interventions affect this specif ic (‘elastic’) 
configuration of neighbouring.
Modernizing Trade
In April 2012, when I met Rashid again, his supply chain was still running 
smoothly. However, he saw himself confronted with decreasing sales, 
especially with customers from Kazakhstan and Russia. Rashid and many 
fellow traders at the Dordoi Bazaar attributed this slump to the on-going 
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implementation of the Customs Union (CU) between Kazakhstan, Russia 
and Belarus.18 Customs regimes changed and control was tightened at the 
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan-China borders, both of which are 
enforced as the CU’s external border since July 2011. This development posed 
a threat also to the distribution schemes of trade entrepreneurs like Azhar. 
She began to f ind it more and more tricky and time-consuming to import 
goods from Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan. Just a couple of weeks before I met 
Azhar the second time in April 2012, she started purchasing goods locally 
from one of the other wholesale bazaars of Barakholka, which apparently 
was a much less prof itable endeavour.
The CU is, however, not the only top-down intervention that has af-
fected established businesses. Top-down developmentalism, usually in the 
name of modernization,19 targets multiple scales ranging from the planned 
reconstruction of Almaty’s Barakholka bazaar agglomeration (Spector 2008) 
to new regulations for self-employment in the retail and wholesale sectors 
in Kazakhstan that came into force in early 2013. All of these interventions 
challenge the existing trade networks and strategies.
Such interventions, however, are not new. Deliberate and often forceful 
reform efforts from as far back as the late Qing and Tsarist periods more 
than a century ago had changed lives in signif icant ways in today’s border-
lands of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Xinjiang. More recently, since the late 
1990s, China’s Great Western Development campaign has come to shape 
both rhetoric and infrastructure in Xinjiang. Accelerated development plans 
and the ‘new Silk Roads’ initiatives aim at fostering mutual exchange and 
cooperation with neighbouring states in order to boost domestic economic 
growth (Zhao 2001: 202). These development interventions often result in 
pronounced economic trans-border asymmetries, not least in trade bal-
ances. China has become by far the most important exporter of consumer 
goods to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (World Bank 2009, Kaminski and 
Raballand 2009). On the one hand, this has, just like the immigration of 
18 A tripartite CU between Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus came into existence in January 
2010. The long-term objective is to launch a Common Market referred to as Eurasian Economic 
Union (agreed upon by the three presidents in May 2014), using the example of the European 
Union as a role model. 
19 Modernization is understood here according to the three-fold epistemological distinction of 
development by Thomas (2000). The meanings or senses Thomas attributes to development, can 
be subsumed roughly as long-term social change, as an ideology of change and as an intentional 
practice of change. Modernization, as a dominant notion of gradual top-down transformation or 
in the Chinese political-economic thought of termed path-dependent development (Luo 2009), 
needs to be explored in its interrelation with small trade primarily in the two latter meanings, 
put forward by Thomas. 
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Han-Chinese, provoked wide-spread and often exaggerated fears of Chinese 
expansion both in Kazakhstan (Sadovskaya 2012: 121-126) and in Kyrgyzstan 
(Laruelle and Peyrouse 2012: 109). On the other hand, traders in the region 
such as Rashid and Azhar benefited greatly from China’s rise and its ac-
cession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.20 Due to the low 
customs duties and taxation for (and lack of control of) imports from China, 
wholesale prices of consumer goods at Bishkek’s Dordoi Bazaar are still 
much lower than in neighbouring Kazakhstan, giving it a competitive edge 
in the business of re-exporting Chinese consumer goods to markets across 
Eurasia.21
Trade statistics in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan hide the real dimen-
sions of imports from China. Only the off icial trade revenue between China 
and Kazakhstan as reported by Kazakhstani statistics has increased more 
than thirty-fold from US$400 million in 1992 to US$12.3 billion in 2008 
(Alff and Schmidt 2011: 74).22 According to Chinese statistics, exports to 
Kazakhstan in 2008 were more than twice as high as imports from China 
reported by Kazakhstani sources (Syroezhkin 2009: 231). This is clearly 
due to the fact that trans-border trade generally evades off icial Customs 
payments and thus goes unregistered. Imports of consumer goods from 
China to Kyrgyzstan are as well severely underreported in the off icial 
Customs statistics. Their estimated value was US$3 billion in 2008 – ten 
times more than the off icially reported f igure (Kaminski and Raballand 
2009, USAID 2010).
Partly as a response to these imbalances, Kazakhstan’s leadership pro-
moted their own modernization agenda.23 Off icial documents and public 
announcements by President Nursultan Nazarbaev, especially since the 
f inancial crisis that hit Kazakhstan’s fast-growing economy in 2007 and 
2008, have called for an increase in Kazakhstan’s economic competitive-
ness, f irst and foremost, by boosting domestic industrial production 
20 Kyrgyzstan became a WTO member in 1998.
21 These favourable conditions have also contributed to the upcoming sewing industry in 
northern Kyrgyzstan. Since the start of the millennium, a light industry of up to 5,000 small 
and medium-sized sewing manufactories has been set up in Bishkek due to the cheap garment 
imports from China, the relatively low cost of manpower, and the subsidized electricity. In 2010, 
between 90,000 and 150,000 people were employed in this sector of the Kyrgyzstani economy 
(SIAR Research and consulting 2011).
22 Future projections on bilateral trade turnover with Kazakhstan for 2015 go as high as US$40 
billion (People’s Daily 2011b).
23 The modernization discourse in Kazakhstan takes up notions both of the former Soviet 
paradigm of progress and rather novel expressions of competitiveness and innovation (see e.g. 
Ministry for Communication and Information 2011). 
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and technological innovation (see e.g. Ministry for Communication and 
Information 2011). The trade sector also ranks high on Kazakhstan’s mod-
ernization agenda (Ministry for Economic Development and Trade 2010). 
The country’s geographical position at an important Eurasian crossroads 
is advocated in large-scale projects aimed at increasing the transit of goods 
across its territory by road and rail.
The f irst stage of the bilaterally planned International Centre for Border 
Cooperation (ICBC) at the Chinese-Kazakhstani crossing point of Khor-
gos, was opened to the public in April 2012. ICBC, regarded as a f lagship 
project to further facilitate trade of all kinds, occupies a total area of 528 
hectares, divided between both states. Under this initiative, a special regime 
is instituted to facilitate visa-free entry for both SCO and third-country 
passport holders for a duration of up to 30 days, and free movement of people 
through special cross-border corridors within the zone. Potentially relevant 
for small trade entrepreneurs, a special bilateral customs and taxation 
regulation was introduced for ICBC declaring a duty-free regime for goods 
not exceeding RMB 8,000 or US$1,230 in value per person per day (People’s 
Daily 2011a). Kazakhstan’s section of ICBC is designed to include a centre 
for small-scale trade, seven modern hotels with a total capacity to accom-
modate up to 5,000 people, logistic terminals, and many other facilities. 
By 2035 the Kazakhstani side of ICBC shall be upgraded to the status of a 
special economic zone under the name ‘Eastern Gates’. With the Chinese 
government’s commitment to revive trade, special economic zones in the 
Chinese part of Khorgos and in Kashgar are declared to boost economic 
exchange and interaction (People’s Daily 2011b). Despite the wide-spread 
fear of Chinese economic expansion and the implementation of the CU, 
the former secretary-general of SCO, Muratbek Imanaliev, like other top 
off icials, praised ICBC’s potential:
Considering the strategic location of the centre […] one could state 
that the foundation of ICBC Khorgos is an important project in the 
non-commodity sector of the economy. It is able to provide a powerful 
stimulus to the development of a whole complex of customs, transport, 
trade and tourism infrastructure of the region. (People’s Daily 2011b).
Quite in contrast to the hubris surrounding ICBC, Bolashak traders I talked 
to remained sceptical of its potential benefit for their own supply chains. 
They stated that they would rather keep relying on their existing networks. 
Additionally, as Marzhan emphasized, ICBC was simply too far away from 
the manufacturing centres in China to be a compelling option for making 
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purchases. Contrary to the situation in the early 1990s, the immediate 
borderlands were no longer the most important arenas for skilful neigh-
bouring – at least for wholesale traders like her. One of the main factors 
for Marzhan’s success was the carefully maintained relations with her 
partners in Beijing and with her representative in Urumqi being in charge 
of communications with the former to organize supplies and delivery. The 
promised rather than delivered economic incentives by large-scale state-led 
schemes, on the contrary, are nowadays perceived to play only a minor role 
in activities by many traders.
State-led development efforts and their outcomes are nevertheless 
not to be looked at separately from the agency of bazaar entrepreneurs 
like Marzhan, Rashid or Azhar. The following section points out that the 
discourse around and dealing with large-scale state interventions, in fact, 
contributes to changing societal representations and the renegotiation 
of trade practice at bazaars. On the one hand, bazaar trade nowadays 
is often said to ensure the access to consumption to broader circles of 
the society against counterproductive modernization efforts of the state 
authorities. On the other, top-down measures, despite local traders’ scepti-
cism, increase the relevance of immediate borderland communities in the 
exchange processes, particularly in terms of the ongoing creation of the 
CU. The renewed involvement of immediate border communities adds 
another dimension to the ‘art of neighbouring’, namely the processes in 
which borderlanders broker or mediate the shipment of goods across the 
border. These processes of constant (re-)negotiation and re-scaling of social 
relations illustrate the considerable impact of trader strategies on the 
contradictory and highly unpredictable outcomes of state-led development 
efforts, as well as the gains (or losses) derived from this uncertainty. The 
capacity of bazaar traders to employ a particular set of social skills is 
what ensures their economic survival and successful neighbouring amidst 
large-scale interventions.
Strengthening Trust, Acting Morally
Marzhan’s story is a testimony to the emergent class of self-employed 
wholesale traders who have benefited from economic growth and infra-
structural improvements in (and beyond) western China. These traders 
are dependent on favourable and f lexible relations across the border. 
The timely and f inancially tenable production and the delivery of goods, 
therefore, depend closely on trustworthy personal networks between 
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traders, producers, transport providers, Customs off icials and customers. 
It is this very practice of navigating constraints and opportunities by way 
of constantly investing in social relations and networks, which can reach as 
far as Beijing or Guangzhou that reveals the ‘art of neighbouring’ in action. 
These networks have often been built over years (if not decades) through 
close cooperation; they therefore entail essential qualities and values, with 
trust being particularly important.
Both Marzhan and her business partner Adil constantly stress the para-
mount importance of trust, which is both crucial in critical situations and 
vital for everyday business. As Adil puts it: ‘We are exclusive distributors of 
our products in Central Asia […] We have signed a contract with our partners 
in Beijing. They agreed to keep our seasonal collections under tight wraps 
and not sell it to competitors from Central Asia. So far, they have kept their 
word’. For Adil, the fact of ‘not cheating and not being cheated’ is among 
the most important principles in building trust. According to Marzhan, 
building trust with Chinese business partners is f irst and foremost a matter 
of intercultural sensitivity:
I have several friends in this row of stalls working with China, some of 
them successfully, others not really. But I can confidently say that no one 
is able to speak with the Chinese like I do. And this is not because I am 
successful in business but because communication with Chinese follows 
certain rules, which not everyone understands.
Reflecting on their success, Adil and Marzhan highlight the trust-generating 
effect of working together with confidence over a long period of time, and 
through periods of crisis, to their mutual benefit. On one occasion, while 
praising her business relations, Marzhan explains that during periods of 
closed borders her partners in Beijing even sent goods by plane to speed 
things up and secure her urgent supplies. In this particular situation, she 
mentions the notion of guanxi, which is in a certain sense a Chinese coun-
terpart of the Russian notion of blat.24 Since the end of the Soviet Union the 
relevance of blat in economic life is often believed by many traders to have 
become restricted to close social bonds and replaced by a stronger impact of 
monetary aspects beyond that. Yet, the influence of guanxi, as Mayfair Yang 
argues in her seminal work (Yang 1994: 2002), continues to shape business 
24 Guanxi such as blat refers to interpersonal exchange systems based on social ties that ensure 
the reciprocal access to certain resources (Ledeneva 1998).
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interactions and relations since China’s opening-up.25 It is important to 
note that Yang suggests an increasing role of guanxi in strategies ‘to locate 
and maintain supply sources for new commercial ventures (Yang 2002: 
463) In trans-border bazaar trade, guanxi has taken on a translocal form 
and become an essential element in the ‘art of neighbouring’ relevant for 
business.
Following Marzhan and Adil, the sensitivity to social properties, 
honesty, and skills in intercultural communication help build trustful 
relations. Together with suff icient f inancial means, they are critical for a 
successful wholesale business that relies so much on a smooth, timely and 
cost-effective supply chain. It is here that the monetary extensions of blat 
and guanxi – bribe (xinghui 行贿, vzyatka) – come into play. In Marzhan’s 
case, deliveries from Beijing to Almaty took somewhere between f ive days 
and more than a month in autumn 2011, depending on the situation at 
the Khorgos crossing.26 Though reluctant to talk about the details, Mar-
zhan says that she is not paying off icial Customs fees for her shipments. 
Marzhan blames the inevitable corruption and the lengthy delays at the 
Customs when goods are properly tariffed for this practice. Instead of 
choosing the ‘formal’ way, which Marzhan considers a waste of time that 
could easily ruin her business, she relies on the services of an experienced 
local Kazakh ‘Customs broker’ from the Chinese part of Khorgos, who is 
well acquainted with Customs off icials on both sides. He successfully 
manages, so far almost without loss, the clandestine nightly transport 
of Marzhan’s goods in the stowage of overland busses. The drawback 
of this method is that Marzhan’s goods are considered contraband in 
Kazakhstan. Thus the threat of conf iscation always looms large, even 
after the merchandise has safely arrived in Almaty. This, in turn, requires 
more bribes to more off icials. Taken all costs into account, Marzhan and 
Adil earn a net prof it of just about 10 to 20 percent on the f inal wholesale 
price, which they negotiate individually with their customers. This margin, 
25 Granzow, too, discusses the role of guanxi in Chinese entrepreneurship as being either 
temporary or enduring aspects of China’s modernization (Granzow 1995: 191-194). 
26 Restraints to and interruption of cross-border trade occur frequently and can be caused by 
different factors and events. Yet most predictable are closures before and after public holidays in 
China, self-evidently, less so during social unrest in Xinjiang or power shifts between off icials 
for the distribution of resources in Kazakhstan. In early May 2011 Kazakhstan’s mass media 
reported that Customs and security service off icials at the Chinese-Kazakhstani crossing points 
of Khorgos and Kalzhat were sacked by special police forces. In the aftermath of these events 
high-ranking off icials were convicted of being responsible for the organization of large-scale 
contrabandism and money-laundering. Huge amounts of goods were confiscated and the border 
crossings remained closed during the busy summer months. 
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however, enables Marzhan and Adil to be part of Almaty’s upper-middle 
class. They drive a Lexus sedan and own several apartments in different 
parts of Almaty.
Given the profits of her wholesale business and the essential skills and 
resources, Marzhan contends that her trade business has achieved a new 
stage of prof iciency:
How many years I have worked in this sphere of business? I know every 
detail – for example, how to identify trends and how to sell a product in 
demand. […] I travel four, f ive times to Urumqi and Beijing each year. I go 
alone so that nobody disturbs me. I always think on my own and choose 
the products needed. In every respect, this is a creative type of work, and 
not just a profane buy-and-sell business.
During conversations with other wholesale entrepreneurs in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, I heard similar stories. Former ‘shuttle traders’ often 
highlight their contributions to the ongoing formation of sophisticated, if 
still widely considered informal or ‘unorganized’ trade. Zhibek Azhybaeva, 
the deputy head of the Kazakhstan Association of Bazaars in Almaty, states 
in an interview:
Bazaars, in fact, have developed into quintessential incubators for busi-
ness development. In particular, at bazaars people f ind out whether 
[trade] is an attractive type of business for them, or if one has come there 
coincidently. […] those, who worked at the bazaar for two years, will 
continue to do so and increase their business. The one, who could not 
withstand the challenge, leaves and searches for another way of earning 
his subsistence.
The entrepreneurial spirit of self-reliance and ‘being one’s own boss’ are 
highly praised among those who succeed. Gradually, the negative ste-
reotypes against bazaar trade and its allegedly chaotic, unproductive, and 
low-class nature are being challenged. In addition, bazaar entrepreneurs 
cast wholesale trade as an altogether different affair than preceding forms 
of ad hoc trade practice. This styling of wholesale trade as a sophisticated 
art of doing business is accompanied by the traders’ rise in social status 
and authority. Improvement in social representations of trade entrepre-
neurialism and the recognition of its signif icance in terms of welfare 
and employment in general enforce claims of morality, which could be 
brought in line with the notion of a ‘moral economy’. This concept was 
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developed by E.P. Thompson (1971) and James Scott (1976) in their seminal 
works on eighteenth-century England and twentieth-century Southeast 
Asia. In Thompson’s conception the term refers ‘to confrontations in the 
market-place over access (or entitlement) to “necessities” – essential food’ 
(Thompson 1991: 337-338). He describes the beliefs, usages, forms, and deep 
emotions that surround ‘prof iteering’ and ‘the marketing of food in times 
of dearth (Thompson 1991: 337-338 in Edelman 2005: 331). Scott confines 
‘moral economy’ rather to questions of reciprocity between ruling elites 
and peasants in terms of ‘what states and elites may claim’ or commodify, 
and ‘what they must, in turn, provide in times of necessity’ (in Edelman 
2005: 332).
The most important aspect of morality in bazaar trade concerns the 
vendor-customer relationship, or what Thompson calls ‘confrontations in 
the market-place’. More specif ically, what is at stake is the universal access 
to affordable goods that bazaars, unlike shopping malls, are able to provide 
to the low-income population. Marzhan argues:
Our target groups are lower middle-class or average consumers. For them 
the price is what counts. It’s a matter of fact that most of them are not 
from Almaty, where people are far better off, but they come from regional 
centres in provincial Kazakhstan where incomes are considerably lower. 
Therefore, we cannot continually raise our prices.
The other central aspect of morality in bazaar trade, closer to Scott, is the 
‘right to employment’. While skilled employment, particularly in the state-
run sectors, is still much sought after, access to such positions is restricted 
to professionals and therefore it is diff icult to achieve. From the perspective 
of most of the traders I spoke to both at the Bolashak and Kitai Bazaars, 
trade absorbs skilled professionals, among them university graduates, who 
would not be able to f ind appropriate, equally lucrative jobs elsewhere, in 
particular in the state-budgeted sector. Bazaar traders employing additional 
staff thus conceive themselves in a position of taking over responsibilities 
of state institutions, and by so doing, challenge the very authority and 
accountability of the state. Female traders like Marzhan, who form the 
majority of traders even in the wholesale segment, play an important role in 
this process. This ties in with Bruno’s observations of the gendered nature 
of post-Soviet trade, both in terms of women being pushed into the bazaar 
economy in absence of employment alternatives since the end of socialism, 
as well as being often considered more trustworthy and socially responsible 
entrepreneurs than their male counterparts (Bruno 1997).
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Renegotiating Exchange
The ongoing large-scale interventions in the immediate borderlands are 
increasingly perceived as a threat to these socially conducive functions of 
bazaar trade in public opinions. This is particularly true in the case of the CU 
between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The CU is envisioned to generate 
a competitive advantage for domestic production – by reinforcing its outer 
borders and preventing ‘black market imports’ from China.27
For my interlocutors at Barakholka in Almaty, the new border regime 
imposed by the CU has been harshly criticized as a hasty step that does 
not adequately take the realities on the ground into account. In the words 
of one trader who concisely sums it up: ‘The CU predominantly aims at 
protecting emerging national production from cheap imports from China. 
But people are not ready for that’. Another trader, arguing from a critical 
realist point of view, put it like this:
A country like China, it can export and export and export. And there is 
no need of reinventing the wheel here and rebuilding domestic indus-
trial production, for sure. […] Of course we should be happy to have our 
national producers, but if you can have it cheaper from China… It comes 
out like that, even with all transport costs.
The implementations of the CU and the tighter regulations that come with 
it have an even more pronounced effect on Bishkek’s Dordoi Bazaar. ‘No 
Kazakhstan means no trade’ – such was the cynical formula Rashid used to 
sum the situation up in a nutshell. He thereby points to his full warehouse 
container and the absence of his long-standing customers, who used to come 
here to stock up regularly. Many Dordoi traders like Rashid are forced to 
switch from wholesale to a combination of wholesale and retail trade with 
domestic customers from Kyrgyzstan – a much less lucrative business. 
Some traders and transport providers, however, quickly capitalize on the 
new rules. Since summer 2011, a new form of ad-hoc ‘shuttle trade’ with 
all kinds of Chinese-made consumer goods from the Dordoi Bazaar has 
flourished at several Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan border crossings. Korday, the 
27 A recent report by the German development agency GIZ argues that: ‘The possible guess 
[if Kyrgyzstan f inally joined the CU] might be that the centre of trade will be relocated from 
Kyrgyzstani Dordoi, that will lose its wholesale traders, to Kazakhstan’s Khorgos’ (GIZ 2011: 34). 
The reasons for this, according to the report, are visa-free travel and preferential tariffs at the 
ICBC in Khorgos. In other words, if the ICBC can live up to its promise, the existing ‘tax-free’ 
contraband channels would face competition from an equally tax-free legal one.
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main crossing between Bishkek and Almaty was at times almost impassable. 
Azhar outlined what was going on:
At Dordoi, additional mechanical pressing facilities were installed to bale 
enormous packs of textiles into transportable cubes. […] At Korday, too, 
a new category of service appeared: the shuttle porter. Hundreds of local 
people are employed by traders for some US$20 a day to carry bales of 
merchandise across, sometimes several times a day, back and forth, one 
after another. An enormous crowd queues up in the heat every day, pushing 
each other around […] The Kazakhstani custom officers are just preying 
on them, taking bribes from everyone or randomly confiscating the goods.
This novel type of shuttle trade, specially confined to the immediate border 
crossing, is facilitated by the CU’s legislation that exempts personal belong-
ings of up to 50 kilograms and US$1,500 from paying duty. In fact, customs 
off icials in charge of enforcing these regulations and f ighting ‘contraband’ 
can personally profit from this situation by taking bribes in rather blatant 
ways. For Azhar, all of this means an additional hurdle. The idea of sourcing 
goods directly from Xinjiang or other parts of China and scaling her business 
up to the large retail or wholesale level does not appeal to her; nor could she 
f inancially afford or have the necessary connections to do so. Trading in 
larger quantities of goods requires capital and frequent journeys to Urumqi 
or, even better, to coastal China. Azhar also emphasizes that she is not be able 
to withstand the f ierce competition in wholesale trade. While the scenario 
of being restricted in her opportunities seems to provide a rather negative 
outlook, this could change again with the accession of Kyrgyzstan to the CU, 
which is a matter of intensive debate in Kyrgyzstan (Vecherny Bishkek 2011).28
All of this shows that the small-scale trade f lows across the borders 
between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Xinjiang challenge ‘off icial’ border 
regimes in various ways. Borders are permeable, small trade connections 
are not static, and the situation is in no way exclusively regulated by the 
law. It is rather, as Parham (2009) notes in the context of Kyrgyzstan-China 
and Tajikistan-China borderlands, contextually (re-)negotiated by the actors 
involved, including Customs off icials, traders, and the state’s elites with 
their development agendas. Given the legal loopholes and latent corruption 
at border crossings, notwithstanding powerful measures of state authorities, 
28 Kyrgyzstan has become a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, of which the CU is a 
central component, in May 2015. The economic effects of this accession for Dordoi’s wholesale 
and retail traders and for the Kyrgyzstani economy in general remain yet to be fully explored. 
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there is some limited space for bazaar entrepreneurs to manoeuver within 
networks of distribution and supply.
Conclusion
This chapter seeks to provide in-depth and multilevel observations of 
‘neighbouring’ in the world of trans-border trade in the border zones of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Xinjiang. The cases of traders at the Bolashak 
and Kitai Bazaars in Almaty and Bishkek as nodes of the larger wholesale 
and retail networks show that such an approach matters for the analysis not 
only of mere supply and distribution chains, but also of more general social 
transformations. This process of change interrelates with the capability 
of small traders to position themselves favourably and anticipate future 
change (Alff, 2014).
First and foremost, trade patterns are bound to socio-economic networks 
across the borderlands that can, but not necessarily do, generate spatial and 
social mobility. Marzhan’s close ties to partners in coastal China on the one 
hand, and ethnic ties as emphasized by Azhar and Rashid on the other hand, 
are often mobilized as vital resources. Along with financial capital, this social 
capital is considered a central precondition for entrepreneurial success. From 
the perspective of bazaar entrepreneurs, ‘the art of neighbouring’ implies 
a good amount of resourcefulness that is necessary to make use of China’s 
rise. Trust, socio-cultural sensitivity, social responsibility, and the morality 
regarding access to consumption that is increasingly accepted in the wider 
society, are all part of the story. As illustrated by Marzhan and Adil’s case 
of wholesale business, rather positive representations of trans-border trade 
have started replacing the still widespread and deeply-rooted public percep-
tions of trade as unsophisticated and immoral labour. This change in attitude 
and signif icant economic success of large wholesale business contributes 
to a certain upward social mobility. However, the constant negotiation of 
power asymmetries between wholesale and retail entrepreneurs and state 
authorities continues to imply vulnerability and risk.
This uncertainty is, on the one hand, amplif ied by the outcomes of 
modernization efforts that dominate the public discourse. These outcomes 
condition and enact network-based trade patterns. Economic modernization 
in Xinjiang has opened up channels for supply with cheap consumer goods. 
Bazaar entrepreneurs in Almaty and Bishkek also constantly change their 
supply strategies to adapt to new and changing rules, particularly at border 
crossings and often in ways that are contradictory to the intended goals of 
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state policies. Thus, in accordance with Itty Abraham’s observation, ‘the 
borderland is a zone where privately produced social order and formal politi-
cal rules are in a constant state of uncertainty and conflict (Abraham 2006: 4)
Linking the macro-level of modernization schemes with the micro-level 
of supply and distribution strategies, it becomes clear that bazaar entre-
preneurs, on the one hand, are forced to adapt to changing regulations and 
their implementation to a certain degree, both locally and translocally. 
However, socio-economic networks are also utilized in evasion of off icial 
rules to ensure constant supply and, thereby, to minimize risks. Marzhan’s 
employment of a broker in Khorgos can be predominantly characterized as 
reactive. On the other hand, supply and delivery patterns have turned out 
to be rather proactive. Bazaar entrepreneurs, for example, f ind loopholes 
to avoid restrictions imposed on them at borders. These strategies, adopted 
to bypass rules, are however far from being universally applicable and can 
lead to new barriers for commercial mobility and network-related flows, as 
Azhar’s case of becoming restricted to local supplies illustrates.
With regard to the neighbouring situation, the chapter has shown that the 
locus of neighbouring in the last two decades has shifted from the immediate 
borderlands (Baud and van Schendel 1997: 222) to urban nodes of wholesale 
trade, and as of late, partly back to the border. This shows the scalar elasticity 
or fluidity of the neighbouring situation. Neighbouring has become qualita-
tively different from the early 1990s, and it operates across long distances due 
to socio-political change. With these dynamics, a relatively broad, relational 
definition of borderlands, orientated at nodes in social networks between 
hub bazaars and distribution centres in Almaty, Bishkek and across China, 
seems necessary. Moreover, it must be also stressed that networks can reach 
far beyond the immediate borderlands and thus require a geographically 
unbounded approach beyond the concept of neighbouring in proximity. 
I agree with Parham that it is necessary to remain wary of concepts of 
static or bounded borderlands and attention has to be paid to how they are 
experienced and negotiated in everyday life in a myriad of ways and scopes 
(Parham 2009: 16). Going beyond the much-debated conceptualization of 
borders as delineated structures to enforce state power to a given state 
territory, borderlands are to be understood as contextually changing (and 
changeable) social constructs. They are framed and transcended by power 
relations and negotiation processes among actors involved. Thus, ‘the art 
of neighbouring’ in China’s borderlands with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
implies unexpected alliances and confrontations across scales and places. 
It requires resistance and adaptability and has considerable effects on 
individual livelihoods as well as local and state economies.

5 A World Community of Neighbours in 
the Making
Resource Cosmopolitics and Mongolia’s ‘Third Neighbour’ 
Diplomacy
Uradyn E. Bulag*
Introduction: Mongolia’s Third Neighbour Policy
The late 1980s was a momentous period in world history, and like many 
countries in the world, Mongolia was caught up in it.1 The country’s 
pro-democracy movement, which rose in momentum in the same period, 
was simultaneously an anti-Soviet colonial liberation movement, as it 
denounced Soviet exploitation, colonization and even genocide in the late 
1930s. Meanwhile, the Sino-Soviet détente was accompanied by the Soviet 
withdrawal of troops from Mongolia (Radchenko 2012), a rapid waning of 
the Soviet power, and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991. 
Thereupon Mongolia lost its traditional guarantor of independence as much 
as it rejected it. What it meant for the new democracy was that it was left 
to face China alone, a historical nemesis, and a communist state that had 
just used its military power to crush its student movement in Beijing and 
the Tibetan rebellion in 1989. As Inner Mongols from China flooded into 
Mongolia, the sinicized demeanour and speech, perceived or real, of some 
of the visitors horrif ied the Mongols in Mongolia, serving as a mirror for the 
Mongols to see what a Chinese colonization might look like (Bulag 1998). 
They developed a profound sense of insecurity; Mongols were paranoid that 
an impoverished Russia might sell Mongolia to China, something called for 
by ultra-rightist nationalists such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union and Russia’s fall in fortune galvanized Mongolia to reshape 
its foreign policy as a matter of national survival.
In June 1990, a month after the Mongolian People’s Republic amended 
its Constitution to legalize opposition parties and scheduled a multi-party 
*  My thanks to the editors for invitation to ‘The Art of Neighbouring: Old Crossroads and 
New Connections along the PRC’s Borders’ they organized at Asia Research Institute, National 
University of Singapore.
1 Mongolia was known as the Mongolian People’s Republic from 1924 to 1992. 
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election, the United States sent its f irst residential ambassador, and on 
August 2, 1990, less than a month after the election, the US Secretary of 
State James A. Baker, III came to visit Mongolia and addressed the new 
Mongolian parliament to bolster this young democracy. He reportedly 
told the Mongolians to the effect that ‘Mongolia has two good neighbours, 
but if needed a third, the US would be happy to be it’ (Campi 2005: 48). 
The United States then led the way in supporting Mongolia’s transition, 
rallying democratic countries to provide economic assistance (Addleton 
2013).
The United States’ neighbourly posture to Mongolia was, no doubt, 
designed to replace the collapsing Soviet Union, and help Mongolia to bal-
ance China’s growing economic and political influence. As Munkh-Ochir 
Dorjjugder writes, ‘A rhetorical gesture to support the nation’s f irst move 
toward democracy […], it meant more to Mongolians than to any American 
present at the speech. The idea, possibly quickly forgotten in Washington, 
was immediately picked up by the Mongolian elite’ (Dorjjugder 2011). 
Although the Mongolians were deeply encouraged and inspired by James 
Baker’s proposal, and began to seek ‘third neighbours’ among democratic 
and economically advanced nations, according to Alicia Campi, the US 
did not initially appear to be willing to be committed to its own promise:
As former Mongolian Minister of Foreign Affairs, L. Erdenechuluun 
wrote: ‘To many Mongolian politicians and government off icials, the 
US would appear as the savior of new Mongolia and “major pillar” of its 
national security’. However, at f irst, American off icials dismissed the 
Third Neighbour concept as a non-starter, because they viewed Mongolia 
as a friendly, but minor nation wedged between signif icant American 
rivals, Russia and the PRC. (Campi 2010: 90).
The initial non-committal stance of the US was a reminder to Mongolia 
that the virtual non-territorial ‘third neighbours’ could never be a physical 
deterrent to any Chinese or Russian aggression. Thus, in the National 
Security Concept developed in 1994, Mongolia moved away from its clas-
sical approach of ‘hard balancing’ or relying on a friend against an enemy. 
It declared that Mongolia’s foreign policy would be based on political 
realism, nonalignment, pursuit of national interest, and participation 
in international efforts to strengthen international peace and security. 
Responding to the changed geopolitical condition of Mongolia, and re-
positioning itself as a ‘small state’, Mongolia began to treat China and 
Russia as equal neighbours, hoping to keep them at equal distance while 
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improving relations with them simultaneously. Formulated as neighbours, 
Mongolia no longer treats them as friend or enemy, so that Mongolia’s new 
post-socialist foreign policy is off icially not to antagonize either, still less 
both. Importantly, Mongolia revived the 1930s’ idea of building a neutral 
state, as advanced by the Buryat Mongolian scholar Tseveen Jamtsarano. 
This is best manifested in the declaration of Mongolia’s territory to be a 
‘nuclear-weapon-free zone’ made by President P. Ochirbat to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on September 25th, 1992. It was a solemn 
pledge that Mongolia would not take sides with either of its neighbours or 
allow its territory to be used against the other as happened in the 1960s 
to the end of the 1980s when Mongolia was a host to a number of Soviet 
military bases with nuclear weapons.2
After more than a decade of active experiment, Mongolia formally 
enshrined its Third Neighbour policy in the renewed National Security 
Concepts of Mongolia passed in June 2010. More than any other nations 
in the world, the concept of ‘neighbour’ has come to occupy the core in 
Mongolia’s conceptualization of its place in the world. In this new policy, 
Mongolia pivots its national sovereignty not only on treating China and 
Russia as neighbours, keeping them at equal distance, but more importantly 
on the so-called ‘third neighbours’, a conglomeration of democracies plus 
a few select friendly non-democracies. These ‘third neighbours’, of which 
the US, the EU, and Japan being the most important, are all territorially 
non-contiguous with Mongolia, either by land or by sea.
This chapter is an attempt to understand Mongolia’s Third Neighbour 
approach as its new art of neighbouring. Mongolia’s new foreign policy has 
been primarily for defensive purpose, to use the Third Neighbours to offset 
any aggression from either of its territorial neighbours, especially China. 
Yet, declaring itself a neutral state, pursuing a policy of nonalignment, 
how not to use or not to be used by the ‘third neighbours’ against China or 
Russia demands Mongolia to exercise its ‘smart power’, as it were. The key 
to this art of neighbouring lies in how to avoid the political in the profound 
political solution to maintenance of Mongolia’s sovereignty.
2 The Parliament of Mongolia on February 3, 2000 passed the ‘Law of Mongolia on its nuclear-
weapon-free status’, and on September 17th, 2012, the Permanent Representatives to the United 
Nations of the f ive Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) – the US, Russia, China, United Kingdom and 
France – and the Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations signed parallel 
political declarations regarding Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status (Nuclear Threat Initiative 
2013). See also Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (2010) for the comprehensive review 
of Mongolia’s negotiation for a nuclear-weapon-free status.
124 urADyN e. bulAg
Fortunate Neighbours, Unfortunate Neighbours
Neighbour is a key metaphor in Christian moral philosophy, which has 
recently been taken on board to imagine a cosmopolitan world in which 
people are urged to treat immigrants, strangers, and other non-natives as 
neighbours whom we are obliged to love: ‘love thy neighbour!’ (Derrida 
2004). The central attraction of neighbour lies in the idea of proximity 
which is expected to overcome enmity. However, paradoxically, neighbourly 
proximity is both an end and a means, for the concept of neighbour can be 
instrumentalized to serve a political purpose. The US ‘Good Neighbour’ 
policy was a prime example of the strategic use for assembling alliances, 
as it was designed to promote non-intervention and friendship with its 
southerly neighbours, and to secure Latin American support against the 
looming threat posed by Germany in the 1930s.3
The People’s Republic of China has, since the 1950s, adopted a similar 
good neighbourly policy; inspired by the American model, but also rooted in 
traditional metaphor of neighbours being as close as lips and teeth (chunchi 
xiangyi 唇齿相依), it has been used to put moral injunction on China’s 
neighbouring countries, emphasizing common interest (Lin 2005). In 2003, 
China broadened the scope of its good neighbour policy, pledging to promote 
an ‘amicable, peaceful, and prosperous neighbourhood’ at the same time 
proclaiming China’s ‘peaceful rise’. The two extra dimensions to the original 
idea of good neighbour (mu lin 睦邻) – peaceful neighbour (an lin 安邻) and 
rich neighbour ( fu lin 富邻) (Yang 2004) – are no doubt designed to enhance 
China’s own prestige by placating China’s neighbours (Tsai et al. 2011) .
The moral conception of proximate neighbourhood, I argue, is imbed-
ded in sedentary metaphysics as exemplif ied in the wise saying: ‘You can 
choose your friends, but you can’t choose your neighbours’. The trouble is, 
as Slavoj Žižek (2005) shows, hatred and killing often occur between close 
neighbours. In Bosnia, the concept of neighbourhood called komš iluk has 
become ambivalent, as it is torn between culturally expected intimate social-
ity and the murderous tensions among people in the same neighbourhood 
divided along ethnic lines (Bringa 1993, Henig 2012, Sorabji 2008). One may 
argue that proximity does not necessarily always lead to friendship; rather, 
3 In order to assuage the fears of Latin Americans, on March 4th, 1933, Roosevelt announced 
in his inaugural address that: ‘In the f ield of World policy, I would dedicate this nation to the 
policy of the good neighbour, the neighbour who resolutely respects himself and, because he 
does so, respects the rights of others, the neighbour who respects his obligations and respects 
the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbours’ (Roosevelt 1933).
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precisely because of overlapping interests, maintaining a boundary between 
neighbours may be diff icult but existentially essential. As Jacques-Alain 
Miller writes perceptively, ‘For it is a simple matter to love one’s neighbour 
when he is distant, but it is a different matter in proximity’ (Miller 1994: 79-80).
Conceptualized this way, geopolitics of neighbourhood can be the defining 
characteristic of a nation’s foreign relations. Dana Cuff, in writing about the 
f igure of the neighbour in suburban America, notes that the neighbour is 
both spatial and social. It is also ‘political’ in the sense of Carl Schmitt, which 
requires our wisdom to make a good distinction between a good and a bad 
neighbour (Cuff 2005, Schmitt 1996 [1932]). If we follow Mao Zedong, then, 
choosing to live with the right neighbour against the bad neighbour might be 
seen as the answer to one’s survival and well-being.4 As shown by Mongolia’s 
conceptualization of China and Russia as equal neighbours (so as to avoid 
conflicts) and those beyond as third neighbours (to ‘soft-balance’ the first two 
neighbours), the figure of neighbour has a built-in paradox of both the political 
and the anti-political. It may be both the problem and the solution to it.
Mongolia’s third neighbour conceptualization, as I will analyze below, 
shows that peaceful coexistence of peoples and countries as neighbours lies 
as much in moral injunction as in having a freedom to choose neighbours, 
thereby reassembling a new neighbourhood. To the extent that Mongolia 
actively invites a cluster of nations and international institutions into 
Mongolia as third neighbours to flank the two territorial neighbours, we are 
witnessing a radical geopolitical reconfiguration of Inner Asia, transforming 
Mongolia from a hermit state landlocked between two mutually exclusive 
rival superpowers, to a nation sitting at the centre of a world community 
of neighbours in the making. This is in large part a product of Mongolia’s 
own diplomatic initiatives.
The Mongolian approach may be best explained by Bruno Latour’s 
sociology of translation, in which the aggregation of groups is the target of 
explanation, as opposed to what he calls sociology of the social which takes 
groups as a starting point (Latour 2005). As such, what we need to do is to 
explain how Mongolia has tried to reassemble a new omni-neighbourhood 
in Mongolia, whether a new cosmo-polity is emerging in Mongolia, and what 
characteristics it may have.
Latour’s sociology of translation suggests that an association or group 
is not always comprised only of humans. Non-humans can also play an 
4 ‘Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the f irst importance for 
the revolution. The basic reason why all previous revolutionary struggles in China achieved so 
little was their failure to unite with real friends in order to attack real enemies’ (Mao 1925: 249).
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equal role, exercising agency. I think it is an important insight useful for 
understanding the formation of new neighbourhood in Mongolia, but we 
must at the same time reject Latour’s f lat ontology. For not all things have 
the same weight in their exercise of agency, nor do people have equal power 
or status. Context, history, and culture determine the shape, duration, and 
meaningfulness that each association or neighbourhood takes.
Giovanni da Col (2012), in a recent article in which he develops a concept 
of cosmoeconomics, argues that Tibetan cultural and social life is centred 
on fortune, or yang, and managing one’s fortune is ‘the elementary form 
of fortunate life (da Col 2012: 192). Fortune is the vital force of either an 
individual or a group, but it is perforce to be shared: ‘Good fortune has to 
be shared and redistributed properly and is the medium that connects, 
shapes, and re-creates social networks through the economies it entails. 
But it requires constant care to avoid free-riders and parasites’ (da Col 2012: 
192). Put differently, too much fortune may, like a piece of rotten meat, 
attract a lot of f lies, making you unfortunate. I build on this argument and 
suggest that fortune and its sharing or unsharing may lead to regrouping 
and formations of new political associations.
While da Col’s fortune is something invisible, unquantif iable, and yet 
has a ‘quasi-relational materiality’ as it can be preserved, contained, or 
appropriated, and it can flee or disappear of its own volition due to external 
influence, and such as it is a generalized fortune, I would like to focus on 
something specif ic to locality that may contain the fortune that makes the 
people of the locality particularly fortunate and prosperous, and yet pre-
cisely because of this quality it is subject to desire from outsiders. I call it the 
fortune-sovereignty of the people inhabiting the territory. My conception 
of fortune-sovereignty goes beyond the Eurocentric and modernist under-
standing of sovereignty as something exclusive with a bounded essence; 
fortune-sovereignty not only posits relationality, often hierarchical and 
overlapping, but involves exchanges of fortunes between various sovereign 
realms that result in regional dynamics.5 The best term that captures this 
sense of fortune-sovereignty is the Chinese concept of fangwu (方物) which 
refers to things specif ic to a region. Fangwu, in Chinese conception, is both 
cosmoeconomic and cosmopolitical.
5 Aihwa Ong has recently put forward a similar concept of ‘graduated sovereignty’ to under-
stand the distributed, non-exclusive characteristics of East Asian state sovereign power between 
the centre and special economic zones, where the citizenship is def ined differently according 
to race, ethnicity, gender, class and region, and where foreign corporations are allowed in to 
exercise certain authority (Ong 2006). 
A worlD coMMuNiT y of NeighbourS iN The MAkiNg 127
Take for example the classical Chinese schema of tianxia (天下). It is 
a f ive or nine concentric circle of peoples whose degree of humanity or 
civilization is measured by a gradation of distance from the centre.6 It is in 
practice a combination of political authority and economic fortune; that is, 
the prestige and authority of the centre must be sustained by tribute bearing 
from the periphery. The tributary items – fangwu – from the periphery are 
not just symbolic, but represent the fortune-sovereignty of the realm; in 
return the peripheral leaders get more value-added goods as gifts, i.e. the 
fortune-sovereignty from the emperor’s realm, but political subordination 
to the supreme authority of the centre. James Hevia comes close to capturing 
the essence of the cosmopolitics of this fortune-sovereignty:
[T]ribute is glossed in Chinese-language sources as local products 
( fangwu), that is, things specif ic to the kingdom of the ruler who pre-
sented them to the emperor. The emperor, in turn, bestowed things from 
his kingdom on the other ruler. This exchange of precious objects was 
understood to forge a political relationship between the Qing emperor, 
as the superior, and the other ruler, as inferior, the purpose of which was 
nothing less than the mutual undertaking of the cosmic-moral ordering 
of the world. The objects themselves and their specif ic movements, I 
would argue, cannot be reduced purely to economic or cultural values. 
Rather, they are performative gestures in that they had a role in producing 
political and even natural relations. (Hevia 2003: 15-16)7
6  The Chinese classic Rites of Zhou ranked nine domains of imperial administration starting 
from the residence of the ruler, with required service specif ied in the tributary relations: (The 
ruler) distinguished between the nine domains or areas of service ( fu 服) among the vassal 
states. The area covering one thousand li (from the emperor) is called the Royal Capital Domain 
(Wangji 王畿). The area f ive hundred li beyond the Royal Capital Domain is the area called the 
Marquis Area of Service (Houfu 侯服). The area f ive hundred li beyond the Marquis Area of 
Service is the area called the Master of the Hinterland Area of Service (Dianfu 甸服). The area 
f ive hundred li beyond the Master of the Hinterland Area of Service is the area called the Baron 
Area of Service (Nanfu 男服). The area f ive hundred li beyond the Baron Area of Service is the 
area called the Pledged Off icial Area of Service (Caifu 采服). The area f ive hundred li beyond 
the Pledged Off icial Area of Service is the area called the Guard Area of Service (Weifu 卫服). 
The area f ive hundred li beyond the Guard Area of Service is the area called the Man Barbarian 
Off icial Area of Service (Manfu 蛮服). The area f ive hundred li beyond the Man Barbarian 
Off icial Area of Service is the area called the Yi Barbarian Off icial Area of Service (Yifu 夷服). 
The area f ive hundred li beyond the Yi Barbarian Off icial Area of Service is the area called 
Defense Commander Area of Service (Zhenfu 镇服). Lastly, the area f ive hundred li beyond the 
Defense Commander Area of Service is the Barbarian Border Off icial Area of Service (Fanfu 
藩服) (Quoted in Anderson 2007: 22).
7 See also Hevia (1995: 128-130).
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This schema is predicated on the abundance of China’s fortune-sovereignty, 
a vital force that China often had to share with non-Chinese peoples, albeit 
in attempted exchange for the latter’s political loyalty and subordination. 
This sharing of the fortune-sovereignty was often a dangerous undertaking, 
for often the peripheral peoples would attempt to conquer and occupy China 
in part or in whole, turning China’s ‘cherished men from afar’ into ‘perilous 
neighbours’ (Barf ield 1989). The history of China oscillates between these 
two sets of dynamics: on the one hand, the Chinese imperial imperative 
determines centripetalism, as its centrality must be sustained by tribute-
bearing from the periphery, which must be beckoned and cherished. On 
the other hand, it builds up walls to protect itself from so-called ‘greedy’ 
nomadic neighbours (di Cosmo 1994) whose tribute-making became a way 
to exploit China, as they tried to wrestle more in the missions. There were 
times when peripheral leaders were told not to come to pay tribute, and 
China engaged in active defence by building walls, or expelling ‘barbarians’. 
What it implies is that, I argue, China’s fortune-sovereignty – its specif ic 
material abundance – had the potential to become the source of its misfor-
tune, the aversion of which requiring astute management. The management 
of fortune-sovereignty is the elementary form of the Chinese cosmopolitics.
The geoeconomic and cosmopolitical perspectives as outlined above can 
perhaps explain Mongolia’s transformation from a conquest people to one 
looking inward to defend themselves. I argue that it was this transforma-
tion that brought China to become Mongolia’s ‘perilous neighbour’, and 
making Mongolia lose its own capacity to be China’s worthy neighbour. 
In other words, I suggest that a neighbour is not an individual or group 
that is territorially close to someone fortuitously. To be a neighbour is to 
be oriented to someone’s fortune-sovereignty, thereby becoming a force to 
be reckoned with.
What, then, is the fortune-sovereignty of Mongolia? I have elsewhere 
argued that during the Qing era, the Mongols were largely kept separate 
from the Chinese with the Great Wall and the Willow Palisade serving 
as their borders. The Mongols’ nationalist involution was therefore the 
product of the Qing management of the Mongols, who were given a sense 
of territorial boundary, which they were to defend (Bulag 2012b). Moreover, 
the Mongols were given to develop a sense that their land was rich, as 
there emerged a plethora of place names with the word ‘bayan’, wealthy 
or rich: bayangol, bayanhot, bayanbogd, bayantsagaan, bayanhongor. Like 
the Tibetans, Mongols began to think in terms of fortune, heshig, which 
is located in pastures, mountains or rivers or lakes (for studies of Mongol 
practice of beckoning or increasing one’s fortune, see Chabros [1992], 
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Empson [2011], Humphrey and Ujeed [2012]). Mongols began to think that 
they were the most ‘fortunate’ and ‘blessed’ people in the world in terms of 
their material well-being. This was no doubt the product of the Qing policy 
of territorialization of the Mongol banners, their princes being obliged to 
regularly worship mountains and rivers which were believed to be fortune-
providers (Ts. Nasanbaljir 1964).
Such cosmoeconomic transformation had direct bearing on the Mon-
golian cosmopolitical configuration. In the late nineteenth century, there 
emerged legends about golden horses or golden cattle, which, once grazing 
on luscious pastures or swimming under lakes, are either stolen by southern 
barbarians (nanmanzi南蛮子) or Chinese, and occasionally Russians, or 
running away, startled by the strangers. These legends tell of the massive 
arrival of the Chinese and Russian settlers in Mongolia, and Mongol heroic 
defence of their pasture and salt lakes (Bulag 2010: 167-197, Chen 2001). Such 
legends of loss of fortune-wealth show an irony of Mongolia’s misfortune 
stemming precisely from their rich endowment of natural resources, and the 
Chinese and others turning from a victim fleeing Mongols to ones settling 
in Mongolia and among the Mongols as aggressive neighbours.
Whether or how to share Mongolia’s fortune-sovereignty with non-
Mongols thus became an existential question for Mongols at the turn of 
the 20th century. I argue that the 20th century Mongolian independence must 
be understood in this new cosmopolitical and cosmoeconomic context, 
which constituted a structure of opportunity, an opportunity for Mongolia 
to exercise its agency to form its own polity. By structure of opportunity I 
mean that these expansive powers were all mutually exclusive, all wanting 
to encompass Mongolia into their own polity, either formally or informally. 
I have recently developed a concept called ‘collaborative nationalism’ 
to capture the characteristics and dynamics of Mongolian nationalism 
(Bulag 2010). Mongol nationalism, that is a desire to build a nation-state on 
historical Mongolia, was waged through bringing in and forming a united 
front with a third party against a major adversary. In triangulating the 
relationship, the Mongols developed agential capacity to judge and decide 
how to use their fortune both to cut networks and build new ones.
My point of collaborative nationalism is that nationalism is not always a 
practice of bowling alone, to use Robert D. Putnam’s (2008) apt phrase, but 
is often collaborative with putative friends against putative enemies, and 
the biggest challenge to collaborative nationalism is how to manage the 
shared fortune-sovereignty with the friends in the absence of the enemies 
after they are defeated. Indeed, in the twentieth century, Mongols suf-
fered more in the hands of their Soviet Russian friends than their enemies, 
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Chinese or Japanese. Most of Mongolia’s leaders were killed by the Soviet 
Russians. The Soviet Union stationed a massive army in the 1930s and 40s, 
and from 1966 to 1991, and operated secret uranium mines and railways. This 
friendship was both necessary and hugely costly, and it was even colonial, 
not because of the inherent evilness of the Russians, but because of the 
strategic necessity of collaborative nationalism. Mongols have to share 
their fortune-sovereignty with a friend in order to avoid the possibility 
of its complete loss in the hands of an adversary, who was perceived to 
represent ‘threat’, rather than simply ‘power’, according to the ‘balance of 
threat’ theory proposed by Stephen Walt (1985).
Since the 1920s, Mongolian politicians have been attracted to the Swit-
zerland model to maintain neutrality, but this has never been a real option. 
From the early sixties, landlocked, exploited by the Soviet Union, and yet 
deeply suspicious of China, Mongolia embarked on a road to international-
ize itself by joining the UN and establishing diplomatic relations with as 
many countries as possible (Altangerel et al. 2013, Campi and Baasan 2009): 
another round of collaborative nationalism.
As is clear, Mongolian collaborative nationalism is not just relational, but 
also organizational, as it aims to form partnerships, and it is as strategic 
as it is f lexible, depending on the Mongol judgment of the f luctuating 
qualities of its territorial and non-territorial neighbours, such as their 
aggregate strength, geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and 
offensive intentions. One may argue that f lexibility is not necessarily a 
monopolistic property of late capitalist accumulation as David Harvey 
(1989: 141-172), or Chinese negotiation with global capitalism in the face of 
political uncertainty as Aihwa Ong (1999) would have it. Flexibility is in 
fact a distinct feature of Mongolian territoriality, and it is the traditional 
mechanism to maintain peace or wage warfare.
Consider the rural Mongolian residential pattern. The smallest residential 
community in Mongolia is called hot ail. This is a partnership community 
with several families congregating to share labour and pasture, forming a 
neighbourhood, called after the shared fortune or property: neg usniihan, 
people of one water source; neg goliinhan, people of one river, and so on. The 
members could be relatives or friends, and the size of the community could 
be constant, as some families move in or out, depending on how they get 
along. The flexibility or possibility of moving away from the neighbourhood 
means Mongols have freedom to decide whom to choose to live next to. 
To be sure, there are as many impossibilities as there are flexibilities, but 
my general point is that Mongols do have a tradition of not only choos-
ing a neighbour or neighbours, but also forming a neighbourhood or an 
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aggregation based on common interest. I call this f lexible neighbourhood. 
Mongols do not bowl alone, but form alignment to confront an adversary 
or venture for a fortune.
My concept of f lexible neighbourhood has the advantage of capturing 
not only the flexible form and size of neighbourhood, but also the agencies 
of actors. To be a member of a neighbourhood, or to rally familial units to 
form a community, one has to have suff icient capital, social or economic, 
and they constitute complementarities thereby achieving an organic unity, 
to use Durkheim’s phrase. This flexibility characterizes social dynamics in 
Mongolian history, especially from the twelfth century to the eighteenth 
century. The Manchu tried to destroy this flexibility mechanism by dividing 
up Mongols along banner lines, but within a banner, f lexibility continued. 
The new spirit of f lexibility is precisely how to work against the f ixed ter-
ritorial grain to form a flexible neighbourhood of nation-states in the world.
Following the cosmoeconomic-cum-cosmopolitical perspectives and 
that of f lexible neighbourhood, I suggest that today, as Mongolia discovers 
world class mines of coal, copper, and gold – the fortune or the source of 
energy vital for Mongolia’s economic rise – a new round of neighbouring is 
now taking place. The proximity of these mines, many of which have been 
declared ‘strategic deposits’ by the Mongolian government in 2007, to the 
Chinese border, and the fact that China is the largest market for these miner-
als, as China needs these resources to energize its own economy, all point 
to the fact that Mongolia’s fortune-sovereignty will have to be shared with 
China as a ‘greedy’ neighbour. How to share this fortune-sovereignty has 
become a question of how to keep Mongolia fortunate; it is also indicative 
of Mongolia’s art of neighbouring.
Reassembling Neighbours in Mine-golia
In spring 1990, Mongolia became the f irst Asian communist country that 
embraced democracy. Quickly Mongolia’s career diplomats, now wearing a 
hat of democracy, went out on a new mission; democracy, as an ideological 
resource, did its magic as an ‘actant’ not only to allow Mongolia to join the 
international community of democracies but also bring them in to form 
Mongolia’s new flexible neighbourhood. Mongolia’s strategy paid off, as 
the US led a group of donor countries to provide Overseas Development 
Assistance to Mongolia.
With China being def ined as a neighbour, after normalizing relations in 
1989, Mongolia opened its door for Chinese investment to compensate for 
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the withdrawal of Russian investment. Much of the Chinese capital went 
into small coal mines in Mongolia as Mongolia issued thousands of licenses, 
almost for free, in a bid to attract foreign investment. However, for much of 
the 1990s, despite the in-flowof foreign aid, Mongolia languished in poverty, 
due no small part to, inter alia, the international reputation Mongolia 
enjoyed as a country of pastoral economy, collapse of infrastructure, and 
shortage of skilled labour.
This situation began to improve at the turn of the new millennium, when 
the Canadian company Ivanhoe Mines discovered world class gold-copper 
ore deposits in a place called Oyu Tolgoi, or Turquoise Hill in the Gobi Desert, 
only 80 kilometres from the Chinese border. As more world-class mineral 
deposits were discovered, and international investment poured in, the 
Mongolian government decided to exploit the mine together with Ivanhoe 
and the Anglo-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto exclusively. In 2009 they 
agreed on a 34 percent Mongolian government and 66 percent Ivanhoe and 
Rio Tinto investment deal.
Ivanhoe and Rio Tinto’s entry into Mongolia quickly transformed Mongo-
lia into Mine-golia (Bulag 2009), as minerals have been recognized as the na-
tion’s new fortune-property to make it prosperous. However, the Mongolian 
government’s willingness to allow 66 percent share control by Ivanhoe and 
Rio Tinto happened at a time of heightened nationalist anxiety over China’s 
massive investment in Mongolia. There was a rising anti-China sentiment 
against its perceived threat to Mongolia’s national security (Rossabi 2005). 
I argue that Mongolia’s deal on Oyu Tolgoi followed the logic of ‘collabora-
tive nationalism’, that is to bring in powerful international companies 
from Mongolia’s ‘third neighbours’ to ‘balance’ China’s preponderance of 
investment in small mines, and Russian control of Mongolia’s large copper 
mine of Erdenet. In doing so, Mongolia enacted a political expectation of 
Ivanhoe and Rio Tinto to be different from Chinese companies or Russian 
companies. In other words, the Mongols expected corporations from the 
‘third neighbours’ to demonstrate altruism to Mongolia.
In 2010, Mongolia renewed its 1994 National Security Concept. According 
to Reeves, the renewal was a culmination of gradual shift from an omni-
enmeshment strategy to one of combining omni-enmeshment with balance 
of inf luence, identifying China as Mongolia’s biggest national security 
concern (Reeves 2012). I would add that the new National Security Concept 
has elevated the ‘Third Neighbours’ to the same level as the two territorial 
neighbours, while avoiding a political naivety enshrined in the previous 
conception. Mongolia’s resource nationalistic stance towards Rio Tinto as 
shown in the recent calls for renegotiating the deal represents a belated 
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realization that the ‘Third Neighbours’ may have their own self-interest in 
investment into Mongolia’s vital mineral sectors.
One clause in the new National Security Concept is particularly striking: 
‘External factors which may adversely affect the ensuring of economic 
security: Direct dependence on any one country in economic branches 
of strategic importance’ (Embassy of Mongolia n.d., Chapter 5, article 33). 
This clause is usually interpreted as a ‘one third’ rule, i.e. a proportional 
and equal representation of the three neighbours’ economic interest in 
Mongolia. The rule is thus an indication as much to curb China’s domination 
in Mongolia as a realization of the limited power and indeed the self-interest 
of the third neighbours who may strike better deals with China or Russia 
to the detriment of Mongolia’s national interest, or fall afoul of Mongolia’s 
two territorial neighbours. In 2010 Mongolia put Tavan Tolgoi, the world’s 
second largest coking coal deposit, to international bidding, not limited to 
the ‘third neighbours’ alone. Indeed, ‘third neighbours’ were to be just that, 
‘one third’ in Mongolia’s three-member neighbourhood. In Mongolia’s new 
strategic thinking, the three neighbours must be brought in to achieve some 
kind of equilibrium on which Mongolia’s national sovereignty will rest.
In 2009, shortly before the bidding, three of Russia’s highest leaders 
visited Mongolia in succession: the Prime Minister Putin in May, President 
Medvedev in August, and Speaker of the Upper House, Sergei Mironov, in 
September. In June 2010, the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao visited Mongolia. 
2011 saw an unprecedented number of foreign dignitaries: the President of 
India, Pratiba Davinsingh Patil in July, South Korean president Lee Myung-
bak and US vice president Joe Biden in August, Finnish President Halonen 
August 31st – September 1st, German Chancellor Merkel in mid-October, 
Austrian president Fischer in December, all coming with impressive pack-
ages of offers, all expressing interest in getting a share of Mongolia’s strategic 
fortune-sovereignty – coking coal.
As Mongolian politicians calculated correctly, suddenly Mongolia 
became a major destination for world leaders, as many of them have taken 
up on the Mongolian coal rush. The Mongolian government’s strategy of 
assembling a world community of neighbours through its one-third rule 
can be gauged in its choice of the international bidders for the Tavan Tolgoi 
Mine in 2011: China’s Shenhua was given 40 percent, America’s Peabody 24 
percent and a Russia-Mongolia consortium 36 percent. More interestingly, 
apart from America’s Peabody, the other two entities were not singles, but 
each being a consortium itself: The Russian-led consortium included South 
Korea’s POSCO, utility f irm KEPCO, trading f irm LG Corp and Daewoo 
International, state-owned Russian Railways and Japanese trading houses 
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Itochu Corp, Sumitomo Corp, Marubeni Corp and Sojitz Corp. China’s 
consortium comprised China’s Shenhua and Japan’s Mitsui & Co. This was 
an omni-enmeshment plus interlocking of interests indeed. Surprisingly, 
the Mongolian National Security Council vetoed the deal immediately after 
other South Korean and Japanese bidders cried foul. The rejection was not 
so much a negation of the intention of balancing as a collision between 
rigidity of the new security concept and the pragmatics on the ground. The 
search for bidders continues at this time of writing.
The Mongolian state’s strategy can also be seen in the construction of 
new railway lines to ship the mineral products to the world markets. As 
a land-locked nation, Mongolia does not have its own sea port; its nearest 
port is China’s Tianjin. Since both Oyu Tolgoi copper mine and Tavan Tolgoi 
coal mine are located near the Chinese border, which could be accessed by 
building a two hundred kilometre long narrow-gauge (1,435mm) railway 
from the mines to link to the existing Chinese railway network, it has been 
an option strongly favoured by all the mainstream international experts and 
f inancial institutions, including the World Bank and the Asia Development 
Bank. After prolonged debates, in December 2010, the Mongolian parliament 
resolved to construct a 1,100 kilometre-long internal wide-gauge (1,520mm) 
railway line in the f irst phase, and it was to link to the Trans-Mongolian 
railway and further east to connect to the Russian railway system and the 
Russian Far Eastern ports of Vanino or Vostochnii, in order to ship Mongo-
lia’s minerals to its two close third neighbours, South Korea and Japan. As 
Munkh-Ochir, a Mongolian defence strategist writes, ‘This decision seems 
to reflect a cohort of other-than-economic considerations – geopolitical 
calculations, aspirations for sustainable industrialization, and finally public 
opinion, which matters as the new electoral cycle unfolds’ (Dorjjugder 2010).
Mongolia’s national strategy on railway construction was political; as 
such it seemingly trumped all the economic rationality. It was a reaction to 
the Chinese government’s shutdown of the railway at the Sino-Mongolian 
port of Erlian in 2002 for several days during the visit of the Dalai Lama to 
Mongolia, ostensibly for ‘technical reasons’. In this light, precisely because 
of the unpredictability of the Chinese government which often uses its 
economic muscle for international relations, Mongolia’s political decision 
also has had its economic calculation not to become hostage to China, 
but always allow for an alternative exit. Yet in line with Mongolia’s overall 
strategy, the railway decision must not be construed as shunning China, for 
China is and will be Mongolia’s largest market. Indeed, Chinese capital is 
eagerly sought for building the new planned railways. On October 24th, 2014, 
after four years of gruelling, and oftentimes debilitating, debates with high 
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pressure from both China and Russia, the Parliament of Mongolia approved 
the construction of four railway lines: two railway lines to be linked to the 
Chinese railway system will use the narrow gauge, and the other two – a 
line from the Mongolian copper city Erdenet to the Mongolia-Russian border 
into Tuva, and the planned horizontal line of the Mongolian national railway 
network from the mineral-rich South Gobi to the east, will use the wide 
gauge (Parliament of Mongolia 2014).
As can be seen, China is actively invited in, but the proportion of the 
Chinese share of Mongolia’s fortune-sovereignty will be equalized with 
its other territorial neighbour, Russia. This is exemplary of Mongolia’s new 
strategy of building a world community of neighbours par excellence.
It remains to be seen whether Mongolia’s neighbourhood strategy will 
work eventually, but what is clear is that Mongolia’s art of neighbouring 
with China is through assembling as many neighbours as possible, inviting 
them into Mongolia. This situation is somewhat reminiscent of the Chinese 
tianxia and the tributary system. Like an ancient and wealthy agrarian 
Chinese empire, a mineral-rich Mongolia is now receiving tribute-like mis-
sions from powerful countries, all wanting to make profit out of it. Unlike 
the Chinese emperor who wanted to capitalize on the tributary missions 
to enhance his own prestige as the supreme lord of universe, Mongolian 
leaders’ ambition is perhaps more mundane, that is, they want to transform 
these potential threats into forces that can ultimately guarantee Mongolia’s 
sovereign survival and economic prosperity. This is to be achieved not only 
through a delicate balancing act, keeping all of them at equal distance or 
closeness, but also through sharing its fortune-sovereignty with all of them, 
and f inding a mechanism to interlock all of their interests together, rather 
than pitting them against one another.
Cosmoeconomics of ‘Horspitality’, or How To Be Happy 
Neighbours?
On November 21st, 2005, the US president Bush came to Ulaanbaatar to 
thank Mongolia for its staunch support for the U.S. war effort in Iraq, and 
particularly to thank the Mongol soldiers for intercepting suicide bombers 
at the gate of a US military camp, saving hundreds of US soldiers. ‘This 
visit has historical signif icance because it proves that Mongolia has a third 
neighbour’, Mongolian president Enkhbayar said as he introduced Bush (The 
Washington Times 2005). ‘America is proud to call you the third neighbour’, 
Bush responded (2005). A better and more appropriate response would 
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have been ‘America is proud to be your third neighbour’, but never mind 
Bushisms. This was the f irst time that the US off icially and openly accepted 
Mongolia’s formula and acknowledged a neighbourly relationship between 
them, 15 years after James Baker f irst proposed so to Mongolia. Neighbours 
in need, neighbours indeed.
In his address to the Mongolian parliament, Bush said he had a second 
mission, ‘I’m here on an important international mission. Secretary Rums-
feld asked me to check on his horse’ (Bush 2005). He referred to a diplomatic 
gift horse8 given to Rumsfeld by the Mongolian Ministry of Defence during 
his visit just a month prior to Bush’s visit. Instead of taking the horse back 
to the States, Rumsfeld left it in Mongolia, and it was left in the wild to roam 
freely. The American press at the time was amused, if not embarrassed, not 
so much at the seemingly worthless Mongol gift, as at the possible indication 
of the US desperation to rely on a small and poor nation with a belligerent 
history of war.
A Mongolian horse, a common species, is certainly far less impressive 
than some rare species, such as panda, as a diplomatic gift to show one 
country’s good will (for an in-depth discussion of animal-human neigh-
bourly relations in the Chinese context, see Fiskesjö, this volume). I suspect 
Mongolian diplomats did a poor job in explaining the real signif icance of 
a gift horse apart from emphasizing that the given horse is a pure breed 
or a champion horse in a national naadam competition. Still less did they 
possibly explain why the horse ought to be kept in Mongolia instead of 
taking away.
Rumsfeld was not the f irst to get a Mongolian horse. When the Japanese 
Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, the f irst national leader of a democratic coun-
try arrived for a visit in early August 1991, the Mongols gave him a horse.9 
Less than two weeks later, when the Chinese president Yang Shangkun 
came for a visit, Mongols also gave him a horse. Neither of them took away 
the horses. A more recent American politician to get a horse was the US 
vice president Biden in 2011.10 A US journalist called Evan Osnos wrote a 
piece entitled ‘Equine Diplomacy’ on The New Yorker, complaining that the 
Mongols had even given gift-horses to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and 
the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. Moreover, he claimed that he 
failed in his self-appointed mission to f ind Rumself’s horse, writing: ‘As for 
8 Rumsfeld named it Montana, after his wife’s home state which resembles Mongolian steppe. 
9 He named the horse Kaishun. Kai is from his family name and Shun is from Japanese word 
Shunme that means f leet horse.
10 Biden named the horse ‘Celtic’, after his Irish origins.
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Rumsfeld’s horse, I never found him. By the end of my trip, the [Mongolian] 
defence ministry told me that the horse was back in Khentii province, 
birthplace of Genghis Khan. I was welcome to keep looking for him in the 
province, an area the size of Austria’ (Osnos 2011).11
The former Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu was far more gracious in his 
appreciation of the horse he received. In August 2006, at a ceremony mark-
ing the 800th anniversary of the founding of Chinggis’s Great Mongolia in 
1206, which I also attended, I heard Kaifu reminiscing how he still checked 
on his Mongolian horse through the Japanese embassy. In October 2011, 
the newly appointed Japanese Ambassador Takenori Shimizu to Mongolia 
paid a courtesy call on Kaifu, and Kaifu started his conversation with his 
Mongolian horse:
At the time of that visit, I was deeply impressed by a gift horse I received 
from the then President Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat. That was a prized horse 
that had won in Naadam (the national sports festival of Mongolia). I heard 
that in Mongolia, a horse is a really considerable gift. However, although 
I was very grateful, I had no place to keep the horse if I brought it back to 
Japan, so I thought it would be very unfortunate for the horse. Therefore, 
when I returned I just brought back its reins. (Japan News 2011)
He also recalled how he was deeply impressed by the Mongolian ‘emotional 
intelligence’:
My visit to Mongolia was the f irst as Prime Minister of Japan and it was 
also the f irst by a leader from the West after democratization, so it was 
an extremely good thing. When I visited the country again some years 
later, I was eating a meal at a restaurant when I could hear a horse’s cry. 
As I was wondering what was happening, I saw that Kaishun, my horse, 
had been brought to me by the people taking care of him. I was once again 
deeply moved by the consideration for me. I thought that this could truly 
be called heart-to-heart communication. The people of Mongolia have 
strong compassion, or perhaps I should say an emotional heart. I think 
their mentality is similar to that of Japanese people. (Japan News 2011).
11 The latest to get a Mongolian gift horse was the US secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel in April 
2014. Helen Cooper, a New York Times journalist covering Hagel’s visit, wrote that the American 
fatigue at receiving equine gifts from Mongolia was largely for logistical reasons. They left their 
horses back in Mongolia because they wouldn’t want American taxpayers to bear the cost of 
their upkeep (Cooper 2014). 
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I am not sure that Kaifu really understood Mongolian mentality; what he 
exhibited was perhaps more of his own mentality. The signif icance of the 
gift horse must be examined both historically and in the way Mongols 
conceptualize the human-animal relationship. Historically, horses were 
Mongol ‘local products’ presented to the Qing emperor as an obligatory 
tribute. In 1655, the Qing granted zasag (ruling prince) titles to eight princes 
of the Khalkha, and demanded that the Khalkha make an annual tribute 
of one white camel and eight white horses to the Qing emperor. The offer-
ing of nine whites was institutionalized in 1691 when the Khalkha f inally 
submitted to the Qing (Bawden 1989 [1968]: 102). Thus, viewed historically, 
presenting a horse gift is not an innocent, but profoundly cosmopolitical 
act. In other words, during the Qing dynasty, the Mongol submission was 
annually expressed by surrendering the fortune-sovereignty in exchange 
for gifts – the fortune-sovereignty of the emperor – and trade rights.
The practice of presenting a gift horse to a guest and leaving it behind 
in the wild has a more cosmoeconomic dimension. It is usually the case 
that the Mongols create a specif ic relation between a person or family and 
an animal. In creating this association, this individual animal undergoes 
a consecration ritual called seter, which means henceforth, this particular 
animal is sanctif ied, never to be drafted for labour or killed for food (for a 
brief description of seter, see (Hyer and Jagchid 1983: 88-89). In consecrating 
the animal, it is believed that the fortune of both the owner and his animals 
of the same species will increase. As Tani writes, hunters and herders ‘justify 
their killing and consumption of animals by prohibiting the slaughter of 
a special individual held to be responsible for the herds’ prosperity’ (Tani 
1996: 45). Fortune or heshig may be present everywhere and among all, but 
it is through identif ication through naming and setting free an animal that 
one secures his or her own individualized fortune. Thus, I would argue that 
presenting the gift-horse is precisely an act to share Mongolia’s fortune-
sovereignty with the honoured guest, so that his fortune may also multiply. 
Presenting a horse and performing the seter is indexical to the Mongol sense 
of fortune and happiness. With the fortune of Rumsfeld and Biden, and that 
of Kaifu ever accumulating in Mongolia, it is hoped that Mongolia and its 
third neighbours will not only share Mongolia’s fortune-sovereignty, but 
also share happiness together.
As we have seen, the Japanese Prime Minister had an emotional reunion 
with his gift horse f ifteen years later. Since his retirement from politics 
in 2009, Kaifu has been serving as President of the Japan Mongolia Cross 
Link Association. In October 2011, Rumsfeld also came back to Mongolia, 
to ‘thank the country for their outsized contributions to theUS-led Global 
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War on Terror and to promote stronger ties between the US and Mongolia’ 
(American Chamber of Commerce in Mongolia 2011). During the occa-
sion, the Mongols brought back his Montana from the steppe for a reunion 
with his master (Rumsfeld Off ice 2011). It is said that the Soviet leader 
Leonid Brezhnev took away his Mongolian gift horse immediately, so it 
was probably never consecrated with a seter. As for the Chinese president 
Yang Shangkun’s horse, it was kept in Mongolia until 2002 when it was 
sent to China, four years after Yang’s death. A neighbour that shares 
fortune-sovereignty, but refuses or does not know how to share happiness, 
is inherently unfortunate.
Smart Power and Pax-Mongolica in the 21st Century
I have so far discussed the geopolitical reconfiguration of neighbourhood 
between Mongolia and China through changing fortune; the reverse of 
fortune has turned China from a passive neighbour to an active neighbour, 
from a neighbour that repeatedly tried to wall itself against invaders or 
expel the conquerors to one that began to actively expand into Mongolia. 
The closing in of external powers in addition to China as a result of the 
reverse of Mongolia’s fortune, created a situation not entirely unfavourable 
to Mongolia, however. To the extent that Mongolia’s neighbourhood build-
ing aims to create a new security structure so that Mongolia’s economic 
prosperity and national sovereignty are guaranteed, we need to examine 
what measures Mongolia has taken towards that end. Indeed, Mongolia’s 
geopolitical environment is unadmirable. With a border of 4,710 kilometres 
with China, but less than 20,000 troops in total, China could occupy Mon-
golia within a day if it wanted to. Mongolia has every good reason to fear 
a rising China, not least because, for the greater part of their interactive 
history, China had suffered in the hands of the Mongols repeated loss of 
territory, people and even death of state (wang guo 亡国). It is now the turn 
of the Mongols to fear the worst, for there is still a powerful undercurrent 
in China to regard Mongolia as a breakaway territory by virtue of China’s 
claim to be a successor state to the Qing Empire, of which Mongolia was 
once an important part (Bulag 2012a). In this regard, then, ‘China threat’ 
is not something entirely new, and an assertive China is, to Mongolia, not 
a sudden change from a sleeping beauty to an awakened roaring lion. How 
to deal with such a neighbour is, as we have seen, the core of Mongolia’s 
national security consideration and constitutes the essence of Mongolia’s 
international diplomacy.
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However, if Mongolia’s persistent and eventually successful pursuit of 
‘single-State nuclear free zone’ is any indication, Mongolia’s approach to its 
national security is precisely through peace promotion. In the 1990s, Mongo-
lia pre-empted the China threat by renouncing territorial pan-Mongolism, 
deciding not to support Inner Mongols in their struggle for independence. 
Mongolia was also lucky during the period, because China adopted Deng 
Xiaoping’s dictum of self-restraint (taoguang yanghui 韬光养晦) in its 
foreign policy, aiming to create a safe international environment for its 
economic development. While both sides intensif ied their commitment to 
good neighbourly posture, at the turn of the new millennium, Mongolia’s 
geopolitical environment had fundamentally changed.
One of the important developments at the beginning of the 21st century 
was the formation of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 
2001, comprising China, Russia, and four of the f ive Central Asian republics: 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Both China and Russia 
actively encouraged Mongolia to be a member. Mongolia is attracted to the 
SCO principle that emphasizes ‘mutual respect of sovereignty, independ-
ence, territorial integrity of States and inviolability of State borders, non-
aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force or threat of 
its use in international relations, seeking no unilateral military superiority 
in adjacent areas (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 2006) But it is also 
acutely aware that the SCO is intended as a rival to the US-dominated NATO, 
and it excludes most of Mongolia’s third neighbours. Thus, Mongolia only 
applied for an observer status, refusing to join it as a member.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US and the subsequent US war in Iraq 
and Afghanistan offered an opportunity for Mongolia to get out of this 
straightjacket. Responding to the US call, Mongolia joined the US-led ‘coali-
tion of the willing’ to disarm Saddam Hussein, and contributed to the UN 
peace-keeping operations. More recently, on November 21st, 2012, Mongolia 
became the 57th participating state of the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation (2012) in Europe, in which it has been active since 2004. 
Mongolia’s active participation in the international collective military 
operation is an effort to secure and develop its position in the world by 
extricating itself from the Chinese and Russian spheres of influence, and as 
such it is exemplary of small states who ‘are more likely to use international 
organizations as their preferred foreign policy tool (Hey 2003: 4)
While this may be the intention of any small state faced with a security 
threat, what needs to be explained in our case is the ability of Mongo-
lia as a small and weak state to attract its third neighbours to value its 
contribution and consider it as a worthy neighbour. In the absence of any 
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military strength, paradoxically, Mongolia’s military contribution cannot 
be assessed in terms of hard power, but only in terms of soft power, which, 
in Joseph Nye’s original formulation is, ‘the ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than coercion or payments. Further, it arises 
from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies 
to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments 
(Nye 2004: 10). This is not a moment to make a list of Mongolia’s soft power; 
what I am interested in is whether Mongolia has ‘smart power’ to build a 
neighbourhood of peace.
Since 2001, an annual military exercise called Khan Quest has been 
organized in Mongolia by the Mongolian Armed Forces General Staff in 
conjunction with the US Pacif ic Command (PACOM). China and Russia 
responded to the American entry into Mongolia by launching their f irst 
joint military exercise since their alliance in Far East Russia’s Vladivostok 
and in China’s Shandong Peninsula from August 8 to 25, 2005. The US 
Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld and President Bush’s visits to Mongolia in 
October and November in the same year were not just to express the US 
appreciation for Mongolia’s steadfast support to the US war effort, but also 
to warn China and Russia to stay away from Mongolia. However, although 
Bush told a Mongolian reporter that the US would help Mongolia under 
military threat, saying ‘We will support our allies for sure if a war cannot 
be avoided’, a week after his visit, the Mongolian president paid an off icial 
visit to China. A China-Mongolia joint statement in Beijing declared that 
neither party would participate in any military-political alliance directed 
against each other and would not conclude any treaty and agreement with 
a third country that may adversely affect the interests of each other (United 
Daily News 2005:13).
Whatever the US intention, Mongolia has faithfully stuck to its Concept 
of Foreign Policy and its Concept of National Security adopted in 1994 that 
Mongolia would not provide a military base to any foreign country, and 
it would pursue a policy of non-alignment. The 1994 National Security 
Concept stated that Mongolia’s ‘military-political security can be ensured 
through a collective security system by joint efforts or participation in such 
a system’. What Mongolia had in mind was to transform its defence force 
into the international peace support and UN peacekeeping operations – a 
total internationalization of Mongolia’s national defence.
In 2002 the Mongolian Parliament passed legislation that regulates par-
ticipation of Mongolian military and civilian police personnel in UN peace 
operations. In 2006, against the tough joint Chinese and Russian military 
response, Mongolia deftly established a Peacekeeping Training Centre as 
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part of their Five Hills Training Facility, and launched an expanded military 
exercise involving 22 Asia-Pacif ic countries. Mongolia thereby became 
the f irst country in the region to organize a multinational peace support 
operations Command Post Exercise as well as Field Training Exercise with 
the Global Peace Operations Initiative of the US government. In 2007, the 
participants included Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, the 
Philippines and Tonga, as well as Mongolia and the US.
In addition, since 2004, Mongolia has held annual bilateral military ex-
ercises with India, the so-called ‘spiritual third neighbour’ of Mongolia, and 
has called the exercise Nomadic Elephant since 2007. Since 2008 Mongolia 
and Russia have held annual anti-terror military exercises in Mongolia, and 
China and Mongolia began joint military exercises in 2009.
An important feature of all these military exercises is that the US, Russia, 
China, and India all have provided and continue to provide military aid to 
Mongolia. While each of these countries tries to draw Mongolia into its own 
orbit, Mongolia has steadfastly refused to provide military a base to any of 
its neighbours. Yet, at the same time, Mongolia has opened up and turned 
itself into a military public, creating a cosmopolitical space. In other words, 
Mongolia has brought in all the interested military neighbours, not to target 
any other neighbour, but for mutual understanding. The military exercises 
are to enhance Mongolia’s ability to contribute to global peace keeping opera-
tions, on the premise that, according to John C.K. Daly, ‘collective security 
is the best guarantor of military protection for small states’ (Daly 2008).
Today, maintaining a small army of about 10,000 troops, Mongolia does 
not appear to have enemies in the neighbourhood, and its national defence 
is predicated on global peace-keeping, not f ighting any national adversary. 
Seven hundred years after the collapse of the Mongol Empire, Mongols have 
come back to build a new pax Mongolica, not through war-mongering, but 
through peacekeeping.
Conclusion: the Centrality of Mongolia in the Assembled 
Neighbourhood
The renowned world systems specialist Andre Gunder Frank (1992) once 
emphasized the centrality of Mongolia or Central Asia in shapingworld his-
tory. I suggest that we look at contemporary Mongolia’s relations with China 
also in terms of a world system, rather than purely within the framework 
of ‘international relations’. If in the past, the nomadic Huns and Mongols 
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shaped the world by bursting out of the steppe and inserting themselves 
on other peoples through conquest, today, a tiny country is reshaping the 
world, albeit at a much smaller scale, perhaps even imperceptive to many. 
But the reassemblage of world neighbours on the Mongolian steppe shows 
that it is as much a working of big power competition as an active designing 
by the Mongols to build a world community of neighbours on the basis of 
sharing Mongolia’s fortune-sovereignty – the heshig. It is not a Zomia, a 
land of refuge (Perdue 2008, Scott 2009), but its opposite, a contentious 
land with bursting energy.
The f igure of neighbour is thus spatial and social as well as political. It 
is the proximity brought about by the reverse of the fortune-sovereignty 
that made China and the Chinese a neighbour that the Mongols have had 
to reckon with, and more importantly to establish their national boundary 
with. And similarly, like the ancient Chinese, who either cherished the 
men from afar (huairou yuanren 怀柔远人) or expelled the barbarians 
(quchu dalu/hulu 驱除鞑虏/胡虏) to maintain their ‘all under heaven’ 
(tianxia 天下), today, Mongols have also begun to engage in cosmic-moral 
re-ordering of the world around them, using their fortune-sovereignty.
Mongols are aware that in assembling neighbours from beyond Mongo-
lia’s immediate borders, Mongolia is actually building up a new regional 
polity to reduce conflict and hostility among nations in Northeast Asia. Ever 
conscious of history, the former Mongolian Ambassador to Japan Zamba 
Batjargal elaborated thus:
In 13th and 14th centuries, the Mongol Empire made the material and 
spiritual cultural exchange possible that linked the West and the East. 
And it created what we could call today a ‘free trade zone’ from Asia to 
Europe. It also established a political system that we could call the model 
of today’s republican states. That time, because it implemented a gener-
ous religious and national politics among the people under its control, 
it was able to avert conflict and collision… The Mongolia experience 
shows that today big states and small states could be in equal and helpful 
collaboration and it [i.e., the experience] even can become an important 
model for the advancement of the Northeast Asian unif ication process. 
(Narangoa 2009: 377-378)
The Mongolian case shows that neighbouring does not have to be seen as 
a zero-sum relational game between two countries. The relational is also 
the organizational; in organizing or assembling a neighbourhood, Mongolia 
has tried to build up a cosmopolitan structure with Mongolia as the central 
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node. And this is to be achieved through managing the economic interest 
of all the world’s powers by redistributing the fortune-sovereignty, that is, 
Mongolia’s strategic mineral resources, among them.
Note that all those who come to Mongolia uninvited or actively invited 
are world powers, richer, technologically more advanced, and certainly mili-
tarily more powerful than Mongolia. Mongolia has neither hard power, nor 
soft power to match any of these neighbours in a one to one situation. Had 
Mongolia followed the traditional nation-state centred approach, it would 
have to f ight on all fronts to keep the outsiders out, but this is precisely what 
Mongolia is least capable of. Instead of engaging in such a futile perimeter 
defence, Mongolia has proactively opened up its borders, reduced its number 
of soldiers, and invited the world in to share Mongolia’s new-found fortune-
sovereignty. It is in managing all these powerful neighbours, in maintaining 
peace among them by avoiding favouritism, or staying neutral in sharing 
Mongolia’s fortune-sovereignty that Mongolia elevates itself above all these 
powers, becoming a ‘big man’, as it were.
In this new polity, it would serve the interest of none of the compet-
ing powers to reduce Mongolia’s sovereign redistributive power. It is in 
everyone’s interest that Mongolia remains a functional society and its 
political institutions are strengthened, rather than weakened. In this new 
Mongolia-centred world community of neighbours in the making, it is 
advisable that all follow the Mongolian political proverb, which says: ‘deer 
n’ suudalaa olvol, door n’ guidlee olnoo’, that is, if his highness f inds his seat, 
those below will know how to run errands.
6 The Mobile and the Material in the 
Himalayan Borderlands
Tina Harris*
Introduction: Fixing and Moving
When scans of the 20th century Tibet Mirror newspaper became available 
online through Columbia University’s Tharchin Collection in 2009, I was 
struck by how many of its pages featured eye-catching advertisements. For 
the most part, these advertisements depict hand-drawn images of items 
whose production and consumption locations seem relatively distant from 
each other. ‘Asiatic Brand’ soap guarantees a f ine complexion to those who 
purchase it from outside of Asia; wool carders are proudly produced in 
Kalimpong, India, and are sold in Tibet and Ladakh; and European-made 
fountain pens and clocks are advertised for order by post.
The Mirror (yul phyogs so so’i gsar ‘gyur me long), arguably one of the f irst 
Tibetan-language newspapers, began publication in Kalimpong, India in 
1925, and was disseminated widely across the Himalayas, from Ladakh to 
Assam, to Tibet and Bhutan, and from Sikkim to Nepal until its eventual 
f inal run in 1963. Nearly every issue of the newspaper had commodity 
listings, giving the reader an idea of how Calcutta market prices in silver 
and gold fluctuated from month to month. They also illustrated the costs 
of items brought from Tibet to India and sold in the marketplaces across 
the Himalayas, such as musk, wool, and yak tails (the latter used for f ly 
whisks and religious rituals in Asia and as Santa Claus beards in North 
America). The image below is but one of the many advertisements in the 
newspaper. It is drawn with the ubiquitous ‘His Master’s Voice’ gramophone 
dog, advertising the ‘diverse merchandise’ and ‘electrical appliances of all 
kinds’ that were sold in a shop owned by a Tibetan Muslim in Lhasa.
These advertisements and listings in the Tibet Mirror demonstrate that 
transnational trade has long permeated the economic and social life of the 
towns along trade routes that crisscross the borders of China, India, Nepal, 
Bhutan, and beyond. Contrary to mostly western claims of it being a remote 
part of the world, the Himalayan region in the mid-20th century was – and 
* I would like to thank Erik de Maaker and the participants at the Amsterdam Institute for 
Social Science Research (AISSR) Moving Matters Seminar on February 28, 2013.
146 TiNA hArriS
still is – very much part of regional and international economic networks. 
What struck me by these advertisements, however, was how traders living 
in Himalayan borderlands organized the movement of these items across 
borders during particularly turbulent geopolitical times, and what this 
can tell us about what it means to ‘neighbour’ China in the 20th and 21st 
centuries. As Juan Zhang and Martin Saxer describe in the introduction 
to this volume, neighbouring denotes skilled efforts to negotiate one’s own 
position in relation to others, and to create connections across distance. 
Along these lines, neighbouring in the Himalayan borderlands builds on 
the practical, situational knowledge of traders’ access to roads, vehicles, 
and land, and, at times, requires improvisation and cunning strategies.
In this chapter, I argue that while state-driven schemes of opening up 
borders or shutting off routes are imposed from above, traders go about 
their business in ways that both skirt and exploit these very schemes, and 
it is here that local level cross-border neighbouring processes are sustained. 
Connections are made across distance via relationships between things 
that move and things that stay put; that is, the relationships between the 
goods, vehicles, and the people that move across these borders, and the 
supposedly f ixed structures or apparatuses – roads, land, and rail – that 
allow them to move in the f irst place. In the effort of states to shut their 
Figure 6.1  “Diverse Merchandise” – a 1947 advertisement from the Tibet Mirror
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borders against illegal trade, or to build roads to facilitate unimpeded, free 
trade, neighbouring on a nation-state level often involves the rhetoric of 
f ixity or mobility. However, the mobility of traders is more concerned with 
circumvention around obstacles such as borders or mountains, and this is 
most evident at the basic level of the material: people’s relationships with 
things. All too often, the mobile processes and practices of bordering are 
inextricably linked to the seemingly f ixed demarcation of a border. From an 
international relations or Sino-Indian nation-state perspective, the border 
is seen as governed by top-down laws and policies that are intangible to the 
inhabitants who live in these lands. Yet it makes more sense to think of how 
people deal with their borders instead of the other way around (Abraham 
and van Schendel 2005; Ludden 2003).
In the following pages, I examine how people in borderlands employ 
strategies and rhetoric that navigate the intersections of the mobile and 
the f ixed. However, I would f irst like to emphasize that the mobile and 
f ixed are not self-contained categories, nor are they binary opposites. I 
start from the premise that the borders of China are not necessarily f ixed 
in place, but instead made up of walls, commodities, people, roads, and 
representations. As Brian Larkin has stated, ‘infrastructures…are objects 
that create the grounds on which other objects operate, and when they 
do so they operate as systems’ (Larkin 2013: 329). A border or a borderland 
then has no inherent, singular meaning, and can be transformed depend-
ing on who talks about it, who creates it, as well as who passes through 
(or, as is often the case, who is prevented from doing so). As a result, 
various actors with differential stakes in the development, meanings, and 
value of ‘the border’ – for instance, cartographers, representatives of the 
nation-state, traders, and construction workers – eventually allow some 
things to move and others to halt or be diverted. To privilege the border 
between China and its neighbours as a f ixed structure that allows or 
prevents movement is to obscure the varied ways that traders use (or do not 
use, for that matter) it as part of a larger network of people and processes, 
such as the roads that arrive and leave from it, their counterparts who 
cross the border from the other side, and the border stones that are liable 
to be picked up and moved.
Cross-border trade, in engendering connectivity across distance, happens 
at the most micro level of simply getting material things across borders. 
The following sections of this chapter are roughly divided into three parts, 
featuring both historical and contemporary ethnographic examples of how 
traders evade and navigate the tensions between the mobile and the fixed in 
Himalayan borders, while creating new kinds of cross-border connections 
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that are often divergent to more established geopolitical narratives of 
change in the region. These three parts are based on historical accounts 
and traders’ narratives from my research in India, Tibet (China), and Nepal 
in 2005-2007, and are loosely anchored by three interwoven features that 
most traders must deal with when crossing Sino-Indian or Sino-Nepali 
borders: Roads, Vehicles, and Land. These features may be thought of as 
‘moorings’ from which neighbouring connections are made, both on a local 
scale and over longer distances.
The f irst section, ‘Roads’, deals with the entry of the British into Tibet in 
the early 20th century, the rhetoric of ‘opening’ the Sino-Indian border for 
trade, and the controversy over the location of trade marts. Here, I show 
how the British move to open up the border for strategic purposes actually 
resulted in the relocation of the cross-border road by local traders. The 
second section, ‘Vehicles’, examines processes of assembling and bringing 
automobiles over the border in two timeframes: the 1950s and the 2000s. 
These narratives demonstrate that the resilience of borderland trade vis-
à-vis state regulatory mechanisms is based on the f irst-hand knowledge 
of logistical and technological changes across borders, but not without 
considerable risk. The f inal section, ‘Land’, looks at the anticipation sur-
rounding the reopening of the Sino-Indian border in 2006, demonstrating 
that the move to invest in the potential future of the land around the border 
uncovers new ways of maintaining connections across distance – for both 
profit and family.
Roads: British Trade Marts in the Early 20th Century
The historical trade route from Lhasa in Tibet, to Kalimpong in West Bengal, 
India, has been shaped by major economic and political shifts over the past 
six decades involving the expansion of territory and access to new markets 
on the part of various stakeholders, including British India and China. As 
has been written elsewhere, early British claims on Tibet were partly a 
result of the desire for new markets in the wake of the economic decline 
of the East India Company, and partly an interest in strategic expansion, 
where the British hoped their goods could be introduced to China through 
the ‘back door’ of Tibet (Harris 2013: 8). The establishment of British Trade 
Marts in Tibet provides one example of the close relationship between early 
20th century British geopolitical strategy and its economic advancement, 
where the British needed this corridor to be opened in order for their role 
in the global market to be maintained.
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Figure 6.2  Map of Sikkim, Tibet, and India
Design: uvA-kaartenmakers
The concern that the Russians were also invested in setting up trade links in 
Tibet was one reason for the 1904 invasion of Tibet led by Francis Younghus-
band (Cammann 1970: 147). The invasion was accompanied by the rhetoric 
of ‘opening up’ the border between present-day Sikkim and Tibet for trade, 
as if it were a f ixed and closed part of a pristine, untouched landscape, a 
frontier with nothing there before. In reality, of course, Himalayan traders 
have been forging paths and travelling over these borders for centuries, 
underscoring the fact that nature is not inherently devoid of people; nor 
should it be thought of as residing in a realm separate from social interaction 
and labour (Smith 1984, Tsing 2005, Yeh 2009). This movement toward the 
‘opening up’ of the borders between Sikkim and Tibet produced a situation 
that was actually contrary to ‘opening’ – and this phrase’s connotation of 
unimpeded, unrestricted mobility.
Although a rough road had been built from Darjeeling to the Jelep-la 
mountain pass in 1879, as well as several trade paths on the Tibet side of 
the border that were established earlier, the military activities of the British 
served to construct, repair, and solidify a route straight through India, the 
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Sikkimese border, and into the Chumbi Valley of Tibet. Edmund Candler, 
a Daily Mail correspondent who was dispatched with the Younghusband 
expedition in 1903, writes of the scale of the road-building activities in 
February 1904:
The troops are so busy making roads that they have very little time for 
amusements. The 8th Gurkhas have already constructed some eight 
miles of road on each side of Phari for the ekka [horse cart] transport. 
Companies of the 23rd Pioneers are repairing the road at Dotah, Chumbi, 
and Rinchengong. The 32nd are working at Rinchengong, and the sappers 
and miners on the Nathula and at Gautsa. (Younghusband 1971 [1910])
The opening of the border went along with the signing of a number of trade 
treaties put in place in order to establish other f ixed structures – British 
Trade Marts – in the Tibetan towns of Gyantse, Gartok, and Yatung (Yadong 
in Figure 6.2; gro mo or Dromo in Tibetan), as well as the solid demarcation 
of boundaries between Sikkim and Tibet. To say they were ‘opening up’ the 
borderland was to mark the Tibetan borderland as a frontier, and to call it a 
new frontier was thus to mark it as ripe for exploration, even though it had 
already been inhabited and traversed by mobile people for centuries (Tsing 
2005). Local Tibetans, however, offered some resistance to the building of 
the trade marts by building their own barrier at the border. According to 
Younghusband’s account:
The ‘Chief Steward’, the sole Commissioner on the part of the Tibetan 
Government for reporting on the frontier matter, ‘made the important 
statement that the Tibetans did not consider themselves bound by the 
Convention with China, as they were not a party to it. He reported further, 
that the Tibetans had prevented the formation of a mart by building a 
wall across the valley on the farther side of Yatung, by efficiently guarding 
this and by prohibiting their traders from passing through. Mr. Korb, a 
wool merchant from Bengal, had come to Yatung to purchase wool from 
some of his correspondents on the Tibetan side, who had invited him 
thither; but the Tibetans prevented his correspondents from coming to 
do business with him. (Younghusband 1971 [1910])
The British trade agencies doubled as administrative units; David MacDon-
ald, a trade off icer in Tibet for nearly twenty years, wrote of his duties in 
Yatung, which ‘consisted of administering the Trade Mart, caring for the 
interests of British subjects trading in Tibet, and watching and forwarding 
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reports on the political situation [vis-à-vis China] to the Government of 
India (MacDonald 1999 [1930]: 52-53) Although somewhat cut off from 
British strategic headquarters in England and India, the British trade agen-
cies (which became Indian trade agencies in 1947 and formally continued 
with Chinese control over communication operations in 1954) operated 
in Tibet until the Sino-Indian border war in 1962 and the closing-off of 
all border passes (McKay 1997). Thus, all of these actual constructions as 
well as the investment in these f ixed constructions – the establishment 
of trade agencies, boundaries, and new roads – were intended to facilitate 
unimpeded ‘free trade’ for the British while restricting the movement of 
existing traders in the region. Of course, by building their own wall against 
that of the British encroachment into their territory, the Tibetan traders 
made certain that their control over the everyday economic life of the 
borderlands between Sikkim and Tibet was made known. And yet both the 
British and the Tibetans became stakeholders in what was more or less a 
similar goal – trying to move their commodities through the land in order 
to sell them to neighbouring buyers, employing strategies to circumvent 
obstacles that prevented smooth trade.
As James Scott has described in The Art of Not Being Governed (2009), the 
intimate, locally-based understanding of the ‘friction of terrain’ or ‘friction 
of distance’ – for instance, how long it takes to get from mountain village 
to trade mart, or precisely when landslides might block the roads during 
monsoon season – brings the lived experiences of the trading landscape 
into better view. It is this understanding of the combination of terrain and 
infrastructural change that allows for the continuation of trade across 
borders, and accordingly, cross-border neighbouring practices. In recent 
years, a number of anthropologists have called for studying infrastructure 
more closely, as it both structures and ‘reveal[s] fragile relations between 
people, things, and the institutions (both public and private) that seek to 
govern’ (Appel et al. 2015, Larkin 2013). Studying peoples’ encounters with 
the materiality of transport, such as roads and shipping logistics (Chua 2015, 
Dalakoglou and Harvey 2012) involves not only mobility across borders, but 
the lesser-studied obstacles to mobility as well (Sheller 2010).
Although new roads allow for some goods to move more quickly to 
consumers and increase the return of capital; this often occurs up until 
the original market is saturated (Harvey 1991: 425). What this means is 
that the movement of goods across borders only works up to a point; that 
is, it creates its own barriers to further accumulation. In order for trade to 
continue to flow, a search for new markets in new places begins (Mitchell 
1996: 112). If a new highway is built in order for commodities manufactured 
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in point A to get to new markets in point B, this route may very well be 
the quickest and most prof itable for a limited period of time, at least until 
the markets are saturated and a new, more eff icient opening is found. 
The process thus continues in new geographical spaces, but not without 
considerable controversy and resistance. In the case of this chapter, the 
British created new openings in the Chumbi Valley to open up new market 
paths while restricting movement for the locals. In response, many of the 
local traders retaliated by moving or destroying the British border markers, 
thus continuing to sustain their trading livelihoods (Bell 2000 [1924]).
The building of roads, walls, and border stones between Sikkim and 
Tibet allowed for more eff icient trading – but in very different forms and 
by competing groups – allowing only certain kinds of capital (and goods 
and people) to move quickly. In this case, the struggle between the British 
and Tibetans over the construction of the border, its roads, its marts, and 
its goods, is a struggle over power; over who has access to and control over 
goods and capital that are not attached to, but travel through the Himalayan 
landscape. As Candler concludes in his account, ‘trade marts and roads, and 
telegraph-wires, and open communications are important issues, but they 
were never our main objective. What was really necessary was to make the 
Tibetans understand that they could not afford to trifle with us’ (Candler 
1905: 300). Here, the rhetoric and the move to open up ‘f ixed’ borders on 
the part of the British actually gave rise to obstructions by the locals. This 
trade route is but one window through which to see how neighbouring 
incorporates managing how material goods travel, in situations where 
both parties must decide if the profits to be made over a distance are more 
important than the local barriers. This is a story that repeats itself further 
below in transporting goods over the mountains, and in investing in land 
near the border. The next section will explore these ideas further, and will 
move from looking at the route to looking at the transportation in the 
context of the Sino-Indian border in the mid-1950s, soon after the Chinese 
entered Tibet.
Vehicles: Technologies of Moving Goods Across Borders
Each step in the process of the 20th century cross-border Himalayan trade 
involved numerous producers, traders, border off icials, local off icials, 
transportation agents, brokers, and consumers. The gramophone advertised 
in the Tibet Mirror depicted at the beginning of this chapter likely arrived 
from England by ship at the ports of Bombay or Calcutta, and was then sold 
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through dealers in those cities, taken by train up to Darjeeling and loaded 
onto mule caravans, and then carried over the high reaches of the Himalayas 
into Tibet. The yak tails in the commodity listings of the Mirror might have 
been sold by nomads in central Tibet, exported by a network of muleteers 
on yaks, mules, and trucks, and were eventually used to make Santa Claus 
beards in Canada. These routes – based on multiple traders’ oral narratives 
of how commodities were exported from and imported to Tibet in the 
1950s – provide a telling example of the process of transport and assembly 
over the mountains. It is these intimate, micro-level actions on a local level 
that enable goods, vehicles, and people to cross great distances – a process 
that is part and parcel of what it means to ‘neighbour’.
The entry of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Tibet in 1951 is often 
used by scholars and Tibetans as a historical marker dividing the ‘old soci-
ety’ from the ‘new society’, and indeed, many traders spoke about changes 
in their lives in relation to this temporal rift. But traders’ stories about 
this time period also reflect the f irst phase of rapid improvements in road 
maintenance by China, in order to get supplies – petrol and construction 
materials – to develop Tibet. Because of this, most cross-border traders 
mentioned that the early 1950s was the best time to make money in Tibet; 
it was one of the most prosperous times they’d ever had. An elderly man 
in his 70s from a Dromo (Yadong) trading family noted that ‘from 1951, the 
Chinese army really needed supplies. In 1955 roads were built in Dromo, 
and many of these [supplies] came through Dromo. From that year on, 
our business became bigger, and the town became wealthier’. Similarly, 
an older woman in her 80s reminisced that although ‘life’ – she used the 
generic term – was much better before the PLA’s ‘Peaceful Liberation’ of 
Tibet, her shop in Lhasa flourished during the 1950s. ‘Before the Peaceful 
Liberation, there were no phones. We had messengers, and a small post 
off ice. After the Peaceful Liberation, then we got phones and roads, then 
it became much easier to trade!’ Changes in transport and technology in 
turn lend a hand to particular ideas of what closer ‘neighbouring’ actually 
meant to the traders in the 1950s: more prosperity; at least amongst these 
individuals, and at this time.
Similarly, during a conversation with Ahmed, a Nepali Muslim salesman 
in his 80s (in a mixture of Urdu, Tibetan, and Nepali, which sometimes 
had to be translated by his nephew), he remembered his stint with the 
Bhajuratna/Syamukapu Company, one of the f irst Nepali/Newar trading 
companies that established an off ice in Lhasa. He joined Bhajuratna as 
a salesman in 1954, and in 1955 he began travelling back and forth from 
Lhasa. Much of Ahmad’s remembrances involve the logistics and nitty-gritty 
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of simply getting the goods across the mountains from town to town via 
foot and mule caravans. He discussed how he headed from Gangtok to 
Nathula; then to Yadong at the Tibetan side of the border, and seeing the 
border marker at 14,000 feet. He detailed the coldness of the journey as he 
headed through the Chumbi Valley, up to Sharshima in Tibet. ‘The Chinese 
were there, up in that place, in 1955’, he said, ‘to develop it’. From there, he 
went to Phari (see Figure 6.2), which took nearly one and a half to two days 
on foot, and from there he went to Gyantse. After Gyantse, he travelled to 
Shigatse, and eventually to Lhasa’.
This kind of experience of travelling across borderlands is not particularly 
unique, but it is certainly much more telling about what it means to cross 
borders than what a cartographic map will represent (Harris 2013: 19). Fol-
lowing James Scott (2009), Ahmed’s particular narrative of the pathways 
of trade – understanding the friction of terrain – blurs the boundaries 
of nation-state-centred lines on a map. Ahmed – and indeed, most other 
working traders – never spoke about travelling ‘from India to China’, but 
instead, how he journeyed from town to town to hire another set of mules 
or meet fellow Muslims in the region. Managing distance occurs through 
the intimate connections of cross-border trade relationships; encountering 
and circumventing natural obstacles such as mountains or blizzards, or 
man-made barriers such as borders or customs procedures.
This period in the 1950s coincided with the mass introduction of auto-
mobiles to the Tibetan plateau. Although the f irst automobile was brought 
over the Himalayas to Gyantse in 1906, and the thirteenth Dalai Lama was 
famously presented with a blue baby Austin in the 1920s, several members of 
the elite Tibetan families began to purchase personal cars at this time. Many 
older traders gave narratives of the laborious task of taking French Peugeot 
cars apart piece by piece, bringing them by foot and by mule caravans over 
the border into Tibet, then reassembling them on the other side. After 
transporting Indian bicycles to Tibet for a few years, Ahmed got involved in 
bringing automobiles over the border in the mid to late 1950s. He describes 
the process as follows:
The car would be in different pieces. For Phari, [there was] a little bit of 
transportation up to Shigatse. Not so good roads, dirt roads. Until early 
in 1958, that was the way we were doing it. We would assemble the cars. 
They were getting 8,000 Indian rupees to assemble the cars. From Siliguri, 
they would have the car in small pieces. They would buy a lorry from 
Siliguri in different pieces. Some pieces were for the mules and some for 
the humans to transport, up to Phari. (Harris 2013: 45)
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This procedure of taking entire automobiles apart piece by piece, and 
strapping each piece on the back of a human or mule lugging it over 
treacherous Himalayan pathways is striking, ref lecting a peculiar period 
of early economic growth and technological change in the borderland 
region. At the time in the 1950s, the quickest and most cost-effective way 
to get cars to Tibet was to utilize this laborious method; this is the kind 
of specif ic knowledge that Ahmed and other traders had at the time. 
Yet, as roads began to be constructed and expanded, and more of these 
cars were utilized, it was possible to complete the entire journey by the 
assembled car and to get rid of the porters. But for this short period in 
the contemporary history of trade across Asian borderlands, the strategic 
role of traders in transportation is made visible, where they are intimately 
involved in the construction and maintenance of journeys of goods across 
distance.
In order to talk about further changes in transport and bordering prac-
tices, I now move to more recent narratives concerning the introduction 
of jeeps across the Chinese and Nepali borders. Tenzin, a Tibetan trader 
in household appliances, talks about the logistics of how transport has 
changed over the Sino-Nepal border in 2006, and the pressure she felt to 
get goods across borders more quickly. A trip from Tibet to Nepal that 
used to take several weeks in the mid-20th century with a combination of 
loaded mules and trucks crossing over treacherous dirt paths, now takes 
about a day. In the mid-1960s, the Tibet-Nepal Friendship Highway was 
completed, and over the years, motor transport built up slowly and steadily 
over the approximately 800 kilometre-long road from Lhasa to the Tibetan 
border town of Zhangmu, and from the Nepali border town of Kodari to 
Kathmandu along the Arniko Highway. As Tenzin says, even in the late 
1990s, it still took a signif icant while to build up a trusting relationship 
with the middlemen drivers and therefore to increase eff icient transport 
networks:
Now … we must transport [items] much more quickly. We buy things there 
[in Nepal], then come back [to Tibet] quickly. There is a Nepalese truck 
to Dram [the border town on the Tibet side] and then a Tibetan truck 
from there. We are not allowed to bring the Nepalese truck from there to 
Lhasa. We change people and trucks at same time. We must pay twice. 
We know all the drivers now, they call us when the stuff is here in Lhasa. 
It is easier now. Eight or nine years ago, we had to travel along with the 
trucks, because we didn’t know the drivers. Now we trust them, we have 
been doing a business for a long time with f ive or six of the same drivers.
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Here, any stalling or possibility of gridlock needs to be avoided, because 
owners of companies as well as consumers get upset if shipments are 
delayed, and the turnover time of profits will slow down. Because of this, 
it becomes less possible to check every truck and jeep heading across the 
borderlands without an advanced kind of security technology. As Carolyn 
Nordstrom has written in her work on cross-border trade and illegal global 
networks – from arms traders in Angola to the dock workers in Rotterdam 
shipyards – ‘movement is primary, borders are secondary – laws, some 
might say, are tertiary’ (Nordstrom 2007: 116). Establishing trust, then, is a 
major form of negotiation that anchors and reconfirms social and economic 
networks across borders. In this case, Tenzin spent time going along with the 
drivers to make sure her goods reached their destination, so she eventually 
conducted business with the drivers who doubled as traders. It mattered less 
that these drivers were Chinese than the fact that Tenzin could trust them to 
continue the unfettered transport of her items across the border. These skills 
‘are as much an information and knowledge-based economy as it is a ‘moral’ 
economy … generally a superior degree of knowledge and skills, built over 
the years, rather than a greater degree of ‘ethnic’ solidarity which allowed 
some merchant networks to have the better of others’ (Markovits 2013: 155).
Consider, however, the case of Lhakpa, a Tibetan trader, who also made 
most of his living in 2003 and 2004 renting a seat in a shared jeep, travelling 
back and forth across the Chinese-Tibetan and Nepali borders, bartering 
goods. He discusses the introduction of a new phase of transport in 2006, 
where some of the Tibet-based traders began purchasing their own jeeps 
in the borderlands. Lhakpa remembered taking cotton textiles from Tibet 
to Nepal, where it cost NPR 1,250 (approximately US$16) for ten kilograms 
and being able to sell the cotton in Kathmandu for a fair prof it at NPR 1,700 
(approximately US$22).
That time [2003-2004] we had big prof it. Then they [the traders on the 
Tibet side] made new prices, because they had their own jeep. They 
brought [the jeeps] themselves. They didn’t have to pay their own drivers 
because it is their own jeep. I now have to go in someone else’s jeep and 
I have to pay tax. In Tibet, though, the prof it goes up and up. Here [in 
Nepal] it goes down and down. All the damage is done by the drivers 
who do the trade from Tibet to here. I cannot make any prof it now. Now 
the traders are only the drivers. Because they don’t have to pay, because 
they have their own taxi, own car, own jeep. They can have two ways of 
getting money; from the passenger they can get extra money, and then 
they bring their own ‘luggage’.
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In this case, it might be easy to say that the introduction of a new form of 
technology such as a jeep (or a mobile phone, for that matter) signif icantly 
changes peoples’ lifestyles and the shape of trade. This is, of course, not 
to view advancements in technology as undesirable, but more to reiterate 
the position of human involvement in trade and the shaping of routes and 
borderland spaces. It is therefore not the fast jeep itself that changes patterns 
of profit, but the complex processes of how traders and middlemen are able 
to access new technologies like a jeep, side by side with the knowledge that 
these sorts of decisions will increase (or decrease) eff iciency in cross-border 
trade.
To subsist and thrive as a trader in a borderland is to stay on top of 
logistical changes; to be in a position to negotiate new trading positions 
vis-à-vis the other stakeholders in the changing economic landscape. In 
this case, the ‘successful’ traders along the China-Nepal border became 
the ones who could afford to purchase their own jeeps, the ones who had 
easier and immediate access to transport over the border. Lhakpa has 
since had to consider abandoning his cross-border networks and think 
about specializing only in trade within Nepal itself. These border f lows 
are considerably uneven and also ref lective of economic changes on a 
larger, regional scale. For instance, trade between India and China at 
Nathula went from two million INR (approximately US$43,000) in 2006 to 
almost ten million INR (approximately US$217,000) in 2010 (Subba 2011). 
But a closer look at the f igures for exports and imports show that they are 
extremely uneven. By the f irst half of 2013, India’s exports to China were 
around US$5 billion, while its imports from China grew to over US$24 
billion (Mehdudia 2013). Thus, at the beginning of the reopening of the pass 
in 2006, traders who could negotiate these f lows of goods and networks 
from Tibet – especially those who had Chinese language skills – were 
increasingly able to get their diverse commodities (for instance, washing 
machines, grains, household items, carpets, packaged foods, and clothing) 
across the border with fewer chances of gridlock. Managing the f low 
of cross-border trade is often about weighing the costs and benef its of 
generating different kinds of mobility in order to avoid gridlock. Looking at 
decisions that traders make about transportation on an intimate, material 
level is also about looking at the decisions that govern the relationships 
between people and goods on both sides of the border. The next section 
takes us from narratives of transport to the third mooring, the land near 
the border of India and China. Here, neighbouring practices are based 
on how people believe future cross-border trade might affect the value 
of the land.
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Land: Speculation and Unevenness
In 1962, the Sino-Indian War resulted in the sealing-off of all of the border 
passes between China and India, and cross-border trade between India 
and Tibet more or less halted. Much of this cross-border trade was diverted 
through Nepal. But after the start of Chinese reforms in 1978, the growth of 
China and India as major economic powers led to renewed Sino-Indian trade 
negotiations, as well as the re-opening of two western Sino-Indian border 
passes in the 1990s. These passes, Lipu Lekh and Shipkila, currently feature 
very limited, seasonal, small scale trade in items such as jaggery, barley, 
household utensils, and goats, and only for residents with the necessary 
import-export codes. Most recently in 2006, a third mountain pass between 
India and Tibet, Nathula, reopened for trade after 44 years. Very much like 
the excitement over ‘opening-up’ the Chumbi Valley during the time of the 
British encroachment into Tibet in the early 20th century, speculation over 
the future capacity of this trade corridor – in tandem with the value of the 
land – began to grow again in the early 2000s in Tibet. Looking at a map of 
Asia and focusing in on the thumb of Sikkim that borders Tibet, one can see 
that geographically, this border opening provides quick access to the port 
of Calcutta. Subsequently, transport time is cut short for shuttling goods to 
and from China and the sea, like it did in the 20th century, which was the 
reason why the British had their eyes set on this border. Today, however, 
the direction has changed. Instead of the majority of trade goods moving 
from Calcutta to markets in Tibet and China, the direction is now reversed, 
with Chinese traders looking towards new markets to the south. This shift 
in location and the direction of trade – from what was seen as ‘empty land’ 
in the 1950s to profitable land with potential in the 2000s – has profound 
implications for this borderland region.
Speaking to Roshan, a local Indian off icial in Sikkim who was directly 
involved in increasing the flows of commerce between India and Tibet in 
2006, he mentioned the increase in Chinese goods through the Nathula 
border to India.
People these days are crazy about Chinese goods. The cost of freight is 
much less through Nathula. Iron ore from China comes by sea, and it 
would be much easier to bring it through Nathula. Plus, [there’s the] train 
extension [from Beijing to Lhasa and plans for it to expand further down 
to Yadong]. Now, through the Calcutta and Bombay port, you can trade 
anything, but here with border trade, things are a little more diff icult. 
We expect full-f ledged trade in this region within four to f ive years, 
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import and export. There is a four-lane highway from Gyantse to Lhasa 
being built; it will be completed within two years. And there will be a 
four-lane highway to Siliguri, but it will be completed within four to f ive 
years. China wants to send goods to the Middle East and Africa, and will 
have no problem doing this. There will be a massive increase in trade, as 
this region is a hugely important corridor.
This rhetoric of the potential increase in mobility of trade through the 
region translates into the excitement over what it means to be living in a 
borderland at the time of increased global interest in the economic ‘rise’ 
of China. It is important to note that the enthusiasm over the potential 
of the borderland area was not necessarily limited to individuals like 
Roshan who were off icial representatives of trade in the area. There was 
also a shared local interest in the land along the border, but this took on a 
variety of guises. During f ieldwork in Tibet in 2006, I heard many stories 
of middle-class and upwardly-mobile Tibetans purchasing and investing 
in land in the southern part of Shigatse province near the Indian border in 
anticipation of the reopening of the Nathula border in the summer of that 
year. To take one example, Norbu and his wife live in Kathmandu, while his 
Tibetan relatives still live in the Dromo/Yadong area on the Tibetan side 
of the Nathula border with India. Norbu told me about his uncle, whom he 
hadn’t seen for twenty years and was hoping to meet now that the border 
was reopening:
My mother’s brother lives [near] Nathula in Tibet, the border of Nathula 
… He knows everything, so he came [to live] near the Nathula area. He 
bought land, and built a house also … my mother told me that he is a 
Chinese worker, his post is little bit higher, [in a] government off ice or 
something. He has lot of money, so many yak, my mother tells me. So 
many yak, sheep, goats.
Similarly, an ethnic Tibetan government worker for a Chinese state institu-
tion told me about the potential advantages of opening up all borders to the 
south of Tibet. ‘Look at Heilongjiang and Xinjiang!’ he exclaimed. ‘Those 
areas are much more developed than Tibet – those borders with other 
countries are already open’. He noted that there was a time in the 1980s, 
when opening up Nathula f irst began to be discussed between China and 
India, and ‘people bought land for RMB 200,000 (approximately US$25,000)’. 
Now, he says ‘you even can’t get land for RMB 600,000 (approximately 
US$75,000)’. Further, a trader who used to trade between Nepal and Tibet 
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talked about his small trading company moving to the India-Tibet border 
in 2006. He said:
Yadong [on the Tibet side of the Sino-Indian border] is going to open 
pretty soon. My previous company, they actually want me to come back 
and continue to work for them, and they also purchased space there, some 
property, and they want to start their trade business there. Yeah, seems 
like Yadong is going to open pretty soon. There are a lot of indications.
Investment in land around the border areas of China and India is premised 
on what can be more easily moved across and through the land near the 
border in the future, extending the notion of ‘the borderland’ both spatially 
and temporally. But only some individuals can get access to the highly 
valued land around the border, such as Norbu’s uncle, who works for the 
Chinese government. The last quote is from Tendor, who became relatively 
prosperous after a successful career selling refrigerators and other white 
goods, and who can afford to shift his trading base to another location. 
However, on the level of local Tibetan traders buying land, these stories are 
not just about maximizing their trading profits, but the potential of more 
easily reconnecting and interacting with their transnational families and 
trading partners on the other side of the border, a border that has been 
marked by years of mistrust and political violence, from the Sino-Indian 
War to Tibetan refugees escaping from China. According to one trader in 
Sikkim, after the border reopened, he was amazed to see families reunite 
forty-four years after the border had been closed, including an 85-year old 
man who had reunited with his 55-year old daughter. ‘Some people were 
crying the whole day’, he said. Investing in this borderland uncovers new 
ways of establishing connections across distance. Although investment 
occurs for numerous reasons, including profit and reconnection, they all 
involve assigning value to f ixed land in order to move mobile things across 
it.
To further exemplify the differences between individual experiences of 
living in this area with a newly-opened border, the unlimited ‘free trade’ 
promised by both the Chinese and Indian governments was nowhere to 
be found, at least on the Indian side in 2006. When Nathula was reopened 
for trade on July 6th, those on the Indian side found that the wire fences 
(f irst erected after the border was initially shut in 1962) were replaced by 
twenty-meter stone walls. Traders had to cross seven security checkpoints 
from Gangtok to the border, and there were long bureaucratic delays in 
obtaining the proper import-export codes, as well as strict restrictions on 
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who could apply for trade permits (for now, only ‘Sikkimese subjects’). A 
trader in India mentioned his frustration with getting across the border:
Donqingang is the market on the China side; it is 11km away from 
Rinchengang, but Indian traders are not allowed to go here. So at 7:30 
am the border opens, then we go through customs clearance, and get 
there by 8am. The ITBP [Indo Tibet Border Police] escort us to Nathula, 
then from other side, the ITBP escort the Tibetans to Sheratang. But from 
Nathula to Donqingang, there are no escorts, no risk, on that side you 
can do anything!
Mobility across the border is extraordinarily uneven; the diff iculties men-
tioned above are mainly ref lective of the experiences of Indian traders 
needing to get to the Tibet side, for most of the roads have already built up 
on the Tibetan/Chinese side. And although investment in land is increasing 
on the Tibetan/Chinese side of the border, the situation is markedly different 
on the Indian and Nepali sides of the border. Lhakpa talked about the 
unevenness in eff iciency of trade and transport between the Chinese and 
Nepali sides of the border:
From Tibet … they had already made a new road. But the Nepali govern-
ment, they haven’t started. They had [made the] measurements more 
than ten times already, only the measurement. But no starting. The road 
is from Kyirong [in Tibet] to the China border already, but the Nepali 
people haven’t started [the work]. All the people want to go to Tibet by 
shortcut, they want to pay less money. From the Chinese border there 
are a lot of changes. The workers are not Indian, not Nepali … it is not 
Chinese labor, but all the labor is from [Tibetans]. A lot of women too. 
Only the engineers are Chinese.
Here, the road is ready on the Chinese side, but not on the Nepal side (the 
road was f inally opened in December 2014). There is a signif icant uneven-
ness in the gendered and ethnic division of labour as well. I often heard 
things like, ‘we are not advantaged here [in India]. In Tibet there are very 
good roads on the other side of Jelep-la already’. Here, the land provides 
another mooring from which to understand how the rhetoric of unimpeded 
mobility bumps up against traders’ everyday realities of simply trying to get 
goods across the border. These unequal mobilities can be seen on a number 
of scales at once: from some goods that are allowed across the border more 
easily than others; to individual traders who have better access to more 
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extensive cross-border networks; to some states that have the capacity to 
invest in more infrastructure than others.
Conclusion: ‘Diverse Merchandise’
In this chapter, I have attempted to link ethnographic narratives with 
geographies of trade in order to better understand the diverse and uneven 
experiences of exchange, transport, and economic change along the borders 
of China/Tibet, Nepal, and India. Ultimately, this chapter aimed to dem-
onstrate that shifts in Asian economic geographies – such as the current 
‘rise’ of a China-driven economy – is in turn steered by traders’ individual 
skills, circumventions, and negotiations through three facets of trade: the 
roads, the vehicles, and the (border)land. In the cases described above, 
these shifts include border and road construction and disruptions, changes 
in modes of transportation and transport, as well as the (unequal) f lows of 
commodities and materials into new market spaces. It is necessary to focus 
less on the representations and power of ‘f ixed’ borders and more on the 
fact that mobile people employ the skills of neighbouring in order to make 
better use of immediate and profound changes to their material life – their 
landscape and trading paths – as well as to manage (and accrue profit, of 
course) in an economically volatile Himalayan trading environment. And 
yet these are inevitably rather mundane things that people deal with every 
day: a bridge is closed, a new kind of mode of transportation becomes more 
popular, a road is slated to be reopened.
Roads, vehicles, and land have provided the ‘moorings’ from which to 
examine these interconnected processes of neighbouring. Nevertheless, 
it would be a mistake to think of these three features as isolated entities 
or as having agency in and of themselves. Instead, the traders who are 
directly involved in moving across the borders of China, Nepal, and India 
employ specific ways of interacting and producing the future shape of roads, 
vehicles, and land: a border marker can be moved; a jeep can be taken apart 
and reassembled, and border land can be given new meaning when people 
move closer to their families who reside on the other side of the border. 
There is also a profound unevenness to these experiences. Some traders 
never get to ‘the other side’, nor do they manage to survive economically 
in the cutthroat environment of trade if having control or access to certain 
dominant flows of capital – British or Chinese, for instance – is the mark 
of a more ‘successful’ trader. Furthermore, although the tensions between 
mobility and f ixity that have characterized the movement of capital across 
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borders have followed similar patterns in early 20th century, the 1950s, and 
the early 2000s, the groups involved have taken radically different shapes. 
Yet trade is resilient, and new technologies such as cars and railways do 
not always triumph over the challenges of geographical distance, nor do 
descriptions of mobility and transport always take the storybook form of the 
powerful players versus the underdogs. It is thus these curious narratives 
and gaps – such as when it is easier to haul a car over a mountain by foot than 
it is to drive it across – that provide the lens though which we can glimpse 
moments of economic and technological transformation in a region that is 
often depicted as developing too fast for scholars to grasp.
Towards the end of my stay in northern India in 2006, an Indian trader 
and I spoke about the trading activity back and forth across the Sino-Indian 
border. He said, ‘they [the traders] will all tell you not much is happening on 
the border, that only certain goods can go through, and there is not much 
opportunity’. In reality, he said – along with several other traders that I 
spoke with – that the off icial (low) f igures of border trade don’t tell you 
much. There is an enormous amount of unsanctioned items – mobile phones 
and alcohol, for example – that somehow end up on both sides of the border. 
New roads that are ‘opened’ for free(r) trade – using the same rhetoric from 
both the time of Younghusband to the current role of the PRC – are therefore 
used in unexpected ways, for both restricted and unsanctioned purposes, 
the latter often in order for traders to continue to survive. Traders look for 
and know about gaps: opportune moments and places in border policies, in 
technological advances, and in route changes in order to manoeuvre around 
restrictions and to survive as traders. During these moments, they need to 
know when it is better to be mobile or better to stay put, notwithstanding 
the constraints that might prevent them from doing so. In this sense, new 
roads and borders – at least those that are semi-permeable – can sometimes 
be beneficial for traders, as they increase the opportunities for such gaps 
at the time when they are established. Although the ‘diverse merchandise’ 
advertised at the beginning of this chapter included gramophones and 
fountain pens, the ‘diverse merchandise’ of the 21st century now takes the 
shape of mobile phones and Hyundai automobiles. These are all subject 
to the same skills of neighbouring, processes that consist of traders’ un-
derstandings of how cars, roads, land, and capital have the potential to 
become more or less mobile, vis-à-vis the changing economic landscape 






Trans-Himalayan Tibetan Itineraries and Chinese Economic 
Development
Chris Vasantkumar
Introduction: To Exile and Back
In 1959, the fourteenth Dalai Lama and much of the old Tibetan religious and 
cultural elite fled into exile in India. In the intervening years Tibetans on 
both sides of the Himalayas have not stayed put but have instead travelled 
frequently back and forth across the range’s high passes. These journeys 
have been manifold, ranging from taking refuge in the exile communities of 
north India, to temporary trans-Himalayan sojourns on Chinese passports 
to visit relatives living abroad and arduous and illicit round trips embarked 
upon for the purposes of religious or linguistic instruction. In the West, 
discussions of these movements have focused almost exclusively on the 
f igure of the refugee. And, certainly, the f irst wave of Tibetan migration 
south across the ranges was composed largely of refugees from central Tibet. 
Since the 1980s, however, a second set of migrants, mostly from the regions 
of Kham and Amdo in what was historically eastern Tibet, has undertaken 
the diff icult journey across the mountains to the subcontinent.
Prior to 2008 when Tibetan unrest across China prompted a crackdown 
on trans-border flows, several thousand migrants a year or more travelled 
to (and, in many cases, from) Dharamsala and other Tibetan refugee centres 
in northern and southern India. SaveTibet.org notes in their annual reports 
on the ‘conditions impacting the flight of Tibetan refugees’1 that following 
the 2008 protests and ramped up border patrols, the number of Tibetans 
who made it across the border to Nepal (and in many cases beyond to India) 
dropped from an average of 2,500-3,000 in preceding years to a much lower 
range of 650-850 per annum thereafter.2 While many of these migrants 
were inspired by (or sent by parents3 who were inspired by) the prospect 
1 See http://www.savetibet.org/documents/reports/refugee-report-dangerous-crossing-2011. 
2 As of 2016, these trans-border f lows have been halted almost completely by heightened 
Chinese patrols and cooperation between PRC and Nepalese authorities.
3 That a sizeable percentage of pre-2008 migrants were juveniles can be explained by the fact 
that refugees who arrive in Dharamsala under the ages of 18 can gain access to free or extremely 
low cost education at the Tibetan Children’s Villages in the surrounding area. Most of my migrant 
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of religious freedom and unfettered access to traditional Tibetan culture, 
many others maintained a more pragmatic attitude toward the physically 
taxing, dangerous and often costly journey to the subcontinent.4
Such peregrinations have had manifold effects. The ambivalent reception 
of the ‘new arrivals’ (or sar jorpa) of ‘sinicized’ Tibetans fresh off the path, as 
it were, from Tibet itself have complicated notions of national belonging in 
the exile community (Diehl 2002, Falcone and Wangchuk 2008, on broader 
circuits of Tibetan travel see Hess 2009, Yeh 2007). Many ‘new arrivals’ have 
returned5 to China,6 bringing with them both a critical consciousness of 
the blandishments of Chinese nationalism and English-language skills 
informants had gone to India at a slightly older age and were thus unable to access educational 
facilities of quite as high a standard, but did receive instruction in English and other subjects 
at Tibetan Transit Schools. 
4 One example: In 2007, Jashi was a 24 year old recently returned from India working as a guide 
for foreign tour groups. In some respects he is happy to be back home – obviously being close 
to family is a good thing, and he is resigned to making the best of being in China in general, but 
he misses his ‘school’ and his friends in India. He had decided to go of his own accord at the age 
of f ifteen. At that time he said (in a mixture of English and Chinese), he was feeling ‘very hard, 
very excited ( jidong 激动)’ and had met many folks who had been there and had told him how 
great it was there: everything is free and you can learn English. So he made his way to Lhasa 
and stayed there for a month arranging the travel permit to Dram. From Dram he and his small 
party made their way painstakingly across the border, taking f ive days to reach Taptopani. His 
fellow travelers were limited to the guide who commanded the princely sum of RMB2,500 (over 
US$600) and a middle-aged couple whose children were living on the subcontinent. The woman 
had stomach problems and sometimes couldn’t walk and the man was almost blind. During the 
day the going was okay, but at night things got diff icult. Jashi recalls leading the man by the 
hand across narrow log bridges. Once he got to India, he was only able to communicate with 
family by phone and email but he really enjoyed the freedom to experience new things and the 
camaraderie with fellow students at his school. His friends came from various places, Amdo, 
Lhasa and Kham. He had many good Kham friends, not all of whom he was able to maintain 
contact with because it seems he left suddenly (not knowing when ahead of time) and didn’t 
think about getting contact info ahead of time. Now he has fellow returnee friends who say they 
don’t miss India. He thinks they are crazy.
5 For example, in the 23-person cohort that entered the Tibetan Transit School in the late 
1990s with Yeshe, a monk from a farming village near Zhuoni, only two had stayed behind a 
decade later.
6 In their returns we can see an ironic convergence of the rhetoric of the Tibetan Government 
in Exile and of China. Since the 1990s, the Dalai Lama has suggested that all new migrants 
who would not be endangered (as a result of a history of anti-Chinese activism) by returning 
to China should do so (see Garratt 1997). At the same time, the PRC for many years prior to the 
events of 2008 (and still to some degree formally at least thereafter) has encouraged ‘Overseas 
Tibetan Compatriots’ (Guowai Zangzu Tongbao 国外藏族同胞) to join their returned brethren 
(Huiguo Zangzu Tongbao 回国藏族同胞) to join the big trans-national family of Chinese patriots 
(see Barabantseva 2012, Vasantkumar 2012). As Basang, deputy secretary of the Tibet Regional 
Committee of the Communist Party of China explained in a 2002 interview in the People’s Daily, 
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that enabled them to succeed in the rapidly developing tourism sector 
back ‘home’.7 Even in the years of reduced trans-border mobility that 
have followed in the wake of the turmoil of 3/14, Tibetans on both sides of 
the Himalayas are acutely aware of how their co-ethnics elsewhere live. 
Ideas of Tibetan nation, culture and community have come to straddle the 
Himalayas rather than (or in addition to) be(ing) divided by them.
This chapter deals with a subset of related issues that arose during my 
f irst extended period of f ieldwork in Xiahe/Labrang – in what is now Gansu 
Province in China’s northwest – from the summer of 2003 until the spring of 
2004, that I also pursued in the course of additional f ield research in Xiahe 
in 2006, 2007 and 2009 and in Dharamsala in 2006 and 2007. I had initially 
come to northwest China to study the relationship between everyday inter-
actions between members of different minzu or ethnic groups in a national 
framework, specif ically between Han, Hui and Tibetans and off icial PRC 
projects of multi-ethnic national unity, but as I stayed on in Labrang through 
a typically frigid winter, I found myself becoming increasingly interested in 
a particular problem of Tibetanness with both national and trans-national 
characteristics.
From early on in my f ieldwork, I had many interactions with ‘locals’ from 
the town itself, from outlying regions of the autonomous prefecture in which 
Xiahe/Labrang is located and from remoter parts of Amdo who had spent 
time in the exile communities of the Indian subcontinent. The duration 
of their visits ranged from a few months to upwards of f ive, seven, or even 
ten years. Some detested India from the moment they arrived, others still 
reminisced fondly about pizza and sang tunes from Bollywood musicals,8 
but all had for various reasons chosen to return to Amdo. Some had returned 
furtively with a critical consciousness of the limits of Chinese nationalism. 
China’s policy is ‘All patriots belong to one big family, no matter when they join the family’ 
(People’s Daily 2002).
7 Access to such employment opportunities was never guaranteed, especially inside the 
Tibetan Autonomous Region. There, employment as a tour guide was often contingent on passing 
a test in written Chinese. The earlier a Tibetan returnee had left for India, the less likely he or 
she would be able to pass such a test (Martin Saxer, personal communication).
8 Early in my dissertation research in the late summer of 2003, a returnee monk invited me 
on a picnic with a dozen or so students he was informally teaching English. As we reclined in 
post-prandial comfort in a mountain meadow high above Labrang Monastery, he invited each 
of us to sing favorite songs for the group. When others reacted with shyness, he plunged right 
in. It took me a second (and a double take) to realize that he had broken into a tuneful rendition 
of the Bollywood classic ‘Kuch kuch hota hai’. Later he introduced me to another returnee, also 
a monk, whose f irst question to me was ‘Do you know pizza? I like pizza’. It turned out that he 
had worked in a pizza parlour for several years during his time in Dharamsala.
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Others found that their time in India with the religious and cultural elite 
of old Tibet had instilled not a greater reverence for traditional culture but, 
perhaps surprisingly, a high modernist and rather acerbic anti-clericalism. 
Still others had returned with off icial blessing to cash in on the promise of 
economic development.
Initially, I attempted to analyze their travels within a received framework 
that sought to understand Tibetan exile and refuge taking in purely Tibetan 
terms. Only later did I realize that this problem of Tibetanness was also a 
problem of Chineseness – that it was in fact inseparable from the changing 
political and economic circumstances of life in China. I realized in other 
words, that scholars needed a means of analyzing both the interrelation-
ships between Tibetan itineraries and ‘Chinese’ economic development and 
the reasons behind the invisibility of these interconnections.
‘Oddness’ and Other Predicaments of Neighbouring
To this end, in this chapter I employ the notion of ‘oddness’ as discussed 
by John Hartigan, Jr. in his work on Whiteness in the US to argue for the 
necessity of reframing scholarly approaches to contemporary Tibetan trans-
Himalayan mobilities. Hartigan (2005) employs this clunky, yet, I insist, 
generative term in his work to highlight the importance of attending to 
‘disjunctive, yet clearly related’ aspects of ‘cultural identity’. Hartigan seeks 
to gain critical purchase on the class dimensions to Whiteness that are 
often rendered invisible by a focus on generalized White social privilege. By 
juxtaposing a historically minded exposition of the emergence and growth 
of ‘White trash’, f irst as an epithet and later as a means of self-identif ication 
with a situated analysis of ‘the powers and privileges associated with white-
ness’ (Hartigan 2005: 1), Hartigan seeks to bring ‘the social predicament of 
poor whites’ (2005: 4) back into the picture while at the same time attending 
to processes of racialization and the means by which White Privilege is 
perpetuated.
In doing so, Hartigan suggests that these two f igures, of White Privilege 
and White Trash are precisely ‘odd’ because, ‘they are diff icult to hold 
equally in view’ – one is associated with ‘domination and hegemony’; the 
other applies to a population that is ‘far from dominant (Hartigan 2005: 2)’. 
In Hartigan’s analysis of American Whites, he suggests that because ‘prevail-
ing academic discussions’ assume that the pair of whiteness and blackness is 
‘suff icient for explaining race … the degraded status of poor whites … fall[s] 
from view’ (Hartigan 2005: 2). The race-based story of White Privilege in this 
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case trumps class and poor whites are effectively erased. In this chapter, I 
want to apply Hartigan’s analytic oddness to the returned Tibetans I met in 
and around Labrang as a means of highlighting the ways in which the f igure 
of the refugee has effectively enabled the returned, or migrant Tibetan to 
drop from view in scholarly circles. Further, by decentring the refugee as 
the f igure par excellence of migrant Tibetans in the contemporary world, I 
want to bring two sets of odd juxtapositions back into the picture.
First I think we can begin to reclaim from obscurity those Tibetan trans-
Himalayan journeying practices that do not conform to the refugee ideal 
– those journeys where religion or cultural nationalism may not be primary 
motivating factors. Such journeys, I suggest below, have been diff icult to 
‘hold equally in view’ with journeys of taking refugee in no small part due 
to a politics of culture that scripts Tibetan motivations as always already 
separate from China (cf. Adams 1996). In such a frame, the motivations for 
Tibetan sojourns are seen as explicable in purely Tibetan religio-cultural 
(or historical) terms and are thought not to be shaped in any meaningful 
way by the concerns of the Chinese nation-state (at least insofar as these 
concerns exceed the repression of Tibetans within China’s borders). In 
this sense, I seek to recover the stories of the odd migrants obscured by a 
normative focus on the f igure of the refugee.
However, I also want to think about ‘oddness’ on a scale that transcends 
the stories of individuals. Here I refer to the People’s Republic of China 
and trans-Himalayan Tibet as themselves ‘odd neighbours’ – tightly con-
nected quasi-intimates whose legendary antagonism renders it almost 
impossible to consider other sorts of mutual interrelationships. Thus the 
degree that Tibetan trans-Himalayan sojourns were motivated in part by 
changing economic (rather than political or religious) conditions inside 
the PRC has stubbornly resisted analysis. This chapter is a necessarily 
provisional attempt to redress this oversight, by adding the dynamics of 
economic development in contemporary China to the landscape of multiple 
in-betweenesses that comprises what the editors of this volume might term 
the ‘predicament of neighbouring’ that trans-Himalayan Tibetan migrants 
must negotiate. A story from my f ieldwork may help to make these points 
more concretely.
A ‘Neverland’ in the Borderlands
The renovations were behind schedule and Gesar was antsy about how little 
headway his workers seemed to be making. A bundle of scarcely-contained 
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energy even when at rest, in his agitated state he now approached a super-
human level of animation. He flitted from one set of workmen to another, 
supervising and fetching parts as needed. One moment found him cajoling 
the painter daubing at the dimly traced outlines of traditional motifs on 
the new reception counter. The next witnessed him haranguing the two 
men hopping precariously on a shoulder-high plank placed between two 
rickety-looking step ladders whose efforts to install two lighting f ixtures 
were being impeded by some pernickety ceiling dry wall. Only when he had 
begun garrulously slapping the backs of the men sweeping debris from what 
had been previously been slick marble floors did he see that I had entered, 
pulling up short and hurrying over to greet me with his characteristic and 
infectious enthusiasm.
A few days previous, arriving in town in the summer of 2009 for the f irst 
time in almost three years, I had been surprised and somewhat alarmed to 
f ind the lobby of Gesar’s hotel gutted.9 I was initially concerned that Gesar 
had been forced to sell or gone out of business as a result of the town being 
closed to foreign tourists for over a year after the ethnic unrest of March, 
2008. At that time, Tibetans all across China had risen in protest against 
central authorities, and the tide of dissent had sloshed all the way from 
Lhasa at the centre of the TAR to this far-flung outpost on the border of Han, 
Hui and Tibetan spheres of cultural influence. I had gotten down from the 
bus and walked across the street to the steps where Gesar and I had first met 
seven years before, only to f ind his hotel a cacophonous construction site 
swarming with unfamiliar faces. In short order, however, his wife spotted 
me as I peered in through an open window frame and she ran upstairs to 
fetch him. He came down looking tired, covered in the dust of renovation.
A few minutes later, smoking and chatting over cantaloupe in the spa-
cious but modestly furnished owner’s quarters, he described the aftermath 
of the events of the previous March. The last year and half had been hell he 
told me, even if things had been looking up recently. Business had taken a hit 
from the enforced absence of Westerners, his father-in-law had died (after 
which he had had to perform expensive and, to his anticlerical sensibility, 
pointless mourning rituals) and as if this were not enough, a needed and 
apparently unproblematic loan application had fallen through at the last 
moment forcing frantic alterations to the renovation plans. He noted that he 
had stayed open to this point on the custom provided by Chinese domestic 
tourists, explaining that he could not not take these Chinese tourists in – if 
9 Pseudonym for both hotel and person; given continuing instability in the region I have also 
chosen to change the name of the town as well.
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he didn’t and one complained to the authorities, he’d be out of business 
‘like that!’
‘Well, I have to behave, don’t I?!’ he said only half-jokingly. ‘The police 
call me every week and ask me, “What have you been up to?’’ Plus, there are 
good and bad people in every group: Tibetans, Han, Muslims, Americans’. 
Indeed, he continued, when, a few years back he had grown increasingly 
frustrated with the unreliability and poor work habits of the tour guides 
(Tibetan like himself) who he employed in his horse trekking company, he 
had gone into business with a new partner, a Chinese tourist from Chengdu, 
a motivated and diligent worker, who he later found out was actually a Hui 
Muslim. When other Tibetans complained: ‘You are such a Tibetan man, 
always supporting your culture and yet your partner is a Chinese?’ Gesar 
stood his ground: ‘He’s honest, he works hard and is a good guy. I’ve never 
wanted to only serve Tibetans; I’ll work with all kinds of honest people’.
Later after a meal with him and his family, Gesar rose from his chair 
said, ‘Come on, Chris, let me show you something’ and led me out into the 
street and pointed up to an as yet unfinished portion of the second floor. 
This, he said, gesturing grandly, is my future restaurant; if the loan had 
come through when it was supposed to, he would have added a third floor 
done up in traditional wooden architecture. Yet, despite the economies he 
had had to take, construction had plunged ahead undaunted. After this 
view from afar, he led me up the stairs for a tour. ‘Remember? This used 
to be my lobby’, he said as we passed through the halls of the hotel (then 
without showers or Western style toilets) in which I had first stayed in a cold 
December many winters before. In the half-built restaurant, there wasn’t 
yet much to see but Gesar had all the details mapped out it in his head. ‘The 
chairs will be here’, he proclaimed, pointing out the particular kind he had 
purchased in a photo album, ‘the tables will be here, the kitchen here. After 
the tour he was quiet for a moment then pondered out loud, ‘What should 
I call it? I think either “Black Tent” or “Neverland”‘.10
As we stood surveying the still mostly nebulous prospect of this ‘Nev-
erland’, a refurbishment and expansion planned in response to the rapid 
development of Tsatang as a (both domestic and foreign) tourist destination 
over the previous decade, I couldn’t help but both ponder the theoretical 
‘neverland’ inhabited by the economically successful returned Tibetan mi-
grant in contemporary China and be reminded of the humbler but fortuitous 
circumstances of our meeting. On Christmas Day 2002, nearing the end of 
10 Michael Jackson’s passing had just occurred when this conversation took place. In the end, 
‘Black Tent’ prevailed.
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my f irst, preliminary, trip to what scholars used to call the Kansu-Tibet 
marches, I found myself, freezing and devoid of Western companionship, 
in what was then a tiny, rather isolated, and almost impossibly picturesque 
mountain village. Having resigned myself to spending the day watching 
herdsmen drive their yaks across the town’s main bridge, I sat down on the 
concrete steps leading up to a storefront to smoke a cigarette and, f inding 
that I had misplaced my lighter, asked the only other person sitting there – a 
Tibetan man with the long hair and heavy wool-lined cloak of a nomad – in 
Chinese for a light.
Much to my surprise, he replied to my request in perfect English (‘of 
course’) and asked me where I was from. We quickly fell into conversation 
and ended up spending the entire day together over several beers and 
numerous cigarettes. Gesar, was at f irst, my ‘Christmas friend’ as he put 
it. In our long, pleasant, boozy conversation that day I discovered that he 
had learned his English over the course of an extended stay in the Tibetan 
exile community in Dharamsala. He had brought back from India a f ierce 
anti-clericalism and a pragmatic approach to life in China – focusing not 
on political agitation but on improving educational opportunities for local 
Tibetans. His f luent English had allowed him to begin working as a tour 
guide in 1999. Within a decade, he had become the proprietor of a hotel 
(inherited from his father-in-law) and a successful horse trekking business 
(which he had built largely with his own sweat).
At the time, I didn’t really know what to make of this situation. I took my 
Christmas friend to be a charming and unexpected aberration from what 
I assumed to be the usual patterns of Tibetan migration. I couldn’t help 
wondering, ‘What kind of Tibetan comes back from India?’ I was intrigued 
but a little suspicious. Yet in retrospect, this meeting with (more than ten 
years on) my f irst friend in Tibet, seems incredibly fortuitous. Gesar’s ac-
count was merely the f irst indication of the degree to which prior to the 
events of March 2008, Amdo Tibetans refused to stay put, or rather, of the 
degree to which Tibetan lives in what is now northwest China are lived 
on complex, often trans-national terrains. For, in the mid to late 2000s, 
Tibetans in and around Gannan Autonomous Prefecture, even those who 
had never ventured beyond the prefectural capital, lived their lives with a 
consciousness of the possibility of living those lives in important elsewheres: 
Lhasa, Dharamsala and the West. As such, the ‘art of neighbouring’ they 
practiced necessarily had to be responsive to the complexities of negotiating 
many betweenesses simultaneously.
I conceptualize neighbouring and the itineraries and subjectivities 
that both condition and are conditioned by it as emerging from multiple, 
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overlapping and often fraught relationships between proximate quasi-
intimates. In such contexts, closeness in geographical or network space or 
apparent cultural or natural similarity is often belied by the complexity of 
the intermixtures of the familiar and the unknown revealed in practice. 
Further, if the word neighbour itself derives from a term denoting the 
practice or situation of dwelling nearby, in examining the Tibetan examples 
that follow, we can take neither dwelling (with its common associations 
of sedentarism, community, and stasis) nor proximity (in physical space) 
for granted. Instead I suggest below the necessity of treating neighbouring 
not as passive proximity in geographical space but as an active traversing 
of multiple scales and cartographies of proximity and un/familiarity at 
once – the physical barriers and conduits that link and divide China, Tibet 
and India, for example, different imaginings of China and Tibet, and even 
variant modes of enacting Tibetanness itself.
Gesar’s example is representative enough despite its specif icity. He 
had returned in 1999 after seven years in India only after the death of 
his brother and the increasingly poor health of his father prompted his 
family to ask him to come home. Returning as illicitly11 as he had gone, he 
brought with him both the sterling English that had so surprised me and 
an intense suspicion of organized religion. Yet his f ierce anti-clericalism 
had not diminished the level of off icial scrutiny he had received since 
returning. He joked, wryly, about his being subject to long-term surveil-
lance after his return that, ‘the communist party had me in their heart; 
I had my own bodyguard for eight years’. Instead of political agitation or 
religious meditation, his continuing passion since his return had been the 
sponsorship of quality primary and secondary education for local Tibetans 
that would allow them to get ahead economically in today’s China. (That 
his schools were forced to close in the aftermath of the March 2008 protests 
was personally devastating).
At the time of our f irst meeting I still naively assumed that anyone who 
had braved the treacherous and illicit journey across the Himalayas to the 
religious and cultural freedoms of exile Tibetan communities in India and 
Nepal would most likely be tempted to stay on on the Sub-continent – both 
because of the effort expended in the process and on some level, I then 
11  For many, the return journey is no less dangerous than the outward leg. Another of my f irst 
friends in Tibet, Yeshe, a monk from near Zhuoni, narrowly managed to avoid jail time when 
at the last minute he postponed his return trip, going to Calcutta to meet a high lama instead. 
The friend with whom he had planned to travel was stopped near the border soon after entering 
China and thrown in prison when a search of his luggage revealed a tiny but nonetheless damning 
copy of the Tibetan f lag.
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thought, because this was just what Tibetans did. Thus both his story 
and the presence of a sizeable population of returned Tibetans in Amdo 
both affronted my expectations about what Tibetans should want and do 
and posed a thorny problem to think through anthropologically. It was 
clear from my interactions with returned Tibetans that they occupied 
a particularly fraught space between the moral destinations of Chinese 
nationalism and orthodox projects of Tibetanness amongst Tibetans in 
exile. Close to but not quite isomorphic with China, India and non-migrant 
Tibetan populations, they found themselves confronting multiple proxi-
mate un/familiar others on borderlands that were often more imagined 
than geographic. Moreover, their presence unsettled the usual kinds of 
stories that people (Western and Tibetan, Scholars and lay folk) tell about 
the uncomfortable position of Tibet and its people within the contemporary 
PRC. In these stories there is a term for Tibetans who attempt to leave China 
illicitly with hopes of making it to the exile communities of north India 
and elsewhere – ‘refugees’. And certainly many of the returned Tibetans 
I encountered in Amdo, initially thought of their own journeys in these 
terms.
But becoming a refugee, taking refuge, is premised on a particular, de-
ferred relationship to the notion or promise of an eventual return. The arc 
of a refugee’s journey is tied to wider geo-political circumstances. A return 
is promised, but it is deferred until the conflict or calamity that has resulted 
in the refugee’s displacement, their up-rooting, has been resolved. Until 
such a resolution occurs or is made to occur, taking refuge is a waiting game 
fraught with uncertainties and the journey of the refugee is a one-way ticket. 
I don’t wish to downplay or denigrate the travails, hopes or extremities of 
duress that Tibetans who would or do label themselves as refugees have 
experienced. Instead I want to suggest the at least provisional necessity of 
stepping back from a perspective where the f igure of the refugee colours 
all knowledge production about the trans-Himalayan peregrinations of 
contemporary PRC-born Tibetans.12 In a post 3/14 world in which the ‘Tibet 
Question’ remains simmeringly unsettled, what do we make of the refugee 
who goes back (Long and Oxfeld 2004)? How do we begin to reckon with 
this unexpected trajectory of Tibetan migration – from India (and Nepal) 
to China in a way that doesn’t end up likening it to driving the wrong way 
down a one-way street?
12 This point should not be construed as minimizing the struggles of Tibetans who so identify, 
or as endorsing the lack of legal (as opposed to theoretical) refugee status that makes the lives 
of Tibetans living in and traveling to Nepal so fraught with danger and diff iculty.
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Uprouting the Refugee
This question is of particularly pressing importance in the Tibetan case for 
two reasons that have very much to do with the special status of the refugee 
in discussions of trans-national Tibetan culture. I will present these reasons 
briefly before discussing each in turn in more depth. First, in contrast to the 
usual state of affairs in the ‘national order of things’ (Malkki 1997 [1992]), 
in the Tibetan case the refugee is seen as normative rather than aberrant. 
Second, this normative status of the refugee is premised upon a hard and fast 
separation between Tibetan journeying practices and the recent political 
and economic transformations of the contemporary Chinese nation-state. 
Below, I critique both of these propositions arguing that while refugee sub-
jectivities remain important to trans-national Tibetans’ self-conceptions, 
visions of taking refuge neither completely capture Tibetan itineraries of 
the last few decades nor do they adequately describe contemporary Tibetan 
returnees’ subjective assessments of their complex interstitiality-cum-
neighbourliness. Refugees, in other words, are only part of the story.
Further, mistaking them for the entirety of the story has led scholars 
working on Tibetan mobilities to habitually ignore the degree to which 
such sojourns may be shaped in important ways by China’s rapid economic 
development. The tendency has thus been to overlook the degree to which 
both Tibetan journeys and returns are occasioned and conditioned by 
agonistic intimacies of China and Tibet rather than by their separation. 
The emphasis of religious over economic factors in Tibetan migrations 
may be a mark of just how ironclad the common sense that scripts Tibetan 
journey as always already separate from Chinese development has become. 
Indeed, it took me several years after my return from the f ield to make the 
connection between the two.
I did so by realizing the fallacy of two common assumptions. The f irst of 
these is that Tibetans always travel for Tibetan reasons which are always 
already not Chinese. This claim is belied by the intimacy of the links be-
tween the multi-ethnic Chinese nation-state (and its discontents) and both 
Chinese and Tibetan transnationalism (cf. Tuttle 2007, Vasantkumar 2012). 
The second specious assumption takes the form of the analogy China is to 
economy as Tibet is to religion. While this may once have been true at a 
very general level, it has not held water for at least the decade plus that has 
elapsed since the beginning of the Great Western Development Scheme 
(under the auspices of which Tibetan religion itself became a key attraction 
for the tourist dollars needed to catalyse regional development). Ultimately, 
I have concluded that despite the over-determined politics of culture that 
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alternately script Tibetan as separate from both Westerner and Chinese 
(Adams 1996) or try to reconstruct Tibetan returns to China as ‘Chinese’ 
sojourns (Vasantkumar 2012), in practice, Tibetan motivations for migration 
are as likely to be as much economic as religious.
It should be noted that this mutual implication of ‘economic’ and ‘reli-
gious’ factors differs not so much from traditional practices of pilgrimage 
which could incorporate both as it does from received Western wisdom 
about the spiritual purity of traditional Tibetan culture (and by extension of 
the journeys undertaken under its auspices). Further, in some sense, despite 
the fact that Tibetans’ trans-Himalayan peregrinations run counter to the 
usual itineraries of Chinese development (from the country to the city, 
from the western hinterlands to the wealthy urban centres of the eastern 
seaboard),13 it is hard to avoid the creeping sense that any analysis of such 
itineraries that does not link them to China’s rapid economic develop-
ment is incomplete. Let us attempt to redress, at least provisionally, this 
incompleteness.
Drawing on the work of scholars such as James Clifford (1988, 1997) and 
Liisa Malkki (1997 [1992]), anthropologists, critical human geographers and 
practitioners of other allied disciplines have, in recent years, paid increasing 
attention to the ways in which national belonging is given shape not only 
by deeply rooted notions of autochthony or primordial identity, but also 
by particular routes of patterned movement that both tie the component 
parts of nation-states together into provisionally coherent wholes but 
also, commonly, exceed or cross-cut the cartographic boundaries of the 
nation-states in question. This shift in emphasis has taken place in concert 
with the growth of anthropological inquiries that actively question tele-
ological narratives of the nation-state, inquiries that supplement attention 
to the eternal verities of nationalist discourse with an attention to the 
contingent, ongoing production of senses of belonging on both national 
and transnational scales. By looking at the patterns of movement that 
performatively constitute people’s subjective apprehensions of being ‘native 
to the nation’, anthropologists have been able to cast some critical light on 
the predominantly ‘sedentarist metaphysics’ (Malkki 1997 [1992]) through 
which national forms are usually imagined and, further, have illuminated 
13 Although several informants mentioned in 2007 that many more local Tibetans were migrat-
ing to Beijing (thanks to ease of employment in the run up to the Olympics) than heading to 
India, my research has led me to believe that such travels are either not very common (only one 
of my informants had a close friend studying or working in Beijing) or not commonly discussed. 
By contrast I ran into many Tibetans who had been to India, knew friends or relatives who had 
been, or wanted to go and talked about such aspirations or experiences freely.
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the trans-national structures of belonging and community with which 
national projects are complexly bound up. Routes have been placed along 
roots in scholarly attempts to understand belonging in the ‘national order 
of things’ (see Vasantkumar 2013 for a more detailed discussion of related 
themes).
Malkki has famously described the ‘sedentarist’ and ‘arborescent’ 
metaphors of culture that characterize this national order and that lead 
in many cases to displacement as being cast as aberrant – as an uprooting, 
the consequences of which have historically included the marginalization 
of refugees and other mobile populations that exist in the national order’s 
interstices. Yet while Malkki’s interventions are justly famous for providing 
trenchant ethnographic illustration of Anderson (1991) and Clifford’s (1988) 
placing mobility at the heart of (more-than-)national belonging, the Tibetan 
case highlights the limits of her claim that the refugee is necessarily a 
marginal f igure. Quite to the contrary, Moran (2004) acutely notes that 
in the Tibetan context, rather than being a stigmatized, deracinated or 
uprooted Other to an authentic, territorially grounded envisioning of nation 
or culture, the refugee is, instead, central to contemporary articulations 
of authentic Tibetan culture. According to many of trans-national Tibet’s 
strongest supporters, both Tibetan and Western alike, ‘Tibetan culture 
and Tibetan Buddhism now function fully and perfectly only in Diaspora’ 
(Moran 2004: 188).
In this instance, therefore, it is the rooted (or more precisely for returnees, 
the rerooted) that is aberrant, the uprooted normative. Moran explains
The rather different semiotic valence of the ‘Tibetan refugee’. It is as 
if, by the magic inherent in this particular geographic qualif ier, the 
categorization of refugee is stood on its head. The Tibetan refugee does 
come to stand for his or her nation in absentia, carrying the culture as 
legacy and as precious cargo. Further, within the world of popular media 
representations (as well as many Tibetans’ own estimations), this cargo 
is in fact their gift to the world. Tibetans are not usually portrayed as 
‘rootless’ or as stripped of the aura that surrounds their nation-culture; 
in fact, quite the reverse. (Moran 2004: 189)
If Tibetan refugees reverse (or benefit from a reversal of) the usual terms 
of the national order of things (even if this symbolic valorisation is of very 
little assistance in traversing the fraught terrains of national borders and 
geopolitical struggle), it follows that they also reverse the dialectic of vis-
ibility and invisibility that Malkki links to this order. Whereas in Malkki’s 
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account, ‘refugees are rendered ‘systematically invisible’ (Moran 2004: 
189), in the Tibetan case of which I write, it is mobile non-refugee Tibetans 
that are rendered invisible (non-mobile Tibetans in China are arguably 
rendered inauthentic rather than invisible, but this is a topic for another 
paper). Aberrance here is f igured not in terms of the uprooting of sedentary 
authenticities but as the uprouting (if you will) of authentic itineraries 
wherein returning is tantamount to selling out.
Pilgrims of Development
Let me be clear that I am not suggesting that Tibetans who (return) migrate 
trans-nationally in search not only of refuge but also of fortune – Tibetans, 
in other words, who become pilgrims of development – are necessarily co-
opted by or complicit in Chinese national projects. While most necessarily 
swear off explicit political expression, most also have no illusions about 
the contradictions, injustices and inequalities of everyday life in China. 
Indeed, some, like Gesar, seek to lay the foundation for a future Tibet of 
their own imagining that diverges from both China and exile Tibetan ideals. 
In place of the over-determined binaries of the Tibet Question as phrased 
by both interested parties (whether cast in terms of the struggle on the 
part of virtuous communists to free Tibetan serfs from their evil monastic 
overlords or as a confrontation between the peaceful partisans of Buddhist 
enlightenment and the destructive, rapacious Chinese nation-state) the 
situation on the ground is complexly polyvalent (cf. Powers 2004). What 
should we then make of Tibetan modernists who return to China to work 
as guides for foreign tourists, showing them the remains of traditional 
Tibetan culture even as they themselves seek modernity on Tibetan terms 
and critically assess the essentialist claims of both Chinese and Tibetan 
nationalisms? ‘Refugee’ will not suff ice to describe such travellers.
Those who stay, those who go and those who return all do so for a variety 
of reasons. This should not be surprising, but, perhaps, it still is. It also 
shouldn’t be scandalous to admit that for at least some of the Tibetans 
involved that economics may trump (or exist alongside) religion or poli-
tics, that for some at least, travel to India is undertaken at least in part for 
instrumental reasons – to parlay English language ability into superior 
economic prospects (and perhaps laterally support for Tibetan education, 
culture or language) in China. As the iron rice bowl of China under socialism 
has given way to the new post-WTO world of risk and self-reliance, Amdo 
Tibetans, in addition to perceiving themselves as cultural and religious 
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minorities (who prior to 2008 were able to access rather more freedom on 
those counts than Tibetans in the TAR; times have since rather radically 
changed), also internalized, to some degree, ideas of economic and cultural 
backwardness common to those hailing from underdeveloped rural regions 
in China’s western hinterland (cf. Vasantkumar 2014).
As the Chinese central government has, at least formally, turned its at-
tention to the development of the Western Regions (starting in particular in 
2000), local governments have been given some control over assessing how 
best to employ locally specif ic resources to foster economic development 
(under the auspices for example of the maxim ‘develop locally specif ic 
economy [i.e. resources]’, fazhan tese jingji 发展特色经济). Prior to 2008, 
tourism was, alongside such industries as forestry and mineral extraction, 
perhaps the idiom par excellence for this locally specif ic development. 
Places like Lhasa in the TAR, Lijiang in Yunnan, Jiuzhaigou in Sichuan 
and ever more widely scattered locales like Xiahe, Tsatang, Langmusi, 
Repgong, Ganzi, Dege, and Yushu all began to f igure with some prominence 
on the itineraries of Western tourists (and since 2008, with as yet unclear 
consequences, in the journeys of a new breed of Chinese backpackers (see 
Lim 2009, Shepherd 2009, Vasantkumar 2009). In this era of expanding 
western tourism, Tibetans with English language proficiency were ideally 
positioned to serve as guides.14
This positioning was in no small part due to the confluence between 
their ethnicity (Tibetans are generally seen by Westerners as more authentic 
and less politically compromised guides to Tibetan Buddhist monuments 
than Han Chinese) and their linguistic aptitude (most Western tourists 
speak only European languages). Given the generally lousy state of English 
language instruction in Western China in the late 2000s, access to English 
in India was, for many migrants (both potential and returned) one of the 
most appealing aspects of the entire endeavour. This is not to say that these 
economic motives always trumped or replaced more purely nationalist or 
religious motives, often all three were present in different measure. (Even 
the most strongly anti-clerical migrants I met, two young Tibetan men who 
separately praised the Cultural Revolution, only wishing that the Tibetans 
14 Further, most if not all of the Tibetans I talked to in Dharamsala had friends or knew of 
others who had returned to China and achieved at a modicum of economic success. In 2007, one 
Tibetan in Dharamsala told me that outside of Lhasa where supervision of returnees is usually 
strict and occasionally draconian as when in 2004 many returnees were booted from their jobs 
in tourism-related industries for the crime of having visited India, he knew of many people who 
had gone back and were doing alright working as guides, English teachers or entrepreneurs. 
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had been able to control it in their own territory, still expressed reverence 
for the Dalai Lama and Buddhism in general).
Certainly, the journey itself to and from India was and remains ex-
traordinarily dangerous. Just as certainly some Tibetans would no doubt 
undertake such travels even if there were no access to free education in the 
exile communities. Yet, I still believe that a portrait of Tibetan migrants 
that casts them f irmly and solely in refugee mode is less a description of 
the actual itineraries on the ground than a reproduction of a particular 
spatialized cultural politics of difference in which Tibetan is scripted as 
always already separate from Chinese.15 Whether or not economic motiva-
tions for such movements are essential or incidental, it would be advisable, 
I suggest, to consider contemporary Tibetan trans-Himalayan migrations as 
proceeding from a complex amalgam of economic, cultural, religious and 
political motivations. In such an amalgamation, the economic advantages 
in China provided by English language education in Tibetan exile com-
munities abroad should not be overlooked. Whether, in order to add nuance 
to our understandings of trans-Himalayan Tibetan migration, we should 
alternately abandon, decentre, or employ the category of refugee as strategic 
essentialism will thus no doubt occasion signif icant debate.
Odd Migrants
I suggest that in order to start to make sense of the f igure of the returned 
Tibetan we need to begin by broadening our analytic terminology. In 
place of the term ‘refugees’ and its over-determining connotations, which 
are apropos to many but not all Tibetan populations and in place of the 
descriptive, but strangely flat ‘returnees’, I propose the term ‘odd migrants’. 
As discussed at the beginning of this essay, I am using the word ‘odd’ in a 
somewhat technical sense that, following Hartigan, is meant to highlight 
both the singularity of and the signif icant internal cleavages within the 
population I attempt to describe. For, the category of Tibetan returnees 
is riven by differences of class, region and language that parallel the 
15 Which, it should be noted, exists uncomfortably alongside other mappings (such as the 
common equation by long-term Tibetan residents of Dharamsala of new arrivals with the 
cultural and moral orientation of the Chinese nation-state. The bitter irony to f ind having 
sacrif iced so much to leave China that one is tarred with accusations of complicity with the 
PRC upon arrival in India, might be another example of the normalization of the f igure of the 
refugee (here equated only with those who left China in 1959 or shortly after) in an exile Tibetan 
context.
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signif icant discontinuities Hartigan highlights that make it so diff icult 
to think different sorts of American Whiteness together. Two groups of 
returnees are particularly ‘odd’ in this sense.
These two groups can be effectively distinguished by their reasons for 
returning, their welcome (or lack thereof) upon return and by the sorts of 
conceptual limits these reasons and receptions render manifest. The f irst 
of these two odd groups is a population of young PRC-born Amdowas, both 
ecclesiastical and lay, most often, but not exclusively male who venture to 
India for religious or practical instruction (e.g., learning English) motivated 
by a general sense of dissatisfaction with life in China’s Tibet(s) that derives 
only partially from some sort of ethno-national or religious sense of mar-
ginalization. These migrants have travelled both to and from India in some 
less-than-licit manner, sneaking across snowy passes ‘like thieves in the 
night’ as one of my friends put it, toughing it out in Ngari or dodging border 
posts down in the misty valleys near Dram. This sort of migrant is no longer 
feted upon his or her return, but instead goes to a local police station, turns 
themself in and, depending on their degree of guanxi and the corruptness 
of the police, pays a f ine of varying severity and slips back into the general 
stream of social life (with perhaps, as in Gesar’s case, a bodyguard in tow).
The return of even average Tibetans used to occasion considerably more 
positive off icial attention than it does today. My friends in Labrang told 
me that the local government used to hold galas to welcome back guiguo 
zangzu tongbao 归国藏族同胞or ‘Returned Tibetan Compatriots’ and I 
have seen pictures in friends’ apartments of gatherings of smiling returnees 
posing beneath red banners with this phrase picked out in gold characters. 
For the most part, however, Tibetan returnees have grown so common 
place16 that the government has become perhaps just a little blasé about 
them. Or perhaps it has to do with changing def initions of guiguo (归国). 
Gui (归), has the connotations of returning home having made good for 
oneself while away – it in this sense describes a return that casts both the 
returner and the place of return in a positive light. Where once even the 
return of farm boys or long haired nomads was viewed in this light, in the 
years immediately preceding 2008, it seemed that to occasion the kinds 
of feting now prevalent in the development-minded PRC, as with so many 
other things in contemporary China, one, as it were, has to pay to play. This 
is where the second group of odd migrants comes in.
16 By 1998, China had ‘welcomed’ the visits of 22,935 Tibetans visiting relatives and more than 
2200 returning from abroad to settle down (China Tibet Information Center 2007). 
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Here I refer to a smaller and generally more aff luent substrate of the 
Tibetan population who have the means and material resources at their 
command to be feted as ‘foreign investors’ or who have the life story to 
allow them to be deployed for propagandistic purposes as the heroes (or 
more rarely heroines) of idealized success stories, as having achieved what 
might, for lack of a better phrase, be termed ‘China’s Tibetan Dream’.17 
In the years prior to the troubles of 2008, f ive such idealized biographies 
of returnees could be easily located on the website for the China Tibet 
Information Center.18
These accounts served as exemplif ications of opportunity and self-
improvement. These f ive vignettes which all feature a truly baff ling 
system for romanizing Chinese versions of Tibetan names were entitled 
‘Yixi Dainbgyai Takes the Lead in Becoming Rich’, ‘Dainzeng Wangdu, an 
Exemplary Village Head’, ‘Goisam Paintog – A Famous Tibetan Doctor’, 
‘Zhaxi Wangdu, a Deputy to the Lhasa Municipal People’s Congress’ and 
‘Gyaincain Qoinpe – Member of the Lhasa Municipal Committee of the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference’. All the individuals 
in question hail from central Tibet and are members of the generation of 
Tibetans who fled the TAR in the 1950s; they are, in other words, as the 
purple prose of the website puts it, ‘approaching the evenings of their lives’. 
All returned to Tibet between 1982 and 1987.
While sharing certain formulaic aspects, f light into exile, disillusion-
ment, tearful returns, described in purplest prose – Dainzeng Wangdu for 
example is said to remark, ‘After my return to the motherland it was as if 
I were a parched seed [sic] which had suddenly been drenched with sweet 
dew’, and concluding homilies on the virtues of the party – these vignettes 
highlight the different modes in which returnees can make good. Yeshe 
Dhonjub (at least I think that’s how one might render Yixi Dainbgyai) by 
virtue of his own considerable talents and preferential government invest-
ment and taxation policies is able to parlay his small timber concern into 
a diversif ied business empire in Tsethang. Tenzin Wangdu illustrates how 
Tibetans in China can gain control over their own affairs by assuming posi-
tions of power in local government. Kelsang Phuntsok demonstrates that 
traditional arts such as Tibetan medicine are not only allowed to flourish 
in today’s open-minded China but can become in themselves sources of 
17 Given the avidity with which ‘China’ is inserted into Tibet-related titles (e.g., ‘Tin Tin in 
China’s Tibet’ and ‘China’s Tibetan Mastiff ’ just to name two).
18 http://www.tibetinfor.com/en/reports/ordinary/returned/ret_menu.htm (website 
deactivated).
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wealth and social esteem. Finally, Jashi Wangdu and Tenzin Jigme show 
that Tibetans even have access to higher levels of Chinese government: ‘as 
spokespersons for the people, they actively participate in the administration 
and discussion of state affairs’.
Conclusion: Odd Neighbours
I think we should take these vignettes neither as representing the actual 
experiences of actual individuals nor as completely f ictitious, but rather as 
something akin to, say, a movie ‘based’ on a book by the same name – ac-
tualities embellished and repurposed for particular ends – here the United 
Front attempt to hail overseas Tibetans as one of the key constituencies 
of the Chinese nation-state. That is to say simply because these accounts 
stretch credibility or bear the all-too-telltale marks of formalism or because 
Goisam Paintog crops up at least once as the protagonist of what is supposed 
to be Dainzeng Wangdu’s story, that does not mean we should conclude 
that the phenomenon of wealthy and successful Tibetan returnees does 
not exist, or the interests of such returnees do not sometimes coincide with 
off icial envisionings. Just as the strange romanizations distance us but 
allow us to perceive dimly actual Tibetan names, these formalized accounts 
similarly allow us distanced, f iltered access to actual Tibetan lives even as 
the medium itself makes it impossible to overlook their repurposing.
Further, even though these exemplary biographies of returned Tibetans 
made good don’t fully coincide with the details of their lives, they can be 
seen as a signif icant manifestation of government policy towards potential 
trans/national co-uterines. They seek to emphasize a co-nascence that 
highlights Tibetan compatriots’ place in the Chinese national-family. These 
and other returned Tibetans made good may or may not be foreign born 
but have found themselves sucked (or have manoeuvred themselves) into 
the vortex of new forms of nationally-inflected trans-national structures 
of feeling which the PRC seeks to mobilize. Further projects of economic 
and ‘social’ development in what are commonly perceived to be backward 
minority regions hail the so-called ‘Overseas Tibetans Compatriots’ as ‘a 
potential subset of Huaqiao (华侨) or ‘Overseas Chinese’ and an underu-
tilized source of the ‘foreign investment’ central to plans for (for example) 
developing the West (see Vasantkumar 2012, for a more detailed treatment 
of one of these ‘Overseas Tibetans’).
Yet despite the important differences between these celebrated and 
f ictionalized Tibetan returnees and the invisible, illicit ones with whom 
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we began this chapter, it is worth ref lecting on one further valence of 
neighbouring as I have tried to employ it in this chapter – the fact that the 
boundaries between the two may not be absolute. The motivations of the 
wealthy investors may be as much religious as economic, the poorer return-
ees may have initially travelled in hopes of improving their economic status 
in China. (Indeed the boundary between the economic and the religious 
often breaks down on closer inspection). The experience of trans-national, 
trans-Himalayan migration even in its most illicit form can, as Gesar’s 
experiences so boldly illustrate, itself be productive of class mobility. Such 
complexities highlight the degree to which economically and religiously 
motivated Tibetans are in Hartigan’s terms, precisely odd, given that they 
are so hard to hold together conceptually. What this oddness in turn sug-
gests, I argue, less as a conclusion than as a jumping off point for further 
study is that in place of, or at the very least in addition to understandings 
of these Amdowas’ trans-Himalayan peregrinations as a sort of spatialized 
Cri-de-Coeur, stemming from a monolithic Chinese anti-Tibetanness, we as 
scholars must seek to treat them as more complex phenomena that both 
bind together and produce economic, political and moral terrains in novel 
and unpredictable combinations. Moreover, in this reimagining, Tibetan 
mobilities and Chinese economic development are themselves revealed as 
odd neighbours.
8 ‘China is Paradise’
Fortune and Refuge, Brokers and Partners, or the Migration 
Trajectories of Burmese Muslims toward the Yunnan 
Borderlands
Renaud Egreteau*
Introduction: The Road from Mandalay
Syed Islam,1 a young Muslim in his mid-twenties, likes to boast about his 
epic journey from Myanmar (formerly Burma)2 to Ruili, a bustling Chinese 
market town located in southern Yunnan, right at the Burmese border. Born 
and raised in Myanmar’s western Rakhine (formerly Arakan) State, he left 
his hometown a couple of years ago, and illegally crossed into Bangladesh. 
There, he bought a flight ticket and flew from Dhaka to Bangkok. Once in 
Thailand, local friends helped him travel by bus to Mae Sot, on the Thai-
Myanmar border, where he sneaked back into Myanmar, and made it to 
Yangon. From the former Burmese capital, which he could not directly reach 
from his native Rakhine State because of government travel restrictions, 
he made the journey northwards to the cities of Mandalay and Lashio, and 
then entered Yunnan a few days later.
Syed Islam is not alone in making this arduous journey from western 
Myanmar to China. Wandering in the streets of Ruili (or Shweli in Burmese), 
one cannot overlook the presence of South Asian-looking shopkeepers and 
the local success of Bollywood movies. The bearded and dark-skinned men 
wearing longyis (Burmese sarong) and topis (Muslim prayer cap), chewing 
* The author gratefully acknowledges Dong Yu-fei (Swift) for his research assistance on 
Chinese-written material. The f ield research in the Yunnan-Myanmar borderlands was spon-
sored through a grant generously provided by the Hong Kong-based Hang Seng Bank Gold Jubilee 
Fund for Research (Project Code No. 20370858, 2010-12).
1 In this chapter, all names of informants have been changed to protect their anonymity. In 
Myanmar, ‘U’ is a designation of respect for elder men, and ‘Daw’ for women. 
2 For linguistic simplicity and without any political connotation, this chapter uses the English 
adjectives ‘Burmese’ and ‘Burman’. ‘Burmese’ refers to the citizenship and common language 
of the people of present-day Myanmar, while ‘Burman’ more specif ically designates the ethnic 
Bamar majority of the country, where non-Burman ethnic minorities, such as the Karens, 
Kachins, Mons, Rohingyas, and so on, also dwell. Myanmar is the country’s off icial post-1989 
appellation, and admitted as such henceforth. Yangon is the vernacular term for the English 
Rangoon. The Rakhine State was known as the Arakan State until 1989.
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betel nut and smoking cheroots (Burmese cigars), belong to Muslim communi-
ties that have immigrated from Myanmar over the past two decades. Almost 
exclusively Sunni, and distinct from the local Chinese Muslim communities 
(the ‘Hui’ 回, also colloquially known as ‘Panthay’ in the Burmese language), 
these ‘Burmese Muslims’ have since the late 1980s established extensive net-
works of trade and set up successful gem and jade businesses, grocery stores, 
restaurants and cosmetic shops in a few major cities of Southwestern Yunnan. 
This chapter explores their remarkable history of migration in the context 
of a booming borderworld. It draws on f ieldwork carried out between 2010 
and 2012 in Ruili, Jiegao, and Baoshan – three bustling Chinese commercial 
towns located along the historical ‘Burma Road’ that has connected, since 
it was built in the late 1930s, the Burmese city of Mandalay and Kunming, 
Yunnan’s capital. It seeks to understand why and how Burmese Muslims have 
been venturing northwards, while the dominant trend of migration rather 
points southwards, from Yunnan into resource-rich Myanmar.
From the mid-1980s indeed, the geopolitical configuration of Myanmar’s 
northern areas has significantly changed. For decades, several armed groups 
had acted as powerful buffers between Myanmar and its northern Chinese 
neighbour. Since the 1960s, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), the Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA, formed in 1961) and other ethnic armed militias 
controlled most of the trafficking routes, resources and movements of people 
in the Sino-Burmese borderlands (Lintner 1999). However, when in the 1980s 
Beijing decided to withdraw its moral and f inancial support to Burmese 
communist insurgents, these buffer territories began to vanish. Under Deng 
Xiaoping’s guidance, China was entering a new era. Maintaining stability in 
the region and opening a door to booming Southeast Asia, including Myanmar, 
became a key element of Deng’s approach. This shift in Chinese policy coin-
cided with the regime change in Yangon in 1988 and the advent of a supposedly 
more liberal military junta ready to end the country’s isolation. Amidst the 
Burmese pro-democracy uprising of August 1988, a border trade agreement 
was signed between China and the Burmese authorities; bilateral commerce 
subsequently flourished (Lintner 1989, 1994). Yunnanese merchants, investors, 
and fortune-seekers began to flood into northern Myanmar and Mandalay, 
the long-standing centre of the Burmese gem and jade business.
An extensive and growing literature has focused on the massive f lows 
of Chinese immigration into Myanmar, along the ‘Road to Mandalay’, as 
Kipling’s poem goes.3 This body of scholarship has early on highlighted the 
3 Whilst he never set foot in the former Burmese royal capital, Rudyard Kipling wrote in 1890 
an acclaimed poem entitled ‘Mandalay’. It narrates how a British soldier stationed in colonial 
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Burma longs for a young Burmese girl. After 1885 and the annexation of Upper Burma, British 
troops were continuously taken up on the Irrawaddy River from Rangoon to Mandalay, or the 
slow and never-ending ‘Road to Mandalay’. 
Figure 8.1  Map of China-Myanmar Borderlands
Design: renaud egreteau and bertrand lefebvre, 2005-2010
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increasing economic dominance of Yunnanese migrants in Myanmar since 
the early 1990s, and the resentment this has generated among Burmese 
local populations (Mya Maung 1994, Seekins 1997, Le Bail and Tournier 
2010, Zin 2012). However, little has been written about migratory f lows 
in the opposite direction: from Myanmar into China, on the ‘Road from 
Mandalay’.
Based on ethnographic research on both Burmese migrants who arrived 
recently in Yunnan and well-settled Burmese shopkeepers, this study argues 
that two main driving forces have pushed and pulled them, respectively, 
toward China. The f irst is economic: the search for better job opportunities 
and the prospect of a thriving business environment have attracted many 
Burmese to a booming Yunnan province since the late 1980s. Myanmar’s 
gem and jade industry, with which Burmese and Chinese Muslim com-
munities have a long history of association, is most notable in this respect. 
Surging demand from Chinese consumers in the 1990s fostered a new type 
of Burmese economic migration northwards and the Burmese Muslims 
are ideally positioned to use and expand their diasporic networks as well 
as their brokerage skills across the Chinese borders. In the process, the 
Chinese borderlands have been transformed into a wider transnational 
space, interconnected with the rest of the world, and in which Burmese 
Muslim ‘middlemen’, as neighbours and brokers, feel very much at ease.
The second driving force is the search for refuge. Muslim communities 
have long been the target of patronizing and discriminating treatment 
in Myanmar – by the postcolonial state authorities, the police, as well as 
local Buddhist populations. Persecution has been especially rampant in the 
Rakhine State and in central Myanmar. Scores of Burmese Muslims have 
therefore looked for safer places to practice their religion and negotiate their 
own Islamic identity. Intriguingly, China, and Yunnan in particular, offered 
a far more benign environment than Myanmar. There, across the borders, 
Burmese Muslim migrants have found a much sought-after sanctuary. In 
this process of seeking fortune and religious refuge, this chapter will then 
show, the Burmese Muslim migrants have engaged in active and positive 
‘neighbouring’ in the borderworld along the southern edges of Yunnan. 
This borderworld offers them a site where they can safely prosper. In the 
local Chinese business world they are ‘useful neighbours’, or in Chirot and 
Reid’s (1997) words, ‘essential outsiders’.
In this chapter, I will f irst brief ly outline the historical origin, role 
and middlemen position of the various Muslim communities inhabiting 
Myanmar. I will then trace their migration to China arguing that they 
moved northwards in search of both a safe haven and an ‘El Dorado’ where 
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professional opportunities lacking in Myanmar have mushroomed since 
the late 1980s. Finally, I will analyse how they have, in the process, become 
‘essential outsiders’ in their new home in the Sino-Burmese border areas as 
brokers, partners, and neighbours.
Historical Background: Indian and Muslim Middlemen in 
Colonial and Early Post-Colonial Burma
In Myanmar, Indian migrants, whether Hindu, Sikh or Muslim, have 
long acted as intermediaries between state authorities (in a colonial and 
early postcolonial context) and the Burmese population (Mahajani 1960; 
Chakravarti 1971). Similar to Chinese, Armenian, and Jewish communities 
worldwide, Indians have long been examined through the lens of the ‘mid-
dlemen minority’, a theoretical corpus much used by social scientists from 
the 1970s, which has since evolved into an extensive multi-disciplinary 
scholarship (Bonacich 1973, Schaffer et al. 2009). Middlemen commonly 
act as ‘go-between’ agents who broker between dominant interest groups, 
the state and the local people. They often migrate into spaces where they 
can offer a valuable role as intermediaries and are in a position to mobilize 
assets and provide goods or services unavailable locally. As minorities, they 
subsequently form ethnic enclaves (Light et al. 1994) or immigrant niches 
(Waldinger 1994), in which they can perform brokering and networking 
activities. Highly mobile, they frequently master several languages and use 
their own ethnicity-based networks for communication, trade, knowledge 
exchange and circulation. They demonstrate much flexibility in collect-
ing capital and mobilizing their own kin labour forces. But they maintain 
cultural practices distinct from those of the locals – and tend to therefore 
be more or less segregated from their host societies. They remain ‘outsiders’ 
(Chirot and Reid 1997, Nyíri 2011), but their presence as intermediaries and 
their brokerage skills are much needed and hardly replaceable.
The British colonial enterprise bolstered a massive flow of Indian im-
migrants into the Burmese province from the late the nineteenth century. 
Tamils, Marwaris, Bengalis, Biharis, Chettiars and others migrated f irst 
to the coastal areas of Arakan and Tenasserim, then to Rangoon and the 
Irrawaddy delta, and eventually to Mandalay and the northern areas after 
the Burmese territories were completely incorporated into the British ‘Raj’ 
in 1886. Familiar with British commercial and administrative practices, the 
colonial legal system as well as the English language, they managed to pros-
per as trustworthy brokers. They expanded their networks throughout the 
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colonial province, especially in the early 20th century, and helped establish 
new connections with their northern Chinese neighbour.4
About half of the Indian migrants brought by the British were Sunni 
Muslims. Their descendants now form the largest group among the three to 
four million Muslims in Myanmar today (Mahajani 1960, Chakravarti 1971, 
Yegar 1972, Khin Maung Kyi 2006, Taylor 2006, Egreteau 2011). The second 
largest group of Burmese Muslims are the Rohingyas, a segregated Sunni 
minority originated from the swampy borders between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Although Burmese Buddhists consider them to 
be Bengali immigrants, their Islamic practices are now very different from 
the ones observed in South Asia in general, and in the Bengal region in 
particular (Yegar 2002, Defert 2007, Nyi Nyi Kyaw 2008). The Rohingyas, a 
community of about a million today, mostly live in the Bangladesh-Myanmar 
borderlands, but some also settled in Mandalay, Yangon and Mawlamyaing 
(formerly Moulmein) in the southeast of Myanmar.5
In the late colonial era, the immigrated Indians acquired a disproportion-
ate influence in the economy, security forces and administration of the 
Burmese colonial province (Khin Maung Kyi 2006, Egreteau 2011). Their 
success triggered strong Indophobic sentiments among local Burmese 
communities. Resentment against the ‘Kalas’ (or ‘foreigners from the West’ 
in Burmese language) was far more blatant at the time than against any 
other ‘outsiders’, including the Chinese minorities (Khin Maung Kyi 2006, 
Egreteau 2011: 35-36). After Myanmar’s Independence in 1948, extensive 
‘Burmanization’ programs were launched by the Burmese postcolonial 
state. Strict restrictions on acquiring Burmese citizenship and the outright 
xenophobic policies later def ined by General Ne Win’s military regime 
further drove scores of foreign and non-Buddhist communities out of the 
country in the 1960s. Muslims, in particular, were forced to assimilate to 
the Burman-dominated society if they wished to stay in Myanmar (Khin 
Khin Su 1954, Holmes 1967, Yegar 1972). Clashes between Buddhists and the 
4 Their role as interpreters and informants to Chinese Hui jade merchants and mule caravan 
leaders traveling from Yunnan throughout Myanmar has recently been examined by Lehmann 
(2007) and Ma (2003).
5 Besides Burmese Muslims of Indian origins and Rohingyas, there are two other Muslim 
groups in Myanmar. First, the Zerbadees, or descendants of Arab, Indian or Persian traders 
who have intermarried with local Burmese since the 13th or 14th centuries. They form a small 
but rather well-assimilated community in Myanmar (Yegar 1972, 33-35, Khin Maung Yin 2005: 
169, Berlie 2008: 11-12, Sulaiman 2008). And second, the Hui (Chinese Muslims) from Yunnan 
who have long-standing trade relations in the region. The Hui, or Panthay in Burmese, have also 
been well documented (Yegar 1966b, Forbes 1986, Atwill 2003, Ma 2003, Chang 2003, Sun 2011). 
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Indian and Muslim minorities have been a recurrent feature of Myanmar’s 
history in the 20th century, in particular in the 1930s and during the Japanese 
occupation between 1942 and 1945. During the 1970s and 1980s, various 
‘de-Islamization’ programs were also put in place by the Burmese military 
administration (Yegar 2002, Berlie 2008). Mosques have been burnt down 
and not allowed to be rebuilt by the local or state authorities ever since. 
Negative portrayal and stereotypes of Islam still linger. In 2012 and 2013, 
riots against Muslim populations in western and central Myanmar spread 
once more with particular severity. Many were led by Buddhist monks 
(Human Rights Watch 2012, 2013).
Whilst several key post-independence Burmese politicians and leading 
intellectuals were Muslims, the country’s various Islamic communities have 
since the 1960s tended to adopt a far lower public prof ile at the national 
level. Enacted in 1982, Myanmar’s latest Citizenship Law purported to 
strengthen the 1948 Citizenship Act. It still has legal power and has long 
been a major cause of resentment among the country’s Muslim communi-
ties. The law has indeed created three categories of citizens: full, associate 
and naturalized. It states that any individual unable to prove that his or her 
ancestors settled in what is Myanmar today before 1823 (and thus, before 
the f irst Anglo-Burmese war and the f irst waves of labor migration from 
British India) would not be recognized as full Burmese citizens (Taylor 
2006: 675-680). Consequently, Burmese of Indian origins, whether Hindus, 
Sikhs or Muslims were, and still are, openly singled out as second-class 
citizens. Many have been repatriated back to India or Pakistan since the 
1960s. After several decades of Burmanization, most of those who remain in 
Myanmar have become more or less forcibly integrated; they have adopted 
Burmese names and language (Myanma-sa), and acquired the associate 
or naturalized status. One notable exception is the Rohingya community. 
A handful of its leaders have relentlessly argued the group has been an 
indigenous ethnic community in Myanmar, and therefore does not need 
to go through a process of association or naturalization.
The deep-rooted ‘Indophobia’ in Myanmar, while remaining salient, 
has over time transformed into blunt ‘Islamophobia’ (Selth 2004, Egreteau 
2011: 50-51). It now primarily targets the Rohingya, considered as ‘foreign’ 
residents, but also affects the more integrated Burmese Muslim communi-
ties, such as the Panthay (Defert 2007, Nyi Nyi Kyaw 2008, Berlie 2008). The 
Rohingya suffered two dramatic mass exoduses in 1977-78 and 1991-92 
when 200 thousand refugees were forced to flee their native Rakhine State 
westwards, into neighbouring Bangladesh. Whilst thousands f lee their 
homes in Rakhine State every year and try their luck in makeshift boats 
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throughout the Indian Ocean, forming a new type of ‘boat people’ (Lewa 
2008, Espenilla 2010), the remaining population in Rakhine have faced 
recurrent persecution ever since (Grundy-Warr and Wong 1997, Mathieson 
2009, Human Rights Watch 2012). As observed elsewhere in the world, 
with the changing of the political context from a colonial enterprise to a 
nationalistic and independent polity, the communities construed as ‘es-
sential outsiders’ in the colonial era became unwanted and ‘inessential’ in 
the new landscape. Burmese Muslims, particularly those who had made the 
most of their middlemen skills before independence, were left faced with 
the choice of leaving the country or assimilating into the Burmese society.
Moving North: Seeking Fortune in China
It was however only with the opening up of the borders between Yunnan 
and Myanmar in 1988 that Burmese Muslims started to venture northwards. 
In the late 1980s, the Sino-Burmese borderlands witnessed a relative paci-
f ication. Bilateral trade resumed. The Chinese border town of Ruili soon 
transformed into the bustling heart of an increasingly lucrative trade of both 
legal and illegal Chinese and Burmese commodities. Whilst thousands of 
Chinese fortune-seekers began to flock southwards around the Burmese 
borders, Burmese traders who had till then been based in Myanmar’s urban 
trading centres such as Yangon, Mandalay, and Taunggyi, started to venture 
northwards, toward Ruili. The town soon became the main entry point 
into China for all Burmese migrants, including Muslims. There, the latter 
found a new economic ‘niche’ to expand their traditional activities. The 
stories of members of their own communities who successfully established 
themselves in Ruili since the late 1980s encouraged others to risk the hazard-
ous migration northwards to Yunnan instead of following the still rather 
popular – but no less hazardous – route into Bangladesh or Malaysia.
It remains diff icult to estimate the size of the Burmese Muslim commu-
nity that has migrated to Yunnan over the past two decades. Their mobility 
and discretion, and the lack of reliable off icial data, make any attempt a 
challenge. Very few of these Burmese Muslims are, in fact, permanent set-
tlers. Most of them possess Burmese identity papers (fake or real), some own 
Bangladeshi or Malaysian passports and are granted Chinese business visas 
or temporary residency certif icates, which range from one week to one year, 
depending on their bargaining skills with the local Chinese immigration 
off icers. Based on my research since 2009, I estimate however that by 2012 
between 30,000 to 40,000 Burmese are living on the Chinese side of the 
‘chiNA iS PArADiSe’ 195
border. Among them, most probably 5,000 are Muslims; and four-f ifths of 
these Muslims reside in and around Ruili and Jiegao, the border checkpoint a 
few miles away. In particular, about 1,000 of these Muslims were Rohingyas, 
according to members of the local community, by 2012.
There are also a few dozen Burmese Muslim households in Baoshan, 250 
kilometres north of Ruili. In the towns of Zhangfeng (Longchuan), Mangshi 
(Luxi) and Wanding (Wanting), as well as further away along the ‘Burma 
Road’ towards Kunming, Burmese Muslim traders are not the strongest 
competitors to the Chinese, Kachin, and Shan traders. However one excep-
tion remains: away from the main commercial axis of Mandalay-Ruili-
Kunming, Jinghong in Yunnan’s Xishuangbanna Prefecture also shelters 
several Burmese Muslim and Rohingya families (see Figure 8.1). Over the 
past decade, Jinghong has become the main jade hub of Xinshuangbanna’s 
Prefecture.
Burmese Muslims have set up gem and jade shops there, and sell bracelets 
or cheap jewellery to Chinese local tourists. In contrast, other Yunnanese 
cities such as Tengchong or Yinjiang, although very close to the Burmese 
borders and looking back on a long tradition as trade hubs for Burmese gems 
and jade, feature no visible presence of any Burmese Muslim households 
(as of 2012). Burmese Muslims are also largely absent in Cangyuan, Nancan, 
Mengla, Lancang and other Sino-Burmese border towns in areas dominated 
by the Wa and Shan. There, the Chinese and other indigenous communities 
control the trade and circulation of commodities and people.
Some Burmese Muslims run Burmese food and halal restaurants, small 
guesthouses, grocery stores and cosmetic shops in Yunnan. Others f ind jobs 
as domestic workers. According to local informants some are also involved 
in smuggling goods, including heroin, which is locally known as ‘No. 4’. 
Casual Western travellers are often bluntly offered to buy some. The vast 
majority of Burmese Muslims, however, focus on the gem and jade business 
exclusively. Most of them have engaged in relatively small-scale trading, 
at least in comparison to the local Chinese, Shan or Kachin business com-
munities. The wealthiest Burmese jade dealers settled in Ruili seem very 
well connected beyond the mere borderlands. They import boulders and 
stones from Myanmar and sell them to Chinese local dealers; they also look 
further afield for better transactions in Kunming and Guangzhou primarily. 
Other Burmese Muslim migrants, petty traders or street hawkers, are more 
likely to try their luck locally by selling cheap stones or inexpensive jewels 
on the local markets. Once the sales are done for the day, they travel back 
to Myanmar. Ruili has become a popular destination for domestic Chinese 
tourists. An airport was built just 90 minutes away from the town, which 
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links the area to Kunming, and the world. Ruili is now known throughout 
China as the ‘Myanmar jade gateway’, the place to shop for Burmese pre-
cious and semi-precious stones. As Chinese visitors tend to stay on Chinese 
soil during their holidays in Ruili or Xishuangbanna (and do not wish to 
cross into less developed Myanmar), the Burmese gems and jade has to be 
readily available on the Chinese side of the border, which further increases 
the value of the Burmese brokers and merchants there.
Most Burmese Muslim migrants experience China as a relatively liberal 
place, where setting up a business is still far easier than in Myanmar. Doing 
business in China (and with the Chinese), as well as developing transna-
tional commercial networks to, and from, Yunnan can quickly pay off. Most 
Burmese Muslims I interviewed claim that they perceive China’s economic 
environment as far more flexible than its (still) state-run counterpart in 
Myanmar. Chinese entrepreneurs have appeared quite willing to deal 
with them as foreign brokers and thus allowed a Burmese commercial 
niche to grow in the border areas. Yunnan’s local authorities have also 
substantially reduced administrative hurdles during the 1990s. Tariffs are 
low and in many cases irrelevant, given that informal exchanges across 
the Yunnan-Myanmar borders are rather the norm (Set Aung 2011). The 
checkpoint in Jiegao, for example, was established as a Special Economic 
Zone in 1995, after a bridge was built over the Shweli River in 1992. Since the 
1990s and thanks to local arrangements and one-day permits easily provided 
by Chinese immigration, anyone from Myanmar is free to move in Ruili as 
long as he or she contributes to the local economy. Even if corruption and 
patronage is rampant in Yunnan, these phenomena are considered far less 
of an obstacle to business than in Myanmar. Kyaw Thein, for example, a 
25-year old Rohingya who lived in the city of Baoshan since 2009, explains 
how every year he renews his ‘green book’ – a residency certif icate – for 
another full year without any problem as long as his business is thriving 
and he abstains from quarrelling with the locals.
Journey to ‘Paradise’: China as a Safe Haven
Newman (2006) and van Houtum (2005) argue that borders, beyond offering 
a gateway to the outside world, are also erected to substantiate alterity – 
home and away, the inside and the outside, the known and the unknown, 
the good and the evil. Borders are structured around processes of exclusion 
and inclusion, as Newman and Paasi (1998) further claimed. Persecuted 
populations cross borders in the hope of f inding shelter, protection and, 
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in the end, a new life on the other side. China, rather than the Muslim 
neighbouring state of Bangladesh or the distant Malaysia and Indonesia, 
has since the late 1980s progressively earned a reputation as a safe religious 
haven among the various Muslim communities from Myanmar, especially 
the Rohingyas.
When I asked Burmese Muslims in Yunnan about their motivations for 
coming to China, most stressed religious discrimination and persecution 
as the main reasons why they left. Once in Yunnan, they felt a huge sense 
of relief and soon realized they were allowed to practice their religion far 
more openly than in Myanmar. In China, they could publically attend 
religious festivals without fearing repercussions from their neighbours. 
Even though Burmese Muslims are sometimes perceived negatively by locals 
(the stereotype on the ‘dark and dirty foreigner’ often surfaces in everyday 
situations), they are facing far less day-to-day xenophobic discrimination 
compared to in Myanmar. Behind the border, they found security and 
opportunities. Migrating from Buddhist-dominated Myanmar into the 
Yunnan borderworld was thus also a journey from a deeply antagonistic 
neighbouring situation to far more open and welcoming one.
The Burmese Muslims in Yunnan are exclusively Sunnis. Remarkably, 
they are quite well integrated into the socio-cultural networks of the Hui 
(Yegar 1966a, Forbes 1986, Ma 2003). They seem to participate in social 
activities and engage in religious work with local members of the Hui com-
munities – a key illustration of a neighbouring process at work. However, 
only local Hui imams are recognized by the Chinese authorities as religious 
leaders. A Hui imam is thus the only one allowed to supervise Ruili’s sole 
mosque, which was built in 1987. An imam from Rakhine state told me that 
Burmese imams are nevertheless regularly spotted in town and around 
this mosque; they are tolerated as long as they do not preach in public, but 
privately. Despite their different backgrounds, Muslims in Ruili organize 
religious events together, such as the sharing of iftar and the sundown meal 
that breaks fast during the month of Ramadan.
A case in point is Mohammed Hajj. A Rohingya imam from Buthidaung 
township in north-western Rakhine State, he f irst settled in Yangon in 
1972 and then moved to Ruili in late 1988, right after the political and pro-
democracy upheavals in Myanmar. He has not left Ruili since. In his 70s 
now, he discreetly teaches Arabic and Urdu, something he could not do 
freely while in Myanmar. Likewise, the younger Sein Aung has lived in Ruili 
since 2010. He spent his teens in the former Burmese capital, Yangon. His 
uncle, also a Rohingya who settled in Yunnan in the early 1990s, brought 
him to Ruili to work in his small gem shop. ‘It’s paradise here!’ Sein Aung 
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enthusiastically told me about his new host country. ‘I’m very happy here’, 
he stressed, adding that they (the Rohingyas) could practice their religion 
openly and do whatever business they wanted. He cherished the relative 
absence of daily discrimination, compared to what he had experienced in 
Myanmar.
However, the Burmese Muslims are well aware of the limits of the Chi-
nese host society and the political pressure imposed by state authorities: ‘we 
can’t use Facebook here in China, [whilst] we could inside Myanmar’, Zaw 
Min, another resourceful Rohingya in his early twenties told me. He used 
to work for a French NGO in Maungdaw (Rakhine State) before migrating 
to Ruili in 2011. Facebook has become a critically important tool for young 
Burmese in recent years, especially since the state censorship has been 
relaxed in Myanmar after 2011.
Nevertheless, for most of the Burmese Muslim communities the Chinese 
border acts as a positive barrier that protects them from a brutal Burmese 
state and a Buddhist-dominated society often prone to religious violence. 
Crossing the borderline is more than merely a step towards a better economic 
situation; it is experienced as an act of liberation. Against the background 
of other communities facing religious persecutions from the Chinese state 
authorities today, such as in Xinjiang or Tibet, this may seem odd, but 
the combination of refuge and fortune found in the Myanmar-Yunnan 
borderworld facilitates a return to their former role as middlemen minority.
‘Essential Outsiders’: Burmese Neighbours as Networkers
As a diasporic community, the Burmese Muslims possess a long history of 
transnational networking and dispersal. They have also developed a certain 
professional shrewdness derived from current experiences and based on old 
traditions of brokerage and long-distance commerce, especially in an age of 
colonial enterprises. The Chinese world they found in the Myanmar-Yunnan 
borderlands since the 1980s has enabled them to make the most, once more, 
of these assets. Even more signif icantly, this borderworld also offers them a 
space where they engage in extensive networking and commercial activities, 
through multi-faceted partnerships and agreements negotiated with local 
entrepreneurs. They become, once more, ‘essential outsiders’ (Chirot and 
Reid 1997) in this Chinese local business world in which they can success-
fully develop a commercial niche.
Many Burmese Muslims, like Syed Islam with whom this chapter started, 
undertook epic journeys via Northeast India, Thailand, Malaysia or even 
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Saudi Arabia. Abdul Salim, another young Rohingya from Rakhine State, 
for example, told me how he moved out of his hometown and f led into 
Bangladesh in 2009. From there, he sneaked into the Indian state of West 
Bengal and arrived in Calcutta. He continued on to Assam and reached 
the town of More in India’s remote state of Manipur, right at the Burmese 
border. There, he entered again Myanmar after paying a hefty bribe to local 
smugglers. He continued by bus to Mandalay thanks to his fake Burmese 
national identity card, and f inally took another bus to the Yunnan border. 
Both Syed and Abdul had a member of their own community already estab-
lished in Ruili (an uncle in Syed’s case, a village neighbour in Abdul’s). This 
connection helped them getting the necessary Chinese residency papers 
upon arrival and, subsequently, a job.
Recalling this skilful manoeuvring, Abdul Salim explained to me that 
after his arrival in Bangladesh he bought fake Bangladeshi papers from 
some local counterfeiters whom to contact a friend had advised him. With 
the fake passport, he was able to enter India legally and reach Calcutta. 
There, he took a train to Assam and a bus to Manipur, at the border with 
Myanmar. He had no problem passing all the security checkpoints that 
the Indian authorities regularly set up along the roads throughout a north-
eastern region plagued with insurgencies and a high level of criminality. To 
re-enter Myanmar at the border town of Tamu, he needed to switch back 
to a Burmese identity. To do so, he acquired a basic Burmese identity card 
by bribing an off icial and claiming he was merely a ‘Bama Muslim’ and 
not a Rohingya.
After he sneaked back into Myanmar by night, he continued by bus to 
Mandalay where he now had all options to continue his trip to Yangon, 
Thailand, or Yunnan. At each point of his odyssey, he found fellow Burmese 
who could assist him and, with the help of local underground networks, 
including local Bangladeshi and Indian ones, provide the necessary papers 
for his onward journey.
Such stories of young men venturing out contrast sharply with the image 
of the downtrodden Muslim refugees sweltering in camps in Bangladesh, 
or the ‘boat people’ stranded on Thai or Malaysian shores. Many Burmese 
Muslims have indeed proved to be extremely mobile and resourceful. The 
more fearless of them frequently move across borders without off icial 
papers. Instead, they rely on well-established clandestine networks, which 
they can trust. The pioneers who migrated to Yunnan in the late 1980s or 
early 1990s thereby played a crucial role.
U Aung Myint, for instance, a leading f igure today of Ruili’s Burmese 
community and a member of several Chinese jade business associations, 
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arrived in Ruili in early 1989. Now in his f ifties, he recalls how he decided to 
try his luck after the failure of the 1988 pro-democracy uprising in Myanmar 
and ventured on the arduous two-day journey from Mandalay (via Lashio) 
to the Chinese border. He established lucrative gem-and-jade shops and now 
regularly travels to Kunming and drives a Cadillac. Another businessman 
Mr. Nasrul Islam, now in his late 50s, runs a cosmetic and grocery shop in 
the city of Baoshan, some 250 kilometres further north on the road towards 
Kunming. During the 1988 uprising, he was working in Yangon. Hearing 
the news that the Chinese border was opening up, he swiftly travelled to 
Mandalay, and up to Muse to enter Yunnan. The story of Daw Yin Yin, a 
Sunni Muslim in her late 40s, is another case in point. She was sent from 
Yangon northwards by her family to set up a gem business in the early 1990s: 
f irst in the jade market of Mandalay, and then in Ruili, where business 
was reputedly growing. She arrived in Yunnan with her husband in 1992. 
She now owns a small gemstone shop in one of Ruili’s indoor markets. Her 
husband later returned to Mandalay to manage stock and supplies but 
continues to visit Ruili on a regular basis.
As Ruili’s economy continued to surge in the 2000s (Guo 2010), not only 
the Burmese Muslim community grew, but many already well-settled Bur-
mese Muslim traders also expanded their commercial networks beyond the 
borderlands, throughout the thriving province of Yunnan, up to Kunming, 
its capital. In July 2009, U Aung Myint led to Kunming a 70-strong delegation 
of Ruili-based jade traders to attend an international gem fair. As Vice-
President of the Yunnan Gems Traders Association, he is a respected f igure 
increasingly used by the Chinese local authorities to settle disputes between 
Burmese and Chinese dealers and migrants, and act as a guarantor when 
the local Chinese police cracks down on illegal Burmese migrants. Although 
local Burmese middlemen become quite successful brokers, they are no 
match to the powerful state-run Chinese and Burmese jade conglomerates 
involved in bigger mining and extraction businesses (Khin Maung Nyunt 
1995, Egreteau 2012). While they are not occupying a dominant economic 
position, they have managed to carve out a niche in Ruili.
Conclusion
In summary, Muslim communities of all backgrounds seem to have found 
in the Chinese borderlands a space to trade, live, and prosper in ways they 
could not dream of in authoritarian Myanmar. As the literature on border 
studies puts it, they use the borderline as a tool, and exploit the complex 
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nature of the borderworld and the legal boundaries to form a new space of 
interconnectivity, especially through cross-border trade and trans-border 
human interactions (Diener and Hagen 2009). Most have benefited from 
the local economic boom fostered by China’s development policies since 
the 1980s, and subsequently made the most of the exponential Chinese 
demand of jade (and more globally of Burmese natural resources and cheap 
labor). Those who now reside in Yunnan have obtained renewable residency 
permits from the local Chinese authorities, and many learned the Chinese 
language. They are allowed to build shops or rent stalls in local markets. 
They can also travel beyond Yunnan to Guangzhou, Shanghai, or even Hong 
Kong. Residency in Ruili, thus, opens a window to China, and consequently 
to the world. Their exilic journey northward can therefore be construed as 
an attempt not at settling down and assimilating to a new host society in 
Yunnan, but as an effort to regain some of the ‘essential-ness’ they previ-
ously boasted in Myanmar, but have gradually been deprived of, as ‘useful 
outsiders’. Their professional shrewdness and expertise in navigating and 
crossing borders, as well as the mediating role of the more established 
members of their community (such as the imams or well-established and 
wealthy traders) are the assets that rekindle their usefulness. The paradox is 
that these assets would be lost, would they fully assimilate into the Chinese 
society – as many did nonetheless in Myanmar’s post-colonial society. 
The safer and more promising bet is therefore for them to use both the 
border and their identity as strategic devices in the art of multi-directional, 
in-between ‘neighbouring’.
The Burmese Muslim communities and their post-1980s migration into 
the Yunnan-Myanmar borderlands therefore offer an interesting illustration 
of how a borderworld can be construed and used by neighbours in strategic 
ways. Since the opening-up of the region over two decades ago, the Sino-
Burmese boundaries have acted as much as ties that bring together two 
economies in need of each other, as a protective wall separating two polities. 
Beyond the Chinese border, the Burmese Muslim migrants have found 
economic opportunities as well as a safe haven, where they can practice 
their religion – including in friendly cooperation with the local Chinese 
Muslim community – trade and travel freely. In comparison to what they 
can expect inside contemporary Myanmar, they have found in Yunnan their 
‘little paradise’. There, they enjoy freedom of movement (despite regular 
Chinese immigration and police controls), less administrative harassment 
from local authorities (despite the usual bribery), and a more or less leni-
ent attitude of Chinese provincial and state off icials toward their Islamic 
traditions. Many regard the Chinese side of the Chinese border as an at least 
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temporary sanctuary, where they hope to start a better life, support their 
relatives back home, and maybe, one day, move on.
The combination of brokering and language skills, trade networks inside 
Myanmar, and diasporic solidarities has facilitated their success in the 
Yunnan borderworld and, in fact, much beyond it in mainland China, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia or the Persian Gulf. From these border spaces at the 
edges of China, they engage in neighbouring economic and social activi-
ties and make the most of the new connections. Other ethnic or religious 
minorities from Myanmar (such as the Kachin, the Wa, or the Shan) have 
certainly developed a different relationship to, and understanding of, the 
Chinese ‘borderworld’. Not all of these other migrant communities seem to 
extensively use diasporic networks and religious solidarities the way the 
Burmese Muslims do. But it is precisely the practice of network formation 
and ethno-religious solidarity that make the Burmese Muslims’ neighbour-
ing experiences exceptional. Moreover, the region is constantly evolving 
along with China’s dynamism and rapid development growth. Yunnan 
in the 2010s has been a far different place than it used to be during the 
1990s or 2000s. Since my f irst f ieldtrip to Ruili in 2003, the configuration 
of the cross-border trade has already much evolved, and the place and 
role of the Burmese communities of traders, hawkers and shopkeepers 
(who are not only Muslims) have changed too. As Ruili expands, they face 
more competition from a wide ranges of different other communities of 
merchants and brokers. A comparative study in the longue durée might also 
reveal intriguing features, especially if socio-political tensions between the 
Chinese and Burmese state leadership and society continue to bring about 
new challenges and opportunities further into the 2010s.




In the early morning of November 30th, 2007, a dozen Chinese trucks lined up 
at the Hekou-Lao Cai border gate and blocked the bustling traff ic. Around 
these trucks, a small crowd of Chinese traders and drivers congregated 
in dismay, complaining loudly about unfairness and injustice. It was the 
off icial opening day of the seventh Annual China-Vietnam Border Trade 
Fair (Zhong-Yue bianjing jingji maoyi jiaoyihui中越边境经济贸易交易会; 
hereafter the Trade Fair). Under the red banners that proudly announced 
the success of the Trade Fair, Chinese grievances and disappointment were 
growing. These trucks, fully loaded with various kinds of merchandise, had 
attempted to cross the border to reach the Trade Fair’s venue in Lao Cai. As 
they proceeded with customs clearance, to their surprise, they were told by 
the Lao Cai Customs Off ice to pay additional tariff by 60 to 140 percent on 
almost all their commodities, despite the fact that a special duty-free policy 
was in place for the Trade Fair, which had been the case for the past six years.
At f irst, Chinese traders, many of whom came from faraway places in 
Guangdong, Fujian, Shandong, and Sichuan, regarded the unexpected tariff-
ing at the border gate as a mistake of some kind. They reasoned and explained, 
trying to make the Vietnamese officials understand that the commodities 
were specif ically for the Trade Fair. Pretty soon they realized that their 
reasoning and pleas were useless. Unable to cross the border without paying, 
unwilling to go back empty-handed, the Chinese traders were fuming with 
anger and felt cheated. A few Yunnanese traders were among the loudest; they 
decided to lead the pack back to the Chinese side of the border and protested 
in front of the Hekou Entry and Exit Inspection Center. They demanded to 
see Chinese officials immediately for explanations and solutions.
* The ethnographic materials used in this chapter are drawn from my 12-month f ieldwork 
in Hekou and Lao Cai in 2007, and a short one-month f ieldtrip in 2012. Pseudonyms are used 
throughout this chapter. I acknowledge with much gratitude the generous support by the 
University of New England, Australia, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 
and Macquarie University, Australia for f ieldwork and writing. 
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This incident reveals the inherently precarious nature of the seemingly 
benign undertaking of ‘neighbouring’. Through this incident, this chapter 
zooms in onto a particular moment in contemporary neighbouring rela-
tions when neighbourly intimacy is def ined by cooperation and mutual 
interest as much as lurking crises and anxieties. To be one’s neighbour 
is to enter into the intimate realm of contact and to be confronted by its 
vicissitudes. Focusing primarily on the Chinese practice of neighbourly 
unease, this chapter offers reflections on how apprehensions and anxieties 
are constitutive forces in the agonistic intimacy of neighbouring. With this 
Trade Fair incident, this chapter shows that at the moment of acute anxiety, 
a stronger motivation to strengthen the façade of ‘neighbourly harmony’ 
rises. Everyday trade relations, in particular, are sustained by Chinese and 
Vietnamese partners in practice – not in spite of anxieties but, in fact, are 
motivated by anxieties. Just as Franck Billé’s description (Chapter 1, this 
volume) of the envious gazes between the Russian and Chinese neighbours 
across the Amur River as both motivating and unsettling, the moving force 
of neighbourly unease at the China-Vietnam border keeps cordial gestures 
and productive practices in play. ‘Neighbourly harmony’ is inherently fragile 
and volatile. It is a constant practice and is in perpetual need of construction 
and reinforcement.
Through the drama of the failed yet ‘successful’ (as the off icial news 
proclaimed) Trade Fair, this chapter examines the intricate ways in which 
Chinese traders manage daily affairs with their Vietnamese neighbours, 
accompanied by a particular sense of unease of their encounters. This unease 
is at once a recognition of the unpredictability of dealing with close neigh-
bours. It is also a performative and rhetorical strategy to ensure that surface 
harmony is maintained, and cooperation on a day-to-day basis is upheld. 
Through traders’ discourses of suspicion and distrust, this chapter explores 
the constructive force of anxieties that impels compromises, negotiations, 
ceremonial rituals, staging of friendship, and performances of cooperation.
I locate this neighbourly unease within the dynamic processes of China 
and Vietnam’s reform and opening since the 1980s. At the China-Vietnam 
border, drastic transformations took place after the brutal 1979 Sino-
Vietnamese Border War (hereafter the border war) and the subsequent 
political stalemate. This borderland was heavily militarized and the border 
remained shut for a whole decade.1 Starting from the early 1990s, while 
the border zone was still mired in restrictions and dangers, a few traders 
1 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the Sino-Vietnamese Border War in 1979, 
its causes and consequences. For details, see for example Li (2007) and Tretiak (1979).
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started to explore the untapped trans-border marketplace with bartering 
and small-scale trade. The consequence of the border war seemed to have 
little effect on the nascent border trade, as borderlanders soon learned to 
call their neighbours ‘friends’ and ‘partners’, rather than ‘enemies’. Veteran 
soldiers cast off their military uniforms and changed into business suits. 
Peasants who escaped the war had returned to their bombed down homes to 
start small businesses. Within a short span of 20 years, the China-Vietnam 
border turned from one of the most restrictive zones of closure to a pros-
perous special economic zone of trade and leisure. This once contested 
border zone has now become a showcase for trans-border development, 
entrepreneurship, consumption and desire.
In what follows, I will f irst present briefly the recent history of violence 
and peace at the borderland and show that the inherent sense of conflict and 
distrust underpins contemporary efforts of peace and friendship. This is not 
to suggest that these efforts are dishonest in any way; in fact, because the 
conflicts and distrust are all too real, people have learned to be more cau-
tious and cordial in order to make friendship work. I relate contemporary 
neighbourly anxieties to historical relations of power between China and 
its near neighbour where elaborate ceremonies of goodwill were sometimes 
spurred by insecurities and embarrassment. It shows that neighbourly 
gestures are performed most ceremoniously when tensions arise. I then 
describe the Trade Fair incident in detail and elaborate on the ‘intimate 
insults’ (Das 2007), stereotyping and jokes that Chinese traders used to 
belittle their Vietnamese neighbours. This practice revealed deep seated 
feelings of distrust, insecurity, and to a certain extent helplessness the 
Chinese experienced when trading with their neighbours – policies can 
change without notice, market competitions grow f ierce, trading partners 
turn out to have little loyalty, prof it margins become slim. While most of 
their frustrations have more to do with conflicts between government 
and business, Chinese at the border f ind fault with ordinary Vietnamese 
who may be also suffering from the hardening of the business environ-
ment. Unable to hold off icials responsible for their arbitrariness, greed, 
and incompetence, Chinese traders blame their Vietnamese neighbours 
for being either too smart or too stupid, too flexible or too stubborn. At 
the same time, the Chinese try to keep the appearance of goodwill and 
neighbourly amity, knowing all too well that without such performative 
reassurance, business across the border might not be feasible. This constant 
state of dilemma and anxiety is the undercurrent to the hustle and bustle of 
cross-border interactions, the shadow of the amicable surface of everyday 
life at the margin of the state.
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Good Neighbours, Bad Neighbours, Good Neighbours Again
In their three thousand years of existence in close proximity and of intense 
interactions, the southern frontier of the Chinese empire and the northern 
regions of the Vietnamese kingdom went through various kinds of rela-
tionships that compounded the neighbouring situation: kin, rival, tribute 
successions. While evolving together through a long history of peace and 
war, prosperity and famine, Vietnam has never been able to escape the 
Chinese influence, and China has never been able to dominate Vietnam. 
The close proximity and mutual influence that the two nations had on each 
other produced a state of co-existence characterized by asymmetric power 
relations (Womack 2006). Since early histories, the neighbouring relations 
between China and Vietnam have been variegated, encompassing, and 
subject to continual making and remaking.
When the communist movement brought China and Vietnam together 
in pursuit of a revolutionary future, neighbouring took on a particular 
meaning of brotherhood and comradery. As the ‘big brother’ in this relation-
ship, China supported Vietnam’s struggles against the French and then 
the Americans through military and material assistance. The Hekou-Lao 
Cai border, as one of the most important border ports between China and 
Vietnam, became a major pathway through which Chinese rice, corn, tex-
tiles, and weapons were brought to northern Vietnam. Meanwhile, China 
suffered the worst famine in modern history. Although millions died from 
starvation, Chinese aid to Vietnam did not stop. This deathly sacrif ice that 
many Chinese made, willingly or grudgingly, was for the grander purpose of 
supporting an ideal of communist unity in the region. A rhetoric of ‘helping 
a neighbour/brother’ was used by the Chinese state to justify its actions 
while people learned to ‘tighten their belts’ to help a neighbour in need.
In the Hekou-Lao Cai border, however, local Chinese benefited from be-
ing physically close to their neighbours as they had better access to food and 
supplies. Starvation was minimal as local Chinese and Vietnamese shared 
the aid they received and much of the limited resources that they had. 
Those who had endured this period of hardship in Hekou still remembered 
this time fondly – although people had very little, they were generous; as 
neighbours Chinese and Vietnamese helped each other out: ‘you gave me 
half bowl of rice, and I gave you a bunch of wild vegetables, that’s how we 
survived together’.
It was the simple faith that neighbours ought to help each other out that 
sustained borderlanders through diff iculties. When China declared war 
on Vietnam in the late 1970s it came as a shock to the locals. The building 
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up of animosity between these two countries was, in fact, gradual, lasting 
from the late 1960s to the 1970s. Before both states became openly hostile to 
one another, the rhetoric and performances of friendship and brotherhood 
continued to dominate. However, it was also during this period that strong 
suspicions and dissatisfactions started to grow. The leadership in China 
believed that they had lived up to the role of a ‘brotherly neighbour’ who 
never faltered when the Vietnamese were in deep crisis, and they expected 
respect and obedience in return. The Vietnamese suspected the Chinese 
attempt of domination and refused to become a puppet by seeking sup-
port from the Soviet Union instead. The Chinese leadership felt its ‘natural 
authority’ over Vietnam was def ied and that blood and money had been 
spent for very little in return (Chen 1995). The Vietnamese gradually saw 
China as a new enemy because of its contempt and arrogance (Li 2007: 252). 
In the early 1970s, skirmishes along the China-Vietnam borders became 
more and more frequent. And on February 17th, 1979, the border war broke 
out. From then on, bloodshed and armed conflicts dominated the frontier 
zones. For the following ten years, the border was heavily militarized. Most 
borderlanders fled to inland regions in search of safety. Those who stayed 
continued to work as farmers, local guides, and civilian soldiers (minbing 
民兵) to help their troops with food, surveillance and local defence.
Borderlanders on both the Chinese and Vietnamese sides who stayed 
through the decade-long conflict found it diff icult to accept that their 
close neighbours could turn into enemies as many farmers were recruited 
to become armed civilian soldiers. The trust was ruined for those who 
could no longer tell whether their familiar neighbours were still innocent 
farmers or in fact merciless soldiers. One veteran in Hekou told me that 
when the war broke out he felt betrayed and hurt by the Vietnamese. He 
still had relatives and friends on the Vietnamese side who helped his family 
during the famine; but when conflicts intensif ied he became cautious of 
what he could say or do, for he was no longer sure if his acquaintances 
had already become Vietnamese spies. Now, in retrospect, he lamented 
that he must have been brainwashed into believing that his neighbours 
were ‘devils’ (guizi鬼子) in disguise. A few local businessmen in Hekou 
who experienced the terror of war told me that the worst was when they 
saw the dead bodies of people they knew, who were killed by landmines, 
or by Vietnamese neighbours who regarded these people as soldiers. ‘The 
Vietnamese are too close to us’, one local trader told me, ‘we have no place 
to hide if the Vietnamese were to launch an attack’.
Vietnamese borderlanders were equally weary of the border war. In fact, 
many of the Lao Cai residents still could not understand why the Chinese 
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declared war in the f irst place. One family that lived in Lao Cai for the 
past 30 years related to me their experience. The father used to be a farmer 
and continued to work on his f ields during the Chinese invasion. Prior to 
the war he traded his produce regularly with the Chinese and this helped 
feeding his family. When the war broke out his family had to hide in the 
mountains for a few days. Upon returning they found that their house had 
been burned town, and some of their friends killed during the invasion. The 
close proximity bred fatality when a good neighbour turned into an enemy.
The political and military tensions between China and Vietnam less-
ened considerably since 1986. This was also when other coastal regions 
and provincial capitals in China began to benef it from the nationwide 
economic reforms. With caution and nervousness, local residents in Hekou 
and Lao Cai also started bartering and trading with one another at the river 
banks and hidden mountain tracks. Soon, both governments off icially 
facilitated small-scale border trade at designated marketplaces even though 
diplomatic ties between China and Vietnam had not yet been resumed. 
Emphasizing on mutual help and local needs, trade was encouraged so 
that everyday commodities such as clothes, medicine, salt and sugar, and 
household utensils could be purchased. Since the 1990s, border trade soared 
after Hekou became an off icial ‘open border port’ (bianjing kaifang kou’an 
边境开放口岸) designated by the Chinese State Council, and started to 
enjoy favourable policies as a special economic zone. Since 2007, Hekou 
has been the biggest and most prof itable border port in Yunnan province 
(Hekou Ministry of Commerce 2008). Local borderlanders took advantage 
of the ‘opening’ of the border and ventured into various kinds of businesses. 
Trade markets thrived as businessmen, investors, and tourists started to ar-
rive and explore new possibilities. As ‘doing business’ (zuo shengyi 做生意) 
dominated everyday cross-border interactions, Chinese and Vietnamese 
became once again friendly neighbours.
Performative Intimacy
Today, both the Chinese and the Vietnamese governments maintain that the 
prosperity of the boder speical zone relies heavily on friendship, cooperation 
and peace. These are cast as the foundation of mutual progress and good 
neighbouring. Starting from 2002, Chinese leadership off icially promoted 
its ‘Good Neighbour Diplomacy’ (mulin waijiao 睦邻外交) that promoted 
peace and stability, communication, and cooperation, and hoped that this 
could ease regional anxiety over China’s ‘rise’ in economic and military 
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power. In Southeast Asia, China has been particularly friendly towards 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as it aims to promote 
‘good neighbourly and friendly relations, increase high-level exchanges, 
and strengthen the mechanism of dialogue and cooperation in all areas to 
enhance understanding and mutual benefit’ (Chambers 2005: 16). However, 
suspicions and anxieties in Southeast Asian countries do not easily go away 
when China seems to repeatedly violate the thin trust that is built upon non-
binding bilateral agreements and business contracts. While Chinese leaders 
continue to join regional and international forums to promote dialogue 
and friendship, China’s increasingly assertive behaviour in flexing military 
muscles, particularly when it comes to territorial disputes, remains alarm-
ing for China’s neighbours. The South China Sea disputes in recent years, for 
example, demonstrates best the fragile nature of neighbourliness. As China 
signs action plans for strategic partnership with Vietnam, it also builds 
drilling platforms and other construction on the disputed Spratleys. While 
Vietnam strenuously protested against Chinese drilling and threatened 
an arbitration case at an international tribunal, it also has to emphasize 
the amicable relationship between two countries. While tensions over 
territorial disputes continue to cast shadows on China-Vietnam relations, 
friendship and good neighbourliness are also diligently performed.
Historically, for the Chinese, neighbouring entails a particular strategy 
of huairou (怀柔). James Hevia, when writing on imperial rituals and 
diplomacy of the Qing Empire, calls it ‘chershing men from afar’ (Hevia 
1995). Other scholars have pointed out that ‘cherishing’ may be too innocent 
a word as huairou indicates a distinct imperial attitude of pacifying barbaric 
nations through civilization and royal benevolence, so that these nations 
are willingly subservient to China’s power and influence (Esherick 1998, 
Zhang 1998). The acts of huairou are performed most ceremoniously through 
imperial rites and rituals when nations near and far sent their embassies to 
pay tribute to the emperor. In return, they received gifts and concessions 
for commerce.
In the long history of Sino-Vietnamese relations, Annam (northern 
Vietnam) had always been viewed as a loyal and submissive tributary 
state of the Chinese Empire, although China could rarely get its way in 
conflicts or in peace. John E. Wills recorded a telling incident in the Qing 
history (Wills 2001). In 1725-1728, the Qing imperial court had to send 
troops to the Yunnan-Annam frontier to deal with a substantial Annamese 
encroachment of bordering territories due to claims to a promising silver 
mine. When the king of Annam refused to give up his claim to this zone 
and amassed soldiers at the border, Emperor Yongzheng decided that the 
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territory was not worth f ighting for. The rivers and thick jungles made the 
frontiers nearly ungovernable, hill tribes were connected on both sides of 
the border, local lords were stubborn and powerful, and trade was taking 
place on unregulated markets and clandestine tracks. Giving the territory 
to Annam would be a grand gesture of huairou, as the Qing court hoped 
that Annam would be grateful to the generosity and benevolence of the 
emperor and remain loyal and submissive to the Qing rule. In the end, a 
great ceremony was held when the Annamese off icials received the royal 
edict conceding the territory. The matter was settled and neighbourly 
peace resumed.
Bradley Davis (2014) documented another episode of borderland 
anxiety and cooperative power brokering from 1874 to 1879 when the Sino-
Vietnamese frontier was under the rule of Vietnam’s Nguyen dynasty but 
in effect dominated by the Black Flags (heiqi jun 黑旗军) led by a Chinese 
military rebel Liu Yongfu. When the Black Flags, an armed rebel band from 
southern China, entered northern Vietnam as they fled purging from the 
Qing army, they quickly established an alliance with the Nguyen court by 
killing Francis Garnier, a French explorer who advocated colonial expansion 
and attempted to overthrow Nguyen rule in the Red River Delta. Liu Yongfu, 
already a powerful local lord in the lucrative trading town of Lao Cai, set 
up customs posts in the frontier and demanded a much higher duty on 
trans-border trade and charged additional fees on transport, inspection, 
protection, and permission to sell. The French consulate and the Nguyen 
off icials in Hanoi had to respect Liu’s lordship and sent envoys to negotiate 
terms of commerce along the Red River. While maintaining respect and 
civility during the negotiations, the French and Vietnamese secretly called 
Liu ‘an ignorant, unyielding, and mistrustful bandit who has lived by raping 
the mountains for these past twenty years’ and the Black Flags ‘the enemy 
of upland populations’ (Davis 2014: 67). Still, the Nguyen authorities had 
to rely on Liu’s army to keep peace and generate revenue through tax. In 
1878, Liu was even awarded a special bonus by the Nguyen court, a payment 
made to mark special events and meritorious service to the state. Liu and his 
personal militia also began to receive regular salaries and supplies directly 
from the Vietnamese court on a monthly basis. The endorsement of Black 
Flags as off icials enabled the Vietnamese court to maintain authority in 
areas beyond its administrative reach; at the same time, Liu and his armies 
were never to be trusted as they remained a vicious threat. Cooperative 
power brokering had to be entertained for the sake of frontier rule and 
profitability, even when anxiety and mutual distrust remained central to 
such an uneasy relationship.
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These incidents in the Sino-Vietnamese history point to the critical inti-
macy in a neighbouring relation when conflicts and distrust co-exist with 
performances of goodwill and fidelity. This inherent tension is unlikely to go 
away, as it continues to trigger caution and inspire greater efforts in making 
relationship work. The Sino-Vietnamese border conflict was another major 
incident in the history of these two neighbours when intimate ties broke 
down and had to be rebuilt again. But trust was not easy to f ind. Brantley 
Womack wrote about the lingering effect of distrust in his reflection of the 
asymmetric relations between China and Vietnam:
After the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1991, […] the 
disparity remained and grew more complicated. Now both countries 
were concerned about developing a peaceful relationship, but “off the 
record” and in concrete areas of confrontation, the Chinese disparaged 
the Vietnamese as unreliable, while the Vietnamese were alert to Chinese 
malevolent inscrutability and bullying. The attitudes were not simply 
the residual effects of previous hostility. The issues were the peacetime 
problems of border trade, bridges, rail connections, and so forth, not 
problems of history. But there was a continuity of roles. Vietnam tended to 
be overly sensitive to China’s actions, while China tended to be insensitive 
to the effects of its policies on Vietnam. (Womack 2006: xi)
If at the off icial level, such distrust is experienced subtly and expressed 
vaguely, at the local level, borderlanders who live in close contact have a 
more complicated view of neighbouring anxiety. On the one hand, past 
shadows of war and sabotage continue to haunt borderlanders, and the 
constant movement of traders, workers, tourists and other visitors at the 
trans-border marketplace makes any long-lasting relationship diff icult to 
maintain. On the other hand, trade and collaboration must go on as usual 
despite the underlying anxieties. The intimate relations borderlanders forge 
are always fraught with subterranean caution and uneasiness.
The Trade Fair and Its Unease
The Annual China-Vietnam Border Trade Fair was the brainchild of the 
Yunnan provincial government and China’s Ministry of Commerce. It is 
the f irst off icial trading function organized by local governments of Hekou 
and Lao Cai to consolidate China-Vietnam cross-border ties. The f irst Trade 
Fair was held in Lao Cai in December 2001, which was considered a huge 
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success by both local governments in terms of economic benefit and symbolic 
significance. Since then, the Trade Fair has grown considerably in scale and 
influence. High value commodities are traded at this event every year, and 
lucrative contracts sealing million-dollar deals are signed. For years, the Trade 
Fair has been a signature showcase of the economic (and diplomatic) success 
that an open economy can bring to the borderland. But the 2007 Trade Fair, 
as the vignette at the beginning adumbrates, ended on quite a different note.
On November 30th, 2007, when the Chinese traders and truck drivers were 
protesting in front of the Hekou Entry and Exit Inspection Center right next 
to the border gate, I joined my friends and went to see what was going on. 
The local police had already arrived and tried to separate the protestors 
from the spectators attracted by the commotion. Chinese traders were 
making their demands in unity and asking Hekou’s local authorities to 
act quickly and negotiate with the Vietnamese. If this matter could not be 
settled quickly, they claimed, the Hekou government as the main organizer 
of the Trade Fair should compensate the traders for their losses. Most of the 
traders protesting were not of familiar faces, and my local trader friends 
were simply watching the commotion without joining in. Later that day I 
met up with Weifen, a seasonal pineapple trader and tour guide who has 
been doing business in Hekou for over a decade. I asked him what was going 
on at the Trade Fair and he vented out his frustration:
This is why we always say that the Vietnamese are not trustworthy, not 
honest (bu kexin, bu laoshi 不可信不老实). You see what is happening 
now? We are right about them. We have this Trade Fair every year, but 
this kind of nonsense never happened before! Last year the Trade Fair 
was held in Hekou. These Vietnamese came over with their expensive 
redwood furniture, and earned several million dollars at the Fair. We did 
not tax them a single cent for their furniture, because the main purpose 
of this Trade Fair is to provide opportunities and a platform for traders. 
Who would have thought that the Vietnamese are playing dirty tricks 
this year?
After Weifen complained enough about the Vietnamese, he changed target:
Of course, Chinese traders are upset! It is understandable. But they are 
making a huge deal out of this now! They all gathered at the border mak-
ing a scene! Now the police have to go there. It is total chaos. How can 
these traders get what they want if they behave like this? In a situation 
like this, we Chinese should stick together. Why rile things up in our 
NeighbouriNg iN ANxieT y AloNg The chiNA-vieTNAM borDer 213
own home turf? We are f ighting amongst ourselves and the Vietnamese 
are getting away with their secret schemes (yinmou decheng 阴谋得逞). 
We are making a big scene here and they are laughing their teeth off 
watching us!
Embedded in Weifen’s indignation is a chronic frustration that local traders 
have with their Vietnamese neighbours. Even though many Chinese traders 
in Hekou have come to terms with the Vietnamese style of doing business 
(which, according to them, is characterized by short-sighted greediness and 
crude dishonesty), they were still surprised by this incident and claimed 
that they did not expect such a glaring breach of agreement to happen in 
a high-profile event like the annual Trade Fair.
This incident and the surprise experienced by Chinese traders shed 
light on the fragile foundation of neighbourly interaction. When the seem-
ingly harmonious border turns into a contested social space, the ‘radical 
Otherness’ (Žižek 2005) of the neighbour becomes visible and confront-
ing. It reminds those involved in the neighbouring situation that familiar 
cross-border encounters can be unpredictable. This incident shows that the 
rhetoric of ‘friendship’ and ‘harmony’ is not capable of preventing confronta-
tions and disruptions, and that the established order can be challenged 
without notice. Amidst the most amicable efforts to be good neighbours, 
suspicion lures, waiting to be confirmed (Žižek 1997).
For Hekou’s traders, this Trade Fair incident was but another indication 
that one should never take the smooth sailing of border interaction for 
granted. If the official bilateral agreement on duty-free trade can be violated 
arbitrarily without warning, one could hardly be confident that individual 
deals and arrangements made in the marketplace would be honoured. 
Although feeling self-righteous, Hekou’s traders had come to the realization 
that Hekou’s local government had very little weight in bargaining with the 
Vietnamese government and in defending Chinese interest. One the one 
hand, Chinese traders were upset that the Vietnamese were not punished; 
on the other, they were concerned that if such punishment did happen it 
might jeopardize future opportunities. Many indeed were aware that their 
fellow Vietnamese traders were also victims of the arbitrary levy imposed 
by Vietnamese off icials, but by blind anger and frustration they lashed out 
on all Vietnamese alike. Those who were new to cross-border trade could 
not do much except lament and indulge in wishful thinking that stern 
actions must be taken against the Vietnamese the next time around. Playing 
the hurt victim, they derived a particular sense of justice from excessive 
complaining. Others who had established deeper roots and enjoyed close 
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partnership with their Vietnamese counterpart also complained openly 
about Vietnamese dishonesty in the Chinese gathering, but they wasted 
no time in making quiet arrangements so that their goods could still make 
way to Vietnam via other, often illicit, routes.
Coping with Neighbouring and Bordering
What came as a surprise to traders in Hekou were not merely the conflicts 
that took place at the Trade Fair, but the confrontation of the unexpected 
in the familiar. They had to come to recognize their own vulnerability and 
limitations as they failed to rein in, or even to predict, this neighbourly 
‘otherness’. Slavoj Žižek in his Lacanian analysis of the ‘neighbour’ wrote 
about the peculiar ways in which one encounters a ‘neighbour’ – the fully 
subjectivized Other par excellence. The ‘neighbour’ is someone like ‘me’, 
‘my fellow human beings with whom I am engaged in the mirror-like 
relationship of competition, mutual recognition and so forth’ (Žižek 2005: 
143). Under normal circumstances, neighbourly interactions are predicated 
upon social norms, established rules of engagement, and expected cultural 
etiquettes that underpin such interactions. However, once in a while, the 
unexpected happens and familiar norms of engagement are def ied. This 
unexpected disruption reveals the precariousness and the fragility of 
neighbourly relations, as friendliness and courtesy can be ripped apart 
without warning as subterranean hostility comes to the surface. This is the 
moment when one is exposed to the ‘neighbour as the impossible Thing 
that cannot be gentrif ied’ (Žižek 2005: 143).
In an all too familiar way, the Chinese at the border re-enact a particular 
trope of ‘minority contact’ when they engage with the Vietnamese. Just 
as China’s minority subjects are often constructed as modernity’s Other 
(see e.g. Gladney 2004, Nyíri 2006, Schein 1997, 2000), some of the Chinese 
borderlanders and traders still harbor an impression that the Vietnamese 
are a ‘minority’ who should follow the Chinese lead in pursuit of frontier 
modernity. Many traders who visited Lao Cai likened this border town to 
a Chinese city ‘in the 1980s’, and compared the Vietnamese state of living 
to what the Chinese had already experienced in the past. They readily 
recognized the ‘semblant’, a familiar ‘mirror image’ of themselves personi-
fied by the Vietnamese, and relied on the Vietnamese reciprocal recognition 
to validate Chinese superiority.
When an unexpected incident took place, the Chinese illusion and 
the fragile nature of this imagined recognition was exposed. It came as 
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a telling moment when the Chinese were met with the potential threat 
of misrecognition they did not expect. When Weifen complained about 
the lack of unity of Chinese traders in crisis, he was imagining that the 
Chinese had become a laughing stock. This humiliating ‘laughter’ from 
the neighbour threatens to nullify the Chinese superior sense of self. The 
anxiety of being ‘laughed at’ is a constant source of potent paranoia at the 
border. A few traders related to me that they usually felt worst when their 
Vietnamese partners bragged about their own business savvy and laughed 
at Chinese gullibility. While the Vietnamese might be just joking about 
how naïve Chinese traders could be tricked into buying unmarketable 
commodities or overpriced products, Hekou’s traders took these jokes as 
insults. Although they were not amused, fake laughter and compliment 
on Vietnamese business skills had to be made, because they also wanted 
to sign contracts and secure friendship. ‘To survive one has to learn to 
make compromises’, a furniture trader in Hekou told me, ‘and you have 
to act as if you are on their side, and you agree with them even when you 
are offended by their stupid jokes’. ‘Some Chinese are indeed gullible’, he 
reasoned, ‘perhaps they are too eager to make a deal; but most of the time 
Chinese traders are just too trusting, or maybe they do not mind losing a 
little money to the Vietnamese as a deal sweetener’. His words, however, 
could not hide the frustration that he had to ‘sweeten’ business deals more 
than he was willing to, and his ‘generosity’ could still be misinterpreted as 
a sign of lacking business acumen.
On the second day of the Trade Fair, Boss Jiang, a trader dealing in toys, 
hosted a banquet for his local business partners and guests from Zhejiang 
province. Conversations at this banquet at f irst circled around the troubled 
Trade Fair. Soon, everyone at the table was complaining about doing busi-
ness with the Vietnamese. Boss Jiang talked about how he disliked the 
Vietnamese practice of doing business on credit (shexiao 赊销) instead 
of taking a loan from the bank, which would be the standard practice for 
most Chinese businessmen. Boss Jiang’s Vietnamese partners were used 
to ordering large quantities of toys but never paid in full. If they could 
successfully sell the products in Vietnam, the balance was then repaid. If 
the sales were poor, the Vietnamese either further delayed the repayment, 
or requested not to pay until the sales picked up. Boss Jiang had several 
experiences that some of his new Vietnamese clients just ran away and 
disappeared without paying him at all. The money lost in these deals were 
‘tuition fees’ ( jiao xuefei 交学费), Jiang said; but he’d rather lose money for 
the benefit of learning the ‘true nature’ (zhen mianmu 真面目) of some 
Vietnamese traders and valuing those who were trustworthy. The Trade 
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Fair debacle was surprising, but he was not surprised what the ‘greedy 
Vietnamese’ would do to make a quick buck.
Boss Jiang’s local friends also admitted that the Vietnamese could still 
indulge in ‘backward’ ways of doing business, such as relying on credit, 
because they were spoiled by Chinese traders like themselves. As the 
market competition intensif ied, Chinese were even willing to take a loss 
to secure a deal and hopefully a long-term partnership. It was frustrating 
for these Chinese traders, because while they had very little confidence 
in Vietnamese credibility, they had to carry out business with them on an 
unreliable system of trust, verbal agreement, and personal credit. They still 
agreed that networks and mutual trust were important for trans-border 
businesses; they also complained that such a ‘trust’ was often not very 
trustworthy.
It is this tricky ‘neighbourly’ reality that demands a particular market 
(ir)rationality where Chinese businessmen seem to be willing to accept 
unreasonable conditions just to make sure that they are not cut out of the 
game and their partners across the border remain friendly. Some of the 
businessmen I know did not mind cutting down prices to a minimum, or 
even offering the Vietnamese the possibility to ‘borrow’ commodities f irst 
and pay later. Boss Ding, a vegetable trader originally from Guangdong in 
southern China, had to tolerate the practice where his Vietnamese clients 
could choose and pick from a truckload of fresh produce delivered to their 
doorsteps. The Vietnamese had the advantage to pay for only the best and 
freshest produce and rejected the damaged ones as a result of the long 
transit. Several other vegetable and fruit traders like him were doing the 
same thing. They were afraid that if they demanded their clients to pay for 
the full truckload, the Vietnamese would simply go away and use another 
supplier instead. Over the years, Boss Ding spent a great amount of money 
and energy into making sure that his long-term Vietnamese clients were 
happy and comfortable, so that he would keep his business going. He trusted 
his clients, and called them his ‘old friends’; but he also admitted that such 
a trust was high-maintenance work.
Another trader of fashion clothes, Boss Qin, who also came from Guang-
dong, usually gave free sample clothing to his Vietnamese partners to ‘test 
the market’. Prior to the Trade Fair, he was communicating with his partners 
about marketing a new design of jeans. He sent two thousand pairs free of 
charge to his partners and waited to hear the result of the sales. If the sales 
were good, the Vietnamese would pay him back. If the sales were poor, the 
Vietnamese would simply return the unsold jeans back to him. He had 
been doing this for quite a few years. His Chinese trader friends called 
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him ‘cheap’ ( jian 贱), but he said that he had little choice. At f irst this was 
an effective gimmick to attract new Vietnamese trading partners; pretty 
soon Boss Qin realized that he could not stop doing this even if he wanted 
to. The Vietnamese were so used to his ‘friendly deals’ that they would not 
have it any other way. Boss Qin was naturally not happy with this situation; 
however, he became used to it and received his reward for this trusting 
gesture. His partnership with the Vietnamese retailer was strong, and they 
maintained a very amicable relationship that was helpful for business. The 
Trade Fair saga did not frazzle him, as he had never relied on trading events 
such as this to make his business work. His partners had reassured him that 
once the drama quieted down, they would pull strings and make sure that 
his jeans go through customs without paying additional taxes. Now he just 
needed to wait. Boss Qin told me that in crisis like this, good friends on the 
other side were truly helpful. While he always held reservations about his 
Vietnamese partners, when the unexpected happened he had no better 
way but to trust their promises.
The Vietnamese had their reservations too. One of Boss Qin’s partners, 
Mr Anh, a fashion retailer in Lao Cai, expressed his distrust against 
many Chinese traders he encountered. Having lived through the border 
war, during which time his father and uncles were enlisted as civilian 
soldiers, he saw the cruelty of Chinese soldiers burning down his house 
and other family properties. He loathed the Chinese for the invasion and 
for killing his fellow countrymen. When the border re-opened, he also 
saw opportunities to get rich when the Chinese brought in commodities 
that the Vietnamese needed. When cross-border trade just started, he 
remembered, the Vietnamese were sincere but the Chinese were schem-
ing – they brought in low-quality rubbish such as used plastic ware, old 
clothes, and second-hand white goods that no one wanted in China and 
sold these to the Vietnamese. Some Chinese traders were bullying the 
Vietnamese into accepting these low quality goods for a high price. ‘Even 
now the Chinese were not much better than before’, he told me in one 
of our gatherings, ‘their food was poisonous, their toys had lead, their 
soaps and lotions were full of harmful chemicals’. ‘If the Vietnamese were 
picky’, he reasoned, ‘it was because we had to be – we don’t want to sell 
low quality products to our customers’. He had been doing business with 
Boss Qin for over f ive years, and so far his trust over their partnership 
had not been compromised. He knew that Boss Qin would like to receive 
payment from him sooner; but he had to make sure that each batch of 
jeans he received was of good quality and was marketable. Until he had 
made sure by making a good prof it, he would be reluctant to repay Boss 
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Qin. Although they have been good friends for many years, Mr Anh said, 
‘One can never be too careful’.
Cross-border trade at the Sino-Vietnamese frontier is full of ordinary 
suspicions, mild arguments, subtle conflicts, and carefully maintained 
trust. These are embedded in the ‘agonistic intimacies’ (Singh 2011) of neigh-
bourly interactions. The façade of amicable relations and friendships is kept 
until the moment when the unexpected happens. When the normalcy of 
interactions is disrupted abruptly, the familiar social relations and practiced 
norms break down and prove to be inadequate and fragile.
The 2007 Trade Fair was one such moment when the Chinese traders were 
confronted by the very artif iciality of border norms, and f ind themselves 
still unsettled by unexpected confrontations. At f irst, nothing seemed to 
be a good enough solution to redress the situation. Two days into the Trade 
Fair saga, the Hekou Ministry of Commerce proposed a plan to appease the 
disgruntled Chinese traders. For those who travelled from other provinces to 
the border, each would receive a compensation of RMB 4,000 (approximately 
US$500) to cover transportation and incidental costs. A special trade zone 
was designated in Hekou’s new trading district as a substitute for the Trade 
Fair, where Chinese traders could do business amongst themselves. Chinese 
traders were still unhappy about this solution, claiming that they had 
travelled long and far to engage with the Vietnamese market, rather than 
trading with fellow Chinese. For many, the insult was acutely felt when they 
were rejected entry at the border gate. Regarding themselves as honoured 
guests and model entrepreneurs, they felt mistreated and disrespected.
At Hekou’s makeshift substitute trade zone, a sales representative of a 
famous regional winery in Yunnan expressed openly his indignation that 
what the Vietnamese did was a slap in the face. ‘This incident was of an 
international scale’, he declared to a small group of traders around him, 
‘and both the Chinese and Vietnamese central governments should take 
this matter seriously. The Vietnamese county government in Lao Cai was 
short-sighted, looking only for a quick income; and the Chinese county 
government in Hekou was weak and lacking strong muscles’. He suggested 
a strong retaliation the next time around. One man sitting at the next 
stall selling home entertainment systems stated that Hekou government 
should do something and show that China could not be easily bullied. ‘For 
example’, he suggested, ‘in 2008 when the subsequent Trade Fair takes place, 
China should deny entry to all Vietnamese companies. It would teach the 
Vietnamese who’s the boss’.
A week later, the 2007 Trade Fair ended quietly and most of the traders 
left town without further drama. The repercussions of this ‘international 
NeighbouriNg iN ANxieT y AloNg The chiNA-vieTNAM borDer 219
incident’ were minimal. Although the 2007 Trade Fair did not receive com-
prehensive coverage in the local and provincial media (unlike in previous 
years), there were a few general reports on its success. The unpleasant 
conflicts disappeared completely in these reports. A month later, local 
traders in Hekou no longer took this incident seriously, as their deals still 
went through via various formal and informal channels. Peace and friend-
ship resumed in business relations as if the incident never took place. ‘It 
was diff icult for our Vietnamese partners too’, Weifen told me later on, 
‘and they also suffered loss like us. It was important to move on and not 
let this one incident damage our business’. Other businessmen were easy 
to forgive as well. They comforted themselves in thinking that a loss this 
time might bring prof it in the long run. By 2008, when the subsequent 
annual Trade Fair took place in Hekou, no retaliation was made as the Fair 
was most ceremoniously held. Over three hundred Chinese companies 
and 60 Vietnamese companies joined the Fair, generating over US$1 billion 
in revenue by trade and contracts (Hekou Ministry of Commerce 2008). 
Mitigating conflicts and letting go disputes is an essential skill in border 
living. This is a fundamental technique practiced for the benefit of intense 
everyday interactions and exchange. Since neighbours do not easily go away, 
unpleasant incidents are best forgotten.
The Business of Future
On the opening day of the 2007 Trade Fair, while the Chinese traders were 
protesting in anger at the border, a grand opening ceremony took place on 
a meticulously decorated stage in the main event venue in Lao Cai. Huge 
red banners were hanging on each side of the stage with words of goodwill. 
On the left, the banner read ‘friendly neighbours, all-round cooperation, 
long-term stability, future-oriented attitude’ (Mulin youhao, quanmian 
hezuo, changqi wending mianxiang weilai 睦邻友好, 全面合作, 长期稳定, 
面向未来). On the right, the banner read ‘good neighbours, good comrades, 
good friends, good partners’ (Hao mulin, hao tongzhi, hao pengyou, hao 
huoban 好睦邻, 好同志, 好朋友, 好伙伴). At the venue of the Trade Fair, 
however, rows after rows of empty booths were telling a different story. This 
emptiness rendered the ‘good neighbours, good friends’ rhetoric artif icial 
and hollow. This void, like a grim reminder of the unexpected moments of 
neighbourly unease, pointed to the foundational precarity at the heart of 
the neighbouring interactions.
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Figure 9.1  The 2007 Border Trade fair, Lao Cai
Juan Zhang, 2007
Figure 9.2  Empty Booths at the Trade Fair, Lao Cai
Juan Zhang, 2007
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It would be wrong, however, to understand this precarity as an intrin-
sic threat to the legitimacy and integrity of neighbouring at the border. 
Becoming and being neighbours cannot escape this precarity. The point 
of neighbourly unease is the motivation it brings in managing relations 
between those who live in close contact. As Chinese at the border talk 
anxiously about Vietnamese dishonesty, they eagerly aim to demonstrate 
how different they are from their ‘inferior’ neighbour by taking (albeit 
sometimes involuntarily and reluctantly) the ‘high ground’. The politics 
of differentiation are enacted when the Chinese aim to embody moral 
qualities of big-heartedness and generosity. Despite the performances, 
neighbouring unease does not go away quite easily. The point of unease is 
that neighbours are always reminded that friendship and surface harmony 
can be easily broken; and to make neighbouring work, compromises and 
strategies of pacif ication are necessary. Not unlike a localized practice of 
huairou, Chinese traders negotiate with the Vietnamese tactically and with 
care. Concessions and settlements are part of the neighbouring technique 
used to lubricate interactions and reduce friction; and grand ceremonies 
are always performed to mask tension.
In a sense, neighbourly unease is unexpectedly productive. The narrated 
distrust reveals that neighbouring relations need constant reinforcement. 
More efforts need to be invested in the celebration of harmony, mutual 
interest and a shared future of prosperity. Intimacies in trade relations are 
not devoid of doubts and suspicions. And traders on both sides (or at least on 
the Chinese side) are acutely aware that such doubts should be contained, 
tensions soothed, and mishaps forgiven. Neighbouring entails the ability 
to make compromises, to vet out frustrations, to forgive, and to move on.
The makeshift trading zone that was set up as a substitute of the 2007 
Trade Fair was a newly developed business district in Hekou. It was de-
signed to become a new face of the Hekou special economic zone. This 
zone, featured prominently by China’s Central Television in a program on 
‘Looking for gold in Hekou’ (Dao Hekou qu taojin 到河口去淘金), carries 
the promise of a prosperous future. When the Hekou government decided 
to use this new zone as the ideal location for the substitute Trade Fair, 
the intention was not only to solve the crisis at hand, but also to invite 
Chinese traders from interior regions to imagine the promising future of 
border trade in Hekou. Chinese traders were informed that the Red River 
Bridge, the third cross-border bridge between Hekou and Lao Cai, would 
be completed by 2009. By then, trucks would be able to take advantage of 
hassle-free border-crossing and swift inspections. A national new highway 
was constructed which could cut down travel time from Hekou to Kunming 
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by half. Business in the zone would be completely duty-free being a special 
zone within a special zone.
By early 2011, these promises all became reality. The new bridge is now 
directing most of the cargo traff ic, and allowed trucks and passengers to 
clear customs ‘within seconds’ (Wang and Liu 2012). The new highway has 
cut down travel time considerably, although many truck drivers still prefer 
to go by old routes to save on toll fees. New border markets, condominiums, 
and shopping centres are changing the entire landscape of the new zone. 
Since 2007, annual Trade Fairs have been organized as planned, with each 
new one larger in scale and more profitable than the previous one. When 
I revisited Hekou in 2012, traders informed me that being friendly with 
Vietnam had indeed been a worthwhile effort. The 2007 Trade Fair debacle 
was just a minor setback in the process of all-round economic integration 
( jingji yitihua 经济一体化), not only between China and Vietnam but also 
China and the ASEAN market. The stage has been set. Those who know 
how to work with neighbours and share a vision of the future can best 
take advantage of what an opening border promises to offer, even though 
it may mean that they have to always live anxiously with their neighbours.
10 China’s Animal Neighbours
Magnus Fiskesjö*
Introduction: Animal Neighbours and Chinese Circumstances
There are two distinct but interrelated aspects of the presence of animals 
in the world of people. Firstly, they f igure at least potentially as neigh-
bours in their own right – neighbours who can exchange glance with us 
and communicate with us, and who are notably able to be the agents of 
their own considered actions. These characteristics of mutual awareness, 
distance, and recognition are hallmarks of a neighbourly relation, which 
in this sense differs from that of friendship (for which it has potential, but 
which it does not include). Animal rights activists and children’s books 
authors often hasten to describe animals as ‘our friends’, but I believe the 
concept of neighbour relations is much more productive. Just as with any 
independent-minded human neighbour whom we must respect for what 
he or she is, animal neighbours may also choose to not enter into anything 
beyond the most basic aspect of the neighbour relation itself – which I take 
to mean the mutual recognition of each other’s right to an independent 
existence, one alongside the other, including the right to be left alone by 
the other. I hope to argue that this original good neighbourliness between 
humans and animals does still survive in China, and also that it is being 
revived in some ways, despite all the evidence to the contrary in a land 
ravaged by centuries of human efforts to remake the landscape for human 
purposes only.
Secondarily, and in contrast to such neighbourliness, animals also are 
appropriated by humans as the tools and props of human sustenance. This 
notably includes in their use in the significant symbolic games that humans 
engage in amongst themselves, within human social relations. The reason 
for our preference for deploying animals as symbolic reference points is 
precisely because they are sentient beings that resemble us more closely 
than other living things (because, as we know today, we humans share most 
of our original evolutionary blueprint with other animals, our next of kin). 
Thus, for us, they are even more ‘good to think’ (Tambiah 1969) within our 
own relations, than are plants or other living things.
* I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers, the editors, as well as the students in my 
course ‘Animals, Nature, Environment’ at NYU-Shanghai, Fall 2014, for their helpful comments. 
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I argue that the relation with animals as potential neighbours in their 
own right is the primary one – animals originally were present alongside us 
humans, since they evolved (like plants, fungi, and so on) alongside with us 
in nature, not for our sake but in parallel with us. This original relation of the 
animals as sentient beings existing in parallel with us still survives today in 
some forms, and this is worth considering today, especially, as the planet is 
turned into a heavily anthropogenic and human-dominated landscape – a 
development more thoroughly prominent in China, than in most other parts 
of the planet. In this new landscape, in China as in Western Europe and 
similarly radically human-dominated areas of the world, animal diversity 
as well as the numbers of animals has become drastically reduced (Elvin 
2004 is probably the best overall account of this radical transformation; 
also see Menzies 1992, 1994).
Human-Animal Relations in China Today
In China, as in other heavily anthropogenically transformed regions of the 
globe, human-animal relations survive mostly in a few rather limited and 
restricted ways: In the relations with pets, which are heavily dominated 
by and dependent on their human masters, but which can also engender 
mutual human-animal emotional attachments; with other domesticated 
animals that we force to work for us or appropriate for consumption (and 
which are encountered less and less alive and more often only as corpses, 
of industrially-farmed meat animals); and also with the last remaining 
wild animals, which, however, we mostly meet only in carefully staged 
encounters in zoos, and the like; or in other kinds of heavily managed 
environments, or, indeed, as pests to be combated and cleared away.
In this new and even unprecedented situation of increasing human isola-
tion from animals as neighbours in their own right, intimate and friendly 
relations with living animals survive almost only in the highly controlled 
relation to pets, which are kept at their owner’s mercy. As Atran and Medin 
(2008) have argued eloquently, the general decline and loss of our formerly 
more rich experience of encounters with a diversity of other beings sharing 
our space is drastic, and it is important to consider for how it inevitably will 
impact our own cognitive makeup as humans.
It is clear that while the original relation of animals as our non-human 
neighbours still survives to a limited extent, today it has been vastly 
overshadowed by the instrumental relations in which we force animals 
into subservience and make use of them on our terms, whether as pets, 
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as a source of labor, as the source of food, or in symbolic use, in our own 
communications amongst ourselves, or as pests that are to be driven away 
(as with wild animals like mice and insects seeking to co-habit with us in 
our homes). In this situation, where humans are increasingly isolated from 
peer-like animals, the question of what neighbourliness could still mean 
between people and animals comes to the fore – perhaps nowhere more so 
than in China, the former expansive empire which has become the world’s 
most populous nation, mostly bereft of animals except in the (resurging) 
keeping of pets, and in the other more hostile modes. The humans-only 
world of China is also being spread beyond its borders: China’s national 
economy is already practically the world’s largest in human monetary terms; 
as such, it is also increasingly integrated with world capitalism as a new 
centre of the Global North, and increasingly extracting natural resources 
beyond its own borders.
At the same time, the global debates over animals and people are spread-
ing to China, often as part of a rising environmentalism – advocates of 
animal rights, previously found mostly in industrialized Europe and in 
the Americas, now are also found in China – though many such Chinese 
activists are still mostly concerned with domestic animals such as dogs 
and other pets which they seek to save from being harvested for food, and 
much less often with wild animals that do not have any direct use value 
for humans, or are seen as pests. Current Chinese environmentalism is 
oftentimes inspired from the West but harks back to indigenous traditions 
such as the Chinese Classics or to Chinese Buddhism for evidence that could 
help justify and bolster the standing of a contemporary indigenous Chinese 
environmentalism – by trying to present environmentalism as a native 
and ancient tradition.1 For example (as admirably discussed by Cao 2010), 
Western animal liberation activism is compared to Chinese Buddhist ways 
of setting free captive animals for the purpose of making merit for oneself.
The rise in citizen’s animal protection activism is also related to the 
increasing wariness of industrial cheap foods (junk food) in China and 
the resulting dramatic rise in the desire for natural and healthy foods (as 
in eco-food marketing; in the growing trend of rural restaurants framed 
as Nongjiale, farmhouse food; and so on, cf. Park 2014). It must also be 
noted that government authorities in China are also – partly because of 
1 For examples from the Chinese literature, on environmentalism see Pu (2014), Song (2012), 
Wang and Zhang (1999), Zhao (2006); on animal rights and animal liberation, see Cao (2010); for 
outsider’s perspectives, see Callicott and Ames (1989), Cao (2011), Estok and Kim (2013), Kalton 
(2010), Lal (2003) and many others.
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pressure from international intergovernmental organizations, and so on – 
adopting an eco-friendly stance, acknowledging environmental pollution 
problems and even engaging in public advertisement campaigns (on subway 
billboards, etc.) promoting an awareness of endangered global wildlife such 
as rhinos, elephants, and so on, which are being harvested for illicit but 
burgeoning Chinese markets.
At the same time, the related new trend within Western philosophy 
to attempt to re-think human-animal relations, on the other hand, has 
barely spread to China so far. In the West, it includes f igures such as Burgat 
(1997), and a host of thinkers building on Heidegger’s ideas about animals, 
notably two of Heidegger’s foremost pupils: Jacques Derrida (Berger and 
Segarra 2011, Calarco 2008, Derrida 2008), and Giorgio Agamben, whose 
work The Open: Man and Anima (2004) is concerned with the consequences 
for us humans of our own categorically anthropo-centrist and much too 
self-centred distinction from ‘the animal’, a humanism that Agamben sees 
as the product of a Western ‘anthropological machine’ – and that refuses 
the possibility of animals as (good) neighbours. In anthropology, this trend 
includes incisive critics of anthropocentric framings of animals such as Tim 
Ingold (1988), likewise inspired by Martin Heidegger.
The Deep Roots of China’s State-Engineered Anthropocentrism
Drawing on Agamben and other thinkers, Møllgaard (2010) argued, in ways 
rather different from the apologetic searching for native environmental-
isms, that a very similar project of anthropo-centrism in human-centred 
terms lies at the heart of the version of Confucian philosophy that has 
long guided Chinese statecraft. What Agamben critiques as a Western 
‘anthropological machine’ f inds its parallel in the ideological premises of 
Chinese state-making, in the service of a ruling elite which self-presents as 
simultaneously the arbiter of the distinction between humans and animals, 
and the indispensable guarantor of the human-animal divide and of the 
superiority and privilege of humans in this divide (see Lewis 1990: 212, 
Møllgaard 2010: 130-133 and others).
Many students of Chinese philosophy (e.g. Zhao 2006 and others) have 
argued that the ancient Chinese view was different, in that it placed human-
ity within the larger scheme of nature and emphasized the harmony of that 
totality, as opposed to European anthropocentrism. And, it is true that in 
Europe what were once similar conceptions of totalized harmony later 
gave way (in medieval and Renaissance times), to new Christian-inspired 
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conceptions of a nature configured in opposition to humanity, which must 
master nature, and lord over it (Elvin 2004, 2010), and one can say that 
Chinese thought did not come to appropriate such ideas until modern 
times, then in the shape of the Soviet-derived Communist-modern teleol-
ogy of human history as the history of growing human manipulation and 
domination of nature.
But it is equally true that the traditionally dominant Chinese concep-
tions of human-natural harmony did not at all hamper but rather promoted 
the ruling elites’ self-def inition as the privileged arbiter of humanity and 
nature, indeed as the conqueror of nature. Thus in Zhou times, the era 
that provided the molds for later Classical thought, we simultaneously 
f ind (and without contradiction) a cosmology of ‘harmony’ orchestrated 
by the privileged elite, as expressed in rules on the seasonal restrictions 
on hunting, and so on (the kind of evidence that current-day Chinese 
environmentalists like to point to); but also an explicit revelry in the elite-
led conquest and killing of menacing wild animals, and so on, equally 
justif ied in the same cosmological terms, by the position of the elite as the 
necessary arbiter of society, against the wild. This ideology was a key lever 
for the buildup of the most ancient Chinese kingship (Fiskesjö 2001). One 
could even read the early 1950s state-organized mass hunt of tigers and 
other ‘vermin’, which was organized by the new Communist rulers and 
largely exterminated the tiger in China (cf. Coggins 2004, Environmental 
Investigation Agency 2013), as a repeat instantiation of this sort of ancient 
propaganda spectacle.
Although we can identify differences in philosophical traditions East and 
West, we must also couple any discussion of such tenets with the actual-
historical progression of human expansion and appropriation of nature 
that they have been deployed to justify. In the West, as in modern China, 
animal-rights activists and environmentalists have faced the ideological 
obstacles of economistic arguments favouring human-led ‘development’ of 
natural resources, but as they attempt to re-argue human-animal relations, 
both also face the obstacle of anthropocentric traditions of thought and 
practice, which in China mainly means a Confucian anthropocentrism 
veiled as ‘harmony with nature’. The Taoist critiques that have focused on 
of how such false harmony cover up unequal appropriation and destruc-
tion (Møllgaard 2010) may well represent, alongside Buddhism, a major 
fountain of native intellectual tradition that can be used to reconstruct 
neighbourliness and challenge the mainstream (instead of trying to locate 
a Chinese environmentalism in ancient Confucianism, which may be a 
futile endeavour).
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‘China’ can be def ined as a surreptitiously revived project of state-
building and expansion, where each resuscitation has involved drawing on 
certain recycled conceptions, as if they were eternal (Fiskesjö 1999). In this 
mainstream tradition, the def inition of humanity’s place in the centre of a 
(harmonious) world typically relegated animals (as well as human beings 
perceived as more animal-like), to a status as lesser beings, relegated to a 
lower rank in an imagined developmental scheme that organizes the more 
and the less developed (Fiskesjö 2011). Even today, such schemes, in their 
modern version as the Chinese mantra of modernity as development, still 
dominate and help organize the expanding Chinese economic exploits in 
its borderlands as well as around the world, in the name of this develop-
ment. Little heed is given to the animal neighbours, as economic expansion 
extends into areas previously not touched by such exploits, and alternately 
replaces or displaces previous exploitation by other economic powers, or it 
breaks new ground, on a new scale.
The ‘Three Thousand Year War’
The current developments, in which remaining wild forests are turned 
into mono-species cash crop plantations and mountains into mining 
ventures on a scale never seen before, further highlights the stark contrast 
between a human-dominated and anthropogenic landscape and what is 
left of landscapes with less anthropogenic influence – otherwise known as 
nature. From the perspective of the already heavily anthropogenic setting 
of densely-populated central China, the margins of the country as well as 
the new frontiers beyond the border (such as in neighbouring nations like 
Burma, in Africa, South America, and so on), represent refuges of forests 
and other remaining natural resources that have already been denuded or 
exhausted in China’s core areas. Today, while these frontiers are increasingly 
exploited by Chinese entrepreneurs, who are increasingly reaching farther 
for an intensifying economic exploitation of natural resources (on Chinese 
investments in Burma, see for example, Kramer and Woods 2012), there is 
also an accompanying renewed ‘exploitation’ of the receding frontier forests 
and its denizens as the raw material of fantasies fundamental to the Chinese 
self-identif ication as civilized, including in its modern transformations (on 
which more below).
Mark Elvin (2004) chronicles the process leading to today’s overwhelming 
human domination as the ‘three thousand year war’, and his use of the term 
‘war’ may be justif ied, on several levels: Firstly, as already mentioned and as 
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we know from ancient Chinese texts, early paradigmatic kings and culture 
heroes were described as warriors able to kill wild animals obstructing their 
rule and the peace of the farmers ruled over by these same rulers. Secondly, 
beyond such lore, the process itself involved a much longer and important 
war on forest-dwelling animals perceived as threats (the elephants and the 
tigers the most symbolically important among them), in which deforestation 
was intentionally deployed as a major strategic weapon depriving such 
animals of their habitat. This worked in tandem with the expansion of 
Chinese-style agriculture, which served as a tax base. One result was the 
denuded anthropogenic landscape of central China, increasingly dependent 
on fertilizer intervention, and also prone to increased flooding as deforesta-
tion proceeded further af ield. A side effect was that, as historical records 
show, timber became a scarce resource in the old heartland of civilization 
(Elvin 2004: 43-44), a development that itself prompted further expansion 
and state-sponsored measures specif ically to obtain timber as building 
materials. This was accentuated in late imperial times (Ming, Qing), when 
even the far southern reaches of the empire were deforested in this way. 
Today it is reaching vast tracts of Burma overlooked by British colonial 
exploitation.
Animality, Animals, and China’s Human Others
Historically, this process has involved confrontations with non-human 
and human Others that strangely parallel each other, where animal and 
human ‘neighbours’ has been conceptualized and organized along similar 
lines, with the ‘barbarian’ non-Chinese human neighbours conceived as 
more like animals, on a sliding scale. The most striking evidence for this, 
in addition to the rich lore of how such barbarians live like animals in the 
forest or like animals in caves (where they notably fail to cultivate and cook 
their food like the Chinese do), is the peculiar and uniquely Chinese way in 
which these human neighbours were given written names that classif ied 
them as semi-animals (Fiskesjö 2011). This seemingly strange parallel of 
course also has to do with early Chinese configurations of statecraft and 
its long-lasting, cherished tenets of how the rulers’ position is both actually 
and symbolically justif ied. It is indicated by the rulers’ capacity to either 
kill or subdue the animals of the wild, and their duty to civilize those that 
may be civilized, while destroying and clearing those that cannot – or who 
oppose their inclusion in ‘civilization’ – a discourse that notably includes 
morally framed distinctions between docile and willing domesticates, and 
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harmful wild animals. As noted by a number of scholars (Fiskesjö 2011, 
Pines 2004, Sterckx 2002), this ideology, especially in its enduring imperial 
formulation, included the conception of humans and animals as a graded 
range of beings that mirrors the ‘chain of being’ of Christian Europe. But 
this ideology comes with the important Chinese characteristics of the self-
identif ication by the ruling elites as themselves necessary to uphold and 
maintain a proper cosmic order, including its gradual extension throughout 
humanity and among other living things as well. There are of course deep 
tensions involved in the conflicting claims of the pretence to a guardianship 
of a cosmic harmony, the claim to be justif ied in pioneering the clearing of 
the forest, and the mission of civilization. Mark Elvin (2004) is right to point 
out the curious lack of sacrif ices to forest spirits and the maintenance of 
sacred groves in the earliest Chinese states. Perhaps state-making cancelled 
most such shrines and gave precedence to the agriculturists’ culture-heroes 
daring to destroy the forests and kill its denizens – so that the ideology of 
harmony was reduced to a mere pretence, as the early Taoists argued (and, 
sacred groves persisted only among yet-to-be assimilated peoples on the 
periphery of the State’s reach (cf. Coggins 2004).
In my view, under modern China’s veneer of ethnic equality, where the 
former barbarians’ names has been edited into humanized ethnonyms 
without the animal classif ication, the system still preserves elements of 
a ‘chain of being’-like conception of the ‘ethnic minorities’ as people that 
are less than fully human (Fiskesjö 2011). The ethnic minorities are still 
conceived as ‘closer to nature’ in the same manner in which, as barbarians, 
they were formerly conceived as ranking closer to the animals of the wild. 
The preservation of such elements of a chain-of-beings conception may 
above all serve the bureaucratic state elite which continues to cast itself as 
the natural guardian and orchestrator of cosmic ‘harmony’ – albeit today 
in modern terms, as when the notion of a historically existing Chinese 
harmony with a natural order is advanced (for a recent example, see Zhao 
2006).
A number of scholars of the history of human-animal relations in China 
(notably Sterckx, Lewis, Elvin, and others, as well as Chinese scholars of 
environmental history and animal lore) have explicated the uses of animals 
and their destruction in the making of moral parables to extend this overall 
vision. Incidents of encounters with animal neighbours, both domesticates 
and wild animals, have been used to exemplify the tenets of moral phi-
losophy and social order, and the appearances of such unusual animals 
have been interpreted as portents with implications for human affairs, 
wherein the animals are uninteresting in themselves, and only matter as 
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a messenger of reflector of cosmic shifts of interest to reigning emperors. 
Sterckx (2002) notes how in early China, the animal naming apparatus itself 
is primarily a device of interpretation and classif ication for the purposes 
of human government, and it almost never involves the study of animals 
in their own right, even in lexica and encyclopaedia compiled specif ically 
to identify animals. Roughly speaking, the detailed observation and study 
of animals appears only with the introduction of Western science and its 
use in enumerating, identifying and then more effectively appropriating 
animals, plants, and other non-human entities and resources. (It seems that 
this Western influence did not change much of the former certainty, in the 
dominant ideology, about the question of the animal – their distinctions 
from humans; their place in the world).
We must note the overlap of methods used to harness and manage both 
wild animals and wild animal-like people, and how these are themselves 
embedded in human economic expansion. Consider the use of salt in his-
tory, simultaneously a desirable item, and a key commodity. We know how, 
along with iron as a formidable weaponry technology, salt-production was 
seized upon by the early imperial state and re-made as a closely controlled 
monopoly. This was not only to prevent prof iteering individual traders 
from acquiring too strong a position in relation to state agencies, but also 
had a strategic purpose in managing human relations by harnessing the 
demand for salt into a tool for rendering human adversaries more docile 
and accepting of Chinese terms of trade, and control. And, as suggested by 
Shinji Maejima (1931) in his extensive study of salt and the Southwestern 
barbarians, the management of salt production and salt markets and 
trade to attract non-Chinese human neighbours into manageable Chinese 
liaisons already long ago, was explicitly aligned with the use of salt licks as 
a bait for luring non-human wild animals such as deer and wild bovines 
(buffalo, gaur, etc.) out of the forest, so that they could be either killed or 
captured (Maejima 1931, Vogel 2003). That is to say, the controlling and 
harnessing of trade in salt and other items to manage ethnic others not 
as neighbours but as dependents, to the advantage of the Chinese state, 
may even originally have been modelled on the way in which the hunter 
lures his prey out of the forest. In this parallel, which f its eminently with 
a chain-of-beings conception of living things, the civilized deploy their 
superior intelligence and understanding to obtain obedience from those 
possessing a more rudimentary intelligence, so as to overpower them and 
draw them into the sphere of economic utility. This parallel extends beyond 
the use of salt monopolies to other products, and such analogies abound 
in the context of the still-powerful historical Chinese imaginations of the 
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receding wilderness frontier, at which these different neighbours f igure on 
a scale reaching from the civilized human through primitive animal-like 
intermediaries to animal, and from culture to nature. Obviously, there is 
very little of true (or, if we prefer, ‘good’), neighbourliness in these examples: 
instead, mostly, we seem to f ind only the calculated use of others for one’s 
own instrumental purposes.
Even today, the traditional Chinese fantasies of the ethnic other as 
almost-animal are not only not at all out of date, but instead seem to be gain-
ing new ground – as in the exotics promoted in mass Chinese commercial 
ethno-tourism, and in the new eco-wildlife tourism, which develops as the 
wilderness recedes ever further. The animal-like ‘primitive’ peoples may 
well in actuality be deeply integrated into the Chinese economy, especially 
as they too have been encouraged to join the mass ranks of migrant work-
ers that keep up China’s industrial output. But select samples of them are 
nevertheless at the same time encouraged to self-present as ‘wild primitives’ 
in tourist ploys that satisfy the desires of domestic tourism and help keep 
alive the f iction of a chain-of-being persisting even inside China’s border 
(Fiskesjö 2014); all this is of course but a Chinese version of a more general 
phenomenon, previously instantiated when Western colonial-industrial 
powers fantasized about primitive peoples as ‘closer to nature’). Tourism 
agencies catering to the increasingly aff luent upper classes of Chinese 
society may even go on to appropriate other Asians and Africans for these 
same purposes, on a global scale – there are rumours that a Chinese-styled 
Disney model of ethno-theme parks designed along these lines is being 
exported by Chinese entrepreneurs to places around the world where 
wealthy Chinese tourists may now go.
Imaginary Animals
In tandem with this usefulness of ostensibly wild people, wild animals still 
constitute an analogous and highly signif icant presence in the Chinese 
imagination – even though, or perhaps one should say because of how they 
have already been eliminated from huge swaths of the intensively populated 
and cultivated central China. The establishment of nature reserves for the 
protection of wildlife habitat and for use as tourism destinations also f ills 
a similar function in the economy of Chinese self-imagination – some-
times as artif icial safari zoos, a key new institution that is being opened 
in multiple locations across urbanized China (even as some traditional 
zoos are ravaged by killings of zoo rhinos and other precious animals to 
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supply the abomination that is the current, surging luxury trade in body 
parts and stuffed specimens. cf. Guilford 2013, Lü 2013). But as with the 
human zoos of ethno-theme parks, this also does not represent encounters 
of neighbourliness, but rather the projection (onto new sites of convenience) 
of a Chinese-styled ideologically framed border between the human and 
the wild, arranged to be ‘experienced’, recognized and reinforced, again 
and again.
The continuing, persistent role of certain animals in the related economy 
of ‘medicine’ that is eff icacious because drawn from famous wild beasts, 
is a f lip side of this. We see it in the currently unfolding tragedy of the 
intensifying race to slaughter the world’s last rhinos (in remote Indonesia, 
Assam, and Africa; Vietnam’s last population was recently exterminated 
by poachers). Poachers kill the last rhinos only to obtain their horns, to 
smuggle and sell them to service the market inside China and in several 
other Asian countries where wealthy people are still deeply captivated by 
fantasies of aphrodisiac properties of such horns, which in reality is simply 
nail-like material entirely lacking such properties.2
The list of such fantasy phenomena goes on: they include the body parts 
from tigers and pangolins and other exotic species used for similar purposes, 
as well as elephant ivory used for carving seals, and bodily adornments. It 
also similarly includes many exotic culinary items, like bird-spit nests (swal-
low’s nests), bear paws, shark f ins and the like (Blumenfield 2011, Kaiman 
2012). These ‘dishes’ are perceived to hold beneficial properties precisely 
in as much as they derive from known hard-to-access exotic and wild spe-
cies and places, mobilized in a ‘spectacle of nature’ that is performed at 
restaurants and other urban sites, so as to tickle the imagination and sense 
of power on the part of wealthy urbanites (cf. Igoe 2010).
The New Chinese Animal Activism: Reasons for Hope
In this context, it is highly interesting to note the new public outrage unfold-
ing in China recently (and reflected in television news in Hong Kong and 
around Asia, and on global news outlets) over the extraction of gall or bile 
from captive live bears, which are estimated at up to tens of thousands of 
animals across China (Hobson 2007, McDonald 2012). The outrage also seizes 
on the harvesting of paws as a delicacy, sometimes cutting paws from the 
same animals that are kept alive while tapped for bile. This campaigning 
2 Larson (2010) conveniently lists multiple studies conf irming this fact; see too Ellis (2005).
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has reached f lash points where the prof iteering businesses themselves 
have been confronted in attempts to publicly shame them and harm their 
ability to profit (Bristow 2012).
I see this focus on bears’ suffering as especially interesting, because bears 
are meant to be wild, living apart from humans. The sympathetic relation-
ship with bears cultivated by the activists thus more clearly resembles the 
neighbourliness of which I spoke at the beginning of this essay – more clearly 
so than the protests against the suffering of human pets or pet-like domestic 
animals that have otherwise dominated the activities of China’s nascent 
animal rights movement, such as the fascinating rescue operations to save 
dogs or cats about to be captured as restaurant food (Al Jazeera 2011). These 
developments too may involve a sense of neighbourliness with the dogs and 
cats, but only in a highly qualified way, since (unlike the bears), cats and dogs 
are animals f irmly tied to and dependent on human society. If pork and beef 
are acceptable there is obviously no inherent reason not to slaughter dogs and 
cats for food, but in several recent Chinese cases, anti-dog meat campaigning 
has lead to the shutting down of dog-meat culinary festivals (Wong 2011).
The Chinese campaigning against both the uses of the bears and against 
the use of dogs as food can of course also be interpreted as a moral alignment 
with the taboo on eating dogs and cats embraced by many Westerners, or 
even, more generally, as a product of social relations in urbanized capitalist 
consumer society, East and West. More empirical research is needed on this, 
but it seems to me it is highly plausible that a large part of it is prompted 
by the dynamics of a symbolically signif icant competitive global race in 
civilization that comes to pass due to the prevailing contemporary global 
power relations. When Westerners condemn Chinese or other peoples’ 
eating of dogs and other such animals (and the hypocrisy involved in this 
is beside the point here), many contemporary Chinese accept what they 
see as Western international norms as desirable values and then come 
to sense that China is falling short, and they engage in the mimicking 
of Western discourses and activist practices. This may even be at play in 
initiatives for off icial legislation prohibiting the cruelty against animals 
(Whitfort 2012). Yet many Chinese will inevitably feel at the same time that 
a wholesale condemnation of everything Chinese could not be condoned 
as a consequence of their lacking respect for animals or the environment 
and nature at large, and hence the substantial Chinese literature returning 
to the Classics and to Buddhist wisdom in an attempt to f ind an original 
Chinese contemporary-styled environmentalism and sympathy for animals.
And yet I wish to argue that apart from this game of mirrors, there is 
also at the same time in the West and in China, and beyond, an emerging 
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honest concern for animals as fellow living things, or, put otherwise, as 
neighbours. It is true that in China today, as in the West, many animal-rights 
activists tend to focus on those animals that are closest to people. They tend 
to project the demands for rights to humane treatment for humans, to pet 
animals in their proximity, thus leaving themselves open to accusations, 
fairly or not, that they really are more concerned with own self-interest 
and self-appreciation, than with the animals they pretend to care for. The 
same issues exist when, by extension, these movements come to overlap 
and coincide with organic-food and fair-trade movements in attempting 
to uncover and put a stop to the ill-treatment of domestic animals whose 
hide is used in our shoes, whose fur is made into clothing, or the like. But 
in taking up the cause of the caged wild bears and mobilizing concerned 
celebrities to help publicize it, as when the former basketball superstar 
Yao Ming visited a ‘Moon Bear Rescue Centre’ (Heixiong jiuhu zhongxin 
黑熊救护中心) in Sichuan, on February 18th, 2012 (Animals Asia Foundation 
2012, McDonald 2012), it does appear that the movement is now not only 
advancing beyond the defence of pets and other domesticates but also 
revealing a fundamental concern for animals as neighbours (and the bear 
activists are certainly not alone; see for example Watts and Chen 2009). In 
2014, Yao Ming asked the Chinese government to ban all trade in ivory, and 
he has joined hands in campaigning on the issue with both Chinese and 
foreign celebrities – including Britain’s Prince William who visited China 
and its last remnant of Asian elephants, in March 2015. Just ahead of the 
royal visit, China’s government announced a one-year ban (BBC 2015) that is 
widely suspected as a publicity stunt that won’t dent the rapidly advancing 
global extermination of the rhinoceros and the elephant which is currently 
unfolding, today driven largely by Chinese domestic luxury consumption 
(Gao and Clark 2014). One can only hope the campaign to shame both users 
and illicit ‘producers’ in China and in Africa might stop the massacre.
Yet of course these Chinese movements are limited in scope and num-
bers, to some extent inspired offshoots of Hong Kong-based animal right’s 
activism (especially since the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997), and 
they may be much too late to save either the world’s last rhinoceroses, 
elephants, or tigers from total extinction. But they may signal a signif icant 
shift. The signif icance of the concern for ordinary wild black bears from 
the forest and for their general well-being in their own remaining habitat, 
stands out further when compared to the off icially sanctioned but rarely 
passionate concern with the raref ied panda bear – which hails from some 
of the same forests but has been protected mainly as a politicized symbol 
of the Chinese State (Nicholls 2010, Songster 2004).
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The issue of whether or not animals could suffer was in fact a key trigger-
ing point for the debates about anthropocentrism in European philosophy 
and public opinion, and came to extend to political questions of what kind 
of human society we would like to have. Perhaps the question of whether the 
Chinese black bears suffer when they are forced to leak their internal fluids, 
in what can very readily be compared to gruesome forms of human torture, 
may serve a similar role in triggering self-doubt about the anthropocentric 
justif ications for the unhindered enslavement and self ish extermination of 
animal neighbours in China. It would still matter, both for ourselves, and 
for those animal neighbours that remain, after the thousand-year wars that 
we have waged on them – in the case of the rhinoceros, the elephants, and 
the tigers, on-going, Chinese-led f inal blitzkrieg.
 About the Authors
Henryk Alff (h.alff@fu-berlin.de), a Human Geographer by training, cur-
rently is a Research Fellow at the Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography 
in Leipzig, Germany. His research interests include societal change, mobility 
and border studies as well as spatial construction with a regional focus on 
post-Socialist Inner Asia. Henryk completed his doctorate at the University 
of Potsdam in 2010. From 2011 to 2016 he held a postdoc research position 
in the competence network Crossroads Asia at the Centre for Development 
Studies (ZELF) of Freie Universität Berlin. His project at ZELF dealt with 
the transformation of bazaar trade across the former Sino-Soviet border, 
drawing attention in particular to actor-based strategies of adaptation to 
changing border regimes and transformed ideas of development. His work 
has appeared in, among others International Development Planning Review 
and Inner Asia. Henryk has co-edited (with Andreas Benz) the book Tracing 
Connections: Explorations of Places and Spaces in Asian Contexts (WVB 
2014), and currently prepares a special section entitled Beyond Silkroadism: 
Contextualizing Social Interaction along Xinjiang’s Borders, accepted for 
publication with the Central Asian Survey.
Franck Billé is a social anthropologist working in North East Asia (Rus-
sia, China and Mongolia). He specializes in race and ethnicity, borders, 
cartography, and urbanism. His previous work on anti-Chinese sentiments 
in Mongolia was recently published by the University of Hawai’i Press (Sino-
phobia, 2015). His current research in Blagoveshchensk and Heihe focuses on 
mutual perceptions and social transformations, analyzed through the prism 
of urban development. He is currently a visiting scholar at the Institute of 
East Asian Studies, UC Berkeley. He can be contacted at fbille@berkeley.
edu or through his website: www.franckbille.com
Uradyn E. Bulag (ueb10@cam.ac.uk) is reader in social anthropology at the 
University of Cambridge. His interests broadly span East Asia and Inner 
Asia, especially China and Mongolia, nationalism and ethnicity, geopolitics, 
historiography and statecraft. He is the author of Nationalism and Hybridity 
in Mongolia (Clarendon Press, 1998), The Mongols at China’s Edge: History 
and the Politics of National Unity (Rowman and Littlef ield, 2002), and Col-
laborative Nationalism: the Politics of Friendship on China’s Mongolian 
Frontier (Rowman and Littlef ield, 2010), which received the International 
Convention of Asian Scholars 2011 book prize in social sciences.
238 The ArT of NeighbouriNg
Renaud Egreteau (regreteau@gmail.com) is a 2015-2016 Fellow with the 
Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
Washington DC. He previously taught comparative politics at Sciences Po 
Paris (2008-09) and the University of Hong Kong (2009-13) and held a visiting 
fellowship at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) of Singapore 
(2015). A political scientist, he currently researches the multifaceted dynam-
ics of Myanmar’s political liberalization. His work has appeared, among 
others, in the Journal of Burma Studies, Asian Survey, Contemporary Politics 
and India Review. He recently authored Caretaking Democratization: The 
Military and Political Change in Myanmar (Oxford University Press, 2016).
Magnus Fiskesjö (magnus.f iskesjo@cornell.edu) teaches in anthropology 
and Asian studies at Cornell University, since 2005. He was educated at 
universities in his native Sweden, and also in Denmark, China, and at the 
University of Chicago, where in 2000 he received a joint PhD in Anthropol-
ogy and East Asian Languages and Civilizations. From 2000-2005 he served 
as director of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, in Stockholm, Sweden. 
His research mainly concerns historical and political anthropology and 
Asian ethno-politics, as well as museums and heritage issues, including on 
China, Taiwan, Burma and Thailand, but also the US and Europe. Recent 
publications include ‘The reluctant sovereign: New adventures of the US 
presidential Thanksgiving turkey’ (Anthropology Today, 2010), and ‘The 
animal other: Re-naming the barbarians in 20th-century China’ (Social 
Text, 2011).
Tina Harris (c.h.harris@uva.nl) is an Assistant Professor in the anthropol-
ogy department at the University of Amsterdam as well as a member of the 
Moving Matters research group. She received her Ph.D. in Anthropology in 
2009 from the City University of New York (CUNY) Graduate Center. Her 
main research interests involve mobility across borders, infrastructures, 
and material culture. She has conducted research in Tibet, Nepal, and 
India, and is one of the main organizers of the Asian Borderlands Research 
Network. She is also the author of Geographical Diversions: Tibetan Trade, 
Global Transactions (2013, Athens: University of Georgia Press).
Pál Nyiri (p.d.nyiri@vu.nl) is Professor of Global History from an Anthro-
pological Perspective at the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam. His research 
focuses on contemporary migration from China, particularly on new 
mobile elites. His most recent books, Chinese Encounters in Southeast Asia: 
How People, Money, and Ideas from China are Changing a Region (edited 
AbouT The AuThorS 239
with Danielle Tan) and Reporting for China: How Chinese Correspondents 
Work with the World are forthcoming from the University of Washington 
Press.
Martin Saxer (martin.saxer@lmu.de) is based at the Ludwig-Maximilian 
University of Munich (LMU) and leads a f ive-year ERC-funded research 
project under the title “Remoteness and Connectivity: Highland Asia in the 
World” (2015-2020, www.highlandasia.net). He was a Clarendon scholar at 
Oxford and received his doctorate in 2010. Between 2011 and 2015, f irst as 
a postdoc at the Asia Research Institute in Singapore and then as a Marie 
Curie Research Fellow at LMU, he was working on a multi-sited research 
project entitled ‘Neighbouring China: Old Connections, New Dynamics’. He 
conducted extensive f ieldwork in Siberia, Tibet, Nepal and Tajikistan since 
2003, directed two feature length documentary f ilms and runs the visual 
ethnography blog www.theotherimage.com. He is the author of Manufactur-
ing Tibetan Medicine: The Creation of an Industry and the Moral Economy of 
Tibetanness (Berghahn 2013).
Chris Vasantkumar (chris.vasantkumar@mq.edu.au) is Lecturer in An-
thropology at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia. He conducted 
research on the cultural politics of difference and national belonging 
amongst Tibetans and members of other Chinese nationalities in Gansu 
Province, PRC, and northern India from 2002 to 2009. He has published 
essays on China and Tibet in the Journal of Asian Studies, Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space, Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology, the 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, and Theory, Culture, and Society. 
He also contributed a chapter to the path-breaking volume on Critical Han 
Studies. His current research interests include the anthropology of money, 
movement and mobility, the politics of time, metrology and the study of 
measurement, standards and processes of standardization, and topological 
approaches to difference and belonging. He is currently writing a book on 
the making of modern money. His non-academic pursuits include baseball, 
travel, and politics.
Juan Zhang (juan.zhang@une.edu.au) is a lecturer in Sociology at the 
University of New England in Australia. Her research interests include social 
change, transnational migration and mobility in Asia. She has published 
in journals including Environment & Planning D, Environment & Planning 




Abraham, Itty, and Willem van Schendel. 2005. ‘Introduction: The Making of Illicitness’. In Illicit 
Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization, edited by W. 
van Schendel and I. Abraham, 12-48. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Abraham, Itty. 2006. ‘Illegal but Licit’. IIAS Newsletter 42: 1-4.
Adams, Vincanne. 1996. ‘Karaoke as Modern Lhasa, Tibet: Western Encounters with Cultural 
Politics’. Cultural Anthropology 11 (4): 510-546.
Addleton, Jonathan S. 2013. Mongolia and the United States: A Diplomatic History. Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press.
Agamben, Giorgio. 2004. The Open: Man and the Animal. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Al Jazeera. 2011. China’s animal crusaders. Accessed July 10, 2013. Available at: http://www.
aljazeera.com/programmes/101east/2011/07/20117129224537494.html.
Alderman, Liz. 2012. ‘Under Chinese, A greek Port Thrives’. New York Times, October 10.
Alff, Henryk, and Matthias Schmidt. 2011. ‘Seidenstraße 2.0? Handel und Mobilität im Grenzraum 
Kasachstan-Kirgisistan-Xinjiang’. Osteuropa 61 (11): 63-76.
Alff, Henryk. 2014. ‘Post-Soviet Positionalities: Relations, Flows and the Transformation of 
Bishkek’s Dordoy Bazaar’. In Tracing Connections: Explorations of Spaces and Places in Asian 
Contexts, edited by H. Alff and A. Benz, 71-90. Berlin: WVB.
Alff, Henryk. 2015. ‘Prof iteers or Moral Entrepreneurs? Bazaars, Traders and Development 
Discourses in Almaty, Kazakhstan. International Development Planning Review 37 (3): 249-67.
Allès, Elisabeth. 2005. ‘The Chinese-Speaking Muslims (Dungans) of Central Asia: A Case of 
Multiple Identities in a Changing Context’. Asian Ethnicity 6 (2): 121-134.
Altangerel, B., Uradyn E. Bulag, S. Chuluun, and D. Shurkhuu, eds. 2013. Trans-Continental 
Neighbours: A Documentary History of Mongolia-UK Relations. Cambridge: Mongolia and 
Inner Asia Studies Unit.
American Chamber of Commerce in Mongolia. 2011. AmCham Mongolia Hosts For-
mer U.S. Defense Chief. Accessed June 22, 2013. Available at: http://amcham.mn/
amcham-mongolia-hosts-former-u-s-defense-chief/
Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Ref lections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. New York: Verso.
Anderson, Benedict. 1998. The Specter of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the 
World. London: Verso.
Anderson, James A. 2007. The Rebel Den of Nung Tri Cao: Loyalty and Identity along the Sino-
Vietnamese Frontier. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Angermann, Michael. 2006. ‘Zwischen ‘Autozug’ und ‘Drahtseilakt’: Grenzüberschreitendes 
wirtschaftliches Handeln dargestellt am Transithandelsmarkt Kara-Suu im Ferganatal’. 
Unpublished MA Thesis, Humboldt University Berlin.
Animals Asia Foundation. 2012. Yao Ming visits the bears. Accessed July 10, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.animalsasia.org/intl/social/jills…/yao-ming-visits-the-bears/.
Anzieu, Didier. 1995 [1985]. Le Moi-Peau. Paris: Dunod.
Appel, Hannah, Nikhil Anand, and Akhil Gupta. 2015. ‘Introduction: The Infrastructure Toolbox’, 
Cultural Anthropology, September 24, 2015. Accessed September 30, 2015. Available at: http://
culanth.org/f ieldsights/714-introduction-the-infrastructure-toolbox
Atran, Scott, and Douglas L. Medin, eds. 2008. The Native Mind and the Cultural Construction 
of Nature. Cambridge: MIT Press.
242 The ArT of NeighbouriNg
Atwill, David G. 2003. ‘Blinkered Visions: Islamic Identity, Hui Ethnicity, and the Panthay 
Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-1873’. The Journal of Asian Studies 62 (4): 1079-1108.
Augé, Marc. 1992. Non-Lieux: Introduction à une anthropologie de la surmodernité. Paris: Le Seuil.
Barabantseva, Elena. 2012. ‘Who Are ‘Overseas Chinese Ethnic Minorities’? China’s Search for 
Transnational Ethnic Unity’. Modern China 38 (1): 78-109.
Barf ield, Thomas J. 1989. The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 B.C. to A.D. 1757. 
Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell.
Baud, Michiel, and Willem van Schendel. 1997. ‘Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands’. 
Journal of World History 8 (2): 211-242.
Bauer, Kenneth M. 2004. High Frontiers: Dolpo and the Changing World of Himalayan Pastoralists. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Bawden, Charles. 1989 [1968]. The Modern History of Mongolia. London and New York: Kegan 
Paul International.
BBC. 2015. China imposes one-year ban on ivory imports. Accessed March 15, 2015. Available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31648475.
Bell, Charles. 2000 [1924]. Tibet Past and Present. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.
Berger, Anne Emmanuelle, and Marta Segarra, eds. 2011. Demenageries: Thinking (of ) Animals 
after Derrida. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Berlie, Jean A. 2008. The Burmanization of Myanmar’s Muslims. Bangkok: White Lotus Press.
Billé, Franck. 2008. ‘Faced with Extinction: Myths and Urban Legends in Contemporary Mon-
golia’. Cambridge Anthropology 28 (1): 34-60.
Billé, Franck. 2012. ‘Concepts of the Border in the Russian and Chinese Social Imaginaries’. In 
Frontier Encounters: Knowledge and Practice at the Russian, Chinese and Mongolian Border, 
edited by F. Billé, C. Humphrey and G. Delaplace, 19-32. Cambridge: OpenBook Publishers.
Billé, Franck. 2014. ‘Surface Modernities: Open-Air Markets, Containment and Verticality in Two 
Border Towns of Russia and China’, Ekonomicheskaya sotsiologia 15 (2):154-172.
Billé, Franck. 2015. Sinophobia: Anxiety, Violence, and the Making of Mongolian Identity. Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press.
Blumenfield, Tami. 2011. ‘Culinary Controversies: Shark Fin Soup and Sea Creatures in the Asian 
Studies Curriculum’, Education About Asia 16 (3): 29-32.
Bonacich, Edna. 1973. ‘A Theory of Middleman Minority’. American Sociological Review 38 (5): 
583-594.
Bosker, Bianca. 2013. Original Copies: Architectural Mimicry in Contemporary China. Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press
Brenner, Neil. 2001. ‘The Limits to Scale: Methodological Reflections on Scalar Structuration’. 
Progress in Human Geography 25 (4): 591-614.
Breyfogle, Nicholas B., Abby Schrader, and Willard Sunderland. 2007. Peopling the Russian 
Periphery: Borderland Colonization in Eurasian History. London: Routledge.
Bringa, Tone. 1993. We are All Neighbours. Video recording, Granada Television, Spain. Directed 
by Debbie Christie.
Bristow, Michael. 2012. China Bear Bile Farms Stir Anger Among Campaigners. BBC News. 
Accessed July 10, 2013. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-17188043
Brown, Kate. 2003. A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press.
Bruno, Marta. 1997. ‘Women and the Culture of Entrepreneurship’. In Post-Soviet Women: From 
the Baltic to Central Asia, edited by M. Buckley, 56-76. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Bulag, Uradyn E. 1998. Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
bibliogrAPhy 243
Bulag, Uradyn E. 2009. ‘Mongolia in 2008: From Mongolia to Mine-golia’. Asian Survey 49 (1): 
129-134.
Bulag, Uradyn E. 2010. Collaborative Nationalism: The Politics of Friendship on China’s Mongolian 
Frontier. Lanham: Rowman and Littlef ield.
Bulag, Uradyn E. 2012a. ‘Independence as Restoration: Chinese and Mongolian Declarations of 
Independence and the 1911 Revolutions’. The Asia-Pacific Journal 10 (52). Available at: http://
www.japanfocus.org/-Uradyn_E_-Bulag/3872.
Bulag, Uradyn E. 2012b. ‘Rethinking Borders in Empire and Nation at the Foot of the Willow 
Palisade’. In Frontier Encounters: Knowledge and Practice at the Russian, Chinese and Mon-
golian Border, edited by Franck Billé, Caroline Humphrey and Grégory Delaplace, 33-53. 
Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.
Burgat, Florence. 1997. Animal, mon prochain [The animal, my neighbour]. Paris: Odile Jacob.
Bush, George W. 2005. President Discusses Freedom and Democracy in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. 
Accessed June 22, 2013. Available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2005/57239.htm.
Calarco, Matthew. 2008. Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Callicott, Baird J., and Roger T. Ames, eds. 1989. Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in 
Environmental Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Cammann, Schuyler V.R. 1970. Trade through the Himalayas: The Early British Attempts to Open 
Tibet. Westport: Greenwood Press.
Campbell, Ben. 2010. ‘Rhetorical Routes for Development: A Road Project in Nepal’. Contemporary 
South Asia 18 (3): 267-279.
Campi, Alicia, and Ragchaa Baasan. 2009. The impact of China and Russia on United States-
Mongolian political relations in the twentieth century. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press.
Campi, Alicia. 2005. ‘Mongolian Northeast Asia: the New Realities’. The Mongolian Journal of 
International Affairs 12: 46-64.
Campi, Alicia. 2010. ‘U.S. Government Policies towards Mongolia in the Late 20 Years – A Review’. 
Mengzang Jikan (Mongolia and Tibet Quarterly) 19 (3): 82-95.
Candler, Edmund. 1905. The Unveiling of Lhasa. London: Nelson.
Cao, Deborah. 2011. ‘Visibility and Invisibility of Animals in Traditional Chinese Philosophy 
and Law’. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 23 (4): 351-367.
Cao, Wenbin. 2010. Xifang Dongwu Jiefanglun yu Zhongguo Fojiao Hushengguan Bijiao Yanjiu 
(Comparative Studies of Western Animal Liberation Theory and the Chinese Buddhist View of 
the Protection of Life). Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe.
Chabros, Kyrstyna. 1992. Beckoning Fortune: A study of the Mongol dalalɣa ritual. Wiesbaden: 
Otoo Harrassowitz.
Chakravarti, Nalini Ranjan. 1971. The Indian Minority in Burma: The Rise and Decline of an 
Immigrant Community. London: Oxford University Press.
Chambers, Michael. 2005. ‘China and Southeast Asia: Creating a Win-win Neighborhood.’ In 
China’s “Good Neighbor” Diplomacy: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?, edited by Gang Lin, 16-22. 
Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars Asia Program.
Chang, Wen-Chin. 2003. ‘Three Yunnanese Jade Traders from Tengchong’. Kolor: Journal on 
Moving Communities 3 (1): 15-34.
Chao, Steve. 2011. Mustang vs China: A losing battle? Al Jazeera. Accessed July 2, 
2013. Available at: http://w w w.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeracorrespond-
ent/2011/10/201110973044296566.html.
Chen, Ganglong. 2001. ‘Menggu Zu Shibao Chuanshuo Yanjiu (A study of the Mongolian legend 
of recognizing treasure)’. Minsu Yanjiu (Folklore Studies) 2: 84-92.
244 The ArT of NeighbouriNg
Chen, Jian. 1995. “China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69.” The China Quarterly 142: 
356-387.
Chen, Lingna. 2013. Yunnan Chengjian Guojia ji Jingwai Jingji Hezuoqu Xiangmu huo Luohu 
Laowo Wanxiang (Yunnan Gets Contract to Build National-level Overseas Economic Coop-
eration Zone; Project may be Housed in Vientiane, Laos). Accessed March 13, 2013. Available 
at: http://yn.yunnan.cn/html/2013-03/13/content_2651371.htm.
China Tibet Information Center. 2007. Xizang Zizhiqu dui huiguo tanqin Zangbao jiedai guanli 
gongzuo de kaizhan qingkuang (On the work of receiving and managing Tibetan compatriots 
who return to the homeland for social visit in the TAR). Accessed January 13, 2010. Available 
at: http://tibet.cctv.com/20081225/105826.shtml
China’s State Food and Drug Administration. 2001. Drug Administration Law of the People’s 
Republic of China. Accessed March 18, 2015. Available at: http://eng.sfda.gov.cn/WS03/
CL0766/61638.html.
Chirot, Daniel, and Anthony Reid, eds. 1997. Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern 
Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Chua, Charmaine. 2015. ‘Slow Boat to China’ Web log series. Accessed January 15, 2015. Available 
at: https://thedisorderofthings.com/2015/01/05/the-slow-boat-to-china/
Chung, Chien-peng. 2004. Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China’s Territorial 
Disputes. London: Routledge.
Clarke, Michael, and Colin Mackerras, eds. 2009. China, Xinjiang and Central Asia: History, 
Transition and Crossborder Interaction into the 21st Century. London and New York: Routledge.
Clifford, James. 1988. The Predicament of Culture. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Clifford, James. 1997. Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century. Harvard: 
Harvard University Press.
Coggins, Chris. 2004. The Tiger and the Pangolin: Nature, Culture and Conservation in China. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Cohen, Robin. 1996. ‘Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers’. International 
Affairs 72 (3): 507-520.
Cooper, Helene. 2014. In Mongolia, a Gift Horse for Hagel. New York Times. Accessed August 1, 
2014. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/11/world/asia/defense-secretary-chuck-
hagel-mongolia.html?_r=0.
Crossley, Pamela Kyle, Helen Siu, and Donald Sutton. 2006. Empire at the margins: Culture, 
ethnicity and frontier in early modern China. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Cuff, Dana. 2005. ‘Enduring Proximity: The Figure of the Neighbour in Suburban America’. 
Postmodern Culture 15 (2). Available at: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/pmc/v015/15.2cuff.html.
da Col, Giovanni. 2012. ‘The poisoner and the parasite: cosmoeconomics, fear, and hospitality 
among Dechen Tibetans’. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 18 (S1): 175-195.
Dalakoglou, Dimitris, and Penny Harvey. 2012. ‘Roads and Anthropology: Ethnographic Perspec-
tives on Space, Time and (im)mobility’. Mobilities 7 (4): 459-465.
Daly, John C. K. 2008. ‘Mongolia holds Khan Quest Military Exercise’. Eurasia Daily Monitor 5 
(132). Available at: http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2373220.
Das, Veena. 2007. Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into Ordinary. Berkeley: University 
of California Press.
Davis, Bradley Camp. 2014. “Rebellion and Rule under Consular Optics: Changing Ways of 
Seeing the China-Vietnam Borderlands, 1874-1879.” Cross-Currents: East Asian History and 
Culture Review (11): 59-91.
bibliogrAPhy 245
Deb, Siddhartha. 2011. Where China Meets India by Thant Myint-U. The Guardian. Ac-
cessed September 6, 2011. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2011/aug/19/
where-china-meets-india-review.
Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program. 2010. ‘2010 Review Conference of the Parties to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’. Accessed July 5, 2013. Available at: 
http://dtirp.dtra.mil/pdfs/TIC_NPT_2010revconFinalDoc.pdf.
Defert, Gabriel. 2007. Les Rohingyas De Birmanie. Montreuil: Aux Lieux D’Etre.
Demenge, Jonathan. 2013. ‘The Road to Lingshed: Manufactured Isolation and Experienced 
Mobility in Ladakh’. Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies 
32 (1): Article 14. Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol32/iss1/14.
Derrida, Jacques. 2004. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. Translated by Mark Dooley and 
Michael Huges. New York: Routledge.
Derrida, Jacques. 2008. The Animal that Therefore I Am. New York: Fordham University Press.
Devkota, Shiva. 2009. ‘Distribution and Status of Highland Mushrooms: A Study From Dolpa, 
Nepal’. Journal of Natural History Museum 23: 51-59.
di Cosmo, Nicola. 1994. ‘Ancient Inner Asian Nomads: Their Economic Basis and Its Signif icance 
in Chinese History’. The Journal of Asian Studies 53 (4): 1092-1126.
Diana, Antonella. 2009. ‘Roses and Rifles: Experiments of Governing on the China-Laos Frontier’. 
PhD diss., Australian National University.
Diehl, Keila. 2002. Echoes from Dharamsala: Music in the Life of a Tibetan Refugee Community. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Diener, Alexander C., and Joshua Hagen. 2009. ‘Theorizing Borders in a “Borderless World”: 
Globalization, Territory and Identity’. Geography Compass 3 (3): 1196-1216.
Ding, Hong. 2005. ‘A Comparative Study on the Cultures of the Dungan and the Hui People’. 
Asian Ethnicity 6 (2): 135-140.
Dorjjugder, Munkh-Ochir. 2010. ‘Mongolia Approves New Rail Project with Great Powers in 
Mind’. Eurasia Daily Monitor 7 (126). Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_
cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37240 - .UhNcCj9xpIE.
Dorjjugder, Munkh-Ochir. 2011. Mongolia’s ‘Third Neighbour’ Doctrine and North Korea. Brook-
ings. Accessed July 4, 2013.
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. 1993. A Writer’s Diary. Translated by K. Lantz. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press.
Dwyer, Michael B. 2013. ‘Building the Politics Machine: Tools for ‘Resolving’ the Global Land 
Grab’. Development and Change 44 (2): 309-333.
Dyatlov, Viktor. 2003. ‘Blagoveshchenskaya “Utopia”: Iz Istorii Materializatsii Fobii’. In Evrazia: 
Liudi I Mify (Collection of Articles from Vestnik Evrazii), edited by S. A. Panarin, 123-141. 
Moscow: Natalis.
Dyatlov, Viktor. 2012. ‘The Blagoveshchensk Drowning: Story of How Phobias Become a Reality’. 
Sensus Historiae VII: 71-90.
Easterling, Keller. 2012. Zone: The Spatial Softwares of Extrastatecraft. Design Ob-
server. Accessed April 17, 2013. Available at: http://places.designobserver.com/feature/
zone-the-spatial-softwares-of-extrastatecraft/.
Edelman, Marc. 2005. ‘Bringing the Moral Economy Back In … To the Study of 21st-Century 
Transnational Peasant Movements’. American Anthropologist 107 (3): 331-345.
Egreteau, Renaud. 2011. ‘Burmese Indians in Contemporary Burma: Heritage, Influence, and 
Perceptions since 1988’. Asian Ethnicity 12 (1): 33-54.
Egreteau, Renaud. 2012. ‘The Burmese Jade Trail: Transnational Networks, China and the (Rela-
tive) Impact of International Sanctions against Myanmar’s Gems’. In Myanmay’s Transition: 
246 The ArT of NeighbouriNg
Openings, Obstacles and Opportunities, edited by N. Cheesman, M. Skidmore and T. Wilson, 
89-118. Singapore: ISEAS.
Elleman, Bruce A., Stephen Kotkin, and Clive Schof ield, eds. 2012. Beijing’s Power and China’s 
Borders: Twenty Neighbours in Asia. Armonk: M.E.Sharpe.
Ellis, Richard. 2005. Tiger Bone and Rhino Horn: The Destruction of Wildlife for Traditional Chinese 
Medicine. Washington: Island Press, Shearwater Books.
Elvin, Mark. 2004. The Retreat of the Elephants: An Environmental History of China. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.
Elvin, Mark. 2010. ‘Concepts of Nature: China and Europe in Comparative Perspective’. New 
Left Review 64: 65-82.
Embassy of Mongolia. n.d. ‘The Concept of National Security.” Accessed July 5, 2013. Available 
at: http://www.mongolianembassy.us/government_and_policy/the_concept_of_national_se-
curity.php#05.
Empson, Rebecca M. 2011. Harnessing Fortune: Personhood, Memory, and Place in Mongolia. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Environmental Investigation Agency. 2013. Wild Tigers Can’t Afford China’s Half-baked 
Commitments. Accessed September 3, 2013. Available at: https://eia-international.org/
wild-tigers-cannot-afford-chinas-half-baked-commitments
Escobal, Javier, and Carmen Ponce. 2003. The benefits of rural roads: Enhancing income opportuni-
ties for the rural poor. Lima: Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo (GRADE).
Esherick, Joseph W. 1998. ‘Cherishing Sources from Afar’. Modern China 24 (2): 135-161.
Espenilla, Jacqueline Joyce F. 2010. ‘Injustice Ignored: A Case Study of the Irregular Sea Migration 
of the Rohingya Boat People’. Asia Europe Journal 8: 45-59.
Estok, Simon C., and Won-Chung Kim, eds. 2013. East Asian Ecocriticisms: A Critical Reader. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Evans, Grant, Christopher Hutton, and Khun Eng Kuah, eds. 2000. Where China Meets Southeast 
Asia: Social and Cultural Change in the Border Regions. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies.
Fairbank, John King, and Denis Twitchett, eds. 1980. The Cambridge History of China, Volume 11: 
Late Ch’ing 1800-1911 Part 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fairbank, John King, and S. Y. Teng. 1941. ‘On the Ch’ing Tributary System’. Harvard Journal of 
Asiatic Studies 6 (2): 135-246.
Fairbank, John King, ed. 1968. The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Falcone, Jessica, and Tsering Wangchuk. 2008. ‘We’re Not Home’: Tibetan Refugees in India in 
the Twenty-First Century’. India Review 7 (3): 164-199.
Fawthrop, Tom. 2011. ‘High Stakes as Laos Turns to Casinos’. South China Morning Post, January 
23.
Fisher, James F. 1990. Sherpas: Reflections on Change in Himalayan Nepal. Berkeley: University 
of California Press.
Fiskesjö, Magnus. 1999. ‘On the “Raw” and the “Cooked” Barbarians of Imperial China’. Inner 
Asia 1 (2): 139-168.
Fiskesjö, Magnus. 2001. ‘Rising from Blood-Stained Fields: Royal Hunting and State Formation 
in Shang China’. Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities 73: 48-192.
Fiskesjö, Magnus. 2011. ‘The Animal Other: Re-naming the Barbarians in 20th-Century China’. 
Social Text 29 (4): 57-79.
Fiskesjö, Magnus. 2014. ‘Wa Grotesque: Headhunting Theme Parks and the Chinese Nostalgia 
for Primitive Contemporaries’. Ethnos 80 (4): 497-523.
bibliogrAPhy 247
Fond Obshchestvennoye Mnenie. 2007. ‘Rossiya I Kitai (Russia and China)’. Accessed May 14, 
2012. Available at: http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/d070624
Forbes, Andrew D.W. 1986. ‘The “Panthay” (Yunnanese Chinese) Muslims of Burma’. Journal 
Institute ofMuslim Minority Affairs 7 (2): 384-394.
Forbes. 2011. ‘Respublika Dordoi’. Accessed July 8, 2012. Available at: http://www.forbes.ru/
forbes/issue/2011-07/70326-respublika-dordoi
Frank, Andre Gunder. 1992. The Centrality of Central Asia. Amsterdam: VU University Press.
Frank, Andre Gunder. 1998. ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age. Berkeley: University 
of California Press.
Fravel, Taylor M. 2008. Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Ter-
ritorial Disputes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Freitag, Ulrike, and Achim von Oppen. 2010. Translocality: The Study of Globalising Processes 
from a Southern Perspective. Leiden: Brill.
Fujii, Lee Ann. 2009. Killing Neighbours: Webs of Violence in Rwanda. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press.
Fürer-Haimendorf, Christoph von. 1975. Himalayan traders. Life in highland Nepal. London: J. 
Murray.
Gao, Yufang, and Susan G. Clark. 2014. ‘Elephant ivory trade in China: Trends and drivers’. 
Biological Conservation 180: 23-30.
Garratt, Kevin. 1997. ‘Tibetan Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Returnees and the Refugees Convention: 
Predicaments, Problems and Prospects’. Tibet Journal 22 (3): 18-56.
Garver, John W. 2006. ‘Development of China’s overland transportation links with Central, 
South-west and South Asia’. The China Quarterly 185: 1-22.
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). 2011. ‘Customs Union Accession Dif-
ferential Social Impact Assessment for Kyrgyzstan’. Bishkek: GIZ.
Ghaley, Padam. 2001. ‘The Road Comes to Mustang’. Nepali Times, October 5.
Giersch, Charles Patterson. 2006. Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan 
Frontier. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Giersch, Charles Patterson. 2010. ‘Across Zomia with Merchants, Monks, and Musk: Process 
Geographies, Trade Networks, and the Inner-East-Southeast Asian Borderlands’. Journal of 
Global History 5 (2): 215-239.
Gladney, Dru. 1996. Relational Alterity: Constructing Dungan (Hui), Uygur, and Kazak Identities 
across China, Central Asia, and Turkey’. History and Anthropology 9 (4): 445-477.
Gladney, Dru. 2004. Dislocatinng China: Reflections on Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern 
Subjects. London: Hurst & Co.
Glassman, Jim. 2012. Bounding the Mekong: The Asian Development Bank, China and Thailand. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Goldstein, Melvyn. 1975. ‘A Report on Limi Panchayat, Humla District, Karnali Zone’. Contribu-
tions to Nepalese Studies 2 (2): 89-101.
Goodman, David S.G. 2004. ‘The Campaign to “Open up the West”: National, Provincial-Level 
and Local Perspectives’. The China Quarterly 178: 317-334.
Granzow, Bettina. 1995. ‘Chinesische Modernisierung und kultureller Eigensinn’. Zeitschrift 
für Soziologie 24 (3): 183-195.
Grover, Amar. 2011. Wild Mustang. Financial Times. Accessed July 2, 2013. Available at: http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/2/83e8d870-c273-11e0-9ede-00144feabdc0.html - axzz2Zx7Erh6I.
Grundy-Warr, Carl, and Elaine Wong. 1997. ‘Sanctuary under a Plastic Sheet: The Unresolved 
Problem of Rohingya Refugees’. IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin Autumn 5 (3): 79-91.
248 The ArT of NeighbouriNg
Gu, Chaolin, and Ying Sun. 1999. ‘Jingji Quanqiuhua Yu Zhongguo Guojixing Chengshi Jianshe 
(Economic Globalization and Building China’s International Metropolises)’. Urban Planning 
Forum 3: 1-6.
Guancha. 2012. Zhonglyu Gongsi zai Milu Jian Xincheng (Chinalco Builds New Town in Peru). Ac-
cessed October 9, 2012. Available at: http://www.guancha.cn/html2/60378/2012/07/03/82453.
shtml.
Guilford, Gwynn. 2013. The Wrong Stuff: The Latest in Chinese Luxury: Dead, Stuffed 
Zoo Animals. Accessed September 20, 2013. Available at: http://qz.com/124739/
the-latest-in-chinese-luxury-dead-stuffed-zoo-animals/
Guo, Xiaolin. 2010. ‘Boom on the Way from Ruili to Mandalay’. In Myanmar/Burma: Inside Chal-
lenges, Outside Interests, edited by A. Rieffel, 86-100. Washingon DC: Brookings Institution 
Press.
Hamashita, Takeshi. 2005. ‘Tribute and Treaties: Maritime Asia and Treaty Port Networks in the 
Era of Negotiation’. In The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150, and 50 Year Perspectives, edited 
by Giovanni Arrighi, 17-50. London: Routledge.
Hamashita, Takeshi. 2008. China, East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical 
Perspectives. London: Routledge.
Handler, Richard. 1988. Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec. Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press.
Hanna, A.C. 1932. ‘Burmese Moslems’. The Muslim World 22 (4): 398-405.
Hanzi. 2010. ‘Dongmeng Jingji Yitihua de Yonggan Kaituozhe: Fang Jinsanjiao Jingji Tequ Guan-
weihui Zhuxi, Jinmumian Jituan Dongshizhang Zhao Wei Xiansheng (The First Who Formed 
ASEAN Economic Model, Chairman of Golden Triangle Economic Zone and KingsRomans 
Group Mr Wei Zhao)’. Dongmeng Shijie (Bangkok) 11: 10-16.
Harrell, Stevan. 1995. Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers: Studies on Ethnic Groups 
in China. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Harris, Tina. 2008. ‘Silk Roads and Wool Routes: Contemporary Geographies of Trade Between 
Lhasa and Kalimpong’. India Review 7 (3): 200-222.
Harris, Tina. 2013. Geographical Diversions: Tibetan Trade, Global Transactions. Athens: Uni-
versity of Georgia Press.
Harrison, Simon. 2006. Fracturing Resemblances: Identity and Mimetic Confclit in Melanesia and 
the West. New York: Berghahn.
Hartigan, John. 2005. Odd Tribes: Toward a Cultural Analysis of White People. Durham: Duke 
University Press.
Harvey, David. 1989. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Conditions of Cultural 
Change. Oxford: Blackwell.
Harvey, David. 1991. ‘Between Space and Time: Reflections on the Geographic Imagination’. 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 80: 418-434.
Hekou Ministry of Commerce. 2008. Yunnan Hekou Kou’an Duiwai Maoyi Zaichuang Xingao 
(Border Trade Reaches New Level at Yunnan Hekou). Accessed March 3, 2008. Available at: 
http://kmtb.mofcom.gov.cn/article/g/200802/20080205381470.shtml
Henig, David. 2012. ‘“Knocking on my neighbour’s door”: On metamorphoses of sociality in rural 
Bosnia’. Critique of Anthropology 32 (1): 3-19.
Herzfeld, Michael. 2005. Cultural intimacy. Social poetics in the nation-state. New York: Routledge.
Hess, Julia M. 2009. Immigrant Ambassadors: Citizenship and Belonging in the Tibetan Diaspora. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Hevia, James L. 1995. Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy 
of 1793. Durham: Duke University Press.
bibliogrAPhy 249
Hevia, James L. 2003. English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China. 
Durham: Duke University Press.
Hey, Jeanne A.K., ed. 2003. Small states in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior. 
Boulder: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hobson, Kersty. 2007. ‘Political Animals? On Animals as Subjects in an Enlarged Political 
Geography’. Political Geography 26 (3): 250-267.
Holmes, Robert A. 1967. ‘Burmese Domestic Policy: The Politics of Burmanization’. Asian Survey 
7 (3): 188-197.
Honig, Bonnie. 1993. Political theory and the displacement of politics. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press.
Huang, Tingyan. 2011. Laowo Zongli Tongxin Tamafeng Lilin Jinsanjiao Jingji Tequ Shicha 
(Lao Premier Thongsing Thammavong Personally Inspects Golden Triangle SEZ). Accessed 
February 14, 2011. Available at: http://www.laosez.com/html/tqxw/102.html.
Human Rights Watch. 2012. The Government Could Have Stopped This: Sectarian Violence and 
Ensuing Abuses in Burma’s Arakan State. Washington: HRW Publications.
Human Rights Watch. 2013. ‘All You Can Do Is Pray’: Crime against Humanity and Ethnic Cleaning 
of Rohingyas Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State. Washington: HRW Publications.
Humphrey, Caroline, and Hürelbaatar Ujeed. 2012. ‘Fortune in the Wind: An Impersonal 
Subjectivity’. Social Analysis 56 (2): 152-167.
Humphrey, Caroline. 2002. The Unmaking of Soviet Live: Everyday Economies after Socialism. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Hyer, Paul, and Sechin Jagchid. 1983. A Mongolian Living Buddha: Biography of the Kanjurwa 
Khutughtu. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Igoe, Jim. 2010. ‘The Spectacle of Nature in the Global Economy of Appearances: Anthropological 
Engagements with the Spectacular Mediations of Transnational Conservation’. Critique of 
Anthropology 30 (4): 375-397.
Ingold, Tim, ed. 1988. What is an Animal? London: Unwin Hyman.
International Campaign for Tibet (ICT). 2003. China Constr ucts Road Near 
Nangpa La to Stem Flow of Tibetan Refugees to Nepal. International Campaign 
for Tibet . Accessed March 18, 2015 . Available at: http://w w w.savetibet .org/
china-constructs-road-near-nangpa-la-to-stem-flow-of-tibetan-refugees-to-nepal/.
Jacoby, Hanan. 1998. Access to Markets and Benefits of Rural Roads. A Nonparametric Approach. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Japan News. 2011. Japan’s New Ambassador to Mongolia Pays a Courtesy Call on Former Prime 
Minister Kaifu. Accessed June 22, 2013. Available at: http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/adv/chuo/dy/
special/201110_kaifu_shimizu.htm.
Kaiman, Jonathan. 2012. In China, Banning Shark Fin Is Uphill Battle. Los Angeles Times. 
Accessed July 10, 2013. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/31/world/
la-fg-china-shark-f in-20120201.
Kalir, Barak, and Malini Sur, eds. 2012. Transnational Flows and Permissive Polities: Ethnographies 
of Human Mobilities in Asia. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Kalton, Michael C. 2010. ‘Confucian Trajectories on Environmental Understanding’. In Con-
fucianism in Context: Classic Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, East Asia and Beyond, 
edited by Wonsuk Chang and Leah Kalmanson, 191-210. Albany: State University of New 
York Press.
250 The ArT of NeighbouriNg
Kaminski, Bartlomiej, and Gaël Raballand. 2009. ‘Entrepôt for Chinese Consumer Goods in 
Central Asia: The Puzzle of Re-Exports through Kyrgyz Bazaars’. Eurasian Geography and 
Economics 50 (5): 581-590.
Kang, David. 2010. East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute. New York: 
Columbia University Press.
Kansakar, Vidya Bir Singh. 2001. Nepal-India Open Border: Prospects, Problems and Challenges. 
Nepal Democracy. Accessed March 18, 2015. Available at: http://www.nepaldemocracy.org/
documents/treaties_agreements/nep_india_open_border.htm.
Karrar, Hassan H. 2009. The New Silk Road Diplomacy: China’s Central Asian Foreign Policy since 
the Cold War. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
Karrar, Hassan H. 2013. ‘Merchants, Markets, and the State: Informality, Transnationality, and 
Spatial Imaginaries in the Revival of Central Eurasian Trade’. Critical Asian Studies 45 (3): 
459-80.
Kenzari, Bechir. 2011. ‘Construction Rites, Mimetic Rivalry, Violence’ in Architecture and 
Violence, ed. Bechir Kenzari, 149-174. Barcelona: Actar.
Khin Khin Su. 1954. ‘Marriage Institution of the Burmese Moslem Community’. Journal of the 
Burma Research Society 36: 24-33.
Khin Maung Kyi. 2006. ‘Indians in Burma: Problems of an Alien Subculture in a Highly Integrated 
Society’. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K. S. Sandhu and A. Mani, 
624-665. Singapore: ISEAS.
Khin Maung Nyunt. 1995. ‘History of Myanmar Jade Trade Till 1938’. Paper presented at the 
Conference on Myanmar and Southeast Asian Studies, Yangon, Universities Historical 
Research Center, November 15-17.
Khin Maung Yin. 2005. ‘Salience of Ethnicity among Burman Muslims: A Study in Identity 
Formation’. Intellectual Discourse 13 (2): 161-179.
Kolås, Åshild. 2008. Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition: A Place Called Shangrila. London 
& New York: Routledge.
Kontimost. 2011. ‘Pervaya Expo “Kitai-Evraziya” uspeshno zavershilas’. Kontimost 10 (12): 12-15.
Kontinent. 2006. ‘Statistika Znaet Ne Vse. No. 20 (181), 25 October-7 November 2006’. Accessed 
July 8, 2012. Available at: http://www.continent.kz/2006/20/11.htm
Kramer, Tom, and Kevin Woods. 2012. Financing Dispossession: China’s Opium Substitution 
Programme in Northern Burma. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.
Lacaze, Gaelle. 2012. ‘Prostitution and the Transformation of the Chinese Trading Town of 
Ereen’. In Frontier Encounters: Knowledge and Practice at the Russian, Chinese and Mongolian 
Border, edited by Franck Billé, Grégory Delaplace and Caroline Humphrey, 111-136. Cambridge: 
OpenBook Publishers.
Lal, Karyn. 2003. ‘Classical China’. In A Companion to Environmental Philosophy, edited by Dale 
Jamieson, 21-36. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lama, Kunga Tsering. 2007. ‘Crowded Mountains, Empty Towns: Commodification and Contesta-
tion in Cordyceps Harvesting in Eastern Tibet’. MA thesis, University of Colorado-Boulder.
Lama, Sonam. 2013. ‘Road from nowhere to nowhere’. Nepali Times, 5-11  July. Ac-
cessed 01  August 2013 . Available at : http://nepalit imes.com/ar ticle/nation/
Nation-road-from-nowhere-to-nowhere,549
LaoSEZ. 2011. Jinmumian Jituan wei Tequ Baixing Juanzeng 50liang Sanlun Motuoche (King-
sRomans Group Donates Fifty Motorized Rickshaws to Zone’s Common People). Accessed 
February 14, 2011. Available at: http://www.laosez.com/html/tqxw/103.html.
Larkin, Brian. 2013. ‘The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure’. Annual Review of Anthropology 
42: 327-343.
bibliogrAPhy 251
Larson, Rhishja. 2010. Rhino Horn: All Myth, No Medicine. National Geographic. Accessed 
September 3, 2013. Available at: http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2010/07/07/
rhino_horn_and_traditional_chinese_medicine_facts/
Laruelle, Marlène, and Sébastien Peyrouse. 2009. ‘Cross-Border Minorities as Cultural and 
Economic Mediators between China and Central Asia’. The China and Eurasia Forum 
Quarterly 7 (1): 93-119.
Laruelle, Marlène, and Sébastien Peyrouse. 2012. The Chinese Question in Central Asia: Domestic 
Order, Social Change and the Chinese Factor. New York: Columbia University Press.
Laruelle, Marléne, Jean-François Huchet, and Sébastien Peyrouse, eds. 2010. China and India in 
Central Asia: A New “Great Game”? Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Laruelle, Marlène. 2007. ‘The Orient in Russian Thought at the Turn of the Century’. In Russia 
between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism, edited by D. Shlapentokh, 9-38. 
Leiden: Brill.
Lary, Diana. 2008. The Chinese state at the borders. Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press.
Latour, Bruno. 2005. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Le Bail, Helene, and Abel Tournier. 2010. ‘From Kunming to Mandalay: The New Burma Road’. 
IFRI Center Asie Working Papers No. 25.
Leach, Edmund R. 1960. ‘The Frontiers of ‘Burma’. Comparative Studies in Society and History 
3 (1): 49-68.
Ledeneva, Alena. 1998. Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lehman, F.K. 2007. ‘The Central Position of the Shan/Tai as “Knowledge Brokers” in the Inter-
Ethnic Network of the China-Burma (Myanmar) Borderlands’. Paper presented at the Shan 
Religion and Culture Conference, SOAS, University of London, December 8-10.
Levine, Nancy. 1988. The Dynamics of Polyandry: Kinship, Domesticity, and Population on the 
Tibetan Border. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lewa, Chris. 2008. ‘Asia’s New Boat People’. Forced Migration Review 30: 40-42.
Lewis, Mark E. 1990. Sanctioned Violence in Early China. Albany: State University of New York 
Press.
Li, Rex. 2008. A Rising China and Security in East Asia: Identity Construction and Security 
Discourse. London: Routledge.
Li, Xiaobing. 2007. A History of the Modern Chinese Army. Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky.
Light, Ivan, Georges Sabagh, Mehdi Bozorgmehr, and Claudia Der-Martirosian. 1994. ‘Beyond 
the Ethnic Enclave Economy’. Social Problems 41 (1): 65-80.
Lim, Francis K. G. 2009. ‘Donkey friends’ in China: the Internet, civil society and the emergence 
of Chinese backpacking community’. In Asia on Tour: Exploring the Rise of Asian Tourism, 
edited by Tim Winter, Peggy Teo and T.C. Chang, 291-301. New York: Routledge.
Lin, Gang. 2005. China’s “Good Neighbour” Diplomacy: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? 
Accessed July 5, 2013. Available at: https://w w w.wilsoncenter.org/publication/
chinas-good-neighbor-diplomacy-wolf-sheeps-clothing
Lintner, Bertil. 1989. ‘Burma’s Jade Trail’. Gemological Digest 2 (4): 24-31.
Lintner, Bertil. 1994. ‘The Volatile Yunnan Frontier’. Jane’s Intelligence Review 6 (2): 84.
Lintner, Bertil. 1999. Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948. Chiang Mai: Silkworm 
Books.
Long, Lynellyn, and Ellen Oxfeld, eds. 2004. Coming Home? Refugees, Migrants and Those Who 
Stayed Behind. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
252 The ArT of NeighbouriNg
Lü, Minghe. 2013. China’s Prof itable Trade in Stuffed Rare Animals. China Dialogue. Accessed 
September 20, 2013. Available at: https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/
en/6359-China-s-prof itable-trade-in-stuffed-rare-animals
Ludden, David. 2003. ‘Maps in the Mind and the Mobility of Asia’. The Journal of Asian Studies 
62 (4): 1057-1078.
Luo, Rongqu. 2009. ‘New Perspectives on Historical Development and the Course of Moderniza-
tion in East Asia’. Chinese Studies in History 43 (1): 17-27.
Lyttleton, Chris, and Pál Nyíri. 2011. ‘Dams, Casinos and Concessions: Chinese Megaprojects in 
Laos and Cambodia’. In Engineering Earth: The Impacts of Megaengineering Projects, edited 
by Stanley D. Brunn, 1243-1266. London and New York: Springer.
Lyttleton, Chris, Paul Cohen, H. Rattanavong, B. Tongkhamhan, and S. Sisaengrat, eds. 2004. 
Watermelons, Bars and Trucks: Dangerous Intersections in Northwestern Laos. Bangkok: 
Rockfeller Foundation.
Ma, Chao-qun. 2003. ‘The Other Name of Yunnan Muslim – an Etymological Analysis of Panthay, 
Pang-Hse and Pashi’. Huizu Yanjiu (Research on the Hui Ethnicity) 51 (3): 30-36.
MacDonald, David. 1999 [1930]. Touring in Sikkim and Tibet. New Delhi: Asian Educational 
Services.
Madhu, K.C., Sussana Phoboo, and Pramod Kumar Jha. 2010. ‘Ecological Study of Paris Polyphylla 
SM’. Ecoprint 17: 87-93.
Maejima, Shinji. 1931. ‘Unnan no ensei to seinan’i (Yunnan Salt Wells and the Southwestern 
Barbarians)’. Rekishi to Chiri (History and Geography) 28 (5): 22-44.
Mahajani, Usha. 1960. The Role of Indian Minorities in Burma and Malaya. Bombay: Vora & Co.
Malkki, Liisa. 1997 [1992]. ‘National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization 
of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees’. In Culture, Power, Place: Explorations 
in Critical Anthropology, edited by Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, 52-74. Durham: Duke 
University Press.
Mao, Zedong. 1925. ‘Analysis of all the classes in Chinese society (December 1)’. In Mao’s Road to 
Power: National Revolution and Social Revolution, December 1920-June 1927, edited by Stuart 
R. Schram and Nancy Jane Hodes, 249-262. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
Markovits, Claude. 2013. ‘Merchant Circulation in South Asia (Eighteenth to Twentieth Centu-
ries): The Rise of Pan-Indian Merchant Networks’. In Society and Circulation: Mobile People 
and Itinerant Cultures in South Asia, 1750-1950, edited by C. Markovits, J. Pouchepadass and 
S. Subrahmanyam, 131-162. Delhi: Permanent Black.
Mathieson, David Scott. 2009. ‘Plight of the Damned: Burma’s Rohingya’. Global Asia 4 (1): 86-91.
McDonald, Mark. 2012. Finally, Outrage in China against Bear Farming. New York Times. 
Accessed July 10, 2013. Available at: http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/
f inally-outrage-in-china-against-bear-farming/?_r=0.
McKay, Alex. 1997. Tibet and the British Raj: The Frontier Cadre, 1904-1947. Richmond: Curzon 
Press.
Mehdudia, Sujay. 2013. ‘India Raises Trade Imbalance Issue with China’. The Hindu. Accessed 
September 3, 2013. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/india-raises-
trade-imbalance-issue-with-china/article5042167.ece
Menzies, Nicholas K. 1992. ‘Strategic Space: Exclusion and Inclusion in Wildland Policies in Late 
Imperial China’. Modern Asian Studies 26 (4): 719-733.
Menzies, Nicholas K. 1994. Forest and Land Management in Imperial China. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press.
Messerschmidt, Donald A. 1982. ‘Miteri in Nepal: Fictive Kin Ties That Bind’. Kailash: A Journal 
of Himalayan Studies Kathmandu 9 (1): 5-43.
bibliogrAPhy 253
Miller, Jacques-Alain. 1994. ‘Extimité’. In Lacanian theory of discourse: Subject, stucture and 
society, edited by Mark Bracher, 79-80. New York: Routledge.
Millward, James A. 2009. ‘Positioning Xinjiang in Eurasian and Chinese History: Differing 
Visions of the “Silk Road”‘. In China, Xinjiang and Central Asia: History, Transition and Future 
Prospects into the 21st Century, edited by M. Clarke and C. Mackerras, 55-74. London and 
New York: Routledge.
Ministry for Communication and Information. 2011. Modernizaciya i rost konkurentosposobnosti 
ekonomiki Kazakhstana. Almaty: Kazak entsiklopediasy.
Ministry for Economic Development and Trade. 2010. ‘Programma razvitiya torgovli v RK 
na 2010-2014 Gody’. Accessed October 23, 2011. Available at: http://www.minplan.kz/
economyabout/8433/35280/
Mitchell, Don. 1996. The Lie of the Land: Migrant Workers and the California Landscape. Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Møllgaard, Eske. 2010. ‘Confucianism as Anthropological Machine’. Asian Philosophy 20: 127-140.
Moran, Peter. 2004. Buddhism Observed: Travellers, Exiles and Tibetan Dharma in Kathmandu. 
New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. 1999. ‘Lines in the Snow: Imagining the Russo-Japanese Frontier’. Pacific 
Affairs 72 (1): 57-77.
Mya Maung. 1994. ‘On the Road to Mandalay: A Case Study of the Sinonization of Upper Burma’. 
Asian Survey 34 (5): 447-459.
Narangoa, Li. 2009. ‘Mongolia and Preventive Diplomacy: Haunted by History and Becoming 
Cosmopolitan’. Asian Survey 49 (2): 358-379.
Nasanbaljir, Ts. 1964. Ar Mongoloos Manj chin ulsad zalguulj baisan alba, 1691-1911 (Corvée duties 
performed by Outer Mongolia to the Manchu Qing State, 1691-1911). Ulaanbaatar: Academy 
of Sciences Press.
Nasritdinov, Emil, and Kevin O’Connor. 2010. Regional Change in Kyrgyzstan: Bazaars, Cross-
Border Trade and Social Networks. Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing.
Nemstova, Anna. 2012. ‘Russia’s Bridge to Nowhere’. Foreign Policy Accessed July 5, 2013. Available 
at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/07/russia_s_bridge_to_nowhere
Nepal Khadya Surakshya Anugaman Pranali (NeKSAP). 2009. The Cost of Coping. A Collision 
of Crises and the Impact of Sustained Food Security Deterioration in Nepal. World Food 
Programme. Accessed March 18, 2015. Available at: http://www.webcitation.org/69DpcyFOZ.
Newman, David, and Anssi Passi. 1998. ‘Fences and Neighbors in the Postmodern World: Bound-
ary Narratives in Political Geography’. Progress in Human Geography 22 (2): 186-207.
Newman, David. 2006. ‘The Lines That Continues to Separate Us: Borders in Our ‘Borderless’ 
World’. Progress in Human Geography 30 (2): 143-161.
New York Times. 1964. Nepal Road Aims at Link to Tibet. Accessed March 18, 2015. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1964/02/09/nepal-road-aims-at-link-to-tibet.html.
Nicholls, Henry. 2010. The Way of the Panda: The Curious History of China’s Political Animal. 
London: Prof ile.
Nordstrom, Carolyn. 2007. Global Outlaws: Crime, Money, and Power in the Contemporary World. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Nuclear Threat Initiative. 2013. ‘Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status of Mongolia’. Accessed July 5, 2013. 
Available at: http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/nuclear-weapon-free-status-mongolia/
Nye, Joseph S. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs.
Nyi Nyi Kyaw. 2008. ‘Rohingya Muslims: Myanmar’s Forgotten People’. RSIS Commentaries No. 
12. Available at: www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/f iles/textOnlyContent/FMR/30/Khaw.doc
254 The ArT of NeighbouriNg
Nyíri, Pál, and Joana Breidenbach. 2008. ‘The Altai Road: Visions of Development across the 
Russian-Chinese Border’. Development and Change 39 (1): 123-145.
Nyíri, Pál. 2006. ‘The Yellow Man’s Burden: Chinese Migrants on a Civilizing Mission’. The China 
Journal 56: 83-106.
Nyíri, Pál. 2011. ‘Chinese Entrepreneurs in Poor Countries: A Transnational ‘Middleman Minority’ 
and Its Futures’. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 12 (1): 145-153.
Nyíri, Pál. 2012a. ‘Enclaves of improvement: Sovereignty and developmentalism in the special 
zones of the China-Lao borderlands’. Comparative Studies in Society and History 54 (3): 
533-562.
Nyíri, Pál. 2012b. ‘The Renaissance of Concessions’. Political Geography 31 (4): 195-196.
Off ice of the Geographer Bureau of Intelligence and Research (OGBIR). 1965. China – Nepal 
boundary. International Boundary Study 50. Accessed March 18, 2015. Available at: http://
www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/limitsinseas/IBS050.pdf.
Oglezneva, Elena. 2007. Russko-Kitaiskii Pidzhin. Blagoveshchensk: Amur State University Press.
Olsgard, Michelle. 2009. ‘Exploring the Rush for ‘Himalayan Gold’: Tibetan Yartsa Gunbu 
Harvesting in Northwest Yunnan and Considerations for Management’. In Contemporary 
Visions in Tibetan Studies, edited by Brandon Dotson, 69-92. London: Serindia.
Ong, Aihwa. 1999. Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham: Duke 
University Press.
Ong, Aihwa. 2006. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Sovereignty and Citizenship. Durham: 
Duke University Press.
Ong, Aihwa. 2011a. ‘Hyperbuilding: Spectacle, Speculation and the Hyperspace of Sovereignty’. 
In Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global, edited by Ananya Roy and 
Aihwa Ong, 205-226. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Ong, Aihwa. 2011b. ‘Introduction: Worlding Cities, or the Art of Being Global’. In Worlding Cities: 
Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global, edited by A. Roy and A. Ong, 1-26. Chichester: 
Blackwell Publishing.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 2012. Mongolia joins the OSCE. Accessed 
June 22, 2013. Available at: http://www.osce.org/cio/106302
Osnos, Evan. 2011. Equine Diplomacy. The New Yorker. Accessed June 22, 2013. Available at: 
doi:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2011/08/equine-diplomacy-biden-
in-mongolia.html - ixzz1nOtzNUKZ.
Oushakine, Serguei Alex. 2009. The Patriotism of Despair: Nation, War, and Loss in Russia. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press.
Özcan, Gül Berna. 2010. Building States and Markets: Enterprise Development in Central Asia. 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Parham, Steven. 2009. ‘What Lies Between. Controlling State Boundaries and Negotiating 
Trans-Frontier Nations in the Borderlands of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China’. PhD Dis-
sertation, University of Bern.
Park, Choong-Hwan. 2014. ‘Nongjiale Tourism and Contested Space in Rural China’. Modern 
China 40 (5): 519-548.
Parliament of Mongolia. 2014. Töröör tömör zamyn teevriin talaar barimtlah bodlogyn 
heregjiltiig hangah zarim arga hemjeenii tuhai (Some measures to be taken for implementing 
the State Policy on Railway Transportation)’. Accessed January 1, 2015. Available at: http://
www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/10742.
Pedersen, Morten Axel, and Mikkel Bunkenborg. 2012. ‘Roads that Separate: Sino-Mongolian 
Relations in the Inner Asian Desert’. Mobilities 7 (4): 555-569.
bibliogrAPhy 255
People’s Daily. 2011a. ‘Kitai i Kazakhstan namereny ispol’zovat’ MCPS Khorgos dlya ukrepleniya 
torgovykh svyazey mezhdu chlenami-sosudarstvami ShOS’. Accessed July 9, 2012. Available 
at: http://russian.people.com.cn/31518/7637965.html
People’s Daily. 2011b. ‘Otkrytie MCPS Khorgos na kitaisko-kazakhstanskoy granice sozdalo 
novuyu model’ torgovo-ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestvo v regione Evrazii’. Accessed July 
9, 2012. Available at: http://russian.people.com.cn/31521/7664473.html
People’s Daily. 2002. Overseas Tibetans Welcomed Back. Accessed August 31, 2013.
Perdue, Peter. 2005. China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press.
Perdue, Peter. 2008. ‘Is Pu-er in Zomia?: Tea Cultivation and the State in China’. Paper presented 
at the Yale University Agrarian Studies Colloquium, Yale University, New Haven, October 24.
Perekhval’skaya, E. 2008. Russkie Pidzhiny. Saint Petersburg: Aleteiya.
Phoenix TV. 2010. Longxing Tianxia (The Dragon Travels the World). Accessed January 15, 
2011. Available at: http://v.ifeng.com/f/201012/abd93737-0ccf-4d01-b630-aa4f52ecbc51.shtml.
Pines, Yuri. 2004. ‘Beasts or Humans: Pre-imperial Origins of the “Sino-Barbarian” Dichotomy’. In 
Mongols, Turks, and Others, edited by Reuven Amitai and Michal Biran, 59-102. Leiden: Brill.
Ponkratova, Liudmila, Andrei Zabiyako, and Roman Kobyzov. 2009. Russkie I Kitaitsy: Etnomi-
gratsionnye Protsessy Na Dal’nem Vostoke. Blagoveshchensk: Amur State University Press.
Powers, John. 2004. History as Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles Versus the People’s Republic of China. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Pratt, Marie Louise. 1991. ‘Arts of the Contact Zone’. Profession 1991: 33-40.
Pu, Chengzhong. 2014. Ethical Treatment of Animals in Early Chinese Buddhism: Beliefs and 
Practices. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars.
Putnam, Robert D. 2008. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New 
York: Simon & Schuster.
Qi, Xuejun. 2009. Heihe Shihua (Heihe Historical Narratives). Harbin: Heilongjiang People’s 
Publishing House.
Raballand, Gaël, and Agnès Andrésy. 2007. ‘Why Should Trade between Central Asia and China 
Continue to Expand?’ Asia Europe Journal 5 (2): 235-252.
Radchenko, Sergey. 2012. ‘Soviet Withdrawal from Mongolia, 1986-1992: A Reassessment’. Journal 
of Slavic Military Studies 25 (2): 183-203.
Rauber, Hanna. 1980. ‘The Humli-Khyampas of Far Western Nepal: A Study in Ethnogenesis’. 
Contributions to Nepalese Studies 8 (1): 57-79.
Rauber, Hanna. 1981. ‘Humli-Khyampas and the Indian Salt Trade: changing Economy of 
Nomadic Traders in Far Western Nepal’. In The Other Nomads: Peripatetics in Cross Cultural 
Perspective, edited by Aparna Rao, 35-64, London: Academic Press.
Reeves, Jeffrey. 2012. ‘Mongolia’s evolving security strategy: omni-enmeshment and balance of 
influence’. The Pacific Review 25 (5): 589-612.
Reeves, Madeleine. 2014. Border Work: Spatial Lives of the State in Rural Central Asia. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press.
Regmi, Krishna R. and Madhav Joshi. 2008. ‘Emerging Food Security Challenges and Sustainable 
Management Strategies in Nepal’. The Third SAS-N Convention, Kathmandu, Nepal, August 
27-29.
Ren, Mu, and Dominique van de Walle. 2007. Rural Roads and Local Market Development in 
Vietnam. World Bank Research Working Paper WPS4340. Accessed September 1, 2013. Available 
at: http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/poverty/ie/dime_papers/924.pdf
256 The ArT of NeighbouriNg
Ren, Xuefei. 2011. Building Globalization: Transnational Architecture Production in Urban China. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rizvi, Janet. 1996. Ladakh: Crossroads of High Asia. 2nd ed. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1933. First Inaugural Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Accessed July 5, 
2013. Available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/froos1.asp
Rossabi, Morris, ed. 1983. China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbours, 10th-14th 
Centuries. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Rossabi, Morris. 2005. Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Roy, Rabindra, Dietrich Schmidt-Vogt, and Olav Myrholt. 2009. ‘Humla Development Initia-
tives for Better Livelihoods in the Face of Isolation and Conflict’. Mountain Research and 
Development 29 (3): 211-219.
Rumsfeld Off ice. 2011. Reunited with ‘Montana’ – the Mongolian horse presented to me 
six years ago. Accessed June 22, 2013. Available at: https://twitter.com/rumsfeldoff ice/
status/125981857903939584
Rykwert, Joseph. 2000. The Seduction of Place: The History and Future of the City. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Sadovskaya, Yelena Y. 2012. ‘Patterns of Contemporary ‘Chinese’ Migration into Kazakhstan’. In 
Chinese Migrants in Russia, Central Asia and Eastern Europe, edited by F.B. Chang and S.T. 
Rucker-Chang, 106-133. London and New York: Routledge.
Saxer, Martin. 2013a. ‘Between China and Nepal: Trans-Himalayan Exchange and the Second 
Life of Development in Upper Humla’. Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
8: 31-52.
Saxer, Martin. 2013b. Manufacturing Tibetan Medicine: The Creation of An Industry and the Moral 
Economy of Tibetanness. New York and Oxford: Berghahn.
Schaffer, Simon, Lissa Roberts, Kapil Raj, and James Delbourgo, eds. 2009. The Brokered World: 
Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770-1820. Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications.
Schein, Louisa. 1997. “Gender and Internal Orientalism in China.” Modern China 23 (1): 69-98.
Schein, Louisa. 2000. Minority Rules: The Miao and the Feminine in China’s Cultural Politics. 
Durham: Duke University Press.
Schmitt, Carl. 1996 [1932]. The Concept of the Political. Translated by George Schwab. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press.
Scott, James C. 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast 
Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Scott, James C. 2009. The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast 
Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Seekins, Donald M. 1997. ‘Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire’. Asian Survey 37 (6): 525-539.
Selth, Andrew. 2004. ‘Burma’s Muslims and the War on Terror’. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
27 (2): 107-126.
Serruys, Henry. 1967. Sino-Mongol Relations During the Ming II: The Tribute System and Diplomatic 
Missions (1400-1600). Bruxelles: Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises.
Set Aung, Winston. 2011. Informal Trade and Underground Economy in Myanmar: Costs and 
Benefits. Bangkok: IRASEC Occasional Paper Observatory Series.
Shambaugh, David. 2005. ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order’. International 
Security 29 (3): 64-99.
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. 2006. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Charter. Ac-
cessed June 22, 2013.
bibliogrAPhy 257
Sheller, Mimi. 2010. ‘Air Mobilities on the U.S.-Caribbean Border: Open Skies and Closed Gates’. 
The Communication Review, 13:4, 269-288.
Shepherd, Robert. 2009. ‘Cultural Preservation, tourism and “donkey travel” on China’s frontier’. 
In Asia on Tour: Exploring the Rise of Asian Tourism, edited by Tim Winter, Peggy Teo and 
T.C. Chang, 253-263. New York: Routledge.
Shi, Weiyi. 2008. Rubber Boom in Luang Namtha: A Transnational Perspective. Vientiane: GTZ 
Rural Development in Mountainous Areas (RDMA).
Shih, Victor. 2004. ‘Development, the Second Time-Around: The Political Logic of Developing 
Western China’ Journal of East Asian Studies 4 (3): 427-451.
Shin, Leo. 2006. The Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shishmanova, Patricia. 2011. ‘Bereg Byvshikh Russkikh’. Vokrug Sveta. Accessed May 12, 2012. 
Available at: http://www.vokrugsveta.ru/vs/article/7374
Shneiderman, Sara. 2013. ‘Himalayan Border Citizens: Sovereignty and Mobility in the Nepal-
Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) of China Border Zone’. Political Geography 35: 25-36.
Shrestha, Buddhi N. 2011. ‘Border Fences Walls and Identity of Nepal’. The International Confer-
ence on Fences, Walls, and Borders: State of Insecurity?, Montreal, Canada, May 17-18.
SIAR Research and consulting. 2011. ‘Status and Prospects of the Kyrgyz Garment Sewing 
Industry’. Bishkek. Accessed June 13, 2014. Available at: http://siar-consult.com/wp-content/
uploads/report_garment_f inal.pdf.
Singh, Bhrigupati. 2011. “Agonistic intimacy and moral aspiration in popular Hinduism: A study 
in the pollitical theology of the neighbor.” American Ethnologist 38 (3): 430-450.
Smith, Neil. 1984. Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space. Oxford: 
Blackwell.
Sneath, David. 2009. ‘Reading the Signs by Lenin’s Light: Development, Divination and Meto-
nymic Fields in Mongolia’. Ethnos 74 (1): 72-90.
Song, Nianshen. 2012. ‘“Tributary” from a Multilateral and Multilayered Perspective’. Chinese 
Journal of International Politics 5 (2): 155-182.
Songster, Elena E. 2004. ‘A Natural Place for Nationalism: The Wanglang Nature Reserve and the 
Emergence of the Giant Panda as a National Icon’. PhD Dissertation. University of California, 
San Diego.
Sorabji, Cornelia. 2008. ‘Bosnian neighbourhoods revisited: tolerance, commitment and 
komsˇiluk in Sarajevo’. In On the Margins of Religion, edited by Frances Pine and João de 
Pina-Cabral, 97-112. Oxford: Berghahn.
Spector, Regine A. 2008. ‘Bazaar Politics: The Fate of Marketplaces in Kazakhstan’. Problems of 
Post-Communism 55 (6): 42-53.
Spector, Regine A. 2009. Protecting Property: The Politics of Bazaars in Kyrgyzstan. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Springf ield News-Sun. 2012. Michigan Town Near Ohio Could Become China City. 
Accessed October 9, 2012. Available at: http://article.wn.com/view/2012/05/05/
Michigan_town_near_Ohio_could_become_8216China_City_8217/
Sterckx, Roel. 2002. The Animal and the Daemon in Early China. Albany: State University of 
New York Press.
Stites, Richard. 1999. ‘Crowded on the Edge of Vastness: Observations on Russian Space and 
Place’. In Beyond the Limits: The Concept of Space in Russian History and Culture, edited by 
J. Smith, 259-270. Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society.
Subba, Bhim B. 2011. ‘Border Trade at Nathu La: Five Years After’. Institute of Peace and Conflict 
Studies. Accessed August 30, 2013. Available at: http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/border-
trade-at-nathu-la-f ive-years-after-3432.html
258 The ArT of NeighbouriNg
Sulaiman, Mohammed Mohiyuddin Mohammed. 2008. ‘Islamic Education in Myanmar: A 
Case Study’. In Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in Myanmar, edited by M. Skidmore and 
T. Wilson, 177-191. Canberra: ANU E-Press.
Sulek, Emilia R. 2009. ‘In the Land of Check Points: Yartsa Gunbu Business in Golok 2007’. In 
Contemporary Visions in Tibetan Studies, edited by Brandon Dotson, 15-44. London: Serindia.
Sun, Laichen. 2011. ‘From Baoshi to Feicui: Qing-Burmese Gem Trade, C. 1644-1800’. In Chinese 
Circulations: Capital, Commodities and Networks in Southeast Asia, edited by E. Tagliacozzo 
and W.-C. Chang, 203-220. Durham: Duke University Press.
Swope, Kenneth M. 2002. ‘Deceit, Disguise, and Dependence: China, Japan, and the Future of 
the Tributary System, 1592-1596’. The International History Review 24 (4): 757-782.
Syroezhkin, Konstantin. 2009. Kazakhstan-Kitai: Ot Prigranichny Torgovli K Strategicheskomu 
Sotrudnichestvu. Almaty: KISI.
Tagliacozzo, Eric, and Wen-chin Chang, eds. 2011. Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities 
and Networks in Southeast Asia. Durham: Duke University Press.
Tagliacozzo, Eric. 2009. Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast 
Asian Frontier, 1865-1915. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Tambiah, Stanley Jevaraya. 1969. ‘Animals are Good to Think and Good to Prohibit’. Ethnology 
8 (4): 423-459.
Tan, Danielle. 2010. Du Triangle d’or au Quadrangle économique: Acteurs, enjeux et défis des flux 
illicites transfrontaliers dans le Nord-Laos. Bangkok: IRASEC.
Tani, Yutaka. 1996. ‘Domestic animal as serf: Ideologies of nature in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East’. In Redefining nature: Ecology, culture and domestication, edited by R. F. Ellen 
and K. Fukui, 387-415. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taussig, Michael. 1993. Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses. New York: 
Routledge.
Taylor, Robert H. 2006. ‘The Legal Status of Indians in Contemporary Burma’. In Indian Com-
munities in Southeast Asia, edited by K. S. Sandhu and A. Mani, 666-682. Singapore: ISEAS.
The Washington Times. 2005. Bush hails democracy during Mongolian visit. Accessed July 5, 
2013. Available at: http://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/nov/21/20051121-103436-8034r/
Thomas, Alan. 2000. ‘Development as Practice in a Liberal Capitalist World’. Journal of Interna-
tional Development 12 (6): 773-787.
Thompson, Edward Palmer. 1966. The making of the English working class. New York: Vintage 
Books.
Thompson, Edward Palmer 1971. ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth 
Century’. Past & Present 50: 76-136.
Thompson, Edward Palmer. 1991. Customs in Common. New York: New Press.
Tibet Information Network (TIN). 2010. China’s Tibet’s Backyard. Accessed March 18, 2015. 
Available at: http://www.tibet.ca/en/library/wtn/8927.
Tomba, Luigi. 2009. ‘Of Quality, Harmony, and Community: Civilization and the Middle Class 
in Urban China’. Positions 17 (3): 592-616.
Tretiak, Daniel. 1979. “China’s Vietnam War and Its Consequences.” The China Quarterly 80: 
740-767.
Tsai, Tung-Chieh, Ming-Te Hung, and Tony Tai-Ting Liu. 2011. ‘China’s foreign policy in South-
east Asia: Harmonious worldview and its impact on good neighbour diplomacy’. Journal of 
Contemporary Eastern Asia 10 (1): 25-42.
Tsing, Anna. 2005. Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
bibliogrAPhy 259
Tuttle, Gray. 2007. Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China. New York: Columbia 
University Press.
United Daily News. 2005. ‘Sino-Mongolia Joint Statement: No Military Alliance Directed Against 
Each Other’. November 30.
USAID. 2010. ‘Economic Consequences of the Customs Union for the Kyrgyz Republic’. Accessed 
June 13, 2014. Available at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaec882.pdf
van Houtum, Henk. 2005. ‘The Geopolitics of Borders and Boundaries’. Geopologics 10: 672-679.
van Schendel, Willem. 2002. ‘Geographies of Knowing, Geographies of Ignorance: Jumping Scale 
in Southeast Asia’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 20 (6): 647-668.
van Schendel, Willem. 2005. ‘Spaces of Engagement: How Borderlands, Illicit Flows, and Ter-
ritorial States Interlock’. In Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders and the Other 
Side of Globalization, edited by W. van Schendel and I. Abraham, 38-68. Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
van Spengen, Wim. 2000. Tibetan Border Worlds: Geohistorical Analysis of Trade and Traders. 
New York: Kegan Paul International.
Vasantkumar, Chris. 2009. ‘Domestic Tourism and Its Discontents: Han Tourism in China’s 
“Little Tibet”‘. In Domestic Tourism in Asia: Diversity and Divergence, edited by Shalini Singh, 
129-150. London: Earthscan Publishing.
Vasantkumar, Chris. 2012. ‘What is this “Chinese” in Overseas Chinese? Sojourn Work and the 
Place of China’s Minority Nationalities in Extraterritorial Chinese-ness’. The Journal of Asian 
Studies 71 (2): 423-446.
Vasantkumar, Chris. 2013. ‘Tibetan Peregri-nations: Mobility, Incommensurable Nationalisms 
and (Un)belonging Athwart the Himalayas’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 39 (2): 
219-235.
Vasantkumar, Chris. 2014. ‘Unmade in China: Reassembling the Ethnic on the Gansu-Tibetan 
Border’. Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology 79 (2): 261-286.
Vecherny Bishkek. 2011. ‘Soobrazim na chetverykh’. September 28.
Vinding, Michael. 1998. The Thakali: A Himalayan Ethnography. London: Serinda Publications.
Vogel, Hans Ulrich. 2003. ‘Salt and Chinese Culture: Some Comparative Aspects’. the 8th 
Symposium on Chinese Dietary Culture, Chengdu, Sichuan University.
Waldinger, Roger. 1994. ‘The Making of an Immigrant Niche’. International Migration Review 
28 (1): 3-30.
Walt, Stephen M. 1985. ‘Alliance formation and the balance of world power’. International 
Security 9 (4): 3-34.
Wang, Baoxiang, and Weiguo Liu. 2012. Hekou Kou’an Tongguan Jingru “Dumiao Shidai”: Cong 
Banxiaoshi dao Sanfenzhong (Clearing Hekou’s Customs Takes Seconds: From Half an Hour 
to Three Minutes). Yunnan Daily. Accessed September 20, 2012. Available at: http://www.
mofcom.gov.cn/article/resume/n/201504/20150400940136.shtml
Wang, Gungwu. 1983. ‘The Rhetoric of a Lesser Empire: Early Sung Relations with Its Neighbours’. 
In China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbours, 10th-14th Centuries, edited 
by Morris Rossabi, 47-65. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wang, Yude, and Quanming Zhang. 1999. Zhonghua Wuqiannian Shengtai Wenhua (Chinese 
Ecological Culture in Five Thousand Years). Wuhan: Huazhong Normal University Press.
Watts, Jonathan, and Shi Chen. 2009. Young animal activists challenge Chinese culture. 
The Guardian. Accessed September 3, 2013. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/video/2009/apr/09/animal-rights-china
260 The ArT of NeighbouriNg
Weston, Timothy B. 2012. ‘China’s Historic Urbanization: Explosive and Challenging’. In China 
in and beyond the Headlines, edited by Timothy B. Weston and Lionel M. Jensen, 134-153. 
Lanham: Rowman and Littlef ield.
Whitfort, Amanda. 2012. ‘Evaluating China’s Draft Animal Protection Law’. Sydney Law Review 
34 (2): 347-370.
Wills, John E. 1988. ‘Tribute, Defensiveness and Dependency: Uses and Limits of Some Basic 
Ideas about Mid-Qing Dynasty Foreign Relations’. American Neptune 48: 225-229.
Wills, John E. 2001. ‘Great Qing and Its Southern Neighbours, 1760-1820: Secular Trends and 
Recovery from Crisis’. Interactions: Regional Studies, Global Processes, and Historical 
Analysis, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., March 3.
Wills, John E., ed. 2011. Past and Present in China’s Foreign Policy: From “Tributary System” to 
“Peaceful Rise”. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2002. ‘Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: 
Nation-State Building, Migration, and the Social Sciences’. Global Networks 2 (4): 301-334.
Winkler, Daniel. 2008. ‘Yartsa Gunbu (Cordyceps Sinensis) and the Fungal Commodif ication 
of the Rural Economy in Tibet AR’. Economic Botany 62 (3): 291-305.
Winkler, Daniel. 2010. ‘Caterpilla Fungus (Ophiocordyceps Sinensis) Production and Sustain-
ability on the Tibetan Plateau and in the Himalayas’. Chinese Journal of Grassland 32: 96-108.
Womack, Brantly. 2006. China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Wong, Edward. 2011. After Online Campaign, Chinese Dog Meat Festival is Canceled. New York 
Times. Accessed July 10, 2013. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/world/asia/
dog-meat-festival-is-canceled-in-china.html?_r=0
Woodman, Dorothy. 1969. Himalayan Frontiers: A political review of British, Chinese, Indian, and 
Russian rivalries. London: Barrie & Rockliff, The Cresset Press.
Woodworth, Max D. 2011. ‘Frontier Boomtown Urbanism in Ordos, Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region’. Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 1 (1): 74-101.
World Bank. 2007. ‘Cross-Border Trade in the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation’. 
Accessed June 13, 2014. Available at: http://www.carecprogram.org/uploads/docs/Cross-
Border-Trade-CAREC.pdf




Yang, Baojun. 2004. ‘Mulin, Fulin, Anlin: Zhongguo yu Zhoubian Guojia Guanxi de Xin Fazhan 
(Amicable, peaceful, and prosperous neighbourhood: New Developments in China’s Relations 
with Its Neighbouring Countries)’. Xin Shiye (New Perspectives) 3: 76-78.
Yang, Mayfair. 1994. Gifts, Favors and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press.
Yang, Mayfair. 2002. ‘The Resilience of Guanxi and Its New Deployments: A Critique of Some 
New Guanxi Scholarship’. The China Quarterly 170: 459-476.
Yegar, Moshe. 1966a. ‘The Muslims of Burma since Independence’. Asian and African Studies 
2: 159-205.
Yegar, Moshe. 1966b. ‘The Panthay (Chinese Muslims) of Burma and Yunnan’. Journal of Southeast 
Asian History 7 (1): 73-85.
Yegar, Moshe. 1972. The Muslims in Burma: A Study of a Minority Group. Wiesbaden: Otto 
Harrassowitz.
bibliogrAPhy 261
Yegar, Moshe. 2002. ‘The Muslims of Arakan’. In Between Integration and Secession, edited by 
M. Yegar, 19-70. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Yeh, Emily T. 2007. ‘Exile Meets Homeland: Politics, Performance And Authenticity in The 
Tibetan Diaspora’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 25 (4): 648-667.
Yeh, Emily T. 2009. ‘From Wasteland to Wetland? Nature and Nation in China’s Tibet’. Environ-
mental History 14 (1): 103-137.
Younghusband, Francis. 1971 [1910]. India and Tibet: A History of the Relations Which Have Sub-
sisted between the Two Countries from the Time of Warren Hastings to 1910, with a Particular 
Account of the Mission to Lhasa of 1904. London: Oriental Publishers.
Zatsepine, Victor. 2008. ‘The Amur: As River, As Border’. In The Chinese State at the Borders, 
edited by Diana Lary, 151-161. Vancouver: UBC Press.
Zatsepine, Victor. 2011. ‘The Blagoveshchensk Massacre of 1900: The Sino-Russian War and Global 
Imperialism’. In Beyond Suffering: Recounting War in Modern China, edited by J. Flath and 
N. Smith, 107-129. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
Zhang, Feng. 2009. ‘Rethinking the “Tribute System”: Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of 
Historical East Asian Politics’. Chinese Journal of International Relations 2 (4): 545-574.
Zhang, Juan. 2011. ‘Border Opened Up: Everyday Business in a China-Vietnam Frontier’. PhD 
diss., Macquarie University.
Zhang, Longxi. 1998. ‘Shenme shi “Huairou yuanren”? Zhengming, Kaozheng yu houxiandai 
shixue (What is “Huairou yuanren”? Name-rectif ication, Textual Analysis, and Postmodern 
History).’ The Twenty-First Century Review 45: 56-63.
Zhao, Yueyao. 2001. ‘Pivot or Periphery? Xinjiang’s Regional Development’. Asian Ethnicity 2 
(2): 197-224.
Zhao, Zaiguang. 2006. Tianrenheyi de Wenhua Zhihui: Zhongguo Chuantong Shengtai Wenhua yu 
Zhexue (Cultural Wisdom of the Unity of Heaven and Human: Chinese Traditional Ecological 
Culture and Philosophy). Beijing: Wenhua Yishu.
Zhaparov, Amantur. 2009. ‘The Issue of Chinese Migrants in Kyrgyzstan’. The China and Eurasia 
Forum Quarterly 7 (1): 79-91.
Zhu, Zhiqun. 2010. China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance. Surrey: 
Ashgate.
Žižek, Slavoj. 1997. ‘Love Thy Neighbor? No Thanks!’ In The Plague of Fantasies, edited by Slavoj 
Žižek, 45-85. London and New York: Verso.
Žižek, Slavoj. 2005. ‘Neighbours and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence’. In The Neigh-
bour: Three Inquiries in Political Theology, edited by Slavoj Žižek, Eric L. Santner and Kenneth 
Reinhard, 134-190. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Zin, Min. 2012. ‘Burmese Attitude toward Chinese: Portrayal of the Chinese Cultural and Media 
Works’. Journal of current Southeast Asian Affairs 31 (1): 115-131.
Zrazhevskaya, Irina. 2011. ‘Vlasti reshili ustanovit’ podsvetku zdanii po vsemu oblastnomu 
tsentru’, Komsomol’skaya Pravda (Blagoveshchensk), February 15, p. 5.

 Index
9/11 terrorist attacks 140
aff irmative dimensions of contestation 17
Agamben, Giorgio 226
agonistic intimacies 16, 218
AISSR see Amsterdam Institute for Social 
Science Research (AISSR)
Al Jazeera 75
Alff, Henryk 15, 81
Amdo Tibetans 174, 180
Amsterdam Institute for Social Science 
Research (AISSR) 145
Amur River 33, 36, 38, 40, 42, 49, 54, 55, 204
Amur State University 44, 51
Anglo-Burmese war 193




and Chinese circumstances 223-224
imaginary 232-233
new Chinese animal activism 233-236
relations with human 224-226
and three thousand year war 228-229




anti-dog meat campaigning 234
anti-Soviet colonial liberation movement 121
APEC Summit 42
Art of Not Being Governed, The (Scott) 20, 151
ASEAN see Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)
Asian Development Bank 63, 68, 75, 134
Asiatic Brand 145
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) 209, 222
Azhybaeva, Zhibek 114
baijiu (Chinese alcohol) 46
Baker III, James A. 122, 136
Bama Muslim 199
Bangladesh-Myanmar borderland 192
barakholka (f lea market) 95
Barbarian Border Off icial Area of Service 127













Bingtuan wholesale trading centre 103
Black Flags 210
Blagoveshchensk see China-Russia border




Brezhnev, Leonid 136, 139
British ‘Raj’ 191
British Trade Marts 148-152
Buddhism 179, 225, 227, 234
Bui Dam 65
‘Burmanization’ programs 192-193
Burmese Communist Party 58
Burmese Muslim migrants
in colonial and early post-colonial Burma 
191-194
Indian and Muslim middlemen 191-194
journey to China 196-198
as networkers 198-200
overview 187-191
seeking fortune in China 194-196
Campbell, Ben 75
Campi, Alicia 122
Candler, Edmund 150, 152
Ceausescu, Nicolae 136
chain-of-being-like conception 28, 230-232
Chaplin, Charlie 41
cheroots (Burmese cigars) 188
China
and animality 229-232
animals and circumstances 223-224
Burmese Muslims journey to 196-198
human-animal relations in 224-226
and imaginary animals 232-233
new Chinese animal activism 233-236
simulacra of development 63-68
special zones, of Northern Laos 57-63
and state-engineered anthropocentrism 
226-228
and three thousand year war 228-229
China-Burma border 58
China Eurasia Expo 101
Chinalco 66
China-Nepal border 157 see also Himalayan 
borderlands; trans-Himalayan Tibetan 
itineraries
entrepôts 83-88






neighbouring through engagement 43-48
neighbourliness 37-43
overview 33-35
China’s Tibetan Dream 184
China Tibet Information Center 184
Chinatown chronicles 64
China-Vietnam bordering
and Annual China-Vietnam Border Trade 
Fair 211-214




Chinese Cultural Revolution 37
Chinese State Council 208
Chumbi Valley 150, 152, 154, 158
CITES see Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species (CITES)
Citizenship Act (1948) 193
Citizenship Law 193
Clifford, James 178
coalition of the willing 140
collaborative nationalism 132
Command Post Exercise 142
Common Market 108
Communist Party 97
Communist Party of Burma (CPB) 188
Communist Tibet 78
Communist Youth League 80
Confucianism 227
Confucius Institute 47
Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES) 85
Cooper, Helen 137
cosmoeconomics, of Mongolia 135-139
CPB see Communist Party of Burma (CPB)
cross-border trade 25-28, 39-40, 60, 74-88, 
98-119, 147-162, 194-195, 200-202, 203-222




Customs Union (CU) 108, 111, 116
da Col, Giovanni 126
Daewoo International 133
Daily Mail 150
Dainzeng Wangdu 184, 185
Dalai Lama 154, 167
Daly, John C.K. 142
Das, Veena 14, 24
Daurov, Khuzei 106
Davis, Bradley 210
Defense Commander Area of Service 127
Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program 123
Demenge, Jonathan 75
Deng Xiaoping 140, 188
Derrida, Jacques 226
Dong Yu-fei 187
Dordoi Bazaar 97, 104-107, 109, 116
Dorjjugder, Munkh-Ochir 122, 134
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor 36
dropo (grogs po) 84
Dungan traders 104-106
Easterling, Keller 67-68, 70
Eastern Gates 110
East India Company 148
EC see Economic Committee (EC)
Economic Committee (EC) 58
eco-wildlife tourism 232
Education City 70
Elvin, Mark 228, 230




essential outsiders 194, 198-200
ethnic minorities 230
ethno-tourism 232
Eurasian Economic Union 117
Facebook 198
Fairbank, John King 17-18
fangwu concept 126-127
Field Training Exercise 142
Financial Times 75-76




fortune-sovereignty 14, 126-130, 133, 135, 139, 143
Frank, Andre Gunder 142
Fu Chengqiu 71
Gannan Autonomous Prefecture 174
Garnier, Francis 210
Gems Traders Association 200
Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenar-
beit (GIZ) 97
Ghorka kingdom 77
GIZ see Gesellschaft für internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
global cities (quanqiu chengshi) 42
Global North 225
Global Peace Operations Initiative 142
‘go-between’ agents 191
Goisam Paintog crops 185
Golden Boten City 58-61, 63-64, 69
Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone 60-63, 
65, 67, 69-70




Great Western Development Scheme 79, 98, 
101, 108, 177




Han-Chinese traders 103-107, 109
Harrison, Simon 54
Hartigan, John, Jr. 170-171, 183
Harvey, David 130
Heidegger, Martin 226
Hekou Entry and Exit Inspection Center 203, 
212
Hekou-Lao Cai border 203, 206-208
Hepburn, Audrey 41
Hevia, James 127, 209
Hilsa road 76, 78-79, 86, 89-90
Himalayan borderlands see also China-
Nepal border; trans-Himalayan Tibetan 
itineraries
and British Trade Marts 148-152
overview 145-148
speculation and unevenness 158-162
transport technologies of moving goods 
152-157
‘His Master’s Voice’ gramophone 145-146
hot ail community 130















freedom and order 68-71
overview 57
simulacra of development 63-68
special zones, of Northern Laos 57-63
International Centre for Border Cooperation 
(ICBC) 99
international relations (IR) 12
International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) 86
Into Europe (TV series) 64
Itochu Corp 134








Kachin Independence Army (KIA) 188
‘Kalas’ (‘foreigners from the West’) 192
Kansu-Tibet marches 174
Karnali Gramin Trade Concern 73





roots of trade 100-102






KIA see Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
KingsRomans Group 61-63, 67
Kipling, Rudyard 188






Labrang Monastery 169, 183
Lake Manasarovar 89
Lao Cai Customs Off ice 203
Lao National Assembly 58, 62





Limi road 76, 78, 89-90
Liu Yongfu 210
longyis (Burmese sarong) 187




makeshift trading zone 221
Malkki, Liisa 178-179
Man Barbarian Off icial Area of Service 127
Mandalay (poem) 188
Mao Zedong 37, 125
Marquis Area of Service 127
Marubeni Corp 134
Master of the Hinterland Area of Service 127
matrioshka park 41
micro-level trade dynamics 98
266 The ArT of NeighbouriNg
Milan project 65





minzu (ethnic groups) 169
Mironov, Sergei 133
miteri 84
Mitsui & Co 134
Mongolian Armed Forces General Staff 141
Mongolian National Security Council 134
Mongolian People’s Republic 121
Mongolia-Russian border 135




and reassembling neighbours 131-135
smart power and pax-Mongolica 139-142
Mongol nationalism 129
‘Moon Bear Rescue Centre’ 235
moral economy 81, 114-115
Morococha new town 66
Mughal Empire 77
Myanmar jade gateway 196
naadam competition 136
Nathula border 159




neg goliinhan people 130
neg usniihan people 130
neighbouring/bordering
animal 223-236















in post-Cold War world 22-24
trans-Himalayan Tibetan itineraries 167-186
neighbourly harmony 204, 213
Ne Win 192
‘new arrivals’ (sar jorpa) 168
new Chinese animal activism 233-236
The New Yorker 136
New York Times 71, 78
Nguyen dynasty 210
‘No. 4’ (heroin) 195
Nomadic Elephant 142
Nordstrom, Carolyn 156
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) 123
NWS see Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)




‘One Belt One Road’ (yidai yilu) 11
Ong, Aihwa 49, 66, 126, 130
open border port 208
Open: Man and Anima, The (Derrida and 
Agamben) 226
Opium Wars 71
Organization for Security and Co-operation 140
Osnos, Evan 136
Overseas Development Assistance 131
‘Overseas Tibetan Compatriots’ 168, 185
Oyu Tolgoi/Turquoise Hill 132, 134
Paljor’s camp 79-82
Pani Palbang 83, 85
Panthay 193
Paris polyphylla (qiyeyizhihua) 85-86
Patil, Pratiba Davinsingh 133
Peabody 133
Peacekeeping Training Centre 141
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 153
People’s Republic of China (PRC) 21, 25, 37, 69, 
70, 77, 122, 124, 163, 169, 171, 176, 183, 185
Peugeot 154
Phoenix TV 64
PLA see People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Pledged Off icial Area of Service 127
poaching 233
POSCO 133
post-Soviet trade see Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-
Xinjiang borderlands
PRC see People’s Republic of China (PRC)
PRC-born Amdowas 183
PRC-born Tibetans 176
prof iteering (spekulatsiya) 101, 115
Putin, Vladimir 50
Putnam, Robert D. 129
Qing Empire 37, 108, 128-129, 138-139, 209-210
quasi-relational materiality 126
radical Otherness 213, 214
Rakhine State 187, 190, 192-193, 197
Rana, Sonam Yangchen 68
Red List (IUCN) 86
Red River Delta 210, 221
refugees 176-180
Returned Tibetan Compatriots 183
iNDex 267
right to employment 115
Rio Tinto 132
Rites of Zhou 127
Rohingyas 192-193, 195, 197, 199
Rongshar valley 74
Rotterdam shipyards 156
Royal Capital Domain 127
Russian Railways 133
Rykwert, Joseph 41






SCO see Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO)








shuttle trade 102, 114, 117
Shweli River 196
Sikkimese border 150
Silk Roads 101, 108
single-State nuclear free zone 140
Sino-Burmese borderlands see Burmese 
Muslim migrants
Sino-Indian border see Himalayan borderlands
Sino-Indian War 158, 160




Sino-Russian border see China-Russia border




Sino-Vietnamese Border War 204, 206-207
socialist intelligentsia 47-48
Sojitz Corp 134
South China Sea dispute 209
Soviet Union 23, 100, 102, 121, 130, 207
Special Economic Zone 22, 63-68, 196
Special Zone Security 58
special zones, of Northern Laos 57-63
spectre of comparison 49
spiritual third neighbour 142
Sumitomo Corp 134





TAR see Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)
Taussig, Michael 54







three thousand year war 228-229
tianxia schema 127, 135
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) 24, 172, 181, 184
Tibet Mirror newspaper 145, 152
Tibet Regional Committee of the Communist 
Party of China 168
Tibetan Autonomous Region 169
Tibetan Children’s Villages 167
Tibetan Plateau 77, 86
Tibetan Transit Schools 168
Tibet-Nepal Friendship Highway 73-74, 78, 155
top-down developmentalism 108
topis (Muslim prayer cap) 187
Toshiki Kaifu 136-138
trade entrepreneurialism 114
trans-border f lows 167
trans-border marketplace 103, 113, 201, 205, 211, 
216, 218
trans-Himalayan Tibetan itineraries see 
also China-Nepal border; Himalayan 
borderlands
and neverland 171-176
and odd migrants 182-185
oddness of 170-171
overview 167-170
pilgrims of development 180-182
and refugees 177-180
Trans-Mongolian railway 134
transnational networking 179, 198-200
transport technologies, of moving goods 152-157
tributary system 17-20
Tsewang Lama 88-89
Tsing, Anna 35, 43, 75
Tsum Valley 74
Tugling 73
Turquoise Hill/Oyu Tolgoi 132, 134
U Aung Myint 199-200
U Thant 67
UN’s industrial development organization 
(UNIDO) 68
UNIDO see UN’s industrial development 
organization (UNIDO)
United Nations 123, 130, 141
Upper House 133
US ‘Good Neighbour’ policy 124
US Pacif ic Command (PACOM) 141
268 The ArT of NeighbouriNg
van Schendel, Willem 20, 22, 71
Vasantkumar, Chris 17
Walt, Stephen 130
War on Terror 139
Wen Jiabao 133





Wills, John E. 209
Womack, Brantley 211
World Bank 75, 134
World Food Programme (WFP) 78
World Trade Organization (WTO) 109
WTO see World Trade Organization (WTO)
Yang, Mayfair 112-113





Yi Barbarian Off icial Area of Service 127
Younghusband, Francis 149-150
Yunnan-Annam frontier 209-210
Yunnan-Myanmar border 187, 196, 198, 201
Yunnan Province Reform and Development 
Commission 64
zasag (ruling prince) 138
Zaw Min 198
Zhang Feng 17, 19
Zhang Juan 146
Zhao Wei 61-62, 67, 69
Zhirinovsky, Vladimir 121
Žižek, Slavoj 14, 55, 124, 214
Zomia 20-22, 71, 143
